ne whose intuitions are the strongest and the liveliest is of all men the least qualified to examine and generalize them, and should he De tempted to embody them in propositions, they will be sure to take distorted, perhaps erroneous forms. In all departments of speculation, metaphysical, ethical, and theological, we meet with persons whose faith is strong, whose sentiments are fervent, and whose very reason is far-seeing, but whose creed—that is, formalized doctrine-is extravagant, or even perilously wrong. In other cases the conviction, genuine in itself, is put forth in a mutilated shape by prejudiced men to support a favourite doctrine, or by party men to get rid of a formidable objection.

The human mind is impelled by an intellectual craving, and by the circumstances in which it is placed, to be ever generalizing, and this in respect both of material and mental phenomena. But its earliest classes and systems, even those of them made for scientific purposes, are commonly of a very crude character. Still, even such generalizations, though at the best mere approximations, at times serve valuable ends in the absence of better and until better appear. Such laws as these have been laid down: "Nature. abhors a vacuum;" "Some bodies are naturally light, and others heavy;" "Combustible bodies are chemically composed of a base with phlogiston combined with it;" "The organs of the flower are transformed leaves." These were the best general statements which scientific inquirers could give at the time of their observations. They served to express, if not to explain, certain phenomena. Nature's horror of a vacuum showed how water rose in a pump. The doctrine of the natural heaviness and lightness of bodies seemed to explain how stones fell to the earth while smoke rose in the atmosphere. The burning of brimstone was thought to be satisfactorily accounted for when it was said that brimstone, being composed of sulphurous acid and phlogiston, the combustion consisted in giving out phlogiston. The undoubted correspondence between the leaf and the stamen suggested the idea that the leaf had been transformed into a stamen. But modern science, advancing in the inductive method, has shown that none of these were correct expressions of the real laws of nature. It cannot be because of its aversion to a vacuum that water rises in a pump, for if the

vacuum extends higher than a certain number of feet the water allows it to exist in its emptiness. Smoke rises from the earth, not because of its natural levity, but because it is buoyed up by the atmosphere. It unfortunately happens that lead, after it is burned, that is, after it has given off, according to the phlogiston theory, one of its ingredients,-is found to be heavier than before. Stamens and pistils have never been leaves, they are merely after the same model.

These are examples from physical science. Metaphysical science, from the subtle and intertwined nature of the phenomena, can furnish far more numerous instances. In mental philosophy the general statements have commonly a genuine fact, but mixed with this there is often an alloy. The error may not influence the spontaneous action of the primitive principle, but it may tell disastrously or ludicrously in the reflex application. It may not even exercise any prejudicial influence in certain departments of investigation, but in other walks it may work endless confusion, or land in consequences fitted to sap the very foundations of morality and religion. Take the distinction drawn, in some form, by most civilized languages between the head and the heart. The distinction embodies a great truth, and when used in conversation or popular discourse it can conduct to no evil. But it cannot be carried out psychologically. For in each a number of very distinct faculties are included. Under the phrase "heart," in particular, are covered powers with wide diversities of function, such as the conscience, the emotions, and the will. The question agitated in this century, whether religion be an affair of the head or the heart, has come to be a hopelessly perplexed one, because the offices of the powers embraced under each are diverse, and run into each other; and certain of the positions taken up are, to say the least of it, perilous as when it is said that religion resides exclusively in the heart, and persons understand that it is a matter of mero emotion, omitting understanding, will, and conscience, which have equally a part to play. Of the same description is the distinction between the reason and the understanding. It points to a reality. There is a distinction between reason in its primary and reason in its secondary or logical exercises, and the mind can rise, always

however by a process in which the logical understanding is employed, to the discovery of universal and necessary truth. But each of the divisions, the reason and the understanding, comprises powers which run into the other. This distinction is at the best confusing,' and it is often so stated as to imply that the reason, without the use of the understanding processes of abstraction and generalization, can rise to the contemplation of the true, the beautiful, and the good.

