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of sound mind or not3. Sanity is the rule, and insanity the exception*.

§15. Test of Testamentary Capacity.

The general rule is well settled that a less degree of mind is requisite to execute a will than a contract.

In general it is apparent that a testator must understand substantially the nature of the act, the extent of his property, his relations to others who might or ought to be objects of his bounty, and the scope and bearing of the provisions of his will, and must have sufficient active memory to collect in his mind, without prompting, the elements of the business to be transacted, and to hold them in his mind a sufficient length of time to perceive at least their obvious relations to each other, and be able to form some rational judgment in relation to them, and yet he need not have the same perfect and complete understanding and appreciation of any of these matters, in all their bearings, as a person in sound and vigorous health of body and mind would have, nor is he required to know the precise legal effect of every provision contained in the will. It may be said that testamentary capacity does not depend so much upon any particular character of intellect as the ability to remember what property he possesses, what consideration he shall give to those who have claims upon it, and what knowledge he has of the dispositions he wishes to make and of making the disposition. Weakness of mind and forgetfulness are not sufficient to invalidate a will or prevent such person from

3. Aiken v. Weckerly, 19 Mich. 482.

4. Lamb V. Lippincott, 115 Mich. 611, 73 N. W. 887.

5. Kempsey v. McGinnis, 21 Mich. 123.

6. Schneider v. Vosburgh, 143 Mich. 476, 106 N. W. 1129.

making testamentary disposition of his property, yet in the latter case he cannot dispose of property the possession of which he but barely appreciates, among parties whose relations to him he knows, but does not understand". Average mental capacity is not required for the making of a will. Power to buy and sell, to deal in property on the basis of contract by giving deeds and leases and making gifts by delivery are qualifications sufficient to render one competent for making a will, for one who has capacity to contract is competent to make a will. Where a will is read over to the testator, as dictated by a third person and the testator objects to it, because it is not drafted as he wants it but finally executes a will in accordance with his wish, this fact does not make him incompetent to transact business. The fact that the testator was weak, or sometimes foolish, or lacked the average mental capacity of his neighbors, or did not dispose of his property as others who knew nothing of his reasons might think he ought to have done, does not incapacitate him from making a will1o. Testamentary capacity is not affected because one is an invalid, nervous, reserved and disinclined or even hardly able to read and write11. Neither does derangement of the mental faculties make one incapacitated from making a will unless it renders him incapable of acting in the ordinary affairs of life or manifests itself in the testamentary provisions12

7. Schneider v. Vosburgh, 143 Mich. 476, 106 N. W. 1129.

8. Hoban v. Piquette, 52 Mich. 346, 17 N. W. 797.

9. Stuyvesant v. Wilcox, 92 Mich. 228, 52 N. W. 617.

10. Rice v. Rice, 50 Mich. 449, 15 N. W. 548.

11. Hoban V. Piquette, 52 Mich. 346, 17 N. W. 797.

V.

12. Fraser Jennison, 42 Mich. 206, 3 N. W. 882.

§16. Degree of Memory.

The law does not require a testator to have a perfect memory, but his memory must be sufficiently active so that he can collect in his mind without prompting, the elements of the business to be transacted, and to hold them in his mind a sufficient length of time to perceive their obvious relation to each other, and to be able to form a rational judgment in regard to them13.

§17. Insanity.

All legal incapacity rests upon a deviation from the normal legal standard of mind requisite to make a will. In these deviations are included all the abnormal minds from idiocy to insanity. The latter usually is concerned with the impairment of the normal mind. The deviation must exclude ordinary weakness of memory, vacillating of purpose, credulity, vagueness of thought and such ordinary failings as are inherent in most normal minds. In general it may be said that derangement of the mental faculties ought not to make one incapable of making a will, if the derangement does not affect him so as to incapacitate him from acting rationally in the ordinary affairs of life, or show itself in his testamentary disposition14. Thus, insanity may be defined, for all legal purposes, as the prolonged departure, without adequate cause, from the states of feeling and modes of thinking usual to the individual in a normal state of health15. In relation to this subject there are two aspects

13. Aiken v. Weckerly, 19 Mich. 482.

14. Fraser V. Jennison, 42

Mich. 200, 3 N. W. 882, 3 N. W. 882.

15. Bouvier's Law Dictionary.

that require the attention of the jurists, i. e. insane delusions and the lucid interval.

§18. Insane Delusion or Monomania.

Insane delusion may be defined as a belief in a fact for which there is no foundation16 or as a diseased condition of the mind in which persons believe things to exist which exist only, or in the degree they are conceived of only, in their own imaginations, with a persuasion so firm and fixed that neither evidence nor argument can convince them to the contrary1. It is manifest that no insane delusion exists where a father has the opinion that certain of his children, whom he disinherited, had wronged and cheated him, and were scheming to get possession of his property18, neither is a belief on the part of a father that the son has no regard for him19. But a will is void where a testator disinherits a daughter upon the belief that she is a bad woman or that she is not his own offspring, or a son upon the belief that he is a drunkard, or his grandchildren upon the belief that their father has threatened to kill him, and it appears that there is no foundation for such beliefs, but they are mere delusions, although he is competent to manage his business affairs 20. If the delusions on the part of the testator do not enter into the provisions of the will or if the provisions are not dictated by the delusions21 the will is not vitiated, for a testator who had delusions as to "Greenbacks," or

16. In re Merriman's Appeal, 108 Mich. 454, 66 N. W. 372. 17. Bouvier's Law Dictionary. 18. Bean v. Bean, 144 Mich. 599, 108 N. W. 369.

19. Bean v. Bean, 144 Mich.

599, 108 N. W. 369.

20. Rivard V. Rivard, 109 Mich. 98, 63 Am. St. Rep. 566, 66 N. W. 681.

21. Peninsular Trust Co. V. Barker, 116 Mich. 338, 74 N. W. 508.

to the effect that he is holding or running for office, or that his wife courted him, or had maltreated him after marriage, or that he is a great man, and likely to be called to the cabinet, are not effective as to testamentary capacity unless they enter into the provisions of the will22.

§19. The Rule When the Monomania is Conceded.

Monomania is insanity upon a single subject. It is an insane delusion which renders the person afflicted incapable of reasoning on that particular subject; he assumes to believe that to be true which has no foundation or reason in fact on which to found his belief.

It may be said that the general rule in regard to cases of this kind is that when the monomania is conceded, it is only necessary to determine whether the provisions of the will are or are not affected by it23. A man may believe himself to be the Supreme Ruler of the Universe, and nevertheless make a perfectly sensible disposition of his property; and the courts will sustain it, when it appears that his mania did not dictate its provisions24.

§20. Lucid Interval.

A lucid interval may be defined as a period in which an insane person is so far free from his disease that the ordinary legal consequences of insanity do not apply to acts done therein 25.

22. Rice v. Rice, 50 Mich. 448, 15 N. W. 545, 19 N. W. 132.

23. Rivard V. Rivard, 109 Mich. 98, 63 Am. St. Rep. 566,

66 N. W. 681

24. Rivard V. Rivard, 109 Mich. 98, 63 Am. St. Rep. 566, 66 N. W. 681.

25. Bouvier's Law Dictionary.

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