An ordinance providing for the destruction of dogs not licensed is not an unconstitutional interference with property. (In re Ackerman, 6 Cal. App. 5, 91 Pac. 429.)

A provision in the specifications for public street work that no unnaturalized alien should be employed in the work, except with the permission of the highway commission, is invalid. (City Street Imp. Co. v. Kroh, 158 Cal. 308, 110 Pac. 933.)

Section 384 of the Penal Code, subdivision 3, declaring it a misdemeanor to willfully and negligently build a fire on one's own land for the purposes of burning brush, etc., is violative of the federal and state Constitutions as an unreasonable and oppressive interference with the right to use and enjoy property. (In re McCapes, 157 Cal. 26, 106 Pac. 229.)

The provision of the mechanic's lien law allowing an attorney's fee to plaintiff but not to defendant is in violation of this provision. (Builders' Supply Depot v. O'Connor, 150 Cal. 265, 119 Am. St. Rep. 193, 11 Ann. Cas. 712, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 909, 88 Pac. 982.)

The right of property includes the right to dispose of such property in such manner as the owner pleases, and to sell it for such price as he can obtain in fair barter. (Ex parte Quarg, 149 Cal. 79, 117 Am. St. Rep. 115, 9 Ann. Cas. 747, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 183, 84 Pac. 766.)

The mechanic's lien law is not unconstitutional because it abridges the right of contract in respect to one's property. (Stimson Mill Co. v. Nolan, 5 Cal. App. 754, 91 Pac. 262.)

The provision of section 1203 of the Code of Civil Procedure that a failure to comply with the section by filing a good and sufficient bond with the building contract in an amount equal to at least twenty-five per cent of the contract price shall render "the owner and contractor jointly and severally liable in damages to any and all materialmen, and subcontractors entitled to liens upon property affected by said contract," is an unreasonable restraint upon the owner of the property in the use thereof, and is an unreasonable restriction upon the power to make contracts, and is, therefore, unconstitutional. (Martin v. McCabe, 21 Cal. App. 658, 132 Pac. 606.)

Business.-The legislature cannot forbid the lawful pursuit of a lawful occupation on one day of the week any more than it can forbid it altogether. (Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502. But see Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 678.)

But this provision does not prevent the legislature from prohibiting the conducting of offensive trades within the limits of a city. (Ex parte Shrader, 33 Cal. 279.)

So an ordinance making it unlawful for any person to conduct a laundry within certain limits without a certificate from the health officer as to its sanitary condition, and a certificate from the fire wardens as to the condition of the heating appliances, and forbidding the operation of any laundry between 10 P. M. and 6 A. M., or on Sunday, is valid. (Ex parte Moynier, 65 Cal. 33, 2 Pac. 728.)

An ordinance making it unlawful to play any instrument, etc., in any saloon, etc., after midnight, and for any female to be in any saloon, etc., after midnight, does not violate this provision. (Ex parte Smith & Keating, 38 Cal. 702.)

A statute limiting the compensation of employment agencies is invalid. (Ex parte Dickey, 144 Cal. 234, 103 Am. St. Rep. 82, 1 Ann. Cas. 428, 66 L. R. A. 928, 77 Pac. 924.)

When a lawful business is of a beneficial character, and not dangerous to the public, it cannot be subjected to police regulation. (Ex parte Dickey, 144 Cal. 234, 103 Am. St. Rep. 82, 1 Ann. Cas. 428, 66 L. R. A. 928, 77 Pac. 924.)

It is always a judicial question whether any particular regulation of the constitutional right of the citizen to engage in an innocent and useful business is a valid exercise of the legislative power. (Ex parte Hayden, 147 Cal. 649, 109 Am. St. Rep. 183, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 184, 82 Pac. 315.)

An act making it unlawful to issue trading stamps and coupons is unconstitutional. (Ex parte Drexel, 147 Cal. 763, 3 Ann. Cas. 878,

2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 588, 82 Pac. 429.)

