DUE PROCESS OF LAW-Property.-The right to practice law is not "property" within the meaning of this section. (Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293.)

The right to a salary attached to a public office is not property. (Pennie v. Reis, 80 Cal. 266, 22 Pac. 176; Clarke v. Reis, 87 Cal. 543, 25 Pac. 759.)

Title by prescription is property which is protected by this provision. (Sharp v. Blankenship, 59 Cal. 288.)

A vested right in a pension fund is property within the meaning of this provision. (Kavanagh v. Board of Police Pension Fund Commrs., 134 Cal. 50, 66 Pac. 36.)

The question whether an act deprives persons of property without due process of law is a federal question, upon which the decisions of the United States are the controlling authority. (Brookes v. City of Oakland, 160 Cal. 423, 117 Pac. 433.)

What is "due process."-"Due process of law" means such an exertion of the powers of the government as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as those maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the one in question belongs. (Ex parte Ah Fook, 49 Cal. 402; Wulzen v. Board of Supervisors, 101 Cal. 15, 40 Am. St. Rep. 17, 35 Pac. 353.)

The words "due process of law" were intended to convey the same meaning as the words "the law of the land" in Magna Charta, and mean public laws binding all the members of the community under similar circumstances, and not partial or private laws affecting the rights of individuals. (Kalloch v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 229.)

Due process of law requires a trial governed by the established rules of evidence, and a procedure suitable and proper to the nature of the case, and sanctioned by the established usage and customs of the courts. (San Jose Ranch Co. v. San Jose Land etc. Co., 126 Cal. 322, 58 Pac. 824.)

Police power.-In the exercise of the police power certain kinds of property, when held or used so as to be injurious to the general public, may be seized and destroyed. (Collins v. Lean, 68 Cal. 284, 9 Pac. 173.)

An act defining pure wine, prohibiting the use of deleterious substitutes, and forbidding the sale of impure wine, does not deprive one of property without due process of law. (Ex parte Kohler, 74 Cal. 38, 15 Pac. 436.)

Where the exercise of the police power is permissible, the provision of the Constitution declaring that private property shall not be taken without due process of law is inapplicable. (Ex parte Elam, 6 Cal. App. 233, 91 Pac. 811.)

An ordinance prohibiting the sale of liquors is not unconstitutional because it deprives one of the right to dispose of large quantities of liquor which he had on hand at the time the ordinance was passed. (Ex parte Young, 154 Cal. 317, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 330, 97 Pac. 822.) Where an ordinance, fixing the limits within which a disagreeable business may be exercised, has in fact some relation to public health and is appropriate and adapted to that end, it cannot be urged that

the ordinance deprives the owner of his property without due process of law. (Ex parte Lacey, 108 Cal. 326, 49 Am. St. Rep. 93, 38 L. R. A. 640, 41 Pac. 411.)

Particular statutes. The provision of the Constitution allowing prosecutions by information affords due process of law. (Kalloch v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 229.)

The provision of section 971 of the Penal Code as to charging an accessory before the fact as a principal does not deprive him of life, liberty or property without due process of law. (People v. Nolan, 144 Cal. 75, 77 Pac. 774.)

The expulsion of a member of the legislature without a hearing does not deprive him of property without due process of law. (French v. Senate, 146 Cal. 604, 2 Ann. Cas. 756, 69 L. R. A. 556, 80 Pac. 1031.) The legislature has power to provide that a deed in a street assessment matter shall be conclusive evidence of the regularity of all required steps other than those necessary to constitute due process of law or to comply with the Constitution. (Chase v. Trout, 146 Cal. 350, 80 Pac. 81.)

The statute prescribing an increased punishment for a second offense does not deprive a defendant of liberty without due process of law. (People v. Coleman, 145 Cal. 609, 79 Pac. 283.)

A law imposing the death penalty upon a person undergoing a life sentence, who, with malice aforethought, commits an assault upon another with a deadly weapon, or by any means likely to produce bodily injury, is valid. (In re Finley, 1 Cal. App. 198, 81 Pac. 1041.)

An act making the issuance of bonds conclusive evidence of the validity of the lien is void; but an act making the issuance conclusive evidence of the regularity of the proceedings not essential to the jurisdiction of the officers to create the lien is valid. (Ramish v. Hartwell, 126 Cal. 443, 58 Pac. 920.)

This provision does not prohibit a summary proceeding by the state to collect taxes, without the intervention of a court. (High v. Shoe. maker, 22 Cal. 363.)

The act of 1875, providing for a judicial proceeding to authorize the sale of the homestead upon the insanity of either spouse, by the sane spouse alone, is valid, in so far as it relates to a homestead upon the community property acquired subsequent to the passage of the act. (Rider v. Regan, 114 Cal. 667, 46 Pac. 820.)

