remainder were in existence. In case a testator fails to make a legal devise of his realty, or if having legally devised it the devise fails for any cause, the heir will inherit, notwithstanding there is an express provision in the will that he shall not take any part of the estate. There must be a legal devise to cut off the right of the heir to inherit; mere words of disinheritance are insufficient to effect that purpose. Haxtun v. Corse, 2 Barb. Ch. 521; Chamberlain v. Taylor, 105 N. Y. 185, 193; Fitch v. Weber, 6 Hare, 145; Pickering v. Stamford, 3 Ves. 493; Johnson v. Johnson, 4 Beav. 318; 2 Jarm. Wills (Bigelow's ed.), 841; 1 Redf. Wills (4th ed.), 425. Accepting the Mosaic account of the origin of the human race, the testator must have had at the date of his will, and at the date of his death, collateral relatives on his father's side of some degree in the United States. | But such a broad interpretation of the meaning of the word "relations" would render the devise void for indefiniteness, and it is well settled that the word, when used in willa relating to personalty, only embraces persons within the statute of distribution. Edge v. Salisbury, 1 Amb. 70; Crossly v. Clare, id. 397; 3 Swanst. 320; Harding v. Glyn, 1 Atk. 469, and cases cited in Sanders' note; Goodinge v. Goodinge, 1 Ves. Sr. 231; Varell v. Wendell, 20 N. H. 431; Ennis v. Pentz, 3 Bradf. Sur. 382; Eagles v. Le Breton, L. R., 15 Eq. 148; Hibbert v. Hibbert, id. 372; 2 Jarm. Wills (Bigelow's ed.), 120; 2 Redf. Wills (3d ed.), 85; 2 Williams Ex'rs (6th Am. ed.), 1205; 4 Kent Com. (13th ed.) 537, note a. While the evidence does not make the existence of relatives of the testator by the father's side in the United States, which were within the classes embraced within the statute of distribution or the statute of descents impossible, it does render the existence of such persons improbable. It is seldom possible to demonstrate or establish to an absolute certainty the existence or the non-existence of the facts at issue between litigants, and the law does not require such a high degree of proof, but such evidence as renders the existence of the facts in issue, and upon which the right to recover depends, probable, is sufficient to require the party who denies their existence to sustain his denial by evidence. Certainty is not required to convict persons of criminal offenses. We think from the evidence that it is probable that no persons of either class, mentioned in the testator's will, were in existence at its date, or have been since, and that the plaintiffs made out a prima facie case. Second Division, April 19, 1892. Gallagher v. Crooks. Opinion by Follett, C. J. 11 N. Y. Supp. 497 reversed. CORRESPONDENCE. OBITER DICTA IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Glenn v. Marbury, decided May 16, 1892, is a very strong illustration of the improper manner in which uncalled for and unnecessary declarations of law are injected into an opinion. That was a suit filed by Glenn, trustee of the Nation Express and Transportation Company, against Marbury, in the District Court of the District of Columbia. The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in passing upon the case, disposed of it in a very simple manner, by holding that the common law prevailed in the District of Columbia, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to sue in his own name as trustee. When this case came before the Supreme Court of the United States that was the only point necessary for the court to pass upon in order to sustain the court below. If the plaintiff was not enti tled to sue in his own name under any circumstances, then it was wholly out of the legal aspect of the case for the United States Supreme Court to pass upon the validity of any of the defenses made by the defendant below. The old story is familiar of the nineteen excuses for the absence of the juror. The first excuse was that he was dead, and it certainly would have been ridiculous to mention any of the other eighteen excuses. In the same way, it was clearly the duty of the court in this case, if the plaintiff was not entitled to bring a suit in his own name, to pay no attention whatever to the defenses made in the case, and such consideration of these defenses was dehors the record. Especially was it erroneous in the court in this particular controversy to discuss the defenses made by the defendant below, for we can well understand it might have been to the interest of the plaintiff to have obtained a favorable decision in respect to the alleged defenses, even if the particular suit of Glenn v. Marbury was decided against him. Very respectfully yours, ST. LOUIS LAWYER. DINING THE JURY. