Section 1008 of the Penal Code, which permits an indictment to be amended by the district attorney as to mere matters of form, is constitutional. (People v. Anthony, 20 Cal. App. 586, 129 Pac. 968.)

Constitutionality of statutes permitting amendment of indictments. See note, 3 Ann. Cas. 558.

The phrase, "offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment," in this section, re-enacted the rule of the old Constitution that capital or other infamous crimes must be prosecuted by indietment, and the same offenses as were required under it to be prosecuted by indictment are still required to be so prosecuted except where the new procedure permits in addition to indictment, proceeding by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate. (In re Westenberg, 167 Cal. 309, 139 Pac. 674.)

Under this section a prosecution for criminal libel is not required to be by indictment. (Matter of Application of Westenberg, 167

Cal. 309, 139 Pac. 674.)

Under this section of Constitution of 1849 the only offenses required to be prosecuted by indictment were capital or other infamous crimes, and criminal libel was not among them. (In re Westenberg, 167 Cal. 309, 139 Pac. 674.)

Liberty of speech and freedom of the press-Trials for libel.

Sec. 9. Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libels, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact. Indictments found, or information laid, for publication in newspapers shall be tried in the county where such newspapers have their publication office, or in the county where the party alleged to be libeled resided at the time of the alleged publication, unless the place. of trial shall be changed for good cause.

LIBERTY OF THE PRESS.—This provision does not make all publications in a newspaper privileged. (Gilman v. McClatchy, 111 Cal.

606, 44 Pac. 241.)

The liberty of the press is not more under the protection of the Constitution than the liberty of speech, and the publishers of a newspaper can defend an action for libel only upon precisely the same grounds upon which any other individual could defend an action for slander. (Edwards v. San Jose etc. Publishing Soc., 99 Cal. 431, 37 Am. St. Rep. 70, 34 Pac. 128.)

A court has power to punish as a contempt a publication charging a judge with "deliberate lying about the law," etc., in a case before him. (Ex parte Barry, 85 Cal. 603, 20 Am. St. Rep. 248, 25 Pac. 256.)

Under this section a court has no power to forbid the representation upon the theatrical stage of the facts of a criminal case, pending the trial of such case. (Dailey v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. 94, 53 Am. St. Rep. 160, 32 L. R. A. 273, 44 Pac. 458.)

It is proper for the court to inform the jury as to the rules of evidence, and the law applicable to the case, and to tell them that they should go contrary to the instructions of the court only when they have a deep and confident conviction that the court is wrong, and that they are right. (People v. Seeley, 139 Cal. 118, 72 Pac. 834.)

The last sentence of this section applies to the case of a person who causes a libel to be published in a newspaper, as well as to a publication by the publishers and proprietors alone. (In re Kowalsky, 73 Cal. 120, 14 Pac. 399.)

Infringing liberty of the press. See note, 78 Am. St. Rep. 260.
Constitutional liberty of speech and press. See notes, 15 Ann.
Cas. 3; 6 R. C. L., §§ 239-242a, pp. 253-258.

Venue of action for libel or slander. See note, 6 Ann. Cas. 513.

"Good cause," within the meaning of the last sentence of this section, is that set forth in section 1033 of the Penal Code. The provision is not self-executing and confers no enlarged discretion upon the court. (Older v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. 770, 109 Pac. 478.)

The provisions of this section and of section 251 of the Penal Code that in the trial of a case of criminal libel the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact does not take away from the court the right to rule upon the admissibility of evidence during the trial. (People v. Pryal, 25 Cal. App. 779, 147 Pac. 114.)

General rules applicable to libel and slander. See note, 4 Am.
Dec. 348.

Justification in actions for libel or slander. See note, 91 Am. St.
Rep. 285.

Province of court and jury in prosecutions for libel. See note, 13
Am. St. Rep. 625.

Jury as judge of law and fact. See note, 42 Am. St. Rep. 290.
Truth alone as complete defense in civil action for libel. See
note, 17 Ann. Cas. 761.

Popular assemblies.

Sec. 10. The people shall have the right to freely assemble together to consult for the common good, to instruct their representatives, and to petition the legislature for redress of grievances.

RIGHT TO FREELY ASSEMBLE.-This section does not prevent the legislature from forbidding unlawful assemblies. As to what are such assemblies, see People v. Most, 128 N. Y. 108, 26 Am. St. Rep.

458, 27 N. E. 970; Rex v. Birt, 5 Car. & P. 154; Regina v. Neale, 9 Car. & P. 431; Beatty v. Gillbanks, 9 Q. B. Div. 308.