A law authorizing the court to strike out the pleading of a defendant for failure to sign a deposition or as a punishment for a contempt of court is invalid. (Foley v. Foley, 120 Cal. 33, 65 Am. St. Rep. 147, 52 Pac. 122.)

To enter judgment against a defendant for failure to deposit his share of the per diem of the reporter is taking property without due process of law. (Meacham v. Bear Valley Irr. Co., 145 Cal. 606, 68

L. R. A. 600, 79 Pac. 281.)

A statute providing that no case shall be reversed for error, unless it appears that a different result would have been probable if the error had not occurred, is void as depriving parties of due process of law. (San Jose Ranch Co. v. San Jose etc. Land Co., 126 Cal. 322, 58 Pac. 824.)

An act divesting the title of the purchaser of property from a mortgagor by a foreclosure suit in which the mortgagor alone is defendant is void. (Skinner v. Buck, 29 Cal. 253.)

An act extending the corporate limits of a town so as to include lands used solely for agricultural purposes was upheld in Santa Rosa v. Coulter, 58 Cal. 537.

The act of 1907, page 122, prohibiting waste from artesian wells does not unconstitutionally interfere with private property. (Ex parte Elam, 6 Cal. App. 233, 91 Pac. 811.)

The mechanic's lien law is not unconstitutional because it takes property without due process of law. (Stimson Mill Co. v. Nolan, 5 Cal. App. 754, 91 Pac. 262.)

The amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure providing for a new and alternative method of appeal do not violate the "due process of law" clauses of the state and federal Constitutions in failing to require service of notices of appeal upon respondents. (Estate of McPhee, 154 Cal. 385, 97 Pac. 878.)

The amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure relative to the method of preparing the record to be used on appeal is not unconstitutional in not providing for service of the notice filed with the clerk that the appellant intends to appeal and requiring that a transcript be made up. (Estate of McPhee, 154 Cal. 385, 97 Pac. 878.)

The legislature has power to permit execution to issue on a judgment after the expiration of the five years' limitation in effect when the judgment was rendered, provided the judgment had not become barred at the time of the amendment. (Weldon v. Rogers, 151 Cal. 432, 90 Pac. 1062.)

The legislature may extend the time within which an action may be brought at any time before the action is barred. (Weldon v. Rogers, 151 Cal. 432, 90 Pac. 1062.)

The legislature has power to make a tax deed conclusive evidence that after a sale to the state the tax collector stamped all subsequent bills "sold for taxes" and the date of the sale. (Bank of Lemoore v. Fulgham, 151 Cal. 234, 90 Pac. 936.)

It is not within the power of the legislature to take away the right of redemption from a tax sale which existed at the time of the sale. (Johnson v. Taylor, 150 Cal. 201, 119 Am. St. Rep. 181, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 818, 88 Pac. 903.)

Section 526 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not prevent the issuance of an injunction to restrain the board of public works of a city from enforcing assessments levied for the condemnation of land for street purposes, where plaintiffs claimed they were being deprived of their property without due process of law. (Pierce v. City of Los Angeles, 159 Cal. 516, 114 Pac. 818.)

Section 3897 of the Political Code, concerning the sale of property purchased by the state, does not deprive of property without due process of law (Merchants' Trust Co. v. Wright, 161 Cal. 149, 118 Pac. 517); an act providing for the discontinuance of a public lane leading from one public road to another by the board of supervisors without a hearing does not deprive the abutting owner of his property without due process of law. (Swift v. Board of Supervisors, 16 Cal. App. 72, 116 Pac. 317.)

The provision of the act of 1889 providing for the laying out, opening, extending, widening, straightening or closing up city streets, directing the city council to determins objections made to the report of the commissioners and to the assessments, and that a time must be set for the hearing thereof, of which reasonable notice must be given, constitutes due process of law. (United Real Estate etc. Co. v. Barnes, 159 Cal. 242, 113 Pac. 167.)

owner.

Where property is sold for taxes to the state and the owner does not redeem, there is no constitutional objection to the state acquiring the title free from all equities, which it can sell and convey to the highest bidder for cash and which will be good as against the former (Chapman v. Zobelein, 19 Cal. App. 132, 124 Pac. 1021.) The State Banking Act of 1909, in authorizing the summary seizure by the superintendent of banks of the property and business of a bank whenever he has reason to conclude that it is in an unsound condition, without action brought or judicial warrant for the taking, does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution. (State Savings etc. Bank v. Anderson, 165 Cal. 437, 132 Pac. 755.)

Notice. A judgment obtained without service of summons on, or voluntary appearance by, the defendant does not constitute due process of law. (Baker v. O'Riordan, 65 Cal. 368, 4 Pac. 232; Belcher v. Chambers, 53 Cal. 635; De La Montanya v. De La Montanya, 112 Cal. 101, 53 Am. St. Rep. 165, 32 L. R. A. 82, 44 Pac. 345.)

