ces do not square with the theory, call in question the science itself, instead of attributing the error to the faulty application of it. Hence arises an unhappy dissension between theory and practice, to the lasting detriment of both.

The Political Economists themselves are somewhat to blame for this result, by pressing too eagerly for the reduction of their favorite doctrines to practice, without regard to the particular circumstances of each case. The general doctrine

of Free Trade, for instance, which may be correct when applied to two nations which are similarly situated in every respect, which have grown up under the same institutions and the same laws, and in which the profits of capital, the wages of labor, and the ratio of population to territory are nearly on a level, is extended by a hasty generalization to two countries that are contrasted with each other in all these respects, and in its application to which, to say the least, the correctness of the principle is very doubtful. We have in this country the largest extension of the system of free trade which the world has ever witnessed; we have free trade between Maine and Louisiana, between California and Massachusetts; and no one doubts that the system is equally beneficial to all these States. But before the system is carried out between England and the United States, we may reasonably inquire whether it will not necessarily tend to an equalization of profits and wages in the two countries, and whether it is desirable here to hasten the operation of the causes which are rapidly reducing the rates of both to the English standard. This subject will be considered hereafter; but I may say here, that the question does not relate to the correctness of the general principle in economical science, but only to its applicability under particular circumstances. That all terrestrial bodies gravitate to the centre of the earth, is a general law, which is not disproved by the floating of a cork in a basin of water.

Another prejudice against Political Economy has arisen from an error of an opposite character;- from too strict a limitation of it to the causes affecting the increase of national wealth, the other interests of a people being undervalued or left out of sight. The English Economists of Ricardo's school have most frequently fallen into this error; looking merely to the creation of material values, they have tacitly assumed that

this was the only interest of society, the only end which legislation should have in view. The proposition on which they act, though they seldom directly enunciate it, is, that the augmentation of national wealth is at once the sign and the measure of national prosperity. We may admit that it is so, if the wealth be distributed with some approach to equality among the people. But if the vast majority of the nation is beggared, while enormous fortunes are accumulated by a few, --if pauperism increases at one end of the social scale as rapidly as wealth is heaped up at the other, then, even though the ratio of the aggregate wealth to the aggregate population is constantly growing larger, the tendency of things is downward, and, sooner or later, if a remedy be not applied, society will rush into degradation and ruin.

In order to obtain a broader field of inquiry, the subject to be discussed in this volume will be, the general well-being of society, so far as this is affected by the moral causes regulating the production, distribution, and consumption of wealth. It may be doubted whether the whole of this theme is included within the limits of Political Economy, properly so called; — and therefore I propose to consider not only the science itself, but its application to a particular case, the circumstances and institutions of the American people. Thus is opened a wide scope for investigation. The fluctuations of national prosperity; the various social condition of different communities at the same period, and of the same community at different periods; the nature, and effect upon the wealth, happiness, and numbers of the people, of the various institutions, laws, and customs which have obtained in different countries and at different times, might all pass in review before the subject would be exhausted. Hitherto, history has been in the main a political record, a narrative of wars, conquests, and changes in the form of government. But the social economy of different states has now become the chief object of interest even to the historian. Statesmen have been obliged to make the study of politics second to that of political economy. Monarchs now strive to guard their thrones, not so much by the number and efficiency of their standing armies, as by the prudent management of their finances, and by their successful development of the agricultural, commercial, and manufacturing resources of

interference with the natural order of things. Legislation directed to this end is only a legitimate carrying out of the laissez-faire principle.

The enforcement of justice in the ordinary transactions between man and man, which often requires further legislation than is needed for the mere prevention of open vice and crime, is another instance of the legitimate exercise of authority by the government. An individual may not erect a powder-manufactory in the midst of a populous village, nor carry on any operations there which would poison the air with noxious exhalations. His neighbors would have a right to call out to him, "Let us alone; you endanger our lives, and prevent us from pursuing our ordinary occupations in safety."

