executors in certain payments every fifth year, until they reach the age of forty-five, when the remainder shall be paid. The creation of an estate in which a suspension of the power of alienation, not based upon lives, is attempted, is void, for the power of alienation is suspended when there are no persons in being by whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed58. Where the trustee is authorized to sell the realty and personal property of the testator and power is given the trustee to immediately reinvest the same, the statute of perpetuities applies to future estates of this character9. A future estate created by a testator where a life estate was given in different tracts of land to each of his three children, with remainder over in each case to the body heirs of all such children, share and share alike, is void for the reason that the power of alienation is suspended during three lives in being, there being no way of ascertaining such body heirs until the death of all three children. The power of alienation was not suspended for a longer period than two lives in being where a testator created a future estate in remainder by which his estate was to be divided equally between his five children, or the survivor, of them, and, in case any of them died leaving children, the interest of deceased should go to them and that the portions designated for his sons, E., A. and H. be N. W. 510; Torpy v. Betts, 123 Mich. 241, 81 N. W. 1094; Fitzgerald v. City of Big Rapids, 123 Mich. 281, 82 N. W. 56; State v. Holmes, 115 Mich. 458, 73 N. W. 54; Petit v. Flint, etc. R. Co., 114 Mich. 362, 72 N. W. 238; Trufant v. Nunneley, 106 Mich. 554, 64 N. W. 469; Case v. Green, 78 Mich. 545, 44 N. W. 578; Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 363, 36 N. W. 419; Meth. Ch. of Newark v. Clark, 41 Mich. 740; Thatcher v. St. Andrew's Church, 37 Mich. 270. 57. Hull v. Osborn, 151 Mich. 8, 113 N. W. 784. 58. Casgrain v. Hammond, 134 Mich. 419, 104 Am. St. Rep. 610, 96 N. W. 510. 59. Niles v. Mason, 126 Mich. 482, 85 N. W. 1100. 60. Trufant v. Nunneley, 106 Mich. 554, 64 N. W. 469. held in trust by the executors for such sons, "their wives and children," and the income be paid for the support of such sons, their wives and children, during the lives of said sons and their wives, to go upon the death of my said sons and their wives," to the children of said sons severally, and their heirs. A future estate created by a conveyance of land by a person to his son and wife for their lives, and on their death to their son, living at the time of the conveyance, for his life, is not a restraint upon the power of alienation62. The creation of a future estate by which a testator left his property in trust, one-half of the income to be paid to his son for life and one-half to his daughter and first, on the death of either of his children, one-half of the estate to go to their issue and second, on the death of either child without issue, his or her share of the income to go to the survivor, and the principal to the survivor's issue on his death, and it was further provided that on the death of either of his children, the estate of a grandchild, who was a minor, should remain in trust until he became of age, does not violate the rule suspending the power of alienation beyond the period prescribed by law63. A future estate created in the form of a contingent remainder is not too remote which depends on the death of the husband of the grantee of the life estate and on her own remarriage or death, as theirs are lives in being, under the statute permitting the creation of freehold 61. Dean V. Mumford, 102 Mich. 510, 61 N. W. 7. 62. Case v. Green, 78 Mich. 540, 44 N. W. 578. 63. Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 363, 36 N. W. 419. 64. C. L. '97, §8806. Subject to the rules established in the pre ceding sections of this chapter, a freehold estate, as well as a chattel real, may be created to commence at a future day, an estate for life may be created in a term of years, and a remainder limited thereon. estates, to begin at a future day. The limitation of a future estate over to minor children was not deemed too remote where a testator devised the residue of his estate to his sister "and her heirs forever," and in case of a failure of heirs, "all to fall and be bequeathed to the minor children" of a deceased brother66. The creation of a future estate is void where a testator provided in his will that each disposal of real estate made by it should only be for the use and benefit of the person in whose favor it was made, his or her life lasting, and that no parcel of the real estate should be sold or alienated in any manner, but after the decease of those several to whom shares or parcels of the estate were assigned, said shares should remain for the use and benefit of the descendants of him or her to whom a share had been assigned, their lives lasting, and so on, and in case of demise without posterity, the said share should accrue to the use and benefit of the owners being of the testator's relation or descendants, their lives lasting, of the next share or shares, and so on, as long as any posterity should exist, and in case of extinction to the next heirs67. $216. When Estate Created. The creation of the estate takes place at the death of the testator, and the lives must be then in beings. $217. Time of Remoteness. From What Period to Be Reckoned. It is manifest that the object of the rule against perpetuities is to confine the vesting of contingent estates to a short period after the creation; and if it is certain when the estate is created that the contingent event must happen within the prescribed time, it is needless interference with the testamentary power to say that the estate is bad because at some time before the estate was created, and when its existence was entirely in the control of the testator, it was not certain that the contingent event would happen within the time required. The rule is that the question of remoteness is to be determined from the time of the testator's death, and not from the time when his will is established69. $218. Remainder Created In Favor of One Not In Being At Time of Testator's Death. If the contingencies are all to happen within a life in being, the number of them is immaterial, for a remainder in fee after the expiration of two lives in being at that time and a second limitation may be good to one not in being, who may be living at the death of the first remainderman, if such remainderman die under the age of twenty-one7. §219. Valid Devises and Bequests Under the Statute. A. gives a life estate to B., with remainder to C., on condition that he pay to D. a specified sum of money, and providing that, in the event of C. or D.'s death without issue before the death of B., the survivor shall take the fee, and that, in the event of the death of both without issue, before the death of B., the latter's life estate shall become a fee-simple and the power of alienation is not hereby 69. Mullreed V. Clark, 110 Mich. 229, 68 N. W. 989; 70. Torpy v. Betts, 123 Mich. 239, 81 N. W. 1094; suspended for an unlawful period. Where a testator devises the residue of the estate to his grandchildren and directs certain amounts to be paid to each of them at intervals of every five years until they reach the age of forty-five when the remainder is to be paid to them and in the event that both of the grandchildren should die without issue before reaching the age of forty-five years, then that portion remaining unpaid shall pass to other certain persons, this devise does not conflict with the rule under the statute72. Again, where a testator in a will created a trust in that the executor should hold certain land in trust for the benefit of the wife of the testator and his two sons or the survivor of them during their natural lives and then provides that on the death of the two sons the land should descend to their heir, the trust is valid and the power of alienation is not suspended beyond a period longer than two lives in being73. §220. Invalid Devises and Bequests Under the Statute. Where a conveyance of lands creates a trust for a period of fourteen years and during the life of the grantor, after which time the land is to be distributed among certain persons, or the survivor or survivors of them, the trust is invalid for it suspends the power of alienation in a manner not based on lives74. Where a testator devised a life estate to his wife with a remainder to the state upon the condition following: "If the state shall within the period of five years from and after the death of my said wife, formally accept 71. Torpy v. Betts, 123 Mich. 239, 81 N. W. 1094; 72. Hull v. Osborn, 151 Mich. 8, 14 D. L. N. 686; 73. Foster V. Stevens, 146 Mich. 131, 109 N. W. 265; 74. Casgrain v. Hammond, 134 Mich. 419, 96 N. W. 510; |