The legislature has the constitutional right to modify the common law by taking away the revocable nature of the license granted by a ticket to a place of public amusement. (Greenberg v. Western Turf Assn., 148 Cal. 126, 113 Am. St. Rep. 216, 82 Pac. 684.)

An act forbidding the employment of women for more than eight hours a day does not conflict with this section so far as it applies to women employed in hotels. (Matter of Application of Miller, 162 Cal. 687, 124 Pac. 427; affirmed in Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 59 L. Ed. 628, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342.)

Constitutionality of statutes restricting contracts and business.
See note, 21 L. R. A. 789.

Sunday laws.-In Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502, it was held that an act making it unlawful to transact any business upon the Sabbath, except certain designated ones, was in violation of this provision, on the ground that the legislature can no more forbid the lawful pursuit of a lawful occupation on one day of the week than it can forbid it altogether. This decision was overruled in Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 678, and Ex parte Bird, 19 Cal. 130.

An act making it a misdemeanor to keep open a barber-shop on Sundays or other holidays is in violation of this section. (Ex parte Jentzsch, 112 Cal. 468, 32 L. R. A. 664, 44 Pac. 803.)

Life, liberty, etc.-A law imposing the death penalty upon a person undergoing a life sentence, who, with malice aforethought, commits an assault upon another with a deadly weapon, or by any means likely to produce bodily injury, is valid. (In re Finley, 1 Cal. App. 198, 81 Pac. 1041.)

Right of privacy, when and how may be enforced. See note,
89 Am. St. Rep. 844.

Right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. See 6 R. C.
L., §§ 243-250, pp. 258-266.

Political power.

Sec. 2. All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for the protection, security, and

benefit of the people, and they have the right to alter or reform the same whenever the public good may require it.

THE PEOPLE.-The people are such as are born upon the soil, and such foreigners as may elect to assume the obligations of citizens by naturalization. Those who are not of the people have no share in political power; and, therefore, an alien is not eligible to an office in this state. (Walther v. Rabolt, 30 Cal. 185.)

Relation to the American Union.

Sec. 3. The state of California is an inseparable part of the American Union, and the Constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land.

AMERICAN UNION.-The United States Constitution is the su

preme law of the land. (U. S. Const., art. VI, sec. 2; Prigg v. Commonwealth, 16 Pet. 590, 628, 10 L. Ed. 1080, 1094; New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164, 3 L. Ed. 303; Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43, 3 L. Ed. 650; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, 18 L. Ed. 403; Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366, 21 L. Ed. 287; Ex parte Romaine, 23 Cal. 585.)

The object of the United States Constitution was to establish a government which, to the extent of its powers, should be supreme within its sphere of action. (Dobbins v. Commrs. of Erie Co., 16 Pet. 435, 10 L. Ed. 1022; Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 520; 16 L. Ed. 169, 175; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 5 L. Ed. 257; United States v. Rhodes, 1 Abb. U. S. 28, 44, Fed. Cas. No. 16,151; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579.)

The Constitution of the United States is a part of the organic law of each state. (Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366, 21 L. Ed. 287; Ex parte Romaine, 23 Cal. 585.)

This section does not have the effect to make the various provisions of the Constitution of the United States a part of our state Constitution. (People v. Nolan, 144 Cal. 75, 77 Pac. 774.)

Religious freedom.

Sec. 4. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall be forever guaranteed in this state; and no person shall be rendered incompetent to be a witness or juror on account of his opinions on matters of religious belief; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this state.

SUNDAY LAWS.-In Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502, it was held that an act making it unlawful to transact any business upon the

Sabbath, except certain designated ones, was in violation of this provision. In reaching this conclusion, the following principles were laid down:

Our constitutional theory regards all religions, as such, as equally entitled to protection and equally unentitled to preference. Where there is no ground or necessity upon which a principle can rest but a religious one, then the Constitution steps in and says that it shall not be enforced by authority of law.

When the citizen is compelled by the legislature to do any affirmative act, or to refrain from doing anything, merely because it violates a religious principle or observance, the act is unconstitutional.