A law authorizing the commitment of a person to an insane asylum without notice is void. (Matter of Lambert, 134 Cal. 626, 86 Am. St. Rep. 296, 55 L. R. A. 856, 66 Pac. 851.)

The shortness of the period of constructive notice to nonresident heirs of the probate of a will does not deprive them of due process of law, since they are allowed to contest the will within a year after probate. (Estate of Davis, 136 Cal. 590, 69 Pac. 412.)

An ex parte order for alimony is void. (Baker v. Baker, 136 Cal. 302, 68 Pac. 971.)

The fact that the street bond act does not in terms give a lienholder an opportunity to object does not render it unconstitutional. (German Sav. etc. Soc. v. Ramish, 138 Cal. 120, 69 Pac. 89, 70 Pac. 1067.)

An act authorizing a personal judgment against a defendant concealing himself within the state, for whom the court has appointed an attorney with privilege to the defendant to come in within six months, is valid. (Ware v. Robinson, 9 Cal. 107.)

Sections 1206 and 1207 of the Penal Code must be construed as requiring that both debtor and creditor are to have notice of claims for wages, otherwise they would deprive the debtor of his property without due process of law. (Taylor v. Hill, 115 Cal. 143, 44 Pac. 336, 46 Pac. 922.)

Whether a notice of not more than ten days is valid, query? (Boorman v. Santa Barbara, 65 Cal. 313, 4 Pac. 31.)

A general notice of an intended improvement, before it has been determined either finally or conditionally what land will be affected does not constitute due process of law. (Boorman v. Santa Barbara, 65 Cal. 313, 4 Pac. 31.)

An act authorizing an assessment for street improvements without notice to the parties to be assessed is void. (Boorman v. Santa Barbara, 65 Cal. 313, 4 Pac. 31.)

Notice by posting constitutes due process of law. (Davies v. Los Angeles, 86 Cal. 37, 24 Pac. 771.)

Section 720 of the Code of Civil Procedure, allowing the judgment creditor to institute an action against an alleged debtor of the judgment debtor, is not unconstitutional on the ground that no notice is given to the judgment debtor. (High v. Bank of Commerce, 95 Cal. 386, 29 Am. St. Rep. 121, 30 Pac. 556.)

In matters of taxation and assessment, the state is not bound to accord personal service of process upon the citizen. (Wulzen v. Board of Supervisors, 101 Cal. 15, 40 Am. St. Rep. 17, 35 Pac. 353.)

An assessment without giving an opportunity to the taxpayer to show that the assessment is not proportionate to the benefits is unconstitutional. (Lower Kings River Rec. Dist. No. 531 v. Phillips, 108 Cal. 306, 39 Pac. 630, 41 Pac. 335.)

In a proceeding for the sale of the homestead of an insane person, publication for three weeks in a newspaper, and personal service upon the nearest male relative of the insane spouse to be found in the state, or, if none, then upon the public administrator, whose duty it is to appear for such insane spouse, constitutes due process of law. (Rider v. Regan, 114 Cal. 667, 46 Pac. 820.)

Heirs and devisees are not deprived of their property without due process of law by an order setting aside a homestead in probate without notice to them. (Otto v. Long, 144 Cal. 144, 77 Pac. 885.)

A statute allowing an execution to issue against the "joint property" of persons sued, when only one of the defendants has been served, is unconstitutional. (Tay v. Hawley, 39 Cal. 93.)

An act allowing a peace officer to seize all nets, etc., used in catching fish in violation of the game laws, and to destroy them without notice, or to sell them upon notice posted anywhere in the county for five days, is in violation of this provision. (Hey Sing Ieck v. Anderson, 57 Cal. 251, 40 Am. Rep. 115.)

To take property from the possession of a person without a hearing, and compe him to prove title to regain it, is taking property without due process of law. (Havemeyer v. Superior Court, 84 Cal. 327, 18 Am. St. Rep. 192, 10 L. R. A. 627, 24 Pac. 121.)

A forfeiture of the charter and property of a subordinate grove by the grand grove, without sufficient charges to show jurisdiction over the subject matter, and without sufficient notice, is in violation of this provision. (Grand Grove etc. v. Garibaldi Grove, 130 Cal. 116, 80 Am. St. Rep. 80, 62 Pac. 486.)

An order of the probate court made without notice, compelling an attorney of an executrix to repay a fee paid to him by her, is in violation of this provision. (Tomsky v. Superior Court, 131 Cal. 620, 63 Pac. 1020.)

Due process of law does not require that the defendant should have notice of a motion for the issuance of execution. (Harrier v. Bassford, 145 Cal. 529, 78 Pac. 1038.)

The inheritance tax act does not deprive the heir of his property without due process of law, since he is given an opportunity to be