Εικόνες σελίδας
PDF
Ηλεκτρ. έκδοση

The board in its discretion may grant or refuse to grant such license. In no instance shall a license be granted for a longer period than one year or a shorter period than one week.

SECTION 3. The inspector of buildings of the city or town in which the billboard, sign or signboard is placed or any official acting in the capacity of inspector of buildings shall exercise supervision over the same, shall take the measurements of the same, and shall keep a record stating the name of the owner, situation of the sign and the measurements thereof, and this record shall be open to public inspection.

SECTION 4. Any billboard, sign or signboard erected, placed or posted in violation of this statute or maintained in non-compliance with its provisions shall be abolished by the inspector of buildings.

SECTION 5. The owners of billboards, signs or signboards which were erected, placed or posted previous to the passage of this act shall within thirty days after its passage apply for the license aforesaid.

To the Honorable Senate of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts:

We, the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, have considered the questions upon which our opinion is required by the order of June 16, 1919, a copy of which is hereto annexed, and respectfully submit this opinion.

Article 50 of the Amendments to the Constitution is in these words: "Advertising on public ways, in public places and on private property within public view may be regulated and restricted by law." The words "regulated and restricted" do not confer power to prohibit utterly and without bound but only to establish reasonable limitations. This is the significance of the words of Amendment 50 in the light of its history, whatever may be the meaning of power "to regulate" in other connections. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 189-193.

The precise phrase of Amendment 50 is followed in the crucial parts of House Bill No. 629 and House Bill No. 1062. They violate no other provisions of the Constitution. It is within the power of the General Court to authorize the enactment of ordinances or by-laws by cities and towns respecting matters of special and local interest. Commonwealth v. Slocum, 230 Mass. 180, 190.

As we construe the meaning of art. 50 there is at any rate nothing contrary to the Constitution of the United States in these two bills. St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U. S. 269. Whether limitations imposed pursuant to House Bill No. 629 and House Bill No. 1062 would be repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is a question which does not arise until particular limitations have been enacted. Neither of these bills, if enacted, would be unconstitutional.

For the same reasons section one of House Bill No. 835 is not contrary to the Constitution. But the remaining sections of that bill are not in accordance with the Constitution. That bill is in substance an attempt to exercise the power of raising revenue by levying "a special betterment tax." The provisions of that bill do not constitute a betterment and cannot be the basis for assessing a betterment tax.

Section one of House Bill No. 1063, which is a definition of billboard, sign or signboard, is not unconstitutional. The second section of that bill vests an absolutely unrestricted power in the untrammelled discretion of boards of aldermen and selectmen as to the granting and refusal of licenses for the erection or placing of any billboard, sign or signboard as defined in section one. It includes all land within the Commonwealth whether "within public view" or not. It does not come within the terms of art. 50 of the Amendments or of other provisions of the Constitution. The remaining sections are ancillary to section two and fall with it. With the exception of section one, that bill, if enacted, would be unconstitutional.

Senate Bill No. 227 manifestly does not rest upon those provisions of art. 50 of the Amendments which relate to advertising on public ways and in public places, but upon that concerning advertising "on private property within public view." That bill prohibits entirely advertising signs and devices "within three hundred feet of a public building, public memorial, public way, park, playground or other public property," except such as refer to a business conducted within the building on which the advertising sign or device is placed. It is apparent that such prohibition includes advertising signs or devices hidden from public view by intervening obstructions and is not confined to those

"within public view." Legislation of that nature would be beyond the plain scope of the amendment and hence unconstitutional. This consideration disposes of that bill. Other questions which might arise if it were not open to this fatal objection need not be discussed.

ARTHUR P. RUGG.

WILLIAM CALEB LORING.
HENRY K. BRALEY.

CHARLES A. DE COURCY.

JOHN C. CROSBY.

EDWARD P. PIERCE.

JAMES B. CARROLL.

INDEX.

ACTIONABLE TORT.

