One of the objects of the "American Bar Association," is to secure, as far as possible, uniformity of legislation upon such general subjects as I have indicated. A distinguished member of that association is present, by invitation, to represent and recommend its work, and I bespeak for him a careful and considerate hearing while he presents the plea of the association which he represents, for reform in the law.

The "National Bar Association," is another organization, the object of which is to promote the unification of the laws of the various States, which relate to matters in which the people of the United States have a common interest. Its purposes, as declared in its constitution, are in substance the same as those of the American Bar Association.

By invitation from this Association, a member of the National Association is here to speak for it. and to represent its purposes, and I know that the great importance of the subject will command your attention.

These associations are each National in their organization and character, and acting in conjunction with the State Bar Associations and with local Bar Associations within the States, they may accomplish much in securing uniformity of legislation upon such questions as may be proper subjects of unification.

Another object had in view in the formation of this Association, was to "Facilitate the administration of justice." Mr. Field, in the address from which I have already quoted, said:

"We are a boastful people. We make no end of saying what great things we have done, and are doing, and yet behind these brilliant shows there stands a spectre of halting justice, such as is to be seen in no other part of Christendom. So far as I am aware, there is no other country calling itself civilized, where it takes so long to punish a criminal, and so many years to get a final decision between man and man. Truly may we say that justice passed through the land on leaden sandals."

It is not the severity of punishment that deters bad men from criminal action, so much as the certainty that some punishment will follow swift on the heels of the crime. In criminal prosecutions, every delay increases the chances that the guilty may escape, or adds to the burdens which persons charged with crimes they have not committed, must bear in defending themselves and maintaining their innocence.

Litigation in civil actions is, or may be, so prolonged and expensive as to amount to a denial of justice. We concede this much when we undertake to "facilitate the administration of justice." How shall the undertaking be made a success? How shall the "leaden sandals" be removed, and justice be made sure-footed and swift?

In mechanics, if a machine moves too slow, we look out for means to accelerate its motion. The courts of the State in which all judicial power is vested, constitute together a machine for the administration of civil and criminal justice. We concede that it moves too slowly. It moves so slow that we undertake to "facilitate" its motion. There must be friction or clumsy workmanship somewhere in the machinery itself. If so, where is it?

Shall we examine it a moment? Begin with the justices of the peace courts, where a large majority of the small controversies arising between citizens of the State, originate and are determined. There is but little chance for delay here. Court is always open. Return days are short. Continuances are brief. Changes of venue occasion but little suspense. In this court of the people, the suit marches on in a plain, simple way, from the time it is commenced until it is ended. Appeals lie from the justice's courts to the County and Circuit Courts. The terms of these courts are usually six months apart. By selecting the court to which his appeal is taken, the appellant obtains six months of delay, and twelve months if he can obtain a single continuance. Appeals are often taken for delay alone. Here justice puts on her "leaden sandals," and they will be removed only when appeals are no longer the occasion of unnecessary and vexatious delay.

The next piece of this judicial machinery to be examined is the County Court, with "original jurisdiction in all matters of probate, settlement of estates of deceased persons, appointment of guardians and conservators, and settlement of their accounts; in all matters relating to apprentices, and proceedings for the collection of taxes and assessments, and such other jurisdiction as may be provided for by general law.” Jurisdiction has been provided by general law in misdemeanors, and a large class of civil actions, but the law terms. at which this jurisdiction may be exercised, are limited in most counties to two in each year, so that when an appeal comes up from an inferior court, it usually requires six months to bring it to trial. Every continuance of any cause results in a delay of six months more.

It would facilitate the administration of justice to provide by general law that the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the County Courts might be exercised in all terms. It would facilitate it much more if the Legislature should provide by general law that the County Courts should be courts of general jurisdiction, and have concurrent jurisdiction with the Circuit Courts in all matters criminal and civil. Continuances would then be only for such time as should be necessary, and changes of venue would send causes to a court that would be ready to try them within a month at the farthest. All liti gated causes could be set for trial, and tried at the time set, without the enormous expense of holding witnesses over from day to day, as is now done, in the Circuit and County Courts. Jails would not fill up with persons charged with crime, to be kept for months at the expense of the county. Punishment would overtake the guilty, and vindication be afforded to the innocent. Every person could obtain "by law, right and justice, freely, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay." If this were done, should the Circuit Court be abolished? That is not at all necessary. Enough circuit judges might be elected to constitute the four Appellate Courts, and to hold Circuit Courts in the very few counties where the volume of business is so great that the County Court and the Probate Court, provided for in the Constitution, cannot take care of it. The Circuit Courts, where the most vexatious and expensive delays usually occur, would, except in a few large cities and counties, be practically eliminated from the judicial machinery, and a law suit, when commenced, would march continuously along to final judgment, with only such rests as should be necessary to prepare it for trial. The County Courts would be elevated to the present dignity of the Circuit Courts. Men of eminent ability and legal learning would be placed on the County Bench. All records of judgments and decrees affecting real estate would be found in one court instead of in two.

