Wheeler v. Mills, 40 Barb., that the assessors are deprived of jurisdiction, and that the tax cannot be collected. If the assessor wilfully omits taxable property from his list, he is liable to criminal punishment. Any person improperly assessed is entitled to go before the assessors, and to make affidavit as to his taxable property, and thus get an erroneous assessment corrected.

27. IND. Our board of county commissioners employed an expert to ascertain if any taxables had been omitted from the county tax duplicates as handed to the county treasurer for collection. The county commissioners, upon evidence furnished by the expert, call upon Mr. B for the payment of taxes due on $5,000 not listed in 1874, predicating the claim upon the following facts: In January, 1874, Mr. B handed to the county assessor his list of taxables (personal property), placing $5,000 as the valuation, B handing at the same time like list and valuation to the city assessor. The county board of equalization had Mr. B assessed on the tax duplicate the amount as stated on his schedule, $5,000. Taxes on said amount were paid the county by Mr. B. The expert now discovers that the city board of equalization rejected the schedule of $5,000 and had Mr. B's taxables placed on the tax duplicate at $10,000, on which latter amount B paid taxes, and entered protest. The county commissioners now demand of B that he pay taxes on the additional $5,000 that he paid to the city, but not to the county at the time (1874). Can the claim of the county be collected by law?

A. The Indiana tax laws provide that whenever any real or personal property shall be omitted in the assessment in any year, the same, when discovered, shall be listed and assessed, and the average of tax with 10 per cent. interest, may be collected. If, therefore, the demand in the above case rests upon the omission to list and assess a specific parcel of taxable property, it appears that the tax may still be assessed and collected, no statute of limitations running against such a demand. But if the property was truly listed, and the alleged error consists in too low a valuation, we do not believe that the county board of the assessors have now the power to re-open the assessment.

28. MINN. Is there any law of exemption on real estate that a mortgage cannot be a lien on all the property covered by said mortgage?

A. The Minnesota law exempts from taxation a homestead of eighty acres of farming land, with the dwelling, etc., or one lot with dwelling in an incorporated town, city, or village. But it is provided that "Such exemption shall not extend to any

mortgage thereon lawfully obtained, but such mortgage or other alienation of such land by the owner thereof, if a married man, shall not be valid without the signature of the wife to the same, unless such mortgage shall be given to secure the payment of the purchase money, or some portion thereof; and such exemption shall not extend to any contract for a lien, or upon which a lien would arise under the lien laws of this State, for work done or material furnished in the erection or repair of a dwelling-house or other building on said land." Bissell's Stat. at Large, Tit. V., sec. 166.

29. PA.-A few days ago a warrant was served on me for the pay. ment of taxes for the years 1877-8. Now, the question arises to me, can a collector of taxes compel me to pay costs on the same, if I had not been notified?

A. The Pennsylvania law contemplates personal notice not only to the taxpayer, but " demand" of payment, before proceeding to enforce collection by distress. See Brightly's Purdon's Digest, vol. 2, p. 1,364.

30. VA.-The Constitution of the State of Virginia says all prop erty shall be taxed equally, and exempts investments in United States bonds; but by the acts of Legislature the market value of the national bank stock is taxed, whether owned in or out of the State, and the Lank is required to pay said tax, so that the State may thereby collect the tax from non-residents. Please let me know if it is constitutional to tax the stock of non-residents. The capital of the banks is not taxed, as they have it invested in United States bonds deposited for their circulation.

A. This question is answered in the opinion of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Tappan v. Merchants' National Bank, in the following language: "The State within which a national bank is situated has jurisdiction, for the purposes of taxation, of all the shareholders of the bank, both resident and non-resident, and of all its shares." (19 Wall., 490.)

TELEGRAPH.

1. Have the telegraph companies the right to go on the roofs of private buildings in this city for the purpose of stretching and

fastening their wires? Should such be their right under the law, are they not liable for any damage done by their employees to said roofs ?

A. They have no right to enter upon the roof, much less attach anything to it without permission of the owner.

2. If telegraph companies once succeed, without my knowledge or consent in spiking a support to my house or store, and running their wires across it, am I thereafter prohibited, under penalty of fine and imprisonment, from removing the incumbrance from my property?

A. Cap. 491, laws of 1870, which forbids any person to "injure, molest, or destroy any of said lines, posts, pier or abutments, or property belonging thereto," under penalty of fine or imprisonment, unless in case of necessity, such as the removal of a house, when the telegraph company must have 24 hours notice. The invasion of private property is in fact thus protected by law. Chapter 471, laws of 1853, provide for compensation to owners of "land" upon which telegraph structures shall be placed, the county court being required, on application, to appoint commissioners who shall appraise the loss or damage. We suppose that telegraph companies will insist that buildings come within the legal definition of the term land, and that the only remedy of the injured householder therefore is an inadequate award of compensation. If such a construction of the law can be maintained, it is no worse indeed than the confiscation of private property for the use of the elevated railroads, but it is no less an outrage, the commission of which upon any merely plausible construction of the statute, or anything short of unequivocal legislative enactment, the courts should interfere to prevent.