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: The wholesome remarks by Judge Woolson on the impropriety of the dinner given to the jury in the United States court for Iowa, quoted in the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL for June 11, illustrate the difference between the manners and morals of this and former centuries. I take exception however to your statement that "the whole affair is eminently American." Mr. Newton followed a precedent long since, happily, obsolete, which once had the highest ecclesiastical as well as judicial approval. It was long the custom in England for the party to whom the verdict was given to give the jury a dinner. The practice is described in Sir Thomas Smith's Commonwealths, page 74. One of the most notable occasions where the custom was recognized was the trial of the Seven Bishops for libel in 1688. A curious letter from the defendant's solicitor to the Archbishop of Canterbury is still preserved: "May it please your Grace: We have watched the jury all night carefully, attending without the door on the stairhead. They have by order been kept all night without fire or candle, bread, drink, tobacco, or any other refreshment whatever, save only some basons of water and towels this morning about four. The officers, and our own servants, and others hired by us to watch the officers, have and shall constantly attend, but must be supplied with fresh men to relieve our guards, if need be. I am informed by my servant and Mr. Grange's that about midnight they were very loud one among another; and the like happened about three this morning; which makes me collect they are not yet agreed; they beg for a candle to light their pipes, but are denied. In case a verdict pass for us (which God grant in his own best time) the present consideration will be how the jury shall be treated. The course is usually each man so many guineas, and a common dinner for them all. The quantum is at your grace's and my lords' direction. But it seems to my poor understanding, that the dinner might be spared, least our watchful enemies interpret our entertainment of the jury for a public exultation and a seditious meeting and so it may be ordered thus: Each man guineas for his trouble. And each man a guinea over for his own desire; with my lords order, that I or some other intreat them in your names, not to dine together, for the reasons aforesaid. I conceive my lords the bishops will resolve how to direct me in this point, before they come into court. There were 22 of the jury appeared, and no more. And they that did not serve will expect a reward as well as those who did. I beg you grace's pardon for this trouble; 'tis only to enable my lords to consult what is fit to do decently on our part, and all is entirely submitted to your grace's and my lords judgment by, my lord. Your grace's most humble servant, "JO. INCE. "Six o'clock in the morning June 30 1688 at the Bell Tavern King street. "Just now the officer brings me word they are all agreed and are sending to my lord chief justice to know, where he pleases to take their verdict. "There must be 150 or 200 guineas provided." The bill of legal expenses shows a charge: "July 2. To the Mr. of the Bell Tavern, where the jury were kept..... £5 2 6" So it seems as if the Bishops' jury had their dinner after all. NEW YORK, June 12, 1892. ROGER FOSTER. A PREMATURE BANQUET. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: Anent your comments on the Newton Case, and Judge Woolson's righteous indignation at the action of the defendant in giving a banquet to the jury, it has occurred to me that the following anecdote might amuse you: I I was the district attorney of Richmond county in 1872, and among the indictments found at one of the terms of court were three against a Mr. B. for extortion in a petty office. The cases were substantially the same, and I selected one and put the defendant on trial. The jury, after due deliberation, acquitted. thought possibly a different jury would look at the second case differently, and placed the defendant on trial the second time, but the result was the same. Utterly disgusted, but in order to clear up my calendar, I put the man on trial for the third time, paying no attention to the selection of the jury, as I deemed an acquittal a foregone couclusion. To my astonishment, the jury convicted. The next morning one of the jurors told me that he felt that Mr. B. (the defendant) was doing him (the juror) a great injustice, "because," said he, "I acquitted him in the case before this, and he took us over to the house and gave us an oyster supper, and now, just because I voted to convict him this time, he is mad, and wont speak to me." The moral of this story, if it has one, would seem to be to banquet your jury after your trials are over. SUBSCRIBER. PORT RICHMOND, S. I., June 15, 1892. NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. MOYLE'S CONTRACT OF SALE. The Contract of Sale in the Civil Law, with references to the laws of England, Scotland and France. By J. B. Moyle. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1892. This work, by a tutor in New College, Oxford, will be interesting to every student of the civil law, and to every lawyer who desires a scholarly acquaintance with the source of our laws and a knowledge of their departure therefrom and the reasons of it. The little volume is well written, and the author acknowledges his obligation in the preparation of it to Judge Chalmers, the author of the celebrated and successful recent codification of the English law of Sales. POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE. A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence, as Administered in the United States of America; adapted for all the States, and to the union of legal and equitable remedies under the reformed procedure. By John Morton Pomeroy. Second edition, by Carter Pitkin Pomeroy and John Norton Pomeroy, Jr. In three volumes. San Francisco: BancroftWhitney Company, 1892. Pp. liii, 2727. It was a bold venture on the part of the