The Eli A. Herr, an employee of appellant. only question presented relates to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the finding that on the date named said Eli A. Herr "received a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, resulting in his death." Appellant contends that the evidence does not establish this fact, but, on the contrary, conclusively shows that the death of said employee was the result of chronic heart disease, and not of any accidental cause whatever. The evidence tends to show that on June 26, 1920, appellant had a number of men employed in mining coal, including the decedent. On the morning of that day, the decedent, with other employees of appellant, went down into its mine to engage in their usual work. When they reached the bottom of the mine and came to their working place, they found the same so full of smoke that they could not remain therein with comfort or safety, and by reason of that fact returned to the top of the mine. Immediately after the decedent came out of the mine, he walked a short distance to a stairway, sat down on one of the steps, and then fell over. On being carried into the office he was found to be dead. On examination at an autopsy held by the coroner, it was found that the decedent had been afflicted with a serious chronic heart disease. The smoke which caused the decedent and other employees of appellant to leave the mine had been produced by firing explosives early that morning for the purpose of loosening the coal, so that it could be more easily and more rapidly mined, and sufficient time had not elapsed for the air to become pure again before the men went down to work. Where air is impregnated with smoke of this kind, it causes a bad effect to persons who breathe it, and if inhaled too long will prove fatal. It does not affect all persons alike, and its evil results are not always immediate. Appellant's brief dis closes that one witness testified that it "causes distress all over; causes your heart to jump and beat as fast as you can count; affects your lungs and your head, and you get weak all over." The smoke on this occasion affected a number of the men who went down into the mine that morning with the decedent to work. It caused one to become sick at his stomach and to have a headache. He was partly overcome by the bad air, and had to take his time in walking to the cage at the bottom of the mine. It caused another to feel dizzy and light. He was to some extent overcome by the bad air, and was attended by a physician. It caused another to have a headache and to vomit. As he walked along the bottom of the mine, "he didn't have breath enough to walk only a few steps at a time." It made his heart jump and made him dizzy and blind. He got so sick he could not go, but did not become unconscious. After he came out of the mine he was treated by a physician. It made another one sick. He left the mine because of the bad air, and was sick all that day. He felt better the next day, but was not normal. Appellant bases its contention, that the evidence does not sustain the finding in question, chiefly on the testimony of two physicians who attended the autopsy. This testimony consists of their opinions that the death of said Eli A. Herr did not result from inhaling the impure air in the mine, but from the chronic heart disease. However, if their opinions be accepted as the true cause of his death, it does not follow that the finding under consideration is not sustained by the evidence. This is true for the reason that an occurrence, which merely hastens an existing disease to its final culmination, will be deemed an accident within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Laws 1915, c. 106), and where such occurrence arises out of and in the course of an employment, compensation will be awarded. In re Bowers (1917), 65 Ind. App. 128, 116 N. E. 842; Indianapolis, etc., Co. v. Coleman (1917), 65 Ind. App. 369, 117 N. E. 502; Retmier v. Cruse (1918), 67 Ind. 192, 119 N. E. 32; Puritan, etc., Co. v. Wolfe (1918), 68 Ind. App. 330, 120 N. E. 417; Indian Creek, etc., Co. v. Calvert (1918), 68 Ind. App. 474, 119 N. E. 519, 120 N. E. 709. There is no direct evidence that the smoke-laden air, inhaled by the decedent on the occasion in question, hastened his death because of the diseased condition of his heart, but such evidence is not necessary in order to establish that fact, if other proven facts will warrant such an inference. Bronnenberg v. Indiana, etc., T. Co. (1915), 59 Ind. App. 495, 109 N. E. 784; Carter v. Richart (1917), 65 Ind. App. 255, 114 N. E. 110. Directing our attention to the facts set out above, we observe that a man, afflicted with a serious heart disease, went down into a mine, and found the air of his working place filled with smoke that rendered it unfit to breathe, and seriously affected a number of his fellow workmen; that after remaining a short time he left the mine because of the impure air, and on reaching the top he was in such condition that he expired within a short time. It was the province of the Industrial Board to draw any reasonable inference