3. Is there any law in existence in the United States, or have any decisions ever been given in relation to the following question? A telegraphs an order to B in cipher; the telegram reaches in a mutilated condition, or with an important word different from the one used by the sender, and the order, in consequence, is wrongly executed. is responsible or eventually has to bear the loss?

Who

A. The courts have decided that due diligence on the part of the telegraph company is consistent with an occasional error, and that unless gross carelessness, or a want of due diligence can be established, no damages can be collected of the line over which

the message came. Besides, the companies all stipulate that they shall not be held for correctness unless they are called on to repeat the message. As between the sender and receiver, the loss is adjusted by the circumstances in each case.

4. Is a Telegraph Company responsible for loss, arising from a mistake as follows:

A message distinctly directed to New Orleans is sent from New York, on the 15th of December, and is not received in New Orleans until the 18th, the message in the meantime having been sent by the company's mistake to Memphis?

A. The form of blank upon which Western Union telegraph messages are sent is skillfully drawn to protect the company in cases of this kind from liability beyond the cost of sending the message unless repeated, or fifty times the cost if the message is repeated, and the current of decisions now sets so strongly toward the maintenance of these conditions, when brought home to the notice of the sender, as they are in the Western Union blanks, that we should have little hope of recovering anything beyond the stipulated amount in damages. It is high time, however, that the legislature should intervene and put a limit to the immunity secured by this entire class of one-sided contracts, at least so far as to determine that no one can, even by contract, protect himself from a just degree of responsibility for negligence, either his own or that of his servants.

5. We received orders from several firms for some European goods. As these parties were anxious to get these goods as soon as possible, we cabled for them and paid the amount charged us by the cable company, having paid an additional rate, as the dispatch was intended for Germany. We had still more calls for these goods, and sent, a week later, another dispatch, ordering the manufacturer to send us all the goods he could finish up to a certain time. As usual, we notified the party in Europe by letter that we had sent him an order by telegraph. To our surprise we were notified that they never received the first dispatch, only the second one. Not having received our first dispatch, they sent us goods which we did not want and which are unsalable in this market. Owing to the neglect of the cable company we are heavy losers, as we not only lost the profits on the first lot we had ordered, besides the trouble and annoyance not to be able to deliver the ordered goods, but we have now on hand a quantity of goods not wanted in this market. We applied to the cable company for redress, but cannot get any satisfaction. Is the company not responsible for this neglect? It is

not an error on their part (they accept dispatches under the condition that to avoid error a dispatch ought to be repeated), but utter neglect to send the dispatch.

A. If this is not in the stipulation as to repeating the message, the company can be held in damages if the neglect can be established; but it is of very little use to sue such a rich corporation, as the remedy is worse than the original evil. Some time ago it was legally held that the stipulation concerning repeating the message did not apply to a failure to send it, and it may be that the new conditions are so worded as to apply as well to nondelivery as to a mistake in the text.

6.

We cabled for a certain line of goods, and on the same day con. firmed our order by mail. Our correspondent had the goods manufactured for us in accordance with the mutilated cable he received, but before making us a shipment, he was in possession of our letter. A considerable loss resulting from this transaction, we would like to know if we have to stand it or our correspondent?

A. There has been no legal adjudication of this question, as far as we know; but as in this case the sender employs the cable, the latter like a clerk who makes an error, may be regarded, we think, as his agent, and the loss will fall on the employer.

TRADE MARKS.

1. A in Ohio submits us the following: "In the fall of 1876 we went into the business of manufacturing shirts, drawers and other articles, in this State, and adopted the name of 'Peerless' for our productions, using also our monogram in connection with the word 'Peerless' upon our labels. We did not consider it necessary to register the name in the clerk's office, and have used it uninterruptedly until a firm in New Jersey (manufacturers of white shirts) wrote us that they were the only parties entitled to the word 'Peerless,' having registered the same, and that we were infringing upon their rights. Will you please ascertain whether we are obliged to discontinue this word on white shirts, or have we a right under the Centennial decision to use a plain English word as a title by which our goods may be designated?"

A. If our correspondents had used the name as a trade-mark before the New Jersey firm used or registered it, they can continue to use it. But if it was registered when they first adopted it, they have innocently infringed on the right of the other parties and can be stopped in its further use.