Right to assemble and petition government. See 6 R. C. L., § 236, p. 250.

Uniformity of laws.

Sec. 11. All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation.

UNIFORMITY OF LAWS.-This provision does not affect laws in force at the adoption of the Constitution; and, therefore, while section 204 of the Code of Civil Procedure, relating to the impaneling of grand jurors, might have been void under this provision, a mere amendment to that section, making it applicable to the present judicial system, does not make it unconstitutional. (People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 48 Pac. 75.)

General Principles.-The word "uniform" does not mean "universal." (People v. Twelfth District Court, 17 Cal. 547; Hellman v. Shoulters, 114 Cal. 136, 44 Pac. 915, 45 Pac. 1057; In re Zhizhuzza, 147 Cal. 328, 81 Pac. 955.)

All that is necessary to constitute uniformity is that the law shall operate uniformly upon all persons in the same category, and upon rights and things in the same relation. (People v. Henshaw, 76 Cal. 436, 18 Pac. 413; People v. Twelfth District Court, 17 Cal. 547; Ex parte Halsted, 89 Cal. 471, 26 Pac. 961; Wigmore v. Buell, 122 Cal. 144, 54 Pac. 600.)

A statute is uniform in its operation if it applies alike to all persons or objects within a class founded upon some natural, intrinsic, or constitutional distinction. (Vail v. San Diego Co., 126 Cal. 35, 58 Pac. 392; Solano Co. v. McCudden, 120 Cal. 648, 53 Pac. 213; Cody v. Murphey, 89 Cal. 522, 26 Pac. 1081; Kahn v. Sutro, 114 Cal. 316, 33 L. R. A. 620, 46 Pac. 87; Murphy v. Pacific Bank, 119 Cal. 334, 51 Pac. 317; Ruperich v. Baehr, 142 Cal. 190, 75 Pac. 782.)

The meaning of this provision is that the legislature shall not grant to any citizen or class of citizens privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens. (Ex parte Smith & Keating, 38 Cal. 702; Miller v. Kister, 68 Cal. 142, 8 Pac. 813; People v. Henshaw, 76 Cal. 436, 18 Pac. 413; Brooks v. Hyde, 37 Cal. 366.)

The operation of a law is none the less uniform because it operates differently upon different classes, provided there is a reasonable basis for the lack of uniformity, and the corporation license tax act is not invalid because failure of payment by a California corporation results in a forfeiture of its charter, while nonpayment by a foreign corporation results in a forfeiture of its right to do business within the state. (Kaiser Land & Fruit Co. v. Curry, 155 Cal. 638, 103 Pac. 341.)

This provision has no application to municipal ordinances. (In re Zhizhuzza, 147 Cal. 328, 81 Pac. 955.)

This section of Constitution of 1849 did not prohibit the granting of rights of way along waters, roads and highways to telegraph com

panies. (Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hopkins, 160 Cal. 106, 116 Pac. 557.)

This section of the Constitution of 1849 did not forbid special legislation nor the conferring of special powers upon municipalities by their charters, even when there was a general law upon the same subject matter. (Vallejo Ferry Co. v. Lang & McPherson, 161 Cal. 672, 120 Pac. 421.)

Quaere, as to whether section 629 of the Civil Code, making it the duty of certain public service corporations to furnish gas, electricity, steam or heat, on demand, is constitutional. (Thompson v. San Francisco Gas etc. Co., 18 Cal. App. 30, 121 Pac. 937.)

Special laws. It is only laws of a general nature that are required to have a uniform operation, and this section does not forbid special laws. (People v. Central Pac. R. R. Co., 43 Cal. 398; Brooks v. Hyde, 37 Cal. 366; Addison v. Saulnier, 19 Cal. 82; People v. Twelfth District Court, 17 Cal. 547.)

Particular acts held not to be uniform.-In conformity with these principles, the following statutes have been held void as not uniform in their operation:

