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hysteria, from which she has not recovered and may never

recover.

The plaintiff alleges and claims to have shown negligence on the part of the defendant in two particulars, namely, (1) in that the belt which broke and struck the plaintiff was improperly stitched or laced at the place where it parted, and (2) in that the defendant failed to properly inspect the joints of said belts from time to time in order to discover the natural wear and weakness of the lacings.

The testimony as to the manner in which the particular belt in question was laced or stitched before the accident is conflicting. The plaintiff testifies that about a month before the accident the section-hand, Smith, relaced all of the joints in the belt, she assisting him, at his request, by holding the belt; and that the manner in which he repaired or fixed it was by punching four holes in a row in each end of the belt where it was to be joined, and then lacing the ends together by single lacing; that is, as we understand her, by putting one strand of lacing only through the holes. The witness Higgenbottom, who was employed in the same room with the plaintiff as assistant to the second-hand, testifies that he saw the belt just after the accident and helped Smith, the secondhand, to fix it when it was relaced by him; that the lacings broke in the joint where the belt parted, and that they were worn pretty bad. He also testifies that the lacing which broke was single lacing, with only one row of holes on each side of the joint before it broke. In cross-examination he further testifies that when repairing the broken joint the second-hand punched a new row of holes upon each side of the joint, that the holes in the old part were not disturbed, and that he punched new holes because the belt was not laced right in the first place; that there was only one row of holes in each end of the belt, and that it was the custom to stitch all the joints in the belts there with a single strand of lacing through the holes.

On the part of the defendant testimony was introduced to the effect that two rows of holes were punched in each end of said belt at the places where it was joined, and that double

lacing instead of single was used in making the fastenings. Smith, the second-hand, testifies that it was so laced by him. before the accident, and that he did not punch new holes in it after the accident; that it was the lacing that broke.

The testimony of experts in belt-making was introduced both on the part of the plaintiff and of the defendant, and they all practically agree that the double-lacing method is generally adopted by skilled belt-makers and repairers, and that it lasts three or four times longer than the single-lacing method. One of the defendant's experts says that he does not know of any well-regulated mill that would use the single lacing referred to, and that in his opinion a joint laced with a single row of holes on each side and with a single strand of lacing would not be safe. In short, it is apparent, from an examination of all the evidence bearing upon the question of the character and sufficiency of the kind of stitching or lacing first described-that is, the single strand placed in a single row of holes on each end of the joint-that it is considered insufficient and unsafe.

As it was competent for the jury to find, under the foregoing state of the testimony, that the belt in question was improperly and insecurely laced, the court cannot say that they were not warranted in finding the defendant guilty of negligence. Its duty clearly was to provide the plaintiff, in common with its other employees, a reasonably safe place in which to work and reasonably safe appliances and instrumentalities for the performance of the work. And for negligence in the discharge of this duty the defendant is liable under the well-settled law of master and servant. Mulvey v. Locomotive Works, 14 R. I. 204. We agree with the position taken by defendant that the employer does not undertake with the employee that he will adopt the latest and best appliances, or that he is to be cast in damages for error of judgment in selecting one kind of machinery or appliance on proof that another kind is better or safer, when both kinds are in common use. This doctrine is in accord with our own repeated decisions. See the late case of Disano v. Brick Co., 20 R. I. 452. But the appliance here used, if it was con

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structed as the plaintiff's witnesses testify, is practically condemned by the defendant's own witnesses and shown not to be in common use in well-regulated and well-managed establishments; and hence we fail to see the pertinency of the doctrine as applied to this case. In short, the law does not fit the case, assuming, as we must, that the jury found the belt to have been fastened with a single lacing through four single holes in each end of the belt.

Whether the belts in the spinning-room were properly inspected from time to time was also a question of fact for the jury under the conflicting testimony bearing upon this branch of the case.

