Opinion of the Court. On June 17, 1879, a second reissue, No. 8759, was obtained for the bushing, the material parts of the specification and the claim of which were as follows: "Our invention relates to bushings for barrels; and consists of a short metallic tube in exterior form in shape of the frustum of a cone, slightly tapering. The outer surface is screw-threaded, to adapt it to be screwed forcibