board sees fit to call them in-the law evidently does not meet the intention of the Legislature, and is not only undesirable but indefensible. If it is a pardon upon conditions, as the Legislature no doubt intended it should be, then it is open to all the constitutional objections mentioned in People v. Moore, 62 Mich. 502. The term of imprisonment under this law depends, not upon the character of the crime committed, but upon the behavior of the prisoner after he enters upon his sentence. The prisoners are to be classified into different grades, "with promotion or degradation according to the merits of the prisoners, their employment and instruction in industry, and generally as may from time to time appear to be necessary or promotive of the purposes of this act." The hardened criminal may more easily submit to the discipline of the prison than the younger, but more impulsive offender, and therefore get his release sooner. The term of imprisonment depends upon the ability of the convict to please the prison officials in his department, and not upon the enormity of his offense. This law, if permitted to stand, would be a convenient one for judges who might dislike to perform an unpleasant duty. When a person of influence or wealth was convicted, and the usual pressure in such cases brought to bear upon the trial judge to impose a light sentence, how easy it would be to impose a general sentence, and shift the responsibility of fixing its actual term upon the board of control of prisons, and let them stand the siege which would at once commence to procure his release. The law, in my opinion, is not only unconstitutional, as heretofore pointed out, but also wrong in theory and dangerous in practice. That such laws have been adopted by some of the States of the Union has no bearing in favor of this act. A similar statute was sustained in Ohio, but the reasoning of the opinion is not at all satisfactory to me, and does not meet the objections raised against the law. See State v. Peters, 43 Ohio St. 629. It is also urged in support of this law that it is no more despotic or arbitrary than the law providing for a deduction of time from each year of the sentence of a convict who has not infracted the rules of the prison during that time, and it is asserted that the constitutionality of such law has lately been recognized by this court In Re Walsh, 49 N. W. Rep. 606. But there is a material difference between the two enactments. Howard's Statutes, sections 9703 and 9704, provide for a certain reduction of the sentence for good behavior. It is not left at the will or caprice of any one. It is provided that the rules of the prison shall be known to the convict, and that they shall provide what the penalty shall be for an infraction of such rules; that a record shall be kept, and that the rules shall be definite and certain and apply to all the convicts alike. Such a law was sustained in Massachusets (13 Gray, 618) upon the ground that the sentences were not rendered indefinite or uncertain thereby, the judges saying in the opinion: "The scale of deduction is not to depend on any varying or capricious notions which any officer or superintendents of the prison may entertain of the good behavior or good disposition of a convict. It is made to depend upon a fact, ascertained by a fixed rule, entered on the journals of the prison, recorded each month, that is, entered in a book, permanent in its character, fixed and unchangeable when once entered. These books are always accessible, and although the officers may all change, the record is there." We also held in the Walsh Case that the enforcement of our statute, and the deduction of lost time under it, could not be left to the will or caprice of any prison official, and that the prison board could not alter or change a record once made to militate against a prisoner; that it must be enforced under fixed rules, known to the convicts, and that the record must be so kept that the convicts would not be left at the mercy of the mistakes of prison officials; yet as plain as these statutes are, in the Walsh Case it was found that, ever since the passage of this law allowing | deductions, the prison board had disregarded the statute, and built up a system of their own, which was unjust and pernicious, as well as indefinite and uncertain in its operation. But the law under consideration goes further, and proposes without regulation or restriction to give the prison board almost unlimited authority as to the release and discharge of prisoners, without the control of the courts, and without any appeal to any earthly power. It may further be said that the statute in relation to deductions does not give any power to the board to extend the term of imprisonment. The law under consideration does. In order to sustain the statute, it must be argued and considered that the convict is really under sentence all the while; that he is still a convict, although outside the walls of the prison. He is as much under the control of the authorities as is the "trusty" convict who is allowed at times to be outside at work or to run errands, yet if he violates the conditions of his parole after he has been out ten years-if his maximum term has not expired-he can be taken back without trial, or any investigation save by the prison board, and made to serve the ten years beyond his maximum term. See section 5 of this act. It is a wonder to me that such a law as this, giving such unheard-of power to four men, not elected by the people, but holding their offices by appointment, could have been enacted, in view of our Constitution, and the whole theory of our State government, and in the light and example of the history of the establishment and growth of constitutional liberty in this country. In