SCHOOL LANDS (Continued).

to purchase, the mere rejection of the offer in and of itself did not operate to withdraw the lands from sale to other applicants or to put such applicant in privity with the state so as to give him a superior equity to that of innocent purchasers of value of the lands from apparent record owners during the pendency of the mandamus proceeding. (Id.)

9. MANDAMUS PROCEEDING SUBSEQUENT PATENTEES-NONREPRESENTATION BY SURVEYOR-GENERAL.—In a mandamus proceeding to compel the surveyor-general to receive and file an application to purchase school lands, he does not represent patentees who acquired their patents during the pendency of the mandamus proceedings, or those claiming under such patentees, so as to make them bound by the judgment. (Id.)

10. FAILURE TO FILE LIS PENDENS-LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE— SUBSEQUENT PATENTEES.-Where notice of the pendency of a mandamus proceeding to compel the surveyor-general to receive and file an application to purchase school lands was not filed as provided by section 409 of the Code of Civil Procedure, subsequent patentees and purchasers during the pendency of the proceeding were not charged with constructive notice thereof. (Id.)

SCHOOL LAW.

1. FREE TEXT-BOOKS FOR ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -INAPPLICABILITY TO HIGH SCHOOLS.-High schools are not a part of the elementary school system of the state, and section 7 of article IX of the constitution, providing for free text-books for elementary schools, is therefore inapplicable to high schools. (MacMillan Co. v. Clarke, 491.)

2. FREE TEXT-BOOKS FOR HIGH SCHOOLS-POWER OF LEGISLATURE.— While there is no direct constitutional provision for free textbooks for high schools, no further constitutional authority is needed for supplying free text-books for such schools at the discretion of the legislature than the general powers granted by the constitution under which the high school system itself has been created, operated, and maintained, for there is nothing in the constitutional requirement for free text-books for elementary schools which negatives a legislative power to also supply such books to secondary schools, nor is there anything in the nature of a provision for free text-books for high schools to require different or more specific constitutional authority than has been found sufficient for the building and furnishing of schoolhouses, employing teachers, and supplying high school equipment. (Id.) 3. FURNISHING FREE TEXT-BOOKS FOR HIGH SCHOOLS NOT A GIFTCONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-The right of the legislature to extend the free use of text-books to high schools is not within the inhibition of section 31 of article IV of the constitution, which provides that

SCHOOL LAW (Continued).

the legislature shall not have the power to make any gift or au thorize the making of any gift of any public money or thing of value to any individual, in view of section 1 of article IX of the constitution, which declares that the legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement through the agency of a free public school system, and in view of the fact that the free school system is not primarily a service to individuals, but to the community. (Id.)

4. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FREE TEXT-BOOK ACT OF 1917-METHOD OF PAYMENT FOR BOOKS.-The Free Text-book Act of 1917, providing for free text-books for high schools (Stats. 1917, p. 729), is not violative of section 12 of article XI of the constitution as an attempt to impose taxes upon high school districts by direct legislative authority and without the interposition of the corporate officers in whom the power to assess and collect local taxes is vested, in view of sections 1756, 1757, and 1763 of the Political Code. (Id.) 5. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FREE TEXT-BOOK ACT OF 1917-METHOD OF PAYMENT FOR BOOKS.-The Free Text-book Act of 1917 (Stats. 1917, p. 729), which in section 1 provides for the adoption by high school boards of text-books for use in high schools and directs that after July 1, 1920, text-books shall be supplied to pupils of such schools free of charge and that the boards may pay for such books out of the special funds of the districts, is not violative of section 12 of article XI of the constitution as an attempt to impose taxes upon high school districts by direct legislative authority, in view of section 1756, 1757 and 1763 of the Political Code. (Id.)

6. RECOVERY OF MONEYS EXPENDED IN FURNISHING BOOKS TO NONRESIDENT PUPILS-INVALIDITY OF PROVISION-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF OTHER PROVISIONS UNAFFECTED.-Section 2 of the Free Textbook Act of 1917, which merely provides a method by which high school districts that have furnished and paid for free textbooks to its pupils residing in other parts of the county may recover the moneys thus expended, even if invalid, does not affect the constitutionality of section 1 of such act, which provides a complete procedure for providing such books. (Id.)

SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS. See Annexation, 1, 2; Building Contracts, 1, 4.

SECRET PROFITS. See Corporations, 1, 2, 4-10.

SECURITIES. See Conversion, 1.

SIGNATURES. See Promissory Notes, 1.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. See Contracts, 7, 19; Estates of Deceased Persons, 3; Vendor and Vendee, 6, 7.

STATE. See Bonds, 1, 3.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS. See Contracts, 8-11, 18, 39.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. See Corporations, 10, 11, 37, 38; Fraud, 1; Mortgage, 5; Workmen's Compensation Act, 19.

STATUTES.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DISCRIMINATORY STATUTE-RIGHT OF ATTACK.-The general rule that a statute purporting to make an unconstitutional discrimination between persons or classes of persons cannot be assailed on the ground of unconstitutionality by a person not belonging to the class discriminated against, is subject to certain well-defined exceptions, as, where no member of such a class is in a position to raise the constitutional question, any person affected by the application of the statute can urge its unconstitutionality. (Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 26.)

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DISCRIMINATORY STATE STATUTE RIGHT OF NONCITIZEN.-When a state statute imposes a burden on a noncitizen which is not imposed on the citizen of the state, the noncitizen may have relief from the burden thus imposed by invoking the provision of the federal constitution for the nullification of the discriminatory legislation, but when a privilege is granted to a citizen and withheld from a noncitizen, the latter finds relief in the provision of the federal constitution, which, by operation of law, so to speak, extends the privilege to him. (Id.)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.

