In the event that all these questions are properly answered in the affirmative the will becomes a guide for the disposition of the property of the testator. The questions which are likely to arise, if the intentions of the testator are not clear, are: First, what is the intention of the testator? Second, what does he mean by certain words, phrases, or clauses? Third, what kind of an estate does he intend to create? §273. Interpretation and Construction. Interpretation may be defined as the act of finding out the true sense in which a word or any form of words is used. In other words it is the act of determining by the word or any form of words the sense or meaning the author of them intended to convey for the purpose of enabling others to derive the same meaning and idea; while ordinarily the words construction and interpretation are synonymous, yet the latter precedes the former but does not extend beyond the written text. Thus interpretation relies wholly upon the internal textual structure, while construction relies upon not only the internal textual structure, but upon extraneous circumstances and facts which may throw light upon the author's intentions so as to make the context of the document clear. It is clear that where the language is plain and transparent there is no room for the office of construction. The construction of a will at times is extremely difficult for the reason that its language is lacking in precision and its poverty of expression, arising from the in adequate knowledge of the law applicable to dispositions on the part of the testator at the time of the execution of the will is perplexing. In making a construction of a difficult legacy or devise in a will, it is essential that the whole scheme of the will be thoroughly comprehended for the ultimate purpose of establishing the object for which the legacy or devise was made. It is the office of construction to discover such object upon the application of principles of law to the legacy or devise in question. $274. Favorable Construction of Wills. A disposition had manifested itself from an early period on the part of the courts to give a more favorable construction to wills than to ordinary legal documents. This peculiar indulgence extended to testators had its foundation in the fact that they were regarded as inopes consilii, and the language they employed in drawing up wills was free from technical restraint, for they were not sufficiently familiar with certain forms of expression such as “heirs,” "heirs-at-law," "heirs of the body," "without issue," "without having or leaving issue," and others by which estates are created, so that the courts adopted a rule of construction by which generally the first donee was given an estate of inheritance. This freedom in the use of language had its limits, for there were points that had been ascertained and settled by rules sufficiently definite to establish precedents. Nevertheless there are "very few classes of cases," said Justice Miller, "more frequent or more perplexing in the courts than the construction of wills. If rules of construction, laid down by the courts of the highest character, or the authority of adjudged cases, could meet and solve these difficulties, there would remain no cause of complaint on that subject, for such is the number and variety of these opinions that every form of expression would seem to be met. Unfortunately, however, these authorities are often conflicting, or arise out of the forms of expression so nearly alike, yet varying in such minute. shades of meaning, and are decided on facts and circumstances differing in points, the pertinency of which are so difficult in their application to other cases, that the mind is bewildered and in danger of being misled. To these considerations it is to be added that of all legal instruments, wills are the most inartificial, the least to be governed in their construction by the settled use of technical legal terms, the will itself being often the production of persons not only ignorant of law but of the correct use of the language in which it is written. Under this state of the science of the law, as applicable to the construction of wills, it may well be doubted if any other source of enlightment in the construction of a will is of much assistance, than the application of natural reason to the language of the instrument under the light which may be thrown upon the intent of the testator by the extrinsic circumstances surrounding its execution, and connecting the parties and the property devised with the testator and with the instrument itself." §275. Precedents. Precedents in will cases are not followed so arbitrarily as in other branches of the law, although judges submit to be bound by precedents and authorities on points, i. e., an effort is made to collect the intention upon grounds of a judicial nature. It is the policy of the courts to implicitly obey the intention of testators, when ascertained, however informal the language may be in which it is clothed. Courts make application of certain established rules of construction1 by which is prescribed the method of proceeding to ascertain the intention of the testator and by which, particular words and expressions have been given a definite meaning-a 1. It was deemed advisable to set forth in a concise form all the rules of construction relating to wills, as formulated by Mr. Jarman in his great work on wills, so that their nature and character may be readily determined. I. That a will of real estate, wheresoever made, and in whatever language written, is construed according to the laws of the country, in which the property is situate; but a will of personalty is governed by the lex domicilii. II. That technical words are not very necessary to give effect to any species of disposition in a will. III. That the construction of a will is the same at law and in equity; the jurisdiction of each being governed by the nature of the subject, though the consequences may differ, as in the instance of a contingent remainder, which is destructible in the one case and not in the other. IV. That a will speaks, for some purposes, from the period of execution, and for others from the death of the testator; but never operates until the latter period. V. That the heir is not to be disinherited without an express devise, or necessary implication; such implication importing not natural necessity, but so strong a probability, that an intention to the contrary cannot be supposed. VI. That merely negative words are not sufficient to exclude the title of the heir or next of kin. There must be an actual gift to some other definite object. VII. That all the parts of a I will are to be construed in relation to each other, and so as, if possible, to form one consistent whole; but, where several parts are absolutely irreconcilable, the latter must prevail. VIII. That intrinsic evidence is not admissible to alter, detract from, or add to, the terms of the will, though it may be used to rebut a resulting text attaching to a legal title created by it, or to remove a latent ambiguity (arising from words equally descriptive of two or more objects or objects of gift). IX. Nor to vary the meaning of words, and therefore to attach a strained and extraordinary sense to a particular word, an instrument executed by the testator, in which the same word occurs in that sense, is not admissible. X. Courts will look at the circumstances under which the doctor makes his will, as the state of his property. XI. That in general, implication is admissible only in the meaning which does not always correspond with their popular acceptation. The inference is permissible that rules of construction may partake of the nature of adjective law in that they prescribe the method by which the intention of the instrument is ascertained, while, as they become transformed into fixed rules of property they partake of the nature of substantive law and become a precedent for all cases precisely analogous or identical. Thus a degree of absence of, and not to control, an express disposition. XII. That an express and positive devise cannot be controlled by the reason assigned, or by subsequent ambiguous words, or by inference and argument from other parts of the will, and, accordingly, such a devise is not affected by a subsequent inaccurate recital of, or reference to, its contents, though recourse may be had to such reference to assist the construction, in case of ambiguity, or doubt. XIII. That the inconvenience or absurdity of a devise is no ground for varying the construction, where the terms of it are unambiguous; nor is the fact that the testator did not foresee all the consequences of his disposition a reason for varying it; but, where the intention is obscured by conflicting expressions, it is to be sought rather in a rational and consistent, than an irrational and inconsistent purpose. XIV. That the rules of construction cannot be strained to bring a devise within the rules of law; but it seems that, where the will admits of two constructions, that is to be preferred which will render it valid. XV. That favor or disfavor to the object ought not to influence the construction. XVI. That words, in general, are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use them in another can be collected and that other can be ascertained; and they are in all cases, to receive a construction which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one that will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of construction, that is to be preferred which will prevent a total intestacy. XVII. That, where a testator used technical words, he is presumed to employ them in their legal sense, unless the context clearly indicates the trary. XVIII. That words, occurring more than once in a will, shall be presumed to be used always in the same sense, unless a contrary intention appear by the context, or unless the words be applied to a different subject. And on the same principle, where a testator uses an additional word or phrase, he must be presumed to have an additional meaning. XIX. That words and limitations may be transposed, supplied, |