a right to demand that he be governed by general rules, and a special statute that singles his case out as one to be regulated by a different law from that which is applied in all similar cases, would not be legitimate legislation, but an arbitrary mandate, unrecognised in free government. Mr. Locke has said of those who made the laws: They are to govern by promulgated, established laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor-for the favorite at court and the countryman at plough.' And this may justly be said to have become a maxim in the law by which may be tested the authority and binding force of legislative enactments." And again, the same authority says (p. 393): "The doubt might also arise whether a regulation made for any one class of citizens, entirely arbitrary in its character, and restricting their rights, privileges or legal capacities in a manner before unknown to the law, could be sustained. Distinctions in these respects should be based upon some reason which renders them important-like the want of capacity in infants and insane persons; but if the legislature should undertake to provide that persons following some specified lawful trade or employment should not have capacity to make contracts, or to receive conveyances, or to build such houses as others were allowed to erect, or in any other way to make such use of their property as was permissible to others, it can scarcely be doubted that the act would transcend the due bonds of legislative power, even if it did not come in conflict with express constitutional provisions. The man or the class forbidden the acquisition or enjoyment of property in the manner permitted to the community at large, would be deprived of liberty in particulars of primary importance to his or their pursuit of happiness." See, also, Budd v. The State, 3 Humph. 483, where one of the sections of the act incorporating the Union Bank, which provided that if any of the officers, agents or servants of that bank should embezzle the funds of the bank, or make false entries, they should be guilty of felony, was held unconstitutional, because it did not apply generally to officers, agents or servants of banks committing like offences. And Wally's Heirs v. Kennedy, 2 Yerg. 554, where an act authorizing the court to dismiss Indian reservation cases where prosecuted for the use of another, was held unconstitutional. In the last case the court said: "The rights of every individual must stand or fall by the same rule or law that governs every other member of the body politic, or land, under similar circumstances; and every partial or private law which directly proposes to destroy or affect individual rights, or does the same thing by affording remedies leading to similar consequences, is unconstitutional and void. Were it otherwise, odious individuals or corporate bodies would be governed by one law, the mass of the community and those who made the law, by another; whereas a like general law, affecting the whole community equally, could not have been passed." On the like principle is, also, The People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377. not. What is there in the condition or situation of the laborer in the mine, to disqualify him from contracting in regard to the price of his labor, or in regard to the mode of ascertaining the price? And why should the owner of the mine, or the agent in control of the mine, not be allowed to contract in respect to matters as to which all other property owners and agents may contract? Undoubtedly, if these sections fall within the police power, they may be maintained on that ground; but it is quite obvious that they do Their requirements have no tendency to insure the personal safety of the miner, or to protect his property, or the property of others. They do not meet Dwarris' definition of police regulations. They do not have reference to the comfort, the safety, or the welfare of society: Potter's Dwarris on Statutes 458. In Austin v. Murray, 16 Pick. 221, it was said: "The law will not allow the rights of property to be invaded under the guise of a police regulation, for the promotion of health, when it is manifest that such is not the object and purpose of the regulation." See, also, to like effect, the language of COLT, J., in Watertown v. Mayo, 109 Mass. 315, and the opinion of the court and cases referred to in Matter of Application of Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 109, et seq., and v. Marx, supra. The People But it is suggested in argument, that one purpose of the sections is to furnish needful information to the public. If that be so, then, under section 13, article 2, supra, there must first be made compensation to the owner of the property thus to be devoted to public use; for it must be too apparent to need argument in its support, that to compel the purchasing of scales, and the employing of a person to use them, for the benefit of the public, is to appropriate the private property,-i. e., the money which this will cost, -to public use: Morse v. Stoeker, 1 Allen 150; State v. Glenn, 7 Jones' L. 321. The main reliance of the counsel representing the state, to sus tain the ruling below, seems, however, to be on the ground that mining for coal is affected with a public use, so that it may be regulated by law, like public warehouses, as held in Munn v. Illinois 94 U. S. (4 Otto) 113. It cannot be claimed that mining for coal was, by the common law, affected with a public use, and therefore specially regulated by law, like the business of inn-keepers, common carriers, millers, &c.; and, in our opinion, it is not like the business of public warehousing, within the principle controlling such classes of business. The public are not compelled to resort to mine owners any more than they are compelled to resort to the owners of wood, or turf, or even to the owners of grain, domestic animals, or to those owning any of the other ordinary necessaries or conveniences of life, which form a part of the commerce of the country. The owner of a coal mine is under no obligation to obtain a license from any public authority, and, therefore, when he chooses to mine his coal, he