different. The whole of the true analogies of Nature, that is, those derived from objects really correlated, show that every substance or aggregate of substances producing an effect, as it must have power to produce the effect, so it must have power to produce an effect of that particular kind. The parents seem to be endowed with a power to produce an offspring "after their kind," that is, of the same species and no other. There is no power on the part of an inferior plant to produce a higher, on the part of a vegetable to produce an animal, or on the part of an inferior animal to produce a higher. In particular, human beings with intelligences, and such only,-certainly not apes or monkeys, -can have an offspring possessed of reasonable and responsible souls.

This doctrine brings reproduction under laws analogous to those laws of causation which reign in other departments of Nature. The particular mode of the operation of the power has not been and may never be fully determined, but that there is power required, special in kind and adequate in amount, seems to be established on amply sufficient evidence. This doctrine opens to us a glimpse of the deep foundation which the law that the offspring must be of the same species as the parent, has in the very constitution of things, and in the nature of the power that operates in the universe.

III. RECIPROCAL ACTION OF MIND AND BODY.-That the two have been so constituted as that the bodily organism acts on mind, while mind is also capable of operating on the organism, this seems to me to be the most satisfactory as it is certainly the simplest account which can be given of the connexion. But let us properly understand what, on such a supposition, is the precise cause. It is a complex one in every case; it is the mind and the body in a particular relation to each other. The co-existence of the two is necessary to any effect being produced, and the effect is the result of the two operating and co-operating. Thus in all perception through the senses there is a cerebral power and there is mental power, and without both there will be no result, no object perceived. There seems also to be a duality in the effect: there is certainly a mental effect, for the mind now perceives; and the cerebral mass, in the very act of producing mental action, may undergo a change; thus there seems to be a fatigue and exhaustion produced in the organism by the very act of perceiving an immense number of objects within a brief time, as when we travel a great distance by railway, and this can be accounted for by supposing that the organism is affected by the action which has taken place.

There is a similar duality of power in all those cases in which the action begins from the mind, as when we will to move the arm, and the arm moves. Here the concurrence of two factors is necessary in order to the result: there is a volition, and a nicely adjusted organism in a healthy state; and if either were wanting the effect would not follow. Possibly, as there is a duality in the cause, there may also be a duality in the effect, and the next mental state may be so far modified by the joint bodily and mental exertion; but I have to add, that it is just as possible that we may have here come into the region of pure mental causation, in which, as we shall see forthwith, there is no such complexity.

In a vast amount of the results of which we are conscious, the concurrence and co-operation both of mental and cerebral potency are required in order to action. Thus it has been proven that a healthy state of the brain is requisite in order to our remembering or even imagining sensible objects; for in certain derangements of the brain the person cannot image an object with a figure. In all such cases the main cause is to be found in the mind; still the body has a part to play, and if it does not co-operate, the effect is not produced. In all those actions in

which there is the active operation of the bodily organism, in order to a mental effect, it seems probable that the mental act, or rather the joint act, produces also an effect on the bodily organism which has been in action. In all mental emotion there seems to be involved the active co-operation of a bodily organism, and there is always a reaction on the organism, often in wearying and deranging it, at least when the feeling, say fear or sorrow, is excited by the contemplation of evil. Even in the exercises of the intellect there seems to be a concurrence of organic agency necessary, and there is always a lassitude following long and continuous intellectual efforts. I have sometimes thought that a certain organic state is necessary in order to our very volitions; and hence our incapacity to form a fixed purpose in certain states of the body, and the weariness which follows a long stretch of attention, even when this has been accompanied with no bodily exertions.

