by proceedings in rem. And quære whether a foreign judgment PART IV. is conclusive when obtained pendente lite in England. PROCEDURE. Subject to the same qualifications, a foreign judgment in CAP. XI. rem is conclusive, not only between the same parties or privies, Judgments. but as against all the world, though not pleadable as an estoppel even between parties to the original action. No P. 573. presumption will be allowed as to the grounds on which it proceeded, but where those grounds are expressed it will be conclusive as to them, as well as with respect to the facts directly adjudicated upon, provided that they were necessary p. 576. to the decree. A foreign judgment on status stands in the same position as p. 577. a foreign judgment in rem, the question of the jurisdiction of the Court which pronounced it being decided by the ordinary rules applicable to the status of persons. p. 580. The rule that a foreign judgment, to be relied on, must be conclusive, operates to exclude the plea of lis alibi pendens when the prior suit is pending in a foreign Court; and has been held under the old practice to exclude the plea of res judicata when p. 581. the prior suit was pending in the foreign court when the action in which it is pleaded commenced; but quære whether this would be so under the present practice. The fact, however, that an appeal is pending against the judgment relied on does not affect its validity in a foreign Court. English litigants may be restrained in a proper case from pro- pp. 581, 582. ceeding in a foreign tribunal; and will in general be so restrained. when the debtor's estate is being generally administered in England. In other cases, in order to obtain an injunction against proceedings before a foreign tribunal, it must be shown that the multiplicity of actions is vexatious; i.e., that the foreign action can bring the plaintiff no relief that he could not obtain in the English suit. CONTINUOUS SUMMARY. PART I. PERSONS. Nationality, NATIONALITY, according to the English Common Law, was p. 1. By the statutes previous to 33 & 34 Vict. c. 14 (25 pp. 2, 3. Edw. III, st. 2, 7 Anne, c. 5, s. 3, 4 Geo. II. c. 21, and 13 Geo. III. c. 21), the privileges of nationality were conferred on the descendants, up to and including the second generation, of a natural-born British subject who were born abroad, the transmission of this statutory nationality depending upon the father alone. By 33 & 34 Vict. c. 14, the restrictions on the capacities pp. 3-19. of aliens were abolished so far as the power of inheriting or otherwise taking British land was concerned, and statutory means were provided (superseding those which had formerly existed) for the naturalisation and denaturalisation of aliens in Great Britain, and of British subjects abroad, including the acquisition of political rights. The nationality of a married woman follows that of her hus- pp. 17, 18. band, and the nationality of children follows that of the father, or of the mother if a widow. A married woman who becomes a widow may change her nationality under the provisions of 33 & 34 Vict. c. 14. The Legislatures of British possessions and colonies may p. 17. confer a limited British nationality, valid within their territorial limits. On the cession or abandonment of territory, by conquest or pp. 8, 9. otherwise, the nationality of the inhabitants is generally provided for by treaty; but in the absence of treaty provisions, will probably depend upon the voluntary transfer or retention of their domicil. p. 52. P. 53. pp. 53, 54. p. 54. PP. 54-65. p. 55 pp. 56-65. P. 57. Domicil. Domicil is that relation of an individual to a State or country which arises from residence within its limits as a member of its community. In ordinary language, that country is said to be the country of his domicil, and he is spoken of as domiciled within it. Every individual is regarded by the law as domiciled in some one country at every period of his life, and can only be domiciled in one country at a time. A domicil spoken of as the domicil of origin attaches to every individual at his birth. In the case of posthumous or illegitimate children, the domicil of origin is the domicil of the mother at the time of the birth; in all other cases it is regarded as derived from the father. The domicil of the child continues through legal infancy to be that of the parent from which it was derived, and follows the changes of the latter. An infant who marries and changes its home must, for this purpose, be regarded as sui juris. The domicil of an orphan becomes and follows that of its legal guardian. It is, however, doubtful whether a guardian by changing his own domicil can so alter that of the minor as to affect the right of succession to the minor's property, at any rate when there is a fraudulent or self-interested intention that it shall so be affected. The domicil of origin adheres until a new domicil is acquired. The domicil of origin is changed, in the case of a person sui juris, by a de facto removal to a home in a new country, with an animus non revertendi and an animus manendi; or in the case of a woman, by marrying a man whose domicil is different from her own. A domicil which is not the domicil of origin, but has been acquired, is lost by actual abandonment, animo non revertendi. Until a new domicil is acquired, the domicil of origin temporarily reverts. When an acquired domicil has thus been divested, a new domicil is acquired by complete transit to a new country, and the establishment there, animo manendi, of a home. The animus manendi or non revertendi is a question of fact for the Court, as to which neither a declaration ante litem motam, nor an affidavit post litem motam, by the person whose domicil is in question, is conclusive, though all such statements are evidence to be taken into consideration. The animus manendi will in certain cases be a presumption p. 61. of law which will not admit contradiction. The domicil of a married woman becomes and follows that pp. 60, 61. of her husband, but in the event of his death, of a divorce, or of a judicial separation, she becomes re-invested with the power of acquiring a new domicil of her own. The same result may probably be regarded as following from certain exceptional circumstances, such as desertion by the husband. Domicil, for the purposes of succession to movable property, pp. 65, 67. testate or intestate, is further regulated by 24 & 25 Vict. c. 121. By this Act it is provided that, subject to conventions to be made with foreign States for its reciprocal application, British subjects dying in a foreign country shall be deemed, for all purposes of testate or intestate succession as to movables, to retain the domicil they possessed at the time of going to reside in such foreign country, unless they have resided in such foreign country for a year at least before the death, and shall have made a formal written declaration of an intention to become domiciled there. Similar provisions are made with regard to the subjects of foreign States dying in Great Britain. Domicil being a question of fact, it is not competent for pp. 66–68. individual States to enact restrictions upon, or facilities for, its acquisition; and such enactments should not, in the tribunals of other States, obtain recognition. Capacity. With regard to acts and contracts done or entered into in pp. 71-77. the country of the domicil, not relating to immovables, capacity is determined by the lex domicilii, and not by the lex loci solutionis or any other law. With regard to acts and contracts in a place other than P. the country of the domicil, an English Court, at any rate a Court of first instance, will probably prefer the lex domicilii to the lex loci in all cases. In a purely mercantile contract the question has not arisen in modern times. Where there is no act or contract in any particular place to pp. 78, 79. invite the competition of a lex loci, but the question is one of the mere fact of capacity, the decision of the law of the domicil |