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in a machine-shop or ordinary manufactory and those in a spinning-room as to preclude the method of construction in the one case from bearing some fair and reasonable similarity to the method in the other. And if the evidence offered had any bearing or relevancy, however remote, it was not error to admit it. The record shows that when the testimony objected to was admitted, the court said: "The difference between a machine-shop and a woolen-mill will be noted by the jury." The defendant contends that the presiding justice also erred in his instructions to the jury, first, in that he granted the following request of the plaintiff :

"In this case it was the duty of the defendant company to use reasonable care in fastening the belt which operated the plaintiff's spinning-frame so that it should not be dangerous to her while working upon it, and, further, to exercise reasonable care and foresight in keeping and maintaining said belt in a safe and proper condition for running said machine; and if the jury find that said belt was negligently and improperly fastened together at the joint where it broke, then the defendant company would be liable for the consequences of its breaking and injury of plaintiff, if the plaintiff at the time of the injury was in the exercise of due care."

It is argued that this charge wholly overlooks the question as to whether the plaintiff assumed the risk, and hence that it should have been refused.

A single request to charge cannot ordinarily be expected to contain all the law pertinent to a case. It usually has a bearing only on some particular branch thereof, and if applicable to that branch it is proper to grant it. The court, in reviewing a particular request to charge, must take it in connection with the charge as a whole; and if when thus taken it shows that the point omitted in the particular request is fairly covered elsewhere, the fact that it is not also incorporated in the specific request is not error. In a word, all that either party can reasonably claim is that the court shall instruct the jury in all the law applicable to the case. An examination of the charge of the court in this case shows that the question of assumed risk was not overlooked. Referring to the machin

ery, the court said: "If it is unsafe, if it is dangerous, and the employee knows that to be so, and without protest goes to work upon that machine, then the employee assumes the risk of the occupation and the employer would not be liable." Having thus correctly instructed the jury in the law applicable to this question, the court was not called upon to repeat it by incorporating it in said request to charge. Kelley v. Silver Spring Co., 12 R. I. 119.

The third, fourth, and seventh requests of the plaintiff to charge having been excepted to on the same ground, what we have just said is equally applicable to those, and the exceptions must, therefore, be overruled.

It is further urged that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury as requested by the defendant. The first request which was refused was as follows: "The defendant is bound to give its belts and lacings only such inspection as ordinarily careful manufacturing corporations give under like circumstances." Instead of this the court gave the following: "The defendant corporation is bound to give its belts and lacings such ordinarily careful inspection as circumstances require." It is conceded that the charge as given was a correct statement of the law, so far as it went, but it is urged that the jury should also have been instructed as to what is meant by ordinary and careful inspection. While we see no objection to the request as presented, we cannot say that the refusal to grant it in its exact terms was reversible error. The court had already instructed the jury to the effect that ordinary care must be exercised in the inspection of the machinery and appliances, and this instruction had been given, in view of the fact that the evidence of experts and others had been freely introduced by the defendant regarding the methods of inspection in other mills, for the express purpose of showing that the inspection practiced by defendant was such as was made by ordinarily careful and prudent manufacturers. The court also granted the following request of the defendant bearing upon this question, namely: "If the defendant had reasonably suitable belts and lacings, and reasonably careful inspection, the verdict should be for the

defendant." We think it is apparent, therefore, that the defendant could not have been prejudiced by the failure of the court to particularly define what was meant by reasonable care in the matter of inspection, although the charge would have been more satisfactory if such a definition had been expressly incorporated therein. But, taking the charge in connection with the testimony offered and the whole trend of the case, it is evident that the jury were given to understand that the defendant was only called upon to exercise such a degree of care in inspecting its appliances as persons of ordinary care would have exercised under similar circumstances. See, in this connection, Wabash Ry. Co. v. McDaniels, 107 U. S. 454. The defendant's fourth and fifth requests to charge, which were refused, are as follows:

"4th. If belts were constantly breaking in the room where plaintiff worked, and the plaintiff knew of that fact and continued to work there, she assumed the risk of being injured by such breaking.