from such facts. It evidently drew the inference that the same elements in the air of the mine, which caused other workmen to become deak, dizzy and blind, to have rapid pulsations, headache and short ness of breath, to become sick and vomit, so affected the decedent that death followed, because his diseased heart was unable to withstand the added burden placed on it by inhaling the smoke-laden air while in the mine, and in making an effort to escape from its evil effects. With such an inference in support of the finding in question, it is fully sustained by the evidence. We are unable to say that it is not a reasonable inference, and therefore we have no right to disregard it, although we might consider a contrary inference equally as reasonable. Bilskie c. Bilskie, 69 Ind. App. 595, 122 N .E. 436; Bimel Spoke, etc., Co. v. Loper (1917), 65 Ind. App. 479, 117 N. E. 527; City of Linton v. Jones, 130 N. E. 541. The award is therefore affirmed. a NOTE-Disease Following Injury as "Accident" Within Workmen's Compensation.-Where workman's neck was cut while being shaved in a barber shop, and the following day, while handling hides, anthrax germs entered through the cut, causing his death, it was held that the death was due to an injury arising out of the employment. Eldridge v. Endicott Johnson & Co., 189 App. Div. 53, 177 N. Y. S. 863, 4 W. C. L. J. 621. Where an employee strained himself by lifting, and later died from pneumonia, which the evidence established was due to the injury, the board was justified in finding that the subsequent death was due to an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. Folts v. Robertson, 188 N. Y. 359, 177 N. Y. Supp. 34, 4 W. C. L. J. 429. Where an employee suffered an accidental injury and later developed hysterical insanity, a finding of the board that the insanity was due to the injury out of the employment was sustained by the evidence. Kingan & Co. v. Ossam, Ind. App., 121 N. E. 289, 3 W. C. L. J. 276. An employee suffered a frost-bite while performing his duties in the service of the master and developed erysipelas, as the result of the injury, which caused his death. His death was held to be due to an accidental injury arising out of the employment. Larke v. Hancock Mut. Ins. Co., 90 Conn. 303, 97 Atl. 320. Where a workman stepped on a rusty nail and later contracted tetanus by the entrance of germs through the wound, it was held that he sustained an injury arising out of his employment. Putnam v. Murray, 174 App. Div. 720, 160 N. Y. S. 811. This subject is exhaustively treated in the excellent work of Mr. William R. Schneider on Workmen's Compensation, §§ 178 and 291. Mr. Schneider's book is not yet off the press, but he was kind enough to permit access to the proof sheets. A recent decision of interest, Wrightson v. McArthur & Hutchisons, Limited (ante, p. 553), illustrates a doctrine of law which does not arise so often in the twentieth century as it did in the eighteenth and nineteenth. We refer to the common law principle of "Constructive Delivery," or-as it is sometimes called -"Symbolic Delivery." It is hardly necessary to say that early law found a stumbling-block in the conception of any transfer of property which did not involve actual delivery of possession. In the earliest forms of conveyance of land, the grantor took the grantee upon the land and put him in possession. Where this proved inconvenient, later on, he took him in sight of the land and delivered to him a part of the land, i. e., a clod or twig actually removed from it, in lieu of putting him in actual possession of the whole. Here, again, there was delivery of actual possession, although only of a part, namely, the clod. Later on the grantor was content to hand the grantee any clod or twig, or even an office ruler, in the presence of witnesses, and accompanied by the solemnity of a written conveyance under seal. At this stage, the delivery has be come merely symbolic; there is no longer any actual delivery of possession. Nowadays the document of title is signed, sealed and deliv ered; this is purely symbolic delivery. But it is interesting to note that even today a verbal conveyance is not permissible, nor yet one which is not completed by some delivery to someone, of the document of title. Our conveyancing system has not yet outgrown early symbolism. A clear vestige of it still remains, although of course, by statute corporeal hered. itaments lie in grant as well as in livery. A parallel development took place in conI nection with the conveyance of personal prop erty, at any rate of chattels. If A transfers a chattel to B. it is still necessary that there should be some form of delivery. This may be (1) Actual delivery of the possession of the chattel to B. (2) Constructive delivery, e.g., delivery of a sample of goods in token of the whole. (3) Symbolic delivery, i.e., delivery of the means of access to and control of the goods, e.g., the key of the warehouse in which they are stored. (4) Documentary delivery, i.e., delivery of a document of title to the goods, such as a bill of lading, or a dock warrant, or a wharffinger's receipt