exercises no franchise. We are aware of no case wherein it has been held that the owner or operator of a coal mine stands on a different footing, as respects the control and sale of his property, than the owner or operator of any other kind of property in general demand by the public. We are not unmindful that our constitution, in sect. 29, art. 4, enjoins legislation in the interest of miners; but this is solely as respects their personal safety—the enactment of police regulations to promote that end. It recognises that the business is dangerous to life and health, but it nowhere intimates that there is anything in it which disqualifies parties engaged in it from contracting as they may in regard to other matters, or that gives the public a use in it. There is, also, in sect. 5, art. 13, a provision requiring railroad companies to permit connections to be made with their tracks, so that coal banks or coal yards may be reached: but the same provision also applies to consignees of grain, and it affects the duty of the carrier alone, for no duty or obligation is enjoined on the owner of the coal bank or coal yard in that respect. We recognise fully the right of the General Assembly, subject to the paramount authority of Congress, to prescribe weights and measures, and to enforce their use in proper cases; but we do not think that the General Assembly has power to deny to persons in one kind of business the privilege to contract for labor and to sell their products without regard to weight, while at the same time allowing to persons in all other kinds of business this privilege, there being nothing in the business itself to distinguish it in this respect from any other kind of business; and we deny that the burden can be imposed on any corporation or individual not acting under a license or by virtue of a franchise, of buying property and hiring labor merely to furnish public statistics, unless upon due compensation to be made therefor. So far as the owner or operator of a mine shall contract for the mining of coal or the selling of coal by weight, we see no objection to the statute as imposing upon him the duty of procuring scales for that purpose. But we do not think that he can be compelled to make all his contracts in these respects to be regulated by weight, and when he has no necessity for the use of scales in these respects, he cannot, in our opinion, be compelled to keep and use them. We think the court erred in its ruling in giving the one and refusing the other instruction. The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MAINE.2 SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.3 ACTION. See Insurance; Slander. AGENT. See Insurance. ASSIGNMENT. Partial Assignment of Debt may be enforced in Equity-Assignment not in Fraud of Insolvent Law.-A. had made a contract to erect a school-house for the city of N., but became insolvent, and, in order to secure funds to enable him to complete his contract, made an assignment to C. of $600, which was a part of the sum to be due to him from the city of N. upon the completion of the school-house, and C. thereupon advanced him certain sums of money. Held, that the assignment was 1 From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 117 Ill. Rep. 2 From Joseph W. Spaulding, Esq.; to appear in 78 Me. Rep. The cases will probably appear in 142 or 143 Mass. Rep From J. Shaaf Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 65 Md. Reports. not in fraud of the insolvent law, and could be enforced in equity: James v. City of Newton, 142 or 143 Mass. BILLS AND NOTES. Promissory Note-Estoppel.-A promissory note reciting "we" promise to pay, and signed "D. P. Livermore, Treas'r, Hallowell Gas-Light Co.," is the note of the individual and not of the corporation: McClure v. Livermore, 78 Me. An action on such a note against the corporation, and its default, will not estop the owner from maintaining an action against the individual, when it does not appear that the acts of the plaintiff caused the defendant to change his position, or to take some action injurious to himself: Id. CRIMINAL LAW. Homicide-Admissibility of Evidence-Res Gestæ.-On a trial for murder, evidence of what occurred at a saloon, a half a square from the saloon where the homicide occurred, and only four or five minutes before the killing, is admissible to show the movements and general conduct of the prisoner, immediately preceding the killing, and that he was armed and prepared for mischief, and in a frame of mind likely to result in mischief: Kernan v. State, 65 Md. What was said and done by others at the same time and in company with the prisoner, was only a part of what he was directly connected with, and was inseparably connected with the history of his conduct at the time, and necessary to an intelligent appreciation of his actions: Id. CONFLICT OF LAWS. Insolvency-Jurisdiction - Discharge in another State.-A defendant's discharge under the insolvency law of Massachusetts is no bar to a suit in New Hampshire, on a contract made in that state before the insolvency, when the plaintiff has not resided there since the insolvency proceedings were begun, and has not submitted to the jurisdiction of the insolvency court: Norris v. Atkinson, 64 or 65 N. H. CONTRACT. See Insurance. CORPORATION. See Master and Servant. Municipal Corporation-Rules of Procedure-Quorum.-In authorizing the City Council of Baltimore to "settle their rules of procedure," the Legislature did not confer on the Council the power to declare by rule what number of their body should constitute a quorum for the transaction of business: Heiskell v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 65 Md. In a municipal corporation consisting of a definite number, in the absence of any Legislative declaration of what number shall constitute a quorum or legal body, a majority of the members elected shall constitute such quorum or legal body: Id. A mere majority of the members elected being present, the acts of the City Council of Baltimore are valid, notwithstanding the existence of a rule adopted by the Council, requiring that two-thirds of the members elected shall be necessary to constitute a quorum: Id. |