late Professor Pomeroy to put forth a work on this topic in the face of Story's celebrated and admirable treatise. But basing his work on the assumption-whether justified or not we shall not undertake to pronounce-that under the "reformed procedure" of the codes the distinctive equitable principles were being lost sight of, he produced a commentary at once profound and practical, which has taken a permanent place as a classic, and may without exaggeration be called one of the most admirable legal essays of modern times. It is widely and frequently cited by the bar and the bench, and we should suppose that it holds its own with its formidable predecessor, and perhaps has an advantage in the consideration of the modern code adjudications, by the writer of the text. The present edition seems to have been edited in a judicious and selective manner by the sons of the lamented author. SCHOULER ON WILLS. This second edition, from the Boston Book Company, is a welcome book to any practitioner who has toiled through the jungle of the voluminous work of Jarman, overloaded with learned notes by several exhaustive editors, or even the more cleanly forest of Redfield's great treatise. In less than seven hundred pages of text Mr. Schouler has here stated with clearness and discrimination the essential and settled principles of this difficult topic. A table of cases covering only thirty-four pages shows that he has not attempted the hopeless task of trying to reconcile the enormous mass of decisions, scarcely any two of which proceed on the same basis of facts. It is much more difficult and requires more self-denial to write a short work on Wills than a long one, and Mr. Schouler, who has every faculty and acquirement necessary to a good text-book writer, has here given the profession an excellent, discriminating and useful treatise. WHY NOTES. HY do American law journals, for instance, the Weekly Law Bulletin, write "syllabi" for the plural of syllabus, instead of writing syllabuses? It is quite doubtful whether syllabus can properly be called a Latin word, or even a Greek word. On the other hand, there can be no doubt whatever about it having somehow become an American word, and entitled as such to have "es" added to it to denote its plural. We may hear yet of "omnibi" for " "omnibuses and "ignorami" for " "ignoramuses and "cauci" for 66 caucuses."-Indian Jurist. "Once," says an old Californian, "when Niles Searls was district judge up in Nevada and Sierra counties, the late Judge Belden and I were on opposite sides of a case which was to be argued before him. When we reached Nevada City we found the judge about to depart for Downieville on mule-back to hold court there. He made the novel proposition that we should ride over the mountains with him and argue our case on the way. We accepted the suggestion, secured horses and started off on either side of the judge's mule. I opened the case and concluded my argument as we reached North San Juan. Then Belden replied. He was very much in earnest, grew quite warm over the case, and didn't conclude until we had passed Nigger Tent. Then Judge Searls ruminated a short time and delivered his decision flat against Belden. Belden was so much worked up about the case that the decision made all three of us a little uncomfortable for a time, and not a word was spoken as we jogged along. Then, just as we rode down to Goodyear's bar, the judge broke the strained silence with the remark: 'My mule seems very tired.' 'I should think he would,' replied Belden, 'after getting up such a decision as that.'"New York Tribune. hundred and thirty-eight were filled with complete as a From a recent address of Mr. Harry Bingham of Littleton, N. H., on the death of Judge Ladd, we extract the following on politics on the bench: "It has always seemed to me that the business of making a man's politics the test whether he shall or shall not have a judicial appointment is a most miserable business. I never could conceive how politics, honestly entertained by an honest man, learned in the law, who would sooner cut his right hand off than pervert the law, could disqualify him for a seat on the bench, or how a mere partisan qualification could be any qualifi-eral statistics of the United Kingdom, the extracted cation at all for judicial honors. I am sure that the man who is made a judge on account of his partisan qualifications will always turn out to be a mere trimmer. In a storm he cannot be relied upon to stand by the right for anybody, for any thing, not even for his own side in politics. Here I desire to quote a few words on this subject which I have said elsewhere: ‘A judge, as a judge, has no business with party politics, and has no legitimate use for them. He should never be put on or off the bench because he is or is not a partisan of a particular stripe. The idea ef mixing up a certain amount of political partisanship of one kind with a certain amount of political partisanship of another kind, and putting the mixture on the bench and calling it an impartial court, would seem, inasmuch as partisanship of any kind is out of place there, to be a gross absurdity. I should just as soon think that profane swearing is necessary to qualify a preacher to give in the pulpit sound gospel preaching, as that po. litical partisanship is necessary to qualify a man for a seat on the bench. It seems to me that