I am aware that the account now given of the reciprocal action of mind and body, is exposed to a great amount of questioning. Thus, it will be asked, How does mind act on body, and body on mind? To this I reply by a counter-question, What is meant by "How?" If nothing more be meant than simply the occurrence of the facts, then I answer that psychological and physiological research has discovered some of the facts, and may possibly detect more, and may very probably never be able to discover the whole. If something more than this be intended, then I ask, What is intended? If it be expected that we find out some mysterious bond between mind and body, I answer that there is no reason to think that there is any such bond, and that if there did exist such a bond, and we could discover it, it would only increase instead of lessening the mystery. The most reasonable and the most simple view is that spirit and body have been so constituted, that is, have had such a nature imparted to them, that they mutually influence each other, and co-operate to produce a joint result.

IV. MENTAL ACTION.—We are not to suppose that purely mental is in every respect the same as material action. There is a sense in which every given body is inert and passive, it is active only so far as it is acted on. In this respect there is a wide difference between material and mental power. Material causation implies the presence of two or more bodies, whereas mental causation requires the presence of only one--the self-acting mind. I can think, feel, will, without requiring any external object (always perhaps excepting the organism, in the subordinate sense already referred to) to co-operate with me. The oldest definition of mind handed down to us, embodies a great truth when it describes it as that which moves itself. It can set a train of thought a-going, and modify an existing train by a power within itself. This is one of the prerogatives of mind, eminently characterizing it, and at once distinguishing it from sluggish and passive matter.

But while there is self-acting power within the mind itself, there is a sort of duality or plurality even in mental action. What is the cause of any given state, say of the grief I may be feeling at this present time? I have just heard of the death of a particular individual known to me, and the intelligence apprehended is, no doubt, part of the cause; but it is not the whole of it, for the same news may have been comprehended by another person without producing any such effect. In the unconditional clause there must be included not only the immediate intelligence as apprehended by me, but the affection which I acquired in former years for the individual, and even my original susceptibility of friendship and of grief; the concurrence of all this is necessary in order to this particular state under which I am now labouring. Even here, too, we may discover

a kind of duality in the effect, for the result of my cherishing grief at this time is to deepen my affection for my friend, and even to increase my original capacity for affection and sorrow.

V. CAUSATION IN THE WILL.-We have seen that mental action differs widely from material. And we are not to suppose that every mental action is the same in kind as every other. Every faculty of the mind indeed has its own rule and mode of operation, which it is the office of psychological science to ascertain. In particular, causation in the will may differ from causation in other mental action.

I am prepared indeed to maintain that our volitions are not absolutely beyond the law of causation. If I rightly interpret my intuition on the subject of causation, it leads me to look for a cause of our very volitions as well as of our intellectual acts. Besides, as a matter of fact, there have been predictions of voluntary acts, say of crimes, as accurate of physical events, such as births or deaths. On such grounds as these I am inclined to say that causation must have some sort of place in the will as in all other creature-action. But causation in regard to the will may be of a totally different character from causation in acts of intelligence or feeling.

While our intuition seems to me to say that causation has a place even in voluntary acts, it does not say what is the nature of that causation; this is to be determined by an inductive inquiry into the operations of our voluntary acts. And here we are at once met by the fact that man has free will. This fact cannot set aside the other fact that our volitions are caused; but as both are facts, the one must be so stated as to be seen not to be inconsistent with the other. And when we contemplate our volitions by the light of consciousness, we discover at once that causation does not operate in the will as it does in the material universe, or even in our intellectual and emotional actions. Here, I believe, lies the key which is to explain the enigma of the consistency of man's free will and the Divine Sovereignty. We may not be able to find the key, but we can tell the place where it lies.

VI. DIVINE CAUSATION.-I shrink from entering minutely into the consideration of the action of causation within the Divine Mind. It is evidently a subject which stretches far beyond human discussion or comprehension. But it appears very evident that we are led to look on God as a Substance, having power in Himself and the cause of effects produced. Indeed it is from the effects in the universe, and proceeding on an intuitive principle, that we argue that there is a cause above the world. The nature of the causation is in every case to be determined by an inductive investigation of facts, and not by a priori speculation. Such an inquiry will soon convince us that causation in the acts of God is not of the same kind as causation in the operations of created objects. In particular there is no need, as in physical nature, of any co-operation in order to the Divine workmanship. "He spake, and it was done: He commanded, and it stood fast." He said, Let there be light: and there was light." Not only so, but in the original operation of God in the universe, there must have been the exercise of a power, to which we see nothing similar in the actions of any created object. Man cannot create anything absolutely new; he cannot create a new power or property: he can merely modify the old powers; and even this, so far as the external world is concerned, he can do simply by using the power laid up for him in the brain; and all the changes which take place, fall out according to the agencies of Nature. But it is different with