But little complaint has been made of delays in the Appellate Courts, and I submit that with more frequent sittings of these courts, and the entire relief of the judges from circuit duty, there would be no delays that would constitute any just ground for complaint.

In the early judicial history of the State, it was thought proper to have the Supreme Court hold its sittings at Ottawa, Springfield and Mount Vernon. There were reasons that then seemed to justify this opinion, but in the wonderful progress and changed condition of the State, they have passed away, and there appears to be no longer any reason why

the migratory character of that court should be maintained. If its sittings were located in this city alone, and salaries paid to the judges that would permit them to reside here during their terms of office, the business of the court would be more promptly transacted. The ability of the judges to consult together at all times, would enable the court to reach conclusions promptly and without delay. Opinions could be read, approved and filed as soon as prepared. The court might be, for all practical purposes, in perpetual session, and its work in constant progress. Here again, by the change I have suggested, the administration of justice might be facilitated.

I am aware that the positions here taken are open to attack, and subject to hostile criticism. I have prepared no defense for them. I have said nothing intended to disarm criticism. If they serve to provoke others to show a better way to "facilitate the administration of justice," they will have answered the purpose I have in view in presenting them.

We have, in our constitution, said that another purpose of this Association is to elevate the standard of integrity, honor and courtesy in the legal profession. There is certainly no profession in which the standard of these sterling virtues, integrity and honor, should be more elevated than in the legal profession. I believe that in respect to these qualities of character, the lawyers of the United States may safely challenge comparison with any and all other professions or callings. They are so much a lawyer's capital in business, that he cannot dispense with them. More trusts are committed to his keeping than to that of any other member of society, and the betrayal of a trust by an American lawyer is so rare as to be phenomenal. Misfortune, in all its forms, with all of its tongues and voices of sorrow, pain and despair, pours its confidences into our ears, and they are sacredly kept. The oppressed come to us with the bitter story of their wrongs, and whether they bring us gold for a fee, or come in the rags of penury, our services are faithfully given, and they receive such redress as the laws award. The fugitive from the fury of the mob seeks our counsel and protection, and we stand between him and the red-hot storm of evil and unreasoning passion by which he is pursued, and save him by putting ourselves in peril. The criminal, with the strong arm of the law reaching after his estate to satisfy penalties, or thrusting him towards a prison where bolts and bars would separate him from liberty, and where he would be clothed in the garb of disgrace and degradation, or threatening to lead him to a gibbet, appeals to us and receives our assistance. However hot the zeal of those who prosecute, we save him

from punishment beyond the measure of his crime, and the judgment against him is tempered with mercy, instead of being embittered with malice or hatred. The innocent, whom accident, adverse circumstances or falsehood has caused to be accused of criminal violation of the law, bring to us their unfortunate surroundings, and we listen patiently to their earnest but apparently uncorroborated protestations of innocence, and somehow a way is always opened for their escape and vindication. In all the important business affairs of life, men are led by our counsel and act upon our advice. We write their wills, and distribute their estates when they are dead; we drive away the pack of "wolves in sheep's clothing,' who, notwithstanding the homestead exemption laws, "devour widows' houses."

While we can take professional pride in the high standard of integrity and honor of the bar, we are still painfully conscious of the fact that a few members of the profession fall far below the high standard maintained by the American Bar. Let such be only examples of warning, and not imitatation.

Courtesy is a prime virtue, and a strong weapon in the quick, sharp contest of the lawyer's occupation. Its possession, upon all occasions, marks the mastery of the man over himself. To be genuine, it must be in-born. Though in-born, it requires the most assiduous and protracted culture. Like the shield of the Roman soldier, it should be borne into every conflict, no matter how sudden or how fierce. Among the most difficult places for the lawyer to observe that high degree of courtesy which gentlemen owe to each other on all occasions, is in the heated discussions that take place in the trial of causes in the court. Wrought up to that high tension which every lawyer feels on such occasions, engaged in an intellectual duel with an antagonist under like excitement and inflamed by like zeal; realizing that the issue of the duel is to be then and there finally settled, he may allow an angry passion to usurp the place of an intellectual effort, and in this moment of weakness, an uncourteous word or phrase leaps from his tongue. Any one, when under no strain or excitement, can select his words and moderate his tones in courteous measure. It is the strong man only who, in the white heat of controversy, when every passion is awake, when the eye flashes out the fires that burn in the soul, when every power of the mind is aroused, when the battle is on and the contest presses hotly forward, can thrust and parry, and parry and thrust in courteous phrases that flash and cut like a