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THE RECEPTION AND BANQUET.
The banquet given at the Leland Hotel on the evening of Wednesday, January 12th, was a very brilliant and successful one.
There were two hundred and thirty covers laid, and among the guests were many lawyers of State and National reputation.
At an early hour in the evening the guests began to arrive, and the spacious parlors of the Hotel were soon filled with a brilliant throng of people.
At 9 o'clock the doors of the Banquet Hall were thrown open, and the long line of guests, headed by the State officials, judges of the Supreme and Appellate Courts, and other prominent guests, with their wives and ladies, filed in.
Rev. D. S. Johnson officiated as Chaplain.
The following toasts were proposed, and appropriate responses made:
The Supreme Court-Hon. A. Orendorff.
The State Circuit Court-Judge S. S. Page.
The Bar-Judge J. J. Phillips.
The Secrets of the Profession-Mr. J. H. Raymond.
After the tables were cleared away, dancing began and continued to a late hour.
ADDRESSES AND PAPERS DELIVERED AND READ BEFORE THE ILLINOIS
STATE BAR ASSOCIATION AT ITS TENTH ANNUAL MEETING,
SPRINGFIELD, ILL., JANUARY 11TH AND 12TH, 1887.
DELIVERED BEFORE THE ILLINOIS STATE BAR ASSOCIATION. AT ITS TENTH ANNUAL MEETING, HELD AT SPRINGFIELD, JANUARY, 11TH AND 12TH, 1887.
BY M. W. FULLER, PRESIDENT.
Gentlemen of the Illinois State Bar Association:
Since its last Annual Meeting this Association has been called upon to mourn the departure of some of its most eminent members, including my immediate predecessors in office, David Davis and Benjamin S. Edwards. The distinguished magistrate and the accomplished lawyer represented all that is best in the practice of the profession and the discharge of judicial functions. Both had attained the ripeness which is the consummation of careers of honor and usefulness, and blameless lives, we may well believe, had given both, before the inevitable going hence, repose in that upper chamber, whose windows look toward the sunrise, and whose name is Peace.
The distinction between practice and knowledge, between rules and doctrines, between art and science, is sufficiently obvious. Art throws itself into the form of rules, but every rule is to be found in the theorems of science. Up to Hallam's time law had been studied, to use his words, in general with more solicitude to know its rules and definitions, than to perceive their application to that for which all rules of law ought to be studied, the maintenance of public and private rights, and hence was considered an art rather than a science. This must be so as to its practice, which is nothing but the application of the rules deduced from the fundamental propositions of the science.
The Justinian definition of jurisprudence, was the knowledge of what is just and what is unjust; that is to say, the science of justice-the science of that right reason, conformable to nature, constituting the universal law which, as Cicero wrote, neither people nor government can give us any dispensation from obeying; which is "not one thing at Rome and another at Athens, one thing to-day and another to-morrow, but in all times and nations this universal law must forever reign eternal and imperishable." Not only so, but therefore so, jurisprudence may be said to be the science of positive laws.