it is just as sensible to claim that the pulpit would be all right if it were supplied by a certain number of preachers who cau curse one way profanely, and a certain number who can curse the other way profanely, as it is to claim that the court is all right because a part of the judges are partisans of one kind and a part of them are partisans of another kind. Unless some mischievous muddle is required, or somebody is to be humbugged, there cannot be any occasion to constitute a court on such a fundamental theory. There is no sense or reason in holding that you have built up a good thing because you have put two diverse elements in a place where neither of them belongs. There is no precedent for it in nature or in history, and none in poetry unless the decoction prepared by Shakespeare's witches in the play of Macbeth be regarded as one. The only legitimate questions to be asked in the appointment of a judge Is he honest? Is he capable?'" are: In relation to literary theft the editor of the Nineteenth Century has published, in a recent number of his magazine, an emphatic condemnation of the "monstrous extent to which an organized system of plunder is carried in certain quarters." "Under pretense," writes he, "of criticism and the transparent guise of sample-extracts, the whole value of articles and essays--which may and frequently have cost a review hundreds of pounds-is offered to the public for a penny or even a halfpenny," and he adds that "a determination has been arrived at to make an example of such pilferers." The cases are numerous in which the defense of literary piracy on the ground of "comment, criticism or illustration," has been unsuccessfully raised. Perhaps the best example is Campbell v. Scott, 11 Simon, 31. In that case (as cited in "Scrutton on Copyright [2d ed.], page 123) the defendant had published a volume of seven hundred and ninety pages, thirty-four of which pages were taken up with a critical essay on English poetry, while the remaining seven An answer to an inquiry for rate of transportation makes a contract complete on delivery of the goods to the carrier, so that the actual contract then made by the acceptance of the bill of lading is a nullity, and the contract remains as if the carrier had accepted the goods in silence. This is the decision of the highest court of the greatest commercial State of the Union. Jennings v. Grand Trunk R., New York Court of Appeals, 30 Am. Law Reg. 638. The necessary corollary, nay, the direct decision is, that the exclusion of perils of the sea, or fire, or acts of the public enemy, is impossible, if rates have previously been given in reply to an inquiry. Apply this to policies of insurance, life or fire, to sales of merchandise, to contracts for hire! Plainly if such a piece of folly requires analysis for exposure, it lies here: There was no contract until acceptance by the carrier. No one is bound to sell because he has named a price at which he sells. The coutract made when the goods were delivered would have included the inference of a contract on the proposed terms, had not such an inference been excluded by an nexing the substituted contract; and if it was not intended that the substituted contract should have such an operation, it was the duty of the shipper to demand acceptance on the naked promise to carry for a certain rate. If the New York rule were the correct cauon for construing conduct and words, it undoubtedly follows that there was no right to a bill of lading or a receipt, or any acknowledgment. If that document was a right, it was because the intention to act on the usual terms of shippers and carriers was implied in the mak ing of the rate. In truth, there was no contract at all, but for a rate-and that conditioned upon the delivery and acceptance of the goods. To force a carrier into a contract to carry when there was no correlative obligation to ship, is inconsistent with accuracy. Common sense, it may be said, implies such an obligation, but if implied at all, surely it must be upon the cus tomary terms of bills of lading and other similar documents. If A asks B the rate for cotton or sugar, will any one contend that by naming a rate, B is bound to sell whatever A demands-it may be ten times what he has got? A man cannot but be amazed that any thing so elementary had been overlooked as what does coustitute a contract.-R. C. McMurtrie in Am. Law Reg. and Review. The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, JUNE 25, 1892. CURRENT TOPICS. as we are informed there is but one branch So far minor morals the infraction of which the There The exercises of the forty-first commencement of the Albany Law School were held last week. were thirty-five graduates. The orations of the four graduates selected to represent the class inclined more to politics than to law, the subjects of three being respectively, "Social Discontent," "Reciprocity," and "Duration of the (presidential) Executive Term; while the fourth young gentleman audaciously essayed to jest with his reverend himself Curios mistress, and uttered bs were of a humorous description, but we can assure our young friend and a dead-letter misdemeanor. We refer to the Dime pupil that the most curious things in the law are Novel business. We do not recall any law making frequently the most serious. It strikes us as rather it a penal offense to sell, give