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$237. The Rule That Obtains as to Accumulation of Rents and Profits-Annuities to Children.

The rule concerning the accumulation of rents and profits is that the accumulation must not be for a longer period than during the minority of the persons intended to be benefited thereby106. When a provision in a will provided for annuities to be paid to the children of the testator, all of whom were under twelve years of age at the time of his death, and further provision was made that certain real estate was to be held "for the purpose of aiding in carrying out this trust," otherwise a general power of sale was given to the executors; furthermore a residue to the children's children was given, after the death of all the children and on the majority of the youngest grandchildren, continuing the annuity of any deceased child to the children of such child until the division, the reservations of the specified land and of the accumulations therefrom are void for any period beyond the minority of the youngest child107. Under these circumstances the land goes to the heirs, by intestacy, subject only to the accumulations so far as needed to pay the children's annuities, the rest, like the land, goes to the heirs-at-law and not to the grandchildren108. It is manifest that a provision in a will giving directions that all royalties and other moneys received from the leases of mineral lands shall be treated as capital by the trustees, and invested for the benefit of the cestui que trustant, and such accumulations not to exceed the minority of the grandchildren of the testator then living, is not void109.

106. Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552, 2 N. W. 814;

107. Wilson v. Odell, 58 Mich. 533, 25 N. W. 506;

108. Wilson v. Odell, 58 Mich. 533, 25 N. W. 506;

109. Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355, 36 N. W. 419;

§238. The Rule Concerning a Trust for Accumulation Beyond Period Prescribed.

The rule is that a trust for accumulation beyond the period prescribed by law is void only for the excess110.

§239. Charitable Devises or Uses.

A charitable devise may be defined as a disposition or a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering, or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves in life, or by creating or maintaining public buildings or works, or otherwise lessening the burdens of government111.

§240. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions as to Charitable Devises or Uses.

The law of charitable uses referred to as the statute of Elizabeth, commonly called the Statute of Charitable Uses is not in force in this state,-it having been repealed in 1810112. The same requisites are essential to their validity as apply to other devises or trusts, for there is no distinction between charitable devises and any others113. Owing to the non-existence of the doctrine of charitable uses in this state a trust for charitable purposes was declared void114.

110. St. Amour v. Rivard, 2 Mich. 294.

111. Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 555.

112. 1 Territorial Laws 900.

113. Meth. Church of Newark v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730, 3 N. W. 207;

114. Hopkins v. Crossey, 132 Mich. 612, 96 N. W. 490, 96 N. W. 499;

§241. Statutes Relating to Time When Charitable Devises Must Be Made.

Although no statutes exist in this state relating to this question, yet it is deemed advisable to call attention to the construction placed upon them. Thus, many states provide by statute that a testator cannot by will devise or bequeath to a charitable corporation or its use, unless the devise or bequest in the will was made a specified time before the death of the testator115.

§242. Who May be Beneficiaries.

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Any class of persons may be beneficiaries under a charitable devise. They may be foreign religious corporations116, unincorporated charitable societies117, towns118, cities119, parishes120, school districts121, district libraries 122, and trustees for unincorporated society for charitable or religious purposes1 23. The beneficiary must be designated so as to insure certainty124, likewise the trustees and owners125. The question of capacity does not arise in cases of charitable devises, as to the trustees or donees126.

115. Kavanaugh's Will, 125 N. Y. 418; Reemiensnyder v. Gans, 110 Pa. St. 17; Milwaukee Protestant Home for Aged v. Beecher, 87 Wis. 419, 45 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 562.

116. In re Ticknor's Estate, 13 Mich. 44.

117. In re Ticknor's Estate, 13 Mich. 44.

118. Hatheway v. Sackett, 32 Mich. 97.

119. Hatheway v. Sackett, 32 Mich. 97.

120. Hatheway v. Sackett, 32 Mich. 97.

121. Maynard V. Woodward, 36 Mich. 423.

122. Maynard v. Woodward, 36 Mich. 423.

123. Allen v. Duffie, 43 Mich. 1, 38 Am. Rep. 139, 4 N. W. 427;

124. Wheelock v. Am. Tract. Soc., 109 Mich. 141, 66 N. W. 955; Cook v. Universalist General Convention, 138 Mich. 157, 101 N. W. 217.

125. Penny v. Croul, 76 Mich. 471, 5 L. R. A. 858, 43 N. W. 649.

126. Attorney General v. Soule, 28 Mich. 153.

The Object of the Gift.

The objects of the gift as detailed in the definition may be various, but it is essential that the gift is certain as to its purpose120. Thus, a bequest is not uncertain where a sum of money was to be paid to a village to be used in the erection of a school building, to be used as a high school, and to be suitable for that purpose1 27.

Libraries.

Public libraries are regarded as worthy objects for charitable devises, and bequests for that purpose are sustained by the courts128

Parks.

Bequests for the establishment of public parks and playgrounds for children are recognized by the courts to be valid, so is a devise made to a board of water commissioners for the purpose of beautifying the park surrounding the water works129.

Doctrine of Cy Pres.

The doctrine of Cy Pres is founded upon the rule of construction that the intention of a testator, who seeks to create a charity, is to be given effect as far as is consistent with the rules of law. It modifies the strictness of the common law, as to a condition precedent to the enjoyment of a personal legacy, for when a literal compliance with the condition becomes impossible from unavoidable circumstances, and without default in the legatee, it is sufficient that the

127. Hatheway v. Sackett, 32 Mich. 97.

128. Maynard v. Woodward,

36 Mich. 423.

129. Penny v. Croul, 76 Mich. 471, 5 L. R. A. 858, 43 N. W. 649.

condition is complied with as near as it practically can be130. It has been said "that the cases in which the doctrine has been received have arisen on devises in which the testator has expressed himself in terms which have been thought by the courts to contain a clear indication of his intention that the devisee and his issue should take the lands, and an intimation of the mode of the issue's taking them; and his language in respect to the mode of the issue's taking them, has been thought by the courts to be such, as construed literally, imported limitations contrary to law. In construing these devises, the courts have considered the testator's primary object was that the issue of the devisee should take the land, and that the mode in which the issue. should take it was the testator's secondary object; or, as it has been usually expressed, that the former was his general, the latter his particular intention. Then, in conformity to the uniform practice of effecting the intention of the testator as far as possible, they have thought themselves required to adopt that construction of the devise which, by including the issue of the devisee, satisfied the general intention of the testator that the issue should take, but which at the same time, by raising for the issue estates different from those which the testator appeared to have intended them, sacrificed to that extent his particular intention. Thus, where the testator has devised lands to a person and his issue, and has appeared to intend that all the issue of the devisee should take the lands, and, at the same time, has appeared to intend to devise estates by purchase, to the children of unborn children of the devisee, the courts have considered such limitations contrary to law; but, as the will

130. Re Brown's Will, 18 Ch. Div. 65.

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