note comprising the goods. (5) Delivery by bill of sale, i.e., a document purporting to transfer the goods either at the date of signature, or by conferring on the grantee a power to enter and take them. Now in all these cases it is easy to see that the old notion, that there can be no transfer of chattels without delivery, is still at the root of the legal rules in the matter. Such delivery may be actual or symbolic; but there is always at least the vestige of a legal fiction that actual delivery of the physical possession of the goods has taken place. In the case of choses in action, which can only be transferred by an assignment in writing, the doctrine also clearly survives. The assignment in writing is not a mere ceremonial requisite to witness the existence of a contract, as is often absurdly stated in legal textbooks; it has nothing to do with contract at all. The writing is not required as a matter of solemn evidence as is often erroneously supposed. The writing is required because it is a symbol of delivery, the only kind of delivery possible in the case of an intangible an incorporeal form of property, such as a chose in action necessarily must be. If the origin and historical development of this idea of constructive or symbolic delivery is always borne in mind, many of the difficulties which occur in connection with it will tend to disappear. There are many classes of cases in which the doctrine may become important; but the following are the three which most frequently occur: (a) Transfer of the property in goods bargained and sold. The risk, of course, passes with the property, so that the question of such transfer is very important. (b) Registration of documents passing the property in goods, which remain in the apparent possession of the grantor, i.e., bills of sale under the statutes of 1878 and 1880. (c) Charges on chattels belonging to a company, which require to be registered in order that they may be valid against creditors upon liquidation under the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, s. 93 (1). It was in connection with this third class of case that Mr. Justice Rowlatt had to decide Wrightson v. McArthur and Hutchisons, Limited (supra). Here a company was in liquidation. In a compartment on its premises the liquidator found goods which were claimed by the plaintiff. The company had agreed to secure the plaintiff against loss on a certain contract undertaken by him, and sent him a letter agreeing to set aside a quantity of goods in a special compartment of their premises for his benefit in respect of their liability to indemnify him. They set aside the goods, locked the compartment and handed him the keys. Then they sent him another letter in which they said: "You can have the right to remove same as desired." The plaintiff claimed that these goods had been delivered to him and were in his physical possession, as possessor of the key, at the date of the liquidation. On the other hand, the liquidator took the view that the letter created a charge on the chattels, and that such charge required registration under s. 93 (1) of the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908. As it had not been registered, the liquidator claimed that the charge was void, and that the goods were available for the benefit of all the creditors. Nof if the only effect of the letters which passed between the parties was to create a charge in favor of the plaintiff on goods remaining in the company's possession, it is quite clear that such a charge must be registered. Ingenious attempts were made to get out of this by the plaintiff. It was suggested that the real transaction was a verbal pledge of the goods, and that a "pledge" is not a "charge" within the meaning of the statute, and so does not require to be registered. Morris v. Delobbil-Flipo (1892, 2 Ch. 352). But, while it is true that a "pledge" is a common law conception, whereas a "charge" is the creature of equity, it is not possible seriously to suggest that a common law "pledge" is not also a "charge" in equity. Pledge is a form of bailment, and every bailment is a form of common law trust. Re Hardwick, Ex Parte Hubbard (17 Q. B. D. 690); equity gave additional remedies to the cestuis qui trust, but did not create the trust which it enforced. Equity created many new forms of "trust" and "charges" unknown to the common law and unenforced by it; but it did not, in so doing, create a wholly novel juridical conception. A "charge," then, cannot be said to be so purely the creature of equity that no common law bailment or pledge can satisfy its definition. If a common law pledge fulfils all the requisites of an equitable "charge," then it is a "charge," and requires-in a proper case-registration, as such, under s. 93 (1) of the Act of 1908. Again, it was argued on behalf of the claimant that, supposing the transaction was not a verbal pledge, but a conveyance in writing, nevertheless it escaped being a "charge" on another ground. No money was secured by the document. It was simply an agreement conferring on the grantee a right in equity to sue for and obtain a charge on