this case the sentence of Cummings is good, under our previous decisions, for two years; at the end of that period he must be discharged. CHAMPLIN, C. J., and MCGRATH and LONG, JJ., concurred. GRANT, J. (dissenting). Upon the conviction for the crime of larceny, the respondent was sentenced by the court" to be confined in the State house of correction and reformatory, at hard labor, for a period of not less than two nor more than four years, from and including this date, in the discretion of the board of control of prisons of the State of Michigan." In imposing this sentence the court evidently intended a compliance with Act No. 228, Public Acts of 1889. I do not think this conforms to the statute. The sentence there provided is a general one, and does not confer upon the court the power to fix a minimum sentence. The only sentence provided in this act is that the convict be confined in one of the places mentioned. He can then only be released before the expiration of the maximum term of confinement fixed by law by the board of control, unless pardoned by the governor. The sentence however is an absolute one for two years, is therefore legal and must be sustained. While the constitutionality of this act is not necessarily involved, yet as it has been presented by counsel, and a speedy determination of the question seems to be required by public interests, we have concluded to dispose of it. Its constitutionality is challenged on two grounds: (1) Because it interferes with the pardoning power, which is alone possessed by the governor, and (2) because it coufers judicial powers upon the board of control, which by the Constitution are solely vested in the courts. Sentence under this act is not made compulsory, nor does it take away the discretion lodged by the Constitution in the courts. It but gives to the courts the power to sentence under this act if, in their judicial discretion, they choose to do so. They may still impose a determinate sentence The under other statutes, in which cases the provisions of this act do not apply. But if in their judgment, in view of the circumstances of the particular crime, and the character of the criminal, they deem it for the interests of the criminal as well as of society, they may impose sentence under this act. The constitutional power of the courts is neither abridged nor enlarged. The character and extent of the punishment are clearly within the exclusive control of the Legislature. If therefore the act is to be declared unconstitutional, it must be because it warrants an unconstitutional interference with the judgments of the courts. A careful examination therefore of the power conferred upon the board of control is necessary to a proper determination of the question. We may pass without discussion the claim that it interferes with the pardoning power of the governor. The act does not attempt to coufer any power upon the board to pardon. "A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted with the execution of the law, which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed." U. S. v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150. Section 6 expressly declares that nothing in the act shall be construed to impair the power to grant a pardon or commutation in any case. This act was copied from that enacted in Ohio in 1884, which was held constitutional by the Supreme Court of that State. State v. Peters, 43 Ohio St. 629. Other States have also adopted similar provisions. The object of this law is well stated in the opinion in the Ohio case, viz.: "It is evidently prompted by a desire to reform, as well as to punish; to make better those under sentence, as well as to protect society." A similar law has been sustained by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. Conlon's Case, 148 Mass. 168. only additional power conferred upon the board by this act is to allow prisoners sentenced under it to go upon parole outside the buildings and inclosures, remaining while on parole in the legal custody and under the control of the board, subject at any time to be taken back within the inclosure of the prison. This is the power, if any, which is judicial, and therefore unconstitutional. The term of his release depends upon the observance of the conditions of his parole. is left with the board to determine, but I do not think this a judicial act. If the power exists to let a convict out on parole, upon such terms and conditions as the board shall establish and the convict agrees to, I think it competent to clothe the board with the power to determine when the parole is broken. The convict agrees to this as one of the terms of his parole. The power of the Legislature to interfere with and modify the sentence of prisoners by the courts has long been recognized in this and other States, and in so doing it has never been thought that the legislative authority was incroaching upon the judicial authority. The following are illustrations from our own statutes: The law requires the courts to sentence murderers of the first degree to solitary confinement at hard labor in the State prison for life. The law also confers upon inspectors of the State prison the power to release such convicts from solitary confinement, to employ them as other convicts, and to allow them to correspond with their relatives and friends. For fourteen years the law of this State has provided that every prisoner, who shall have no infraction of the rules of the prison or laws of the State recorded against him, shall be entitled to a deduction for each year of his sentence. The validity of this act has been recognized in mandamus proceedings brought to this court by a prisoner in the Jackson prison, and the board directed to allow the prisoner his good time. In re Walsh (Mich.), 