It can be shown that some of the ancient philosophers, and Kepler in modern times, had glimpses of a law of universal gravitation before the days of Newton, but none of the earlier investigators had been able to determine its exact nature and rule. Suppose that while science was at this stage some person had affirmed that there was a power of attraction among all bodies, varying inversely, not according to the square of the distance, but according to the distance: he would no doubt have had a truth, and a very important one; but the law thus stated, while explaining in a general way a number of the phenomena, would, when deductions were drawn from it, have issued in ever accumulating errors, and this not because no such law existed, but because its rule had been improperly apprehended and enunciated. Almost all metaphysical errors spring from this source, from the improper formalization of principles which are real laws of our constitution. When presented in this mutilated shape, even truth may lead to hideous consequences. It will be shown as we advance that there is an intuitive law of cause and effect, but this law has not always been correctly enunciated. Suppose it be put in this form, that "everything must have a cause," it will issue logically and necessarily in the results that the Intelligent Cause of this world must Himself have had a cause. This consequence can at once be avoided by a proper enunciation of the law of causation.

We may now see how it is that metaphysicians, when they go wrong, go further wrong than others. This proceeds from the fundamental nature of metaphysical principles: every error here, like a mistake in taking down the datum of an arithmetical or

1 This distinction is examined, Part I. Book 1. Chap. ii. sect. vi. Supplementary.

mathemetical question, must issue in fearfully magnified error in the results reached. This weakness in the foundation must make the structure insecure to its topmost pinnacle. The tainting of the fountain will go with the stream in all its length. Suppose that we set out in ethical discussion with the assumption that virtue is just a far-sighted love of pleasure, or in theology with the dogma that justice is a modification of benevolence, it will turn out that these principles (which I believe to be wrong) will affect the whole superstructure of speculation, and lead those who adopt them to take very inadequate views of sin on the one hand, and of the justice of God on the other. It should be added that an error in the starting principle comes out in more exaggerated errors in the issue in very proportion to the rigid consecutiveness of the deduction and the extent to which it is carried. A mistake in the first steps of an arithmetical question may be lessened by some counterbalancing blunder in the further calculations. It has often happened that philosophers have shrunk from following out their principles to their consequences. Locke in particular has often been saved from extreme opinions to which his theory led, but from which his sagacity and honesty recoiled, by falling into inconsequences and inconsistencies. Powerful logical minds, like Spinoza and Hegel, have, on the other hand, boldly avowed the most extravagant doctrines, as being the legitimate result of their gratuitous assumptions.

There is another circumstance to be taken into account by those who would unfold the theory of the metaphysician's extravagancies; he is not restrained as the physical investigator is by stubborn facts, nor checked as the commercial man is by stern realities, which he dare not despise. He has only to mount into a region of pure (or rather, I should say, cloudy) speculation, to find himself in circumstances to cleave his way without meeting with any felt barrier. At the same time one might have reasonably expected, that when such speculators as Spinoza, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, felt themselves rushing headlong against all acknowledged truth, they would have suspected that there was something wrong in their assumptions, or in their method. Whenever the results reached contradict the established doctrines of

physical science, whenever they lead to the denial of the distinction between good and evil, or the personality of the soul, or of the existence, the personality, and continual providence of God, it is time to review the process by which they have been gained, for -they are running counter to truths which have too deep a foundation to be moved by doubtful speculations. The reriark of Bacon as to physical, may be applied to metaphysical speculation, that doctrine is to be tried (not valued, however) by fruits: "Of all signs there is none more certain or worthy than that of the fruits produced; for the fruits and effects are sureties and vouchers, as it were, for philosophy." by religion to show our faith by our works, we may freely apply the principle to philosophy, and judge of it by its works, accounting that to be futile which is unproductive, and still more, if instead of grapes and olives it yield but the thistles and thorns of dispute and contention."

"In the same manner as we are cautioned

SECT. III.-CONDITIONS OF THE LEGITIMACY OF THE APPEAL TO

INTUITIVE PRINCIPLES.

There is scarcely occasion to lay down any rules as to the spontaneous use of the regulative principles of the mind. It is of their nature to operate, and, like the physiological processes of seeing and breathing, they act all the better when no notice is taken of them. All that is necessary to call them forth is to present the appropriate objects,-in mathematics, for example, to present geometrical figures and quantities, and in moral subjects to present models and ideals of excellence. Thus are they evoked in the first instance, and thus are our intellectual and moral intuitions refined, elevated, and strengthened. Any other rules fitted to promote their right action are of a moral, rather than a theoretical character. If the motive power of the mind be right, if the man be impelled by a love of truth, and swayed by a spirit of candour, then the regulative principles, if occupied about the proper objects, will of themselves perform their proper function. There is truth in the common observation, that a mind sophisticated by logic and confused by metaphysics will often fall into