away, lend, recomimpertinent to play music from "Robin Hood" on mend, beg, buy, borrow or read a Dime Novel. Of the graduating of law students. The address to the course it would not answer to use the phrase graduates was by the Honorable John Randolph "Dime Novel," in the statute, for the publisher Tucker, of Virginia. This gentleman, so much would evade it by changing the price, just as the honored by his own State - eight years attorneyalley-keepers evaded the law against "nine-pins," by general and twelve years in Congress - but now by adding a pin. Indeed this demoralizing literature choice retired to the teaching of lawis already afforded at half a dime, and such was with a high reputation for learning, tact and sound the literary pabulum on which had fed the young judgment, and for purity and loveliness of charstudent Fales, of Newark, N. J., convicted early acter. His reception was extremely cordial. His this month of murder in the first degree. Judge manner of speaking is earnest and attractive. UnDepue, at Newark, brought this subject to the at-like most orators on such occasions he spoke extemtention of the grand jury recently, using the case of Fales as his text. As a newspaper report says: came to us poraneously and with a considerable degree of personal directness and familiarity, which was quite effective. He discoursed with suitable generalization on the municipal, constitutional and international law. He spoke in terms of glowing admiration of the common law, but not without the acknowledgment of its great debt, late confessed, to the civil law. This is true and just, for in comparison with the people ruled by the civil law the English of Bracton's day were a race of barbarians, with small notions of civility or equity.* He assured his hearers that law is and in this "He had seen several of these novels since the trial of Fales, and was convinced that they were the most pernicious literature that were ever produced. He promised that if he could find any law for the indictment of the books he would bring them before the next grand jury. He had found that upward of twenty persons were engaged in their sale in Newark, and that the purchasers were boys and girls. Men avoided them. The judge presented an estimate, which he had obtained by careful inquiry, of the effect of this literature upon the children of the city. The estimate was obtained from the record of the ages of persons who are brought before the police courts, for offenses in-country always must be a progressive science, and volving attempts to rob, stealing, and crimes of that character; and the result of the inquiry is certainly startling. Here is the judge's presentment in his own language: Persons charged with larceny, combined with breaking and entering, or entering with intent (that is a high crime), under the age of eighteen years, thirty per cent; between eighteen and twenty-three, sixty per cent, making ninety per cent; over twentythree, ten per cent. For simple larceny, which involves the same grade of crime, being petty or grand larceny, according to the amount, under eighteen, sixty per cent; between eighteen and twenty-three, thirty per cent; over twenty-three, ten per cent-cases of simple larceny being considerably the most numerous. It is safe to say that of the persons charged with some form of stealing, over sixty per cent are under the age of eighteen years.' It may well be doubted that the half-dime novel is chargeable with all this precocious crime, but undoubtedly it stimulates to much crime, and to much of a more serious nature. But if any legistive attempt should be made to repress this evil, we should find a large part of the public indifferent if not sneering at it. Such has been the fate of many of Mr. Comstock's well-meant and often useful efforts. VOL. 45 No. 26. we are glad to hear this statement from a Virginia lawyer of such eminence and influence, for it gives us hope that his State will soon put married women on an equal footing with their husbands in respect to rights of property and person. Mr. Tucker however repeated the common declaration that the English people owe their freedom to the common law, a statement which has always seemed to us an attribution of the cause to the effect. We would * *The latest writer on this topic says: "It must be borne in mind that the men who conquered the Britons and founded England were pagan savages, the rudest of their race, and the least tinctured with the civilization of Rome. * The descendants of these men lingered on in barbarism. ** As for the laws of the conquerors, it was such as might be expected from such a source. There grew * * * up a jurisprudence cumbrous, complicated and unnatural, rather say, the common law did not make the English free, but it was because the English were determined to be free that they adopted the rule of the common law. Common law is common custom, and a free people will be governed by its own customs. The common law is simply the expression and not the cause of freedom. A man's prayer does not make him pious, but because he is pious he prays. The Declaration of Independence did not make the American people independent, but it was merely the announcement of their determination to be free. Mr. Tucker's address was illuminated by a beautiful Christian spirit and a just acknowledgment of the all-powerful influence of the Christian