These are internal impediments to the natural action of society, and as such the government is bound to put them out of the way; its action for this purpose is widely distinguished from the enactment of sumptuary laws, the establishment of a maximum of price, prohibiting the exportation of specie, and other obvious infringements of the laissez-faire principle. But it is also the duty of the legislature to guard society against external dangers and hinderances. Men are separated into distinct communities, the action of which upon each other is not so much restrained by law, or by the natural requisitions of justice, as is that of individuals dwelling in the same community. The law of nations is a very imperfect code, and, from the want of any superior tribunal to enforce its enactments, it is very imperfectly observed. War is either a present evil to be averted or alleviated, or it is a possible future event, the occurrence of which is to be guarded against. For either of these ends, the action of individuals within the community may need to be restrained; for the safety of all, the freedom of all to pursue their lawful occupations without let or hinderance is not to be imperilled through the avarice or recklessness of a few. Accordingly, not mere restraints upon importation, but an absolute prohibition of intercourse, an embargo on all navigation, are among the legitimate measures, a necessity for which is created by national dissension and hostility.

Independent communities are not always at war with each other; but they are always rivals and competitors in the great market of the world. This feeling of rivalry is whetted by the

different circumstances under which they are placed, by the peculiarities in the condition of each, and by the opposition of interests which often grows out of these peculiarities. The legislation of each state is primarily directed, of course, to the protection and promotion of the interests of its own subjects; and thus it often injuriously affects the interests of other nations. There is, therefore, a good deal of retaliatory legislation on the part of different governments. There is often, on both sides, a keen measure of wits in devising commercial regulations which shall affect, or render nugatory, measures adopted by the rival nation, not exactly with a hostile intent, but with an exclusive view to its own interests, and therefore frequently with an injurious effect upon the interests of others. Reciprocity treaties, as they are called, are sometimes formed, to obviate the evil effects upon both parties of this keen spirit of competition, when pushed too far. Now, such retaliatory legislation, so far as it operates upon the members of the very community from which it emanates, so far as it limits or restrains the action of all or a portion of them, is not an infringement, but an application, of the laissez-faire principle. It is designed to procure for them a larger liberty than they would otherwise enjoy; if it is effectual, if it answers its purpose, it removes an impediment created by a foreign state far more serious and extensive than the obstruction which it imposes. It may, indirectly and incidentally, turn industry from one channel to another, and make some changes in the investments of capital. But this change is effected only by opening one channel, which would otherwise, under the effects of foreign competition, have remained entirely closed, and by rendering it possible and profitable to turn capital to other uses than those to which it was formerly limited.

If we suppose that the application of native industry and capital is restricted in its range, not by the legislative policy knowingly adopted by a foreign state for this very purpose, but through the superior natural advantages possessed by that state, the same principle still governs the result. By submitting to a small restraint imposed at home, we get rid of a much larger obstacle to our freedom of action, created either by the commercial regulations, finer climate, more fertile soil, more abundant capital, or larger skill and experience of a rival

community. The policy of states leads them to seek independence of each other in their economical, almost as much as in their political, relations; or we might better say, that political independence—that is, the enjoyment of distinct institutions and laws, chosen and established by ourselves—makes it still more desirable and necessary than it was before, that we should not be entirely dependent upon foreigners for the supply of great articles of consumption of prime necessity,- that we should have within our own borders, and under our own control, the means of satisfying all our natural and imperative wants. It is not even desirable that Massachusetts and Ohio should be rendered so far independent of each other, that each could obtain from its own soil, or by the labor of its own inhabitants, all that it can need; for these two States are one in most of their political relations. Members of the same great confederacy, living under the same laws, and each exercising its due share of influence in the national legislature, neither has cause to apprehend the hostile or injurious action of the other. The political ties between them are strengthened by their dependence on each other for a supply of many of the necessaries of civilized existence. But it is desirable that both should be independent, as far as may be, of the great powers of Europe, with whom they cannot be sure of continued friendly intercourse for any time beyond the present, and from whom they are always separated by a great breadth of ocean, and by dissimilarity of customs, institutions, and laws.

True independence, in an economical point of view, does not require us to forego all commercial intercourse with other nations; this would be rather a curse than a blessing. But it does require that each nation should be able to exercise, within its own limits, all the great branches of industry designed to satisfy the wants of man. It must be able to practise all the arts which would be necessary for its own well-being, if it were the only nation on the earth. If it be restricted to agriculture alone, or to manufactures alone, a portion of the energies of its people are lost, and some of its natural advantages run to

To be so limited in its sphere of occupation, to be barred out from some of the natural and necessary employ. ments of the human race, through the overwhelming competi tion of foreigners, is a serious evil, which it is the object of a