1. WORDS.-A statute should always be so construed, if reasonably possible, as to give to each part thereof the meaning and effect which, from the act as a whole, appears to have been intended, and a narrow or restricted meaning should not be given to a word, if it would result in an evasion of the evident purpose of the act, when a permissible, but broader, meaning would prevent the evasion and carry out the purpose. (In re Reineger, 97.)

2. LEGISLATIVE ACTS-PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY.-The presumption which attends every act of the legislature is that it is within the constitutional power. (MacMillan Co. v. Clarke, 491.) See Legislature, 2.

STIPULATIONS. See Sureties, 4.

STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS. See Corporations, 30, 39; Inheritance Tax, 6.

STOCKHOLDERS' LIABILITY. See Corporations, 16, 18, 20, 37.

SUBROGATION.

PAYMENT OF JOINT JUDGMENT BY INDEMNITOR OF ONE DEBTOR-INDEMNITOR NOT ENTITLED.-An indemnitor in paying a judgment obtained against its indemnitee and another for the commission of an act for which the latter were jointly and severally liable is not entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the indemnitee, as against its codefendant. (Adams v. White Bus Line, 710.)

SUBSCRIPTIONS. See Corporations, 20-23.

SUMMONS. See Dismissal, 2, 3; School Lands, 4.

SUPERVISORS. See Municipal Corporations, 19.

SURETIES.

1. CHANGE OF CONTRACT WITHOUT CONSENT-DISCHARGE-APPLICABILITY OF PRINCIPLE.-The principle declared in sections 2819, 2840, and 2844 of the Civil Code that sureties have the right to stand upon the very terms of their contract, and that if it is changed without their knowledge or consent, they are released from liability, applies to all contracts of suretyship, including undertakings to release attachments. (Michelin Tire Co. v. Bentel, 315.) 2. UNDERTAKING TO RELEASE ATTACHMENT-AMENDMENT OF СомPLAINT -NONCONSENT OF SURETIES-DISCHARGE FROM LIABILITY.— Sureties on an undertaking to release an attachment are discharged from liability where after the execution of the undertaking the complaint is amended without their consent by stating a new cause of action on certain claims assigned to the plaintiff subsequent to the commencement of the action. (Id.)

3. CHANGE OF CONTRACT-WHEN SURETY NOT DISCHARGED.-A surety is not exonerated from liability by a change in the contract between the principal and the creditor which is made with his consent. (Id.)

4. CONSENT OF SURETY TO AMENDMENT OF COMPLAINT APPLICATION OF UNDERTAKING то NEW CAUSE OF ACTION NOT IMPLIED. A stipulation of a surety on an undertaking to release an attachment permitting the plaintiff to file an amended complaint setting up a new cause of action on claims assigned to it subsequent to the commencement of the action without prejudice to any rights which the defendants may have against the plaintiff, is not to be construed as a consent that the undertaking should be so altered as to cover the new cause of action. (Id.)

5. UNDERTAKING INAPPLICABLE TO NEW CAUSE OF ACTION-LEGAL EFFECT OF ORDER DISCHARGING ATTACHMENT.- -Where a complaint

CLXXXIV Cal.-57

SURETIES (Continued).

was amended after the levy of an attachment by setting up a new cause of action on claims assigned to plaintiff after the commencement of the action, an order discharging the attachment on the ground that defendants were not indebted to plaintiff at the time alleged in the affidavit was an adjudication that the amendment and the stipulation permitting it did not operate to renew the attachment or keep the undertaking alive for the security of the new cause of action. (Id.)

See Mortgages, 2.

TAXATION. See Attorney at Law, 5; Municipal Corporations, 19, 22, 24, 27, 28; School Law, 4, 5.

TAX SALES.

1. PURCHASE OF FORECLOSED LANDS FROM STATE-PAYMENT OF TAXES AND PENALTIES-VOID SALE-CODE REQUIREMENT INAPPLICABLE.— The provisions of section 3788 of the Political Code that when land purchased from the state and not fully paid for has been sold to the state for delinquent taxes and a tax deed has been issued to the state, the land shall again become subject to sale, but that the applicant must pay the taxes, penalties, and costs, necessarily imply a valid sale to the state, and have no application where a deed has been made which is void on its face. (Bernhard v. Wall, 612.)

2. NOTICE OF TIME OF TAX SALE-INSUFFICIENT

PUBLICATION

VOID DEED.-Under section 3767 of the Political Code, providing that the published notice of a sale of land to the state for delinquent taxes must designate the day of sale, which must not be less than twenty-one nor more than twenty-eight days from the time of the first publication, a notice first published on a day which was more than twenty-eight days prior to the day fixed therein for the delinquent sale was insufficient to authorize the sale, and the deed based thereon was void. (Id.)

3. RECITALS IN TAX DEEDS

- PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF SALES AT PROPER TIMES.-Under sections 3786 and 3787 of the Political Code, tax deeds are only prima facie evidence that the sales on which they were founded were made at a proper time, and such prima facie proof is refuted by recitals in the deeds showing that the sales were made more than twenty-eight days after the first publication of the notice of the sales. (Id.)

4. TAX DEEDS EVIDENCE FROM RECITALS-APPLICABILITY OF CODE PROVISION. The phrase "such deed" contained in section 3786 of the Political Code, providing that "such deed" is primary evidence of certain facts, and in section 3787, providing that it is conclusive evidence of the regularity of all other proceedings, applies to tax