religion as the greatest of civilizing forces. As we listened to this enlightened, humane and liberal orator we could not help thinking that if the world had always been made up of men like him, there would never have been and there never could be any wars, and wishing that the whole legal profession would emulate his spirit. The list of the graduates is as follows: Charles Appleby, | David H. Agnew, James L. Barnes, William S. Bennet, George A. Brigham, Franklin W. Cristman, H. Benjamin Chase, Prescot K. Dederick, John K. Garnsey, George William Gedney, Thomas Guy, Edgar M. Haines, Arthur Helme, Clayton Haff, Herbert L. Hunt, Bernard H. Lord, Warren McConihe, Edward Murphy, 2d, Rufus C. Maltby, Charles L. Moore, Martin T. Nachtmann, Charles V. Nellany, Edward E. O'Brien, Charles H. Page, Jr., Leslie A. Pease, Rufus W. Peckham, Jr., Robert M. S. Putnam, Nash Rockwood, Walter E. Rowley, James E. Ryan, Ralph Thompson, James E. Towner, Jr., Albert V. Van Voast, Clarence B. Ward, Walter H. Wertime. The new dean, Mr. Lewis B. Hall, is to be congratulated on the success of his administration of the school during his opening year. Albany is one of the best places in this country to study law-in some respects the very best certainly in every respect the best in this State, considering its great library, its courts, its Legislatures, the eminent advocates who resort here, and the peaceful and studious air of the ancient town. There is no reason why this old school, the most eminent of the one-year schools left in the country, should not have a larger share of patronage and exert ev a wider influence in the future. Review says: "If there is any business which is strictly private and in no sense public, it is the business of insurance in all its branches. It is not the sale of a prime necessity. People can get along without it. It is subject to the severest competition, and the agents of insurance companies are every| where bidding against each other for business. And yet laws exist and are held valid in every State in the Union, interfering with the terms of contracts between insurers and insured; and a statute of Pennsylvania even prescribes a form of insurance policy." Now the reason why Legislatures have in this way interfered with insurance is that the insurers are corporations, the mere creatures of statute, and manifestly under the reasonable regulation of their creator. We do not deny the right of Legislatures to prescribe rules for the mode and time of payment of employees of corporations, but we do deny their right to interfere with any agreement in such matters between individual employers and their employees. If our judicial friend of the Review could and should induce his cook to accept a year's number of his excellent periodical on account of her wages, the Legislature would be extremely impudent, and in our opinion entirely outside their lawful right, in enacting a law that should interfere with such a beneficial mode of paying off the cook. When our learned and candid friend is writing about individuals he should lay aside his fretful corporation quill, and spare us those denunciations of "the man who is on top and who has the other fellow down and has him by the throat." But we greatly enjoy the mingled audacity and merriment which led the Reviewer to write of the judicial portraits in The Green Bag: 'Many of them have a stern, others a shrewd glare of the eye; and several of them wear the opinionated grin which characterizes The Green Bag's picture of Chief Justice Marshall; a grin which, without doubt, expressed the opinion which the great chief justice had of himself. He undoubtedly regarded himself as having been, in some sort of way, divinely appointed to amend the Constitution of the United States so as to make it what its framers ought to have made it in the beginning." Now we expect to "catch it," but we must say that when it comes to judicial "grins," nothing could be more grinful than the portrait of the G. C. K. himself, at page xvi of the "Publishers' Department" of the current number of the Review, The American Law Review has waxed into what in which he looks as if he held his foot, bearing we should call the Great Corporation Killer, and with all its imposing superstructural weight upon the with many of its views and its zealous expression neck of some detestable monopoly, and a-smelling of them we have great sympathy. But we see no its blood. Our big brother, speaking of our recent reason for its extending its hatred of corporations researches in the matter of drinking tobacco, says: to individuals. Thus in its "Notes" in the current" the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL is always very learned number it vehemently disagrees with some recent in unimportant matters." We don't remember that writers who have denied the right of Legislatures we ever exhibited more learning on an unimportant to interfere with the freedom of contract between matter than the Reviewer exhibits on page 478 in employers and employees, and who have fallen in the passage beginning, "But after all what is a with recent adjudications in several States holding portrait?" Starting out with Alexander, glancing such laws unconstitutional, such for example as the at Porus and Marcus Aurelius, and winding up with store-order law. In its criticism of these views the metrical memorials of Napoleon. |