CHAPTER VII. DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY. $120. Certainty of Description. $121. Description by Name of Owner. $122. General and Particular Words. $123. Inconsistent Descriptions. $124. Estate. $125. Property. $126. Effects. $127. Description of Personalty by Location or Use. $128. Life Insurance. $129. Release of Debts and Obligations. $130. Claims of the Testator. $131. Pecuniary Legacy. $132. Residuary Clause. §120. Certainty of Description. The rule is well settled that any words which will clearly indicate the intention of the testator to dispose of his estate will pass such estate. The formality of the words is not essential. It is, however, essential that the description of the property is clear and certain and not inconsistent with subsequent bequests1. A bequest reading, "to my wife the provisions made for her by the statutes of this state I deem sufficient," and the testator added, after giving sundry legacies, the clause, "all the residue of my estate after paying the above bequests, legacies and my debts and the expenses of settling my estate," which clause was construed to mean that the wife would take the same as if the testator died 1. Stebbins v. Stebbins, 86 Mich. 474, 49 N. W. 294. intestate. The land is included in a case where in a specific bequest a testatrix describes the property as being two stores erected by her on a certain street3. §121. Description by Name of Owner. Where a clause in a will described the property as follows: "Being the same land on which said Sidney Tewsbury now lives," the description was deemed sufficiently certain1. §122. General and Particular Words. In instances of this kind the general rule must prevail that the intention of the testator must be inferred from the whole will. Where the general words in a will purport to pass the entire estate of the testator, but the specific words forming the description contain a less amount of property than the general words, the description of the whole property is considered sufficiently described, for the general description is not to be limited by the particular description®. §123. Inconsistent Descriptions. The description must prevail where a testator devised twenty acres of land to his son by metes and bounds, although previously he referred to the land in his will as "joining" other lands which he had, but this particular piece did not join any of the lands so referred to. §124. Estate. Estates in a general legal sense mean the quantity of interest which a person may have or has in property, including all the varying interests from absolute ownership down to naked possession. §125. Property. Property may be defined as extending to every species of valuable right and interest, including real and personal property, easements, franchises and other incorporeal heredita ments. $126. Effects. This word is extensively used in wills and corresponds usually in meaning to personal estate, but in a cases Lord Mansfield construed the word effect to be synonymous with "worldly substance," which means whatever can be turned to value, and therefore that "real and personal effects" means all a man's property. §127. Description of Personalty by Location or Use. It was decided that the proceeds of wheat that was in the barn of the testator when he died, belonged to his residuary legatees where a testator left his wife all the personal property "belonging to or used in connection with" his farm and being thereon at the time of the death of the testator, to be used by her until his youngest son came of age, it being the intention of the testator to keep it in their hands until all should die9. 8. Hogan V. Jackson, 1 9. Appeal of Kempf, 53 Cowp. 304. Mich. 352, 19 N. W. 31. §128. Life Insurance. A description in a will which reads "and all other property of which I shall die seized," passes a life insurance under a certificate, payable "to the devisees, or, if no will, to the heirs 10" §129. Release of Debts and Obligations. The general rule is that a debt or obligation due a testator from a devisee or legatee should be clear and unambiguous11. Where the will contained the clause that "all the foregoing legacies are intended and declared to be for the individual estate of the said legatees, exclusive of any indebtedness to me at this date or other," this clause did not release any of the legatees from any indebtedness due to the testator12. §130. Claims of the Testator. Claims of the testator do not always pass by the will. Thus, where a testator included in his will the following statement: "It is my will that all my furniture and property be in common to my beloved wife, E. H., and daughter, J. J. H., so long as they live and keep house together," this description did not pass a claim the testator had against the Chippewa Indians to the widow and daughter13. 10. Aveling v. Northwestern Masonic Aid Ass'n, 72 Mich. 7, 1 L. R. A. 528, 40 N. W. 28. 11. Baldwin v. Sheldon, 48 Mich. 580. 12 N. W. 872. 13. Appeal of Jameson, 1 Mich. 99. §131. Pecuniary Legacy. The presumption is that all the devisees are equal holders, where a devise is made to several persons, all standing in the same relation to the devisor14. §132. Residuary Clause. A residuary clause is that part in a will which makes disposition of that portion of the estate which is left after paying the charges, debts, devisees, and legacies, i. e., it disposes of the residuum. The residuum in testamentary language means whatever is not specifically devised or bequeathed. There are general and particular residuary clauses. A general residuary clause disposes of all the residuum of the estate of the testator, whereas the particular residuary clause disposes of the residuum of specific property. Where a testator, after providing for the payment of his debts and funeral expenses and for certain legacies, directed that, after all debts and expenses were paid, the balance of his estate should be equally divided between two church boards, this clause was a disposition of the balance of his property, not bequeathed otherwise, except his personal effects15. The intention of the testator in a will, requiring the executors to put up a building on certain land and provided that "should it become necessary to sell real estate for the purpose of building" they might sell certain other specified premises, and the lot and buildings were to go to the grandson of the testator, providing the grandson 14. Eberts V. Fisher, 44 Mich. 551, 7 N. W. 211. See other cases relating to the same matter. In re Gunn's Estate, 146 Mich. 615, 110 N. W. 63; Gregory v. Tompkins, 132 Mich. 205, 93 N. W. 245. 15. Stebbins v. Stebbins, 86 Mich. 474, 49 N. W. 294 |