49 N. W. Rep. 606. This deduction is two months each year for the first three years, and finally amounts to six months each year. How. St., § 9704. This record must This be kept by the warden, and then the inspectors are required to determine how much of the good time earned shall be forfeited for one or more violations of the prison rules. Is it not apparent that these two acts of the Legislature constitute as much of an interference with the judgments of the courts as does the act under consideration? The effect of both is to modify the sentence of the court. In both discretion is lodged with the prison managers. Yet the validity of the former acts has never been questioned. The power vested in our prison managers is just as "despotic" in the one case as in the other. In fact all these laws are humane and their tendency is to reform criminals and protect society. Such laws should only be held unconstitutional when there is a clear infraction of the Constitution. It is clearly the prerogative of the Legislature, under the Constitution, to fix all punishments for crime, and to provide for a minimum and maximum punishment. It is only limited by the Constitution to the rule that they must not be cruel or unusual. The Legislature by this act has given the courts the power and discretion to sentence a dangerous criminal to prison for the maximum term, and conferred the power and discretion upon the board of control, whose duty it is to watch the conduct and character of the convict, to so modify that sentence as to give him temporary and conditional liberty. I am unable to see in this any cruel or unusual punishment, or any usurpation of or encroachment upon judicial powers as fixed by our Constitution. If the constitutional power exists in the Legislature to provide for the absolute discharge of a prisoner before the expiration of his term of imprisonment, fixed by the court, it must follow that the right exists to provide for his conditional release. No constitutional right of the prisoner is infringed, for his term of imprisonment may be thereby shortened, while society may be benefited by his refor mation. The right to shorten terms of imprisonment was sustained by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, Chief Justice Shaw being then upon the bench. 13 Gray, 618. To declare this act unconstitutional would result in the abrogation of our most salutary laws, holding out wise inducements for the reformation of criminals. It would result in the discharge of many prisoners who have been sentenced under this act, the validity of which appears to have been generally recognized by the circuit judges. It should be accordingly certified to the State house of correction and reformatory at Ionia that the sentence of the court is valid for two years, subject to the deduction provided in Howard's Statutes, section 9704. ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DECISIONS. EIGHT-HOUR LAW-LABOR IN STATE INSTITUTIONS -PENITENTIARY OFFICIALS. The officers and employees in the penitentiary are not embraced in the provisions of chapter 114, Session Laws of 1891, making it unlawful for laborers, workmen, mechanics or other persons, employed by the State of Kansas, to work more than eight hours a day. These officers and employees are given annual salaries, the amount of each officer and employee is specifically stated, and the amounts have been appropriated by the Legislature without specific reference to the current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is to be per formed. Then again the officers and employees mentioned in said section 20, chapter 152, are paid annual salaries, and not per diem wages for each day. The words "laborers, workmen, mechanics or other persons," in section 1, chapter 114, evidently do not em. brace any officer or employee for whom an annual salary has been specifically named and appropriated by the Legislature. Further, chapter 114 is a penal statute, and must therefore be strictly construed. It caunot be extended by construction. Unless it necessarily includes the officers or employees mentioned in section 20, chapter 152, or some one of them, it cannot apply to any officer or employee. We think it has no application to any officer or employee named therein. If the provisions of chapter 114 were applied by the defeudants to the penitentiary, then the appropriations of 1891 for that institution are wholly insufficient, and it is hardly possible that the Legislature intended to It was urged upon leave it in a crippled condition. the argument on behalf of the State that if chapter 114 had no application to the officers or employees in the penitientiary, or in the charitable institutions of the State, that its provisions would scarcely have any operation. This is not correct, because if the statute is constitutional, it will apply to laborers, workmen, mechanics or other persons employed by or on behalf of the State, in many cases outside of the penitentiary and the charitable institutions, and also to many of the employees of counties, cities and townships of the Stute, ex rel. State. Kans. Sup. Ct., Oct. 10, 1891. Ives, Attorney-General, v. Martindale et al., Directors and Warden of Kansas State Penitentiary. Opinion by Horton, C. J. EXECUTION-EXEMPTION—" FLOUR."-The Code of Civil Procedure (section 1390), relative to property exempt from execution when owned by a householder, enumerates in subdivision 4 thereof "all necessary meat, fish, flour and vegetables actually provided for family use." Held, that meal was exempt from seizure under the word "flour." Merwin, J., dissenting. Lashaway v. Tucker. Opinion by Hardin, P. J. Hun, 6. terial, and when the law provides that a ministerial PARTNERSHIP-SALE OF GOOD-WILL-RIGHT OF PUR- OFFICE-WOMEN AS DEPUTY CLERKS.