With regard to the question of inspection, it is pertinent to remark that whether the method adopted by the defendant was sufficient or insufficient, it would not be controlling on this petition for a new trial, for the reason that, although the jury may have found that it was sufficient and proper, yet, as it was competent for them to find negligence on the other and principal ground, which has already been considered by us, it cannot be said that they did not so find. In other words, two grounds of negligence having been alleged by the plaintiff, either one of which, if made out, would be sufficient to sustain the verdict in regard to the negligence of defendant, and evidence having been offered pro and con upon each of said grounds, the court cannot grant a new trial if it can see that one of the grounds is made out, although the other may not be, unless it shall appear by a special finding of the jury that their verdict is based upon a ground which is not sustained by the evidence; and in the case before us there were no (3) special findings by the jury. It is further to be observed that if the method of lacing employed was wrong, this constituted a defect in construction for which the defendant is liable, and which would not have been corrected by inspection, however frequent; and if this original negligence existed, it was quite immaterial whether the subsequent inspection of the belt was sufficient or insufficient, or whether there was any inspection at all, for the jury could properly have found that the accident was caused by such original negligence.

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But the defendant contends that, even granting that it failed to discharge its duty in regard to furnishing reasonably safe appliances and in properly inspecting the same, the evidence shows that the plaintiff must have known of the danger from the breaking of belts, and hence that she assumed the risk of injury therefrom. The law is doubtless clear that even where a master fails in his duty in respect to repairing and inspecting machinery or appliances to be used by the employee, and the latter, with knowledge of the danger, continues in the employment without objection, he assumes the risk and cannot recover if injured. Kelley v. Silver Spring Co., 12 R. I. 112; Disano v. Brick Co., supra. We cannot say, under the testimony in the case at bar, however, that the plaintiff had such knowledge of the defects complained of as to charge her with the assumption of the risk occasioned by defendant's negligence. For, while the defendant has offered considerable testimony to the effect that belts were frequently breaking in the spinning-room where she was employed, she testifies that she was not aware of the fact, and that she never saw but one belt break while she worked there, up to the time of the accident in question. this was so and it was for the jury to determine as to her credibility-it cannot be said, as matter of law, that she assumed the risks occasioned by the negligence of the defendant. If the belts were properly laced originally, and, notwithstanding that, they broke from time to time, and the knowledge of that fact was brought home to the plaintiff so that she appreciated the danger, then it might well be claimed that the risk of injury from such breaking was one of the assumed risks of her employment. Knowledge by the servant of the unsafe condition of appliances which carries, or should carry, to the mind of the servant the danger to which he is exposed is the true test. Clark v. St. Paul Co., 28 Minn. 128; Russell v. R. Co., 32 Minn. 230; Spicer v. South Boston Iron Co., 138 Mass. 436; Rice v. King Philip Mills, 144 Mass. 229; Murphy v. Phillips, 25 W. R. 647; Wilson v. Willimantic Linen Co., 50 Conn., 433; Mulvey v. R. I. Locomotive Works, 14 R. I. 204; Pilling v. Narragansett Machine Co., 19 R. I.

If

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666; Whipple v. R. Co., 19 R. I. 587; Crandall v. R. Co., 19 R. I. 594; Laporte v. Cook, 21 R. I. 158; McDonald v. Telegraph Co., 22 R. I. 131; Wood Master and Servant, SS 376, 749, and 764; Thomas on Negligence, p. 851; Buswell on Personal Injuries, § 204; Sherman and Redfield on Negligence, 185, 194a, and 378. If it be suggested in this connection that the evidence shows that the plaintiff must have known of the unsafe condition of the belt in question because she was present when it was laced and saw how it was done, it is sufficient to reply that, so far as appears in evidence, she had no knowledge as to the proper method which should be employed in the doing of such mechanical work, and hence that she assumed no risk occasioned by the negligence of the defendant in this regard. Although it appears that she knew the manner in which it was laced, she did not know it was dangerous. And the court cannot impute knowledge to a girl of seventeen years of age as to a fact which required expert testimony to determine at the trial.

The first ruling of the trial court which is complained of by defendant is that plaintiff was allowed to introduce the testimony of experts as to the lacing of belts in mills of a different character from the one where plaintiff was employed. The defendant contends that such testimony was not competent, because the difference in the character of the machinery is so great that the testimony was irrelevant. We do not think the court erred in admitting the testimony. The plaintiff was endeavoring to prove that the method of belt-lacing employed by defendant was unskillful and unsafe, and that it was not in common use in well-regulated mills and manufactories, for the purpose of substantiating her charge of negligence against the defendant. And there is no reason why she should be limited to the custom or method adopted in mills or shops precisely similar to that in which she worked. If the belts were differently constructed in different mills, or were subjected to different tension or to different conditions, these things would doubtless affect to a greater or less degree the weight which should be given to the testimony. But we can hardly conceive of there being such a difference between belts