the chattels in the event of the condition happening which entitled him to the goods. But such a contention is hardly arguable. An equity to sue for a charge is another name for an equity to a charge, and such an equity-upon part-performance by the grantee, such as had here occurred -is already a charge and treated as such in a Court of Equity. Clearly then, apart from other considerations which can easily be urged against this plea, the document is a "charge" and, therefore, registrable as such unless excluded from the operation of the section. The But these were only minor contentions. case of the plaintiff really rested upon the contention that the possession of the goods had actually passed to him. The statute applies only in the case of "charges," i.e., transactions in which the grantor remains in possession of the goods in which the grantee takes conditional right. Where the chattels are in fact passed out of the possession of the grantor into that of the grantee, there is no longer any such "charge" as the statute contemplates. The security arises under the delivery of possession. The real point, accordingly, is simply this, whether or not there has been delivery of possession of the goods to the grantee. And this question of possession turns upon whether or not there has been any one of the five forms of delivery discussed earlier in this article. Now, it seems reasonably clear that there has been symbolic delivery of possession. Had the goods been transferred to a stranger's warehouse, and the key then handed to the grantee, there would have been a simple every-day case of symbolic delivery. Further, had all the goods in the defendants' premises been the subject of the grant, and the key of the whole premises handed over, the case would equally have been covered by authority as one of symbolical delivery, Hilton v. Tucker (39 Ch. D. 669). Here, however, the facts fall short of either of those possibilities. There was a partial delivery of goods, in a special compartment, locked away, accompanied by delivery of the key, and the grant of a license in writing to remove the goods at any time. Now, if we go back to first principles, the meaning of this is clear. The intention is to transfer complete control over the goods to the grantee, but it is inconvenient for him to take them all away. Hence there is delivery to him of the means of complete control over the goods, namely, the key and the license to remove. Obviously, the parties have done all they can to transfer possession without actual removal of the goods. This is therefore a symbolic delivery. Ward v. Turner (2 Ves. Sen. 431). "Symbolism," all-dominant in the life of early man with his Totems and Taboos, has not yet completely spent its force. Some psycho-analyst of the future will probably derive interesting conclusions as to the nature of our civ ilization and the character of its superstitions from the survival of such "complexes" as are involved in this and other cases of legal symbolism.-Solicitors' Journal. HUMOR OF THE LAW. "To hell with John Lewis and Gov. Allen," says Alexander Howat. Which recalls the story of the controversy between the English bishop and the judge. "You can only say, 'You be hanged"," boasted the bishop. "I can say 'You be damned," "Yes," replied the judge, "but when I say, 'You be hanged,' you are hanged."-Kansas City Star. Rookie Sentry: Halt, who's there? Voice: Private Stock, Company C. Rookie Sentry: Advance, Private Stock, and be sampled.-American Legion Weekly. The following contemporary account of a hearing before Lord Eldon is worth recalling. The names of the counsel are familiar to the students of Vesey Reports (if any such remain): Mr. Leach made a speech Tedious, dull and long; And the Chancellor said-I doubt 1. Actions-Splitting Cause of Action.-In view of Negotiable Instruments Law, §§ 48, 82, 87, the prohibition in Code, art. 50, § 2, against instituting more than one suit on a joint and several note when the persons "executing the same" are alive and reside in the same county does not apply to prevent successive suits against accomodation indorsers, for the liability of an accomodation indorser of a note is secondary, and not joint, but several and he is not a person "executing the same" within the statute, although one assuming primary liability on the paper is undoubtedly one "executing the same." Bradley v. Louisville Food Products Co., Md., 114 Atl. 913. 2. Assignments-For Collection.-Where defendant, though indebted to a corporation, loaned money to it in a sum less than his indebtedness, receiving its note therefor, and plaintiff, a creditor of defendant, brought suit against him, serving writ of garnishment on the corporation, it might set up defendant's indebtedness to it as a defense, notwithstanding it had assigned its claim to a third person for collection; Rem. Code 1915, § 191, giving right of set-off against the assignee, being persuasive, and the rule of estoppel by assignment being applicable only between assignor and assignee. -Austin v. Wallace. Wash., 200 Pac. 566. 