God, who must at first have created all things out of nothing; that is, there was a power to create in Him, and this power He chose in His infinite wisdom and goodness to exert.

Metaphysicians have often used very absurd language about man's incapacity so much as to conceive of creation. It is quite true that man himself can perform nothing similar to creation, but still he can conceive of it. He can suppose that there was a time when there was no created object, and he can then conceive a world springing into being. He cannot indeed believe that this world started into being without a producing cause, but he is not compelled to believe that it was effected in the same manner as we form a new object, that is, out of pre-existing matter. When I am led, as I am led on good evidence, to look on this world as being produced by God, I can conceive it caused by an immediate exercise of His power. I am not necessarily led to believe that it must have been formed out of Himself, or out of any pre-existing substance; it may have been made not out of Himself, but by Himself, by the power that is in Him. Nor am I led to look upon the forces now in the world as existing in some other form in God: to suppose this is to forget that the mode of the operation of causation varies in the case of every order of beings, and to insist that the power exercised by God must be exerted in the same way as creature potency. The mode of the operation of causation when God creates, is quite as accordant with our intuitive belief as the manner in which the forces operate in the mental or material world.

And here I take occasion to remark that the pantheistic doctrine which maintains that the world must have been drawn out of the Divine Substance, of which therefore it participates, receives no sanction whatever from the primary beliefs of the mind. It is simply a rash and unfounded inference from certain experiential facts which are true of the creature, but may have no application to the Creator. Whatever evidence it may profess to advance, it cannot plead intuition; and I may have occasion to show elsewhere that there are intuitions directly opposed to it, especially that intuition which I have of self as a separate intelligence.

There is another and a kindred topic which here opens to the view, but from the minute discussion of which I draw back. I am led to believe that God is a Substance, and an unchanging Substance, unchanging in the character of His voluntary acts. We have proof that He is a Being of essential holiness, benevolence, and truth, and we further believe that He never will or can do an unrighteous act. On what ground do we cling to this belief? It seems to be founded on the conviction that there may be, that there is, an unchanging Substance possessed of moral excellence which never can and never will be defiled by sin; and are we not thus, and this lawfully and properly, carrying up the law of substance and cause to the Divine Being, and making it guarantee for us the eternal righteousness of God?

BOOK II.

PRIMITIVE BELIEFS.

CHAPTER I.

THEIR GENERAL NATURE.

OUR primary cognitions and beliefs are very intimately connected, and they run almost insensibly into each other. Yet they may be distinguished. The word "cognition," when we find it needful to separate it from faith, might be confined in strictness to those mental energies in which the mind looks on an object now present,-say on a body perceived by the senses, or on self in a particular state, or on a representation in the mind; and then "faith" would be applied to all those exercises in which we are convinced of the existence of an object not now before us, or under immediate inspection.

Philosophers have drawn the distinction between Presentative and Representative Knowledge. In the former the object is present at the time; we perceive it, we feel it, we are conscious of it as now and here and under our inspection. In Representative Knowledge there is an object now present, representing an absent object. Thus I may have an image or conception of Venice, with its decaying beauty, and this is now present, and under the eye of consciousness; but it represents something absent and distant, of the existence of which I am at the same time convinced. When I was actually in Venice, and gazed on its churches and palaces rising out of the waters, there would be no propriety in saying that I believed in the existence of the city,-the correct phrase is that I knew it to exist. I know, too, that I have at this moment an idea of Venice; but as Venice itself is not before me, the proper expression of my conviction is that I believe in its existence.

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