tract to build a frame building is discharged if a subsequent ordinance makes such buildings in that location unlawful. § 460. Remedies for breach of contract.-Where one of the parties refuses to perform or otherwise commits a breach of contract, the other party is generally discharged from further performance and he has an action for damages in which he can recover what he has lost through the other party's breach. He may, however, choose to abandon the contract and sue the other party for a reasonable compensation for whatever services he has already performed. In certain cases coming under the jurisdiction of equity the injured party may secure specific performance. Thus if A has contracted to convey to B a certain lot and then refuses to convey, B can go into equity and get a decree of specific performance compelling A to make the conveyance. Equity will only give relief, however, in certain classes of cases where the remedy at law is inadequate. § 461. History of the statute.-To prevent frauds and perjuries, a statute was enacted in the reign of Charles II in England, in the year 1677, providing that no action should be brought to enforce certain agreements, "unless the agreement upon which such action. shall be brought, or some note or memorandum thereof, shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized." It is to be noticed that by this statute parties are not prohibited from making such agreements by parol, but the performance of such parol agreements is purely voluntary. It is simply declared that the courts will not aid in enforcing them. There is some curious history as to who is entitled to the credit of suggesting or formulating this law. Some give it to Lord Hale, but the better opinion is that Lord Nottingham is its author. That it is regarded as a good law in principle is shown by the fact that its most important provisions have been re-enacted in all English-speaking countries, especially the fourth and seventeenth sections of the statute. § 462. Provisions of the statute.-The fourth section provides that no action shall be brought whereby to charge: (1) Any executor or administrator upon any special promise to answer damages out of his own estate. (2) Or to charge the defendant upon any special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person. (3) Or to charge any person upon any agreement made upon consideration of marriage. (4) Or upon any contract or sale of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them. (5) Or upon any agreement that is not to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof. Unless the agreement or some memorandum thereof in writing should be signed as above required. The seventeenth section provides that no contract for the sale of any goods, wares and merchandise for the price of ten pounds sterling (fifty dollars) or upwards shall be allowed to be good, except the buyer shall accept part of the goods so sold and actually receive the same, or give something in earnest to bind the bargain, or in part payment, unless some note or memorandum of the bargain in writing be made and signed, as required in the fourth section. Let us consider the contracts affected by the statute, in the order in which they are mentioned in the statute itself: § 463. Promises of executors and administrators.— An executor or an administrator coming into possession of the estate of the testator or decedent is only liable to pay the debts of the estate in the order required by law and so far as the assets of the estate properly ad ministered will enable him to discharge such debts. This legal obligation and no other rests upon him, unless he sees fit to assume and incur a personal liability for the debts of the estate. If he does this in a writing, signed by him or his agent, he is bound, but no oral agreement on his part can create such a liability. The statute applies only to debts existing against the estate. If the executor agrees with an heir to pay a sum of money if he will abstain from bringing suit to contest the will or the probate of it, this is a personal undertaking of his own, and one which does not fall within the statute. § 464. Debt, default and miscarriage. What is meant by the terms "debt," "default" and "miscarriage" of another, for which one shall not be answerable upon his oral promise? It may be said, generally, that under these terms are included every form of liability or obligation which rests upon one, whether it grows out of tort or contract, or from whatever cause. There are three persons to be considered: (1) The person who owes the debt or has incurred the liability. (2) The person to whom the debt is owing or who is entitled to enforce the existing liability. (3) The stranger to the transaction, against whom no liability exists, and whom it is sought to charge with the liability of the debtor or wrongdoer. § 465. Original or collateral obligation. Whether an oral promise is enforcible or not under this clause of the statute depends generally upon the question whether the promise is an original obligation or is collateral to some other's obligation. If the former, it would be valid; if the latter, it would be barred. For example: If A promises to pay for goods furnished to B, who makes no promise, it is evident that A's promise is the only and original obligation, and that it is not within the statute of frauds. But if B promises to pay for the goods, and A promises to pay in case B fails to do so, A's promise is collateral, and an action on it is barred by the statute. § 466. Agreements in consideration of marriage.— It is hardly necessary to say that this clause of the statute does not refer to the mutual promises of marriage. It has sole reference to promises collateral to the marriage which are made upon condition that the marriage shall take place, as where a man agrees to make a settlement or pay a sum of money if a marriage is consummated. An antenuptial agreement by which, before marriage, a woman agrees to relinquish her marital rights in her husband's property, in consideration of the payment to her of a sum certain, is within the statute and must be in writing to make it binding. Nor is the subsequent marriage of the parties such a part performance of the contract as will take the contract out of the statute. § 467. Contracts for sale of lands.-The word land as it is used in this statute has been held to include not only the land itself, but every claim of a permanent right to hold lands of another for a particular purpose, and to enter upon them at all times without his consent. A mere verbal license to enter upon land for a temporary purpose is revocable. Difficulties arise as to what things annexed to land are covered by the term as it is used in the statute. A ripened crop ready to be gathered, and a sale of any growing produce, raised by labor and expense, in actual existence at the time of the contract, may be the subject of a binding parol contract. And it has even been held that where timber or other produce of land, or any other thing annexed to the land is specifically sold, |