3. Attachment - Summons Unnecessary. - In proper instances, where civil actions are commenced, and service is obtained by attachment on defendant's property, and publication of a notice based on the jurisdiction thus acquired, the issuance of a summons is unnecessary.Jenette v. Hovey & Co. N. C., 108 S. E. 301. 4. Automobiles-Collision.-Where plaintiffs, traveling in an automobile at a reasonable speed, had passed beyond the center of a street intersection, and were presumably out of the zone of danger from any vehicle approaching from the east and were struck by defendant's motortruck, which was exceeding the legal speed limit, at a place out of the line of travel from that direction, plaintiffs were not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in failing to keep watch for the truck.-Simonsen v. L. J. Christopher Co., Cal., 200 Pac. 615. 5. Bankruptcy-Contribution.-Where a brokerage firm lawfully repledged securities pledged with them by their customers, and after the bankruptcy of the brokers the subsequent pledgee sold a portion of the securities to satisfy its debt and returned the others to the receiver in bankruptcy, the owners of the se curities which were sold are entitled to contribution from those whose securities were returned, though they would not be so entitled if the returned securities had been unlawfully repledged, and therefore the owner of the securities which were returned cannot reclaim them from the receiver in bankruptcy.-in re Toole, U. S. C. C. A., 274 Fed. 337. 6. Bills and Notes-Admissibility of Evidence. -in an action on note given for exclusive right to publish musicians' directory in certain states. where defenuant set up fraud and misrepresentation, testimony concerning acts and conduct of plaintiff subsequent to the consummation of the sale was properly admitted, to be considered by the jury in connection with the question whether the sale was induced by faise and fraudulent representations.-Horowitz v. Kuenl, Wash., 200 Pac. 570. 7.-Definite Time.-Held, that an agreement to extend notes "until frost" is an agreement to extend to a definite time.-West Texas Loan Co. v. Montgomery, N. M., 200 Pac. 681. 8.Holder in Due Course.-Where property was sold to defendant and a conditional bill of sale was given, later followed by an unconditional bill of sale, title to the goods passed by the unconditional bill of sale, and a defense to the note, given for the price of the goods, that certain of the goods sold were not owned by the seller, payee of the note, and had been taken from defendant by the real owner, although good against the payee of the note, good against plaintiff, a holder in due course.Bowen v. Rury, Wash., 200 Pac. 789. was not 9. Substitution.-In payee's action on a note executed by defendant to procure unus wherewith to promote a proposed corporation the payee's agreement to substitute for such note the note of the corporation held no defense, in the absence of an allegation that the note of the corporation was ever tendered to the payee. -Hale v. Gardiner, Cal., 200 Pac. 598. 10. es Brokers-Commission.-Where a real tate broker procures a customer willing, ready, and able to purchase property offered for sale according to the terms of the offer, and the transaction is defeated on account of some fault of the principal, the broker is entitled to his commission, although the sale is not consummated.-Hutchins & Co. v. Sherman, Fla., 89 So. 430. 11. Carriers of Goods-Delay.-A railroad company is not estopped from relying on a provision of a bill of lading that the "amount of any loss or damage for which any carrier is liable shall be computed on the basis of the value of the property at the place and time of shipment," because the consignees were not given notice of a loss in transit until long after the shipment was due to arrive, though the replacement value of the goods was higher when notice of loss was finally received, a loss resulting from delay in delivery being within the class of losses to which such provision refers. Fahey v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. Md., 114 Atl. 905. 12. Duty to Accept.-Generally a court may compel a carrier in the exercise of its public duty to accept goods tendered to it for snipment, and thus impose on it the absolute duty to deliver them at their designated destination. -Mobile & O. R. Co. v. Zimmern, Ala., 89 So. 475. 13.- Liability of Initial Carrier.-Since the passage of the act of 1906, from which § 2777 of the Civil Code of 1910 was codified, the initial carrier in an interstate shipment "is liable for loss occasioned anywhere en route, whether on its own lines or not, where it voluntary receives the shipment, notwithstanding an agreement or stipulation in a bill of lading limiting liability to loss, damage, or injury occurring on its Own lines."-Heath V. Sandersville R. Co., 23 Ga. App. 255 (5), 98 S. E. 92. Director General of Railroads v. Beard, Ga.. 108 S. E. 310. 14. Limitation of Liability.-While a common carrier may charge a rate for transporting of freight, to be determined according to the value of the article shipped, the carrier cannot, by an arbitrary agreement as to the value of |