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5th. If belts were constantly breaking it would be presumed that the plaintiff knew of the fact, and hence assumed the risk, and she cannot recover of the defendant corporation."

The defendant contends that these refusals to charge, coupled with the granting of the plaintiff's sixth request to charge, which is as follows, "Unless the plaintiff had some notice or warning of the weakness in the belt by which she was struck, or such weakness was apparent or might have been seen by her upon a reasonable examination of the belt, she did not assume the risk of injury as one of the ordinary risks of her employment," gave the jury to understand that no matter how open and obvious the danger from belts breaking all around her was, nevertheless that she did not assume the risk unless she knew of the weakness in this particular belt.

We do not think that such an inference would naturally be drawn by the jury. Moreover, as we have said, the court had already charged the jury that the plaintiff assumed all obvious risks, including those caused by the breaking of belts,

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if she knew that they were frequently accustomed to break. So that as to said requests, they had already been substantially covered by the charge and did not need to be repeated.

The ninth and tenth requests of the defendant, which were refused by the court, were as follows:

"9th. The parents of the plaintiff are responsible for the expenses of sickness, doctor's bills, nursing, medicines, etc., and the mere fact that the parents are poor does not render the plaintiff liable therefor.

10th. The poverty of the father, or mother, if the father was dead, would not be sufficient to render the plaintiff liable for necessaries furnished to her; but a refusal or neglect of the father to furnish necessaries must be shown."

These requests, while they are substantially correct as abstract propositions of law, had nothing to do with the questions at issue, and hence were rightly refused. No evidence was offered as to the expense occasioned by the plaintiff's injuries, and no claim was made in the declaration or in argument that the defendant was liable therefor. Moreover, the court expressly charged the jury that the plaintiff could not recover for any such expenses incurred during her minority; that all she was entitled to was compensation for her personal injury and suffering, and that if they found that she would continue to be disabled and suffer after arriving at majority, they could from that time allow her compensation therefor, and also loss of earnings and reasonable medical attendance.. The eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth requests to charge were rightly refused, the questions raised not being pertinent to any issue involved in the case.

We cannot say that the verdict is against the evidence. Petition for new trial denied, and case remanded for judgment.

John W. Hogan, for plaintiff.

David S. Baker, Lewis A. Waterman, Arthur M. Allen, for defendant.

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JAMES BUCKLEY VS. EARLE & PREW'S EXPRESS CO.

PROVIDENCE-JANUARY 25, 1901.

PRESENT: Stiness, C. J., Tillinghast and Douglas, J.J.

(1) New Trial. Admission of Evidence.

A new trial will not be granted because of the refusal of the court to charge the jury that certain evidence had no bearing on the case (assuming such evidence to have been irrelevant), where the evidence in the case, disconnected from the irrelevant, was sufficient to sustain the verdict, and the evidence objected to was neither injurious nor prejudicial.

TRESPASS ON THE CASE for negligence. The defendant requested the court to charge "that this horse had walked off when left in the street unattended is no evidence of any propensity to run away when being driven, and has no bearing on the case." Refused. Heard on petition of defendant for a re-argument of the case decided in rescript Ex. No. 2876, unreported. Petition denied.

PER CURIAM. The defendants claimed at the trial that testimony that the horse in question had walked away on a previous occasion, when left in the street unattended, was irrelevant, and they excepted to the refusal of the judge so to charge. Assuming it to be irrelevant, the court is of opinion that it was not prejudicial.

The declaration charged that the horse was accustomed to run away, and that the defendant knew it. The evidence of admissions by Mr. Prew as to the character of the horse, the testimony of a previous driver as to the horse taking the bits between his teeth and starting to run, coupled with the testimony of the conduct of the horse on the day in question, were sufficient to warrant the jury to believe that the horse had the propensity to run.

The testimony objected to was not testimony which would be likely to prejudice a jury against the character of a party and so lead them to discredit him, as in State v. Briggs, 9 R. I. 361; Graham v. Coupe, 9 R. I. 478; Tourgee v. Rose,