pose. Upon the failure of the personal property to pay the legacy, a demonstrative, not a specific legacy, was not chargeable in the real estates. An annuity of fifty dollars is chargeable on the entire personalty where it was to be paid monthly out of any money which might come into the hands of the executors by their right as executors9.

§261. Interest on Legacies.

The rule is well settled that interest does not begin to accrue on a general legacy until the expiration of one year after the issuance of letters testamentary1o, and the fact that an executor filed a bond as residuary legatee makes no difference11. Interest was properly allowed where a devisee defaulted in payment of annuities12.

$262. Acceptance and Renunciation,

As may be said, the proposition is almost self-evident that a legatee has no interest in the legacy during the lifetime of the testator, but upon the death of the testator an estate vests under a devise or legacy in the devisee or legatee. However, the devisee or legatee is not bound to accept a devise or legacy nolens volens. It is only an heir at law who, by the common law, becomes the owner of land without his own agency or assent. The devisee or legatee can choose between either one of two ways as to the legacy left him in that he may accept or renounce the

7. Thurber v. Battey, 105 Mich. 718, 63 N. W. 995.

8. Hibler v. Hibler, 104 Mich. 274, 62 N. W. 361.

9. Langrick v. Gospel, 48 Mich. 185, 12 N. W. 38.

10. Wheeler v. Hatheway, 54

Mich. 547, 20 N. W. 579.

11.

Wheeler v. Hatheway, 54 Mich. 547, 20 N. W. 579.

12. Stringer v. Steven's Estate, 146 Mich. 181, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 393, 117 Am. St. Rep. 620, 109 N. W. 269.

gift or disposition made to him. There are two classes of cases in which it may become necessary to determine what constitutes a renunciation or acceptance: (1) Cases where the devisee or his privies deny renunciation, and (2) where they assert it. In the former (i. e., before the devisee can be deprived of the estate), there are cases that hold that renunciation is not to be lightly inferred, and that equivocal acts will not do. In general it may be said that an estate cannot be forced upon a man, but it is manifest that a devise is prima facie for the benefit of the devisee and he is supposed to assent to it, until he does some act to show his dissent. The presumption in law is that he will assent until the contrary is proved the assent to the devisee was never given by him, and consequently the estate never was vested in him. The most satisfactory evidence of acceptance is by entry and acceptance under the will, but a renunciation and act inconsistent with acceptance may be effected by deed. The fact that a devisee of a life estate in remainder claimed title in fee to the premises devised by virtue of tax deeds for taxes assessed against the land during the occupancy of the first devisee, that he had such deeds recorded, that he took possession of the premises after death of the first tenant, and that he occupied the same for two years and then conveyed by warranty deed, constitutes a renunciation, at least, the question is sufficient to go to the jury13.

$263. Waiver, Abandonment and Forfeiture.

A waiver of a legacy does not obtain when a widow, entitled to the income of the estate, did not make claim to

13. Defreese v. Lake, 109 Mich.

415, 32 L. R. A. 744, 63 Am. St. Rep. 584, 67 N. W. 505.

the income until after the approval of the accounts of the executor for the order approving the account only showed the payment of the sum intended for that purpose to the trustee11. A legatee forfeited his legacy where the testator, after giving his wife a life estate, gave his nephew, who was living with him, a legacy of a certain sum, “if the said (nephew) shall continue to live with my family and in my estate until he shall arrive at the age of twentyone years," but before coming of age, he left the family of his aunt after being urged not to do so and warned that, if he did so he would forfeit his legacy; and in making claim for his legacy he did not file his petition until twenty-five years after he became of age15.

$264. Title of Devisees and Legatees.

The general rule may be stated that a devisee can take no greater interest or rights in land devised than the devisee had, nor is he a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration1 The fact that one is given by will a residuary interest in personalty of the testator makes him nevertheless a legatee and he takes title to the bequests as such for the reason that the same clause of the will gives him a like interest in the realty17. A daughter cannot maintain ejectment against the grantees of devisees where the owner of lands has devised an undivided interest in the same in fee to his wife with a provision that his daughter should have her maintenance out of the same, and the wife subsequently devised the same in fee to other daughters, sub

14. Dickenson V. Henderson, 122 Mich. 583, 81 N. W. 583.

15. Pearl V. Lockwood, 123 Mich. 143, 81 N. W. 1087.

16. Ribley v. Seligman, 88

Mich. 177, 50 N. W. 143.

17. Charmichael v. Lathrop, 108 Mich. 473, 66 N. W. 350, 32 L. R. A. 352.

ject to the support of the daughter first mentioned, the latter takes no legal interest in the lands or title to the possession18.

§265. Election Between Proceeds and Bequest.

The rule is that where a bare power of sale is given to executors for the purpose of selling lands in order to pay over the proceeds to devisees whose right and title under the will is absolute and vested, the devisees may elect to take the land devised instead of the proceeds before the sale is made19.

$266. Possession of Property.

A devisee may take his estate as of the death of the testator, except as otherwise provided by statute20, for the statute21 providing that no will shall be effectual to pass either real or personal estate, unless it shall have been duly proved and allowed in the probate court, furnishes the means to establish by a peculiar kind of recordevidence the validity of an existing an existing right; and it is well settled that for every valuable purpose touching the existence and transfer of title the probate is retroactive, and has the has the same same effect as if it had been had at the time of the death of the testator. Where there is no deficiency of assets an executor cannot withhold his assent to the legatee's immediate possession of specific bequests, neither can they be withheld

18. Donihue V. Rankin, 31 Mich. 148.

V.

19. Bennett Chapin, 77 Mich. 526, 7 L. R. A. 377, 43

N. W. 893.

20. Richards V. Pierce, 44 Mich. 444, 7 N. W. 54.

21. C. L. '97 §9281.

where they are needed for household or husbandry purposes 22. Possession should be given immediately to the legatee23. In the event the land is not taken by the executors for the purpose of administration a residuary legatee of lands, although holding title subject to the antecedent legacies, may have and defend possession from the time the will is probated24. The widow was entitled to the possession and management of the fund represented by the mortgage in a case where among the assets was a mortgage which it was agreed should be considered as money25, so the widow was entitled to possession and control of all the property where the will of the testator appointed a trust company his "executor," and gave his wife "All the use and income" of his entire estate for life or until marriage28

$267. Support and Maintenance.

Provisions in wills relating to maintenance and support must be so construed as to effectuate the real intent for

22. Eberstein V. Camp, 37 Mich. 176.

23. Eberstein V. Camp, 37 Mich. 176.

24. Chapman v. Craig, 37 Mich. 370.

25. Patterson V. Stewart, 38 Mich. 402.

26. Michigan Trust Co. V. Hertzig, 133 Mich. 513, 95 N. W. 531. See Schohr v. Lock, 84 Mich. 263, 47 N. W. 445, where testator intended to give the wife only the use of the property, and not the possession and control of the property. In Spiers v. Roberts 73 Mich. 666, 41 N. W. 841, the widow was entitled to the posses

sion of the fund as against the subsequently appointed guardian. See also Hull v. Hull, 122 Mich. 338, 81 N. W. 89.

As to accumulations, rents, profits and income: See Pray v. Ralber, 144 Mich. 208, 107 N. W. 1076, where the intention of the testator was to divide the income equally among all his children, subject to be used as necessity demands, judged by the standard of the testator's method of using it if he had been living.

As to annuities: See Roehm v. Clark's Estate, 104 Mich. 1, 61 N. W. 882; State v. Dunbar's Estate, 99 Mich. 99, 57 N. W. 1103,