-The Constitution of Michigau, article 10, section 3, provides that in each county there shall be chosen by the electors thereof a county clerk. Howard's Statutes of Michigan, section 573, authorizes the county clerk to appoint one or more deputies, one of whom shall be designated in the appointment as the successor of the clerk in case of vacancy. Section 574 provides that in case of vacancy in the office of clerk by death, the deputies shall severally perform the duty of clerk until the vacancy is filled. Held, that a woman might be appointed a deputy, she not being designated as the successor of the clerk, even if none but an elector could be chosen clerk. It will be noticed that in this appointment she The relais not designated as successor to the clerk. tor contends that under the provision of the Constitution, none but an elector can be chosen to the office of county clerk. In this I think he is correct, but its decision is not essential to the determination of the present case. He further contends as a necessary cousequence that no one except an elector can be appointed deputy, for the reason that such person may, by the statute and the appointment, become successor to the clerk until a vacancy can be filled. Miss Burr is not designated as his successor, and if she was, it does not follow that the successor, during the temporary time in which a vacancy occurs, must be an elector. The electors have the constitutional right to choose their county clerk, and no one could be appointed for a full term to fill the position in an organized county. But in case of vacancy, the law may provide that another person may be appointed to fill the position and discharge the duties of the office. This is essential for the transaction of the public business, and it is competent for the Legislature to provide that the county clerk may appoint his own successor until a vacancy can be filled in the manner provided by law. The office of county clerk is wholly minis regulated adopts itself in this, as in other cases, to the varied situations and circumstances of the country. *** The law on this subject must be applied with reasonable regard to circumstances.' In the mining regions of this State, where title to a lode can be acquired from a United States government only after work of certain value has been done upon it, can it be that if one of several locators or owners shall assume the sole risk of developing the mine, he shall become liable to those who have taken no chance of possible loss, not only for an accounting as to net profits-supposing him to be fortunate enough to secure any-but also as a tort-feasor, for three times the value of the whole, or for a proportionate share of the ore taken out? The theory of plaintiffs is that defendant could not extract ore from the mine without committing waste, because such extraction is a destruction of the very substance of the estate-an irreparable injury to the inheritance. In view of the character of the prop the plaintiffs. By advertising themselves as the successors of Goupil & Co., “of Paris," they escape the imputation of any purpose to confuse the identity of their business with that of the plaintiffs. Inasmuch as over thirty years, the life of a generation, have elapsed since the plaintiffs acquired the good-will of the New York branch of the business of Goupil & Co., it is hardly possible that they are in danger of losing any of the patronage incident to that good-will. They cannot complain if they lose some of the patronage which may have been attracted by the repute enjoyed in the meantime by the Paris firm, and of which they may have been to some extent the beneficiaries. The defendants have a better right to this patronage than the plaintiffs have. The suit seems to have been brought upon the theory that the plaintiffs acquired the exclusive right to use the name of Goupil & Co. as a trade designation in this country. The plaintiffs have no such right. The case is not one where the vendor of a business has covenanted not to use his name in a simi-erty, and of plaintiffs' implied assent to its sole occu lar business in the same locality, nor is it even one where the vendor has authorized a purchaser to use his name at a given place as part of the good-will purchased; but it is one where the vendors authorized the vendee to use their name in conjunction with his by such a term of description as to denote that he had succeeded to their former business at New York city and its good-will. U. S. Cir. Ct., S. D. N. Y., Sept. 23, 1891. Knoedler v. Boussod. Opinion by Wallace, J. 47 Fed. Rep. 465. WASTE-BY TENANT IN COMMON-MINING.-The extraction of ore from a mine, and the cutting of timber on the claim to be used in the operation, by a tenant in common, is not waste. It may be urged, that at between lessor and lessee for years, their coutract contemplates the extraction of mineral, and in case of a life-estate, the grantor or donor must intend that his grantee or donee shall receive some benefit from his estate. But is it not also true, from the very nature of mining property in this State, valuable only because of the mineral it is supposed to contain, that each of the co-tenants may use it in the only way it can be used? The co-tenants out of possession may at any time enter into an equal enjoyment of their possession; their neglect to do so may be regarded as an assent to the sole occupation of the other. This is but another application of the principle announced in Pico v. Columbet, 12 Cal. 414. True, the co-tenant will not be held to assent to the commission of waste by the sole occupant, but the question returns, what acts done by him are waste? It cannot be doubted that on the part of a mere trespasser it is a wrong in the nature of waste to remove