This provision does not mean to guarantee merely toleration, but religious liberty in its largest sense, and a perfect equality, without distinction, between religious sects. An enforced observance of a day held sacred by one of these sects is a discrimination in favor of that sect, and a violation of the religious freedom of the others.

This decision, however, has been overruled by later cases: Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 678; Ex parte Bird, 19 Cal. 130; Ex parte Burke, 59 Cal. 6, 43 Am. Rep. 231.

WITNESSES.-This section means that a witness is competent without respect to his religious sentiments or convictions-the law leaving his competency to legal sanctions, or, at least, to considerations independent of religious sentiments and convictions. (Fuller v. Fuller, 17 Cal. 605.)

Religious belief as affecting competency of witness. See notes, 92 Am. Dec. 473; 12 Ann. Cas. 155.

Right to religious freedom. See 6 R. C. L., § 237, p. 251.

Habeas corpus.

Sec. 5. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require its suspension.

HABEAS CORPUS.-This right is to be exercised in a reasonable manner. The writ should not issue to run out of the county, unless for good cause shown-as the absence, disability, or refusal to act of the local judge-or other reason showing that the object and reason of the law requires its issuance. Nor should it issue from the supreme court in any case, except under the same circumstances. (Ex parte Ellis, 11 Cal. 222.)

The writ of habeas corpus will not issue when the restraint is not real, but merely nominal and permissive. (In re Gow, 139 Cal. 242, 73 Pac. 145.)

As to what courts may issue writs of habeas corpus, see article VI, sections 4, 5; People v. Turner, 1 Cal. 143, 52 Am. Dec. 295; Ex parte Perkins, 2 Cal. 424; People v. Booker, 51 Cal. 317; Tyler v. Houghton, 25 Cal. 26.

Nature and purpose of writ of habeas corpus. See note, 87 Am.
St. Rep. 168.

When refusal of writ of habeas corpus is justifiable. See note, 67
Am. Dec. 395.

Authority of state courts in habeas corpus. See note, 37 Am. Dec.
200.

Suspension of writ during insurrection or rebellion necessitating government by martial law. See note, 98 Am. St. Rep. 776. Suspension of writ. See note, 45 L. R. A. 832.

Original jurisdiction of state court of last resort to issue writ of habeas corpus. See note, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 156.

Right to bail-Rights of witnesses.

Sec. 6. All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor shall cruel or unusual punishments be inflicted. Witnesses shall not be unreasonably detained, nor confined in any room where criminals are actually imprisoned.

BAIL.-Admission to bail in capital cases, where the proof is evident or the presumption great, may be made, under our Constitution, matter of discretion, and may be forbidden by the legislature. In all other cases the admission to bail is a right of the accused, which no judge or court can properly refuse. (People v. Tinder, 19 Cal. 539, 81

Am. Dec. 77.)

An act making admission to bail matter of discretion in all cases where the punishment is death, unless the proof is evident or the presumption great, is in conflict with this section. (People v. Tinder, 19 Cal. 539, 81 Am. Dec. 77.)

This section does not prevent the court from ordering the defendant into custody as soon as the trial is commenced. (People v. Williams, 59 Cal. 674.)

This provision applies only to cases in which the party has not been already convicted. (Ex parte Voll, 41 Cal. 29.)

A person arrested for felony must, in order to procure bail, be taken before the magistrate who issued the warrant, or some other magistrate in the same county. (Ex parte Hung Sin, 54 Cal. 102.)

The court should not refuse to accept on bail a surety who is a nonresident of the county unless there is some circumstance that would reasonably excite suspicion as to such surety, or unless it would be difficult to investigate his financial standing. (Ex parte Ruef, 8 Cal. App. 468, 97 Pac. 89.)

Sureties on a bail bond may qualify with property real or personal in the county or elsewhere. (Ex parte Ruef, 8 Cal. App. 468, 97 Pac. 89.)

A court has no power to refuse friends and as bail for the sole reason that they are such. App. 468, 97 Pac. 89.)

relatives of the accused

(Ex parte Ruef, 8 Cal.