A provision of the County Government Act that, in counties of a certain designated population, county licenses collected in cities shall be paid into the treasuries of such cities for street improvements (San Luis Obispo Co. v. Graves, 84 Cal. 71, 23 Pac. 1032); an act authorizing a named street railway company to operate a street railway on designated streets (Omnibus R. R. Co. v. Baldwin, 57 Cal. 160); a a provision of the Insolvency Act, giving a right of appeal in cases of contempt-a right not given in other cases of contempt (Ex parte Clancy, 90 Cal. 553, 27 Pac. 411); a law requiring cities of two designated classes to make an effort to agree with the owners of land sought to be condemned, before instituting condemnation proceedings (City of Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238, 27 Pac. 604); a provision of the County Government Act of 1883, that the boards of supervisors of counties of certain designated classes may allow county officers a deputy whenever in the opinion of such board the salaries of such officers are insufficient (Dougherty v. Austin, 94 Cal. 601, 16 L. R. A. 161, 28 Pac. 834, 29 Pac. 1092); the provision of the Australian ballot law for the voting of straight tickets by stamping the ticket opposite the name of the political party to be printed at the head of the ticket (Eaton v. Brown, 96 Cal. 371, 31 Am. St. Rep. 225, 17 L. R. A. 697, 31 Pac. 250); an act providing that in cities having boards of education, the city treasurers are to have the custody of the state and county school money appropriated to the city (Bruch v. Colombet, 104 Cal. 347, 38 Pac. 45); a provision in the County Government Act that, in counties of one particular class only, witnesses in criminal cases shall be paid the same fees as jurors, in the discretion of the judge (Turner v. Siskiyou Co., 109 Cal. 332, 42 Pac. 434); a provision of the County Government Act that, in all counties of one particular class, certain additional fees shall be collected for filing the inventory in estates of deceased persons (Bloss v. Lewis, 109 Cal. 493, 41 Pac. 1081); the Primary Election Law of 1895, being confined in its operation to counties of the first and second

class (Marsh v. Hanly, 111 Cal. 368, 43 Pac. 975); a law giving the district attorney supervisory control over fees of justices of the peace and constables in criminal cases (Dwyer v. Parker, 115 Cal. 544, 47 Pac. 372); an act fixing different rates of liability upon stockholders in different corporations (French v. Teschemaker, 24 Cal. 518); the provision of the County Government Act that no supplies, etc., shall be purchased for the county from any person who has not had a business in the county for a year prior to the purchase (Van Harlingen v. Doyle, 134 Cal. 53, 54 L. R. A. 771, 66 Pac. 44); the provision of section 1197 of the Political Code forbidding the name of a nominee to be placed upon the ballot more than once (Murphy v. Curry, 137 Cal. 479, 59 L. R. A. 97, 70 Pac. 461); a statute providing that all county printing must be let to persons who have been established in business in the county for more than one year (Van Harlingen v. Doyle, 134 Cal. 53, 54 L. R. A. 771, 66 Pac. 44); the act of March 21, 1905, regarding rates of interest on chattel mortgages, and fixing a different penalty for its violation when committed by corporations than when committed by individuals (Ex parte Sohncke, 148 Cal. 262, 113 Am. St. Rep. 236, 7 Ann. Cas. 475, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 813, 82 Pac. 956); a law regulating the rate of interest on chattel mortgages on certain classes of property (Ex parte Sohncke, 148 Cal. 262, 113 Am. St. Rep. 236, 7 Ann. Cas. 475, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 813, 82 Pac. 956).

Particular acts held valid.-On the other hand, the following acts have been held not to be obnoxious to the provision of this section, and valid:

An act whose object it is to legalize the assessment of taxes in San Francisco, since it is not a general, but a special, law (San Francisco v. Spring Valley Water Works, 54 Cal. 571); an act establishing different fee bills for separate counties, not being of a general nature (Ryan v Johnson, 5 Cal. 86); an act to remedy the failure of the tax collector to publish the names of the owners, etc., it being not a general, but a special, law (Moore v. Patch, 12 Cal. 265); the provision of the County Government Act of 1893, empowering certain of the county officers in counties of one class to appoint a certain number of deputies, whose salaries are fixed by the act and made payable out of the county treasury, although in other counties the principal must pay the salaries of his deputies (Tulare Co. v. May, 118 Cal. 303, 50 Pac. 427, overruling Welsh v. Bramlet, 98 Cal. 219, 33 Pac. 66, and Walser v. Austin, 104 Cal. 128, 37 Pac. 869); an act subjecting trespassing animals to attachment without the affidavit required in other cases of attachment (Wigmore v. Buell, 122 Cal. 144, 54 Pac. 600); a law providing that assessors in counties of one particular class shall pay all percentage for the collection of poll taxes into the county treasury (Summerland v. Bicknell, 111 Cal. 567, 44 Pac. 232); an act providing for police courts in all cities of a designated population, and providing that it shall go into effect upon the expiration of the term of office of the present police judges of such cities (People v. Henshaw, 76 Cal. 436, 18 Pac. 413); an act providing for the commitment of minor criminals to nonsectarian charitable corporations at the expense of the county (Boys' and Girls' Aid Society v. Reis, 71