any ore from a mine. The cases cited by appellants fully sustain this proposition. But it is not a just inference that, as between tenants in common, the rule is the same. Section 732 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not relate to trespasses committed by those who have no interest in the property; nor does it define "waste," or declare what acts committed by a guardian, tenaut for life or years, or joint tenant, or tenant in common, as the case may be, shall be waste. For the appropriate meaning of the word, as applicable to acts done by these several classes of persons, we are relegated to the principles of the common law, and to various considerations of policy arising out of different conditions which the common law recognizes and approves. The word "waste "" not an arbitrary term, to be applied inflexibly without regard to the quantity or quality of the estate, the nature and species of the property, or the relation to it of the person charged to have committed the wrong. As was said by Roane, J., in Findlay v. Smith, 6 Munf. 134: "In considering what is waste in this country, it is to be remarked that the common law by which it is is pation by defendant for mining purposes, we regard the right of the latter to the proceeds of its operations as partaking of the nature of a usufruct; the appropriation of the net returns as a legitimate participation of the profits; and its acts of mining as not impairing or consuming the estate to any greater extent than must be presumed to have been intended to be allowable by each of the parties in interest. Murray v. Haverty, 70 Ill. 320, supposing it to have been correctly decided, does not entirely sustain the view of counsel for appellants. That decision was based upon a statute which authorized a tenant to bring trespass ortrover agains this co-tenant who should "take away, destroy, lessen in value or otherwise injure" the common property. The section of our Code does not declare that a co-tenant who "shall take away," etc., shall be guilty of waste. The question waste or no waste is left to the courts. Besides, in Murray . Haverty, the court had already decided the case by holding certain evidence as to license inadmissible under the defendant's plea. Counsel quote from Freeman on Co-Tenancy: "In all cases where a co-tenant practically destroys the estate, or some part thereof, trespass may be sustained by the injured co-tenant." Section 302. But this is to be taken with other portions of the same work where the distinction is pointed out between an appropriation of the proceeds, rents, profits or income, and the destruction of the estate itself. See also Wat. Tresp. 947. The tenant in common of a mine may occupy it for the purpose contemplated by all, even though a portion of the soil or ore be removed. Each tenant has the right to use the mine, and as was intimated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, so long as an estate is used according to its nature, "it is no valid objection that the use is consumption, and it is no fault of the tenant that it is not more endurable." Irwin v. Covode, 24 Penn. St. 162. The taking of ore from the mine is rather the use than the destruction of the estate within the meaning of the general rule. The results of the tenant's labor and capital are in the nature of proceeds or profits, the partial exhaustion being but the incidental consequence of the use. It is not necessary to examine in detail the many cases cited by appellants, as in none are the facts like those of the case at bar. We shall refer to a few of them. Delaney v. Root, 99 Mass. 546, was an action of trover for the conversion of personal property. Stetson v. Day, 51 Me. 434, simply decides that under a statute of Maine a tenant for life, who neglected to pay taxes assessed upon the estate during his tenancy, and thereby subjected the estate to a sale, was liable to an action by the reversioner, either of waste, or of case in the nature of waste. Maddox v. Goddard, 15 Me. 219, and Symonds v. Harris, 51 id. 14, were actious of trespass quare clausum for the destruc tion of a mill, and for the disseverance and removal of machinery from a mill; Blanchard v. Baker, 8 Me. 253, trespass on the case for a similar injury to common property; McDonald v. Trafton, 15 id. 225, has no bearing upon any question involved in the case before us; and Hubbard v. Hubbard, id. 198, was a statutory action of trespass "for strip and waste" of timber. As to the destruction of trees charged in the complaint herein, it has been expressly decided in California, that in the enjoyment of his legal rights in the common property, each co-tenant may cut timber and use and dispose of it, at least to an extent correspond ing to his share of the estate. Hihn v. Peck, 18 Cal. 640. In the case before us there is neither averment nor finding that defendant has cut or consumed more than its share. Besides, the use of the trees was merely incidental to the mining operations of defendant. In Pennsylvania it is held that the cutting of timber, to be used in a mine by the tenant for life, whose mining is not waste, is not itself waste. Neel v. Neel, 19 Penn. St. 328. Nowhere is it held to be waste for a tenant in common of a farm to cut wood necessary to the use of the farm. It was indeed held in New York by the Supreme Court that the cutting down of timber trees by one of several co-tenants upon land whose principal value consisted of the growing timber, was waste, for which the other co-tenants could recover damages under a clause of the Revised Statutes of that State. Elwell v. Burnside, 44 Barb. 447. But aside from the rule to the contrary laid down in Hihn v. Peck, 18 Cal. 640, plaintiffs have no averment that the quicksilver mine is "principally valuable" because of the trees growing from its surface. And here it may be added, applying the rule of Hihn v. Peck, it would seem each tenant in common of a mine is at least entitled to take out his share of the ore. That neither of the tenants can "look into the ground" may be a reason why a court of equity should order an account to be taken, but ought not to operate a prohibition upon the working of the mine by anybody. Sup. Ct. Cal., Aug. 31, 1883. McCord v. Oakland Quicksilver Mining Co. Opinion by McKinstry, J. WATER AND WATER-COURSES-RIPARIAN RIGHTSOBSTRUCTING NAVIGABLE STREAM WHARVES AND BOOMS.