In an action by an administrator for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff's intestate, a girl ten years of age, which resulted in her death on the night of the following day, if there is no evidence that the intestate was conscious after her injury, although the plaintiff cannot recover substantial damages, it is error for the presiding judge to order a verdict for the defendant, where there is evidence of the defendant's negligence without contributory negligence of the intestate, because, if the jury find for the plaintiff on these issues, he is entitled to a verdict for nominal damages. Battany v. Wall, 138.

ADMINISTRATOR.

See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.

ADVERSE POSSESSION OR USE.

Evidence which, it was held, warranted a finding that a certain private way had become public by adverse use, although it appeared that, twentyfive years after the adverse use by the public began, some of the abutters petitioned to have the way made public and the city council denied the petition, and that, after thirty-three years of adverse use, the city erected signs designating it a private way. Sullivan v. Worcester, 111. Upon the evidence at the hearing of a petition to the Land Court to register a title to land which was in the petitioner upon the record, where the respondent claimed a title acquired by adverse possession of the land for more than twenty years under an alleged oral agreement for a sale of the land to his predecessor in title, a finding of the judge, that the respondent's predecessor in title was not in possession under an agreement to purchase, was held to have been warranted and therefore was conclusive. Curtis v. Goodwin, 538.

At such hearing, it appeared that the respondent once had been a tenant of the land, who had continued in possession of the land after the expiration of his term, and, upon the evidence it was held that a finding by the judge of the Land Court that the relation of landlord and tenant did not cease and that the possession of such former lessee was not hostile to but was in recognition of the title of the former lessor was warranted. Ibid.

ADVERTISING SIGN.

Under art. 50 of the Amendments to the Constitution, which provides that "Advertising on public ways, in public places and on private property within public view may be regulated and restricted by law," the General

Advertising Sign (continued).

Court by statute may authorize cities or towns by ordinances or by-laws
to regulate and restrict advertising on public ways, in public places and on
private property within public view. Opinion of the Justices, 605.
Whether an ordinance or a by-law passed by a city or town under the au-
thority of such a statute would be in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States cannot be determined until
such ordinance or by-law has been framed and enacted, but a statute
authorizing lawful enactments of this character by cities or towns would
not be unconstitutional. Ibid.

A provision in a statute, regulating advertising on public ways, in public places
and on private property within public view, attempting to impose “a special
betterment tax" on the owner or lessee of the land on which an advertising
sign or device is located, would be unconstitutional, because such statutory
provisions do not create a betterment. Ibid.

A provision in a statute giving the board of aldermen of a city or the selectmen
of a town power to grant or withhold required licenses for all advertising bill-
boards, signs or signboards, including those on all land in such cities or towns
whether "within public view" or not, would be unconstitutional. Ibid.
A statute prohibiting advertising signs and devices "within three hundred feet
of a public building, public memorial, public way, park, playground or other
public property," except such as refer to a business conducted within the
building on which the advertising sign or device is placed, would be uncon-
stitutional, because the prohibition includes advertising signs and devices
on private property which are hidden from public view by intervening ob-
structions and is not confined to those "within public view." Ibid.

AGENCY.

Existence of Relation.

In an action in this Commonwealth for personal injuries sustained by being run
into by a motor car, proof that the car belonged to the defendant and was
being driven by the defendant's servant is not sufficient to entitle the
plaintiff to go to the jury, if there is no evidence that the driver was acting
within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. O'Rourke v.
A-G Co. Inc. 129.

In such an action against a corporation, where it appeared that the car belonged
to the defendant and that the driver was employed by the defendant as a
chauffeur, whose duties were "driving cars for rentals or taking parties out
for automobile trips," evidence, that the defendant's manager on the Sun-
day when the accident occurred had given the driver the temporary use of
the car for his own pleasure, is not evidence that the driver was the defend-
ant's agent while acting under this permission. Ibid.

In an action against the trustees of a building association, for personal injuries
sustained by the plaintiff from a fall in descending a staircase in one of the
houses of the defendants when she was being shown a tenement in the house
by one of the defendants who was the managing trustee, it appeared that
the defendants had agreed to sell the house to a certain person and there
was evidence that the trustees had agreed to show the tenement to possi-
ble tenants, but it was held that the jury could find that the managing
trustee in showing the house to the plaintiff acted for all the defendants

« ΠροηγούμενηΣυνέχεια »