-Riparian owners cannot, though they own both sides of a navigable stream, construct booms entirely across the stream, since such booms would obstruct navigation. The right of a riparian owner to construct booms, wharves and piers does not permit him to obstruct navigation by such structures. The extent of the structures that he may maintain depends on the width and other characteristics of the stream. The Legislature may indeed, upon public consideratious, authorize such an exercise of the private right across the river as will not materially obstruct navigation. But without legislative permission the exercise of the private right entirely across the stream is forbidden by the statute. It was suggested in the former opinion in this case that the riparian right of constructing a boom was presumably limited by the thread of the stream. That is probably correct. It was a mere intimation however, and it was unfortunately made, if it led the appellants to believe--as the order proposed by them may suggest that the right always extends to the thread of the stream. It has already been shown that it cannot so extend to the obstruction of navigation. The appellants seem to apprehend that the language of this court in Diedrich v. Railway Co., and on the former appeal in this case, as well as in the second clause of the order from which this appeal is taken, renders the riparian right nominal and useless. It is claimed by the learned counsel that the measure of riparian right is restricted to water not navigable, and is unavailing 'because it cannot reach the point where it would become useful. It is not believed that the language of the Federal Supreme Court in Dutton v. Strong or Atlee v. Packet Co., or of this court in Diedrich v. Railway Co., or on the former appeal in this case, is properly subject to such hypercriticism. The right sustained in all these cases is a practical right, "in aid of navigation, through the water far enough to (Diedrich v. Railway reach actually navigable water" Boom Co. v. Reilly. Co.) "to aid in floating logs." These terms do not imply-the whole tenor of the opinions repels-the construction that wharves, piers, booms, and the like, in aid of navigation, must be constructed within such limits as to make them inoperative. A pier upon Lake Michigan, to aid navigation, must go into water deep enough to be accessible to vessels navigating the lake. A boom on a logging stream, to aid such navigation, must go into water deep enough to be accessible to floating logs; must be so constructed as to receive and discharge floating logs. In either case, to reach navigable water reasonably implies reaching it with effect to accomplish the purpose, the word often signifying some penetration of the thing reached. One is not understood to stop outside the limits of a place when he is said to reach it. He is understood to enter it as far as may be necessary for his purpose. The right in question necessarily implies some intrusion into navigable water, at peril of obstructing navigation. Atlee v. Packet Co. This intrusion is expressly permitted to aid navigation, and expressly prohibited to obstruct navigation. It is impossible to give a general rule limiting its extent. That will always depend upon the conditions under which the right is exercised; the extent and uses of the navigable water; the nature and object of the structure itself. A structure in aid of navigation which would be a reasonable intrusion into the waters of Lake Michigan would probably be an obstruction of navigation in any navigable river within the State. A logging boom which would be a reasonable intrusion into the waters of the Mississippi would probably be an obstruction of navigation in most or all of the logging streams within the State. The width of a river may justify a liberal exercise of the right of intrusion, or may exclude it altogether. Its extent is purely a relative question. And there are no facts in this record to warrant any opinion of the extent to which the appellants may exercise the right in this case, without impairing the public use. If within these conditions the appellants can construct a useful boom, they may. If not, their defect of right is in the condition of the river and its relation to their property, and not in the law. Sup. Ct. Wis., Jan. Term, 1879. Stevens Boom Co. v. Reilly. Opinion by Ryan, C. J. NOTES. NE of our prize suburban cities has been smiling over other day in an unexpected bon-mot. It seems that a gentleman, who having paid the State debt of several years in prison for certain defalcations over which he had no control, took up his residence, on being discharged, in one of these delightful towns. Across the way an honest blacksmith plied his skill, and early and late the fires of his furnace sent forth flame and smoke. The odors of burning hoofs and sometimes flesh were not agreeable in the nostrils of the ex-convict, and it was not long before he lodged a complaint against the practices of his industrious neighbor. The blacksmith fought back, and finally the town authorities came to the rescue by calling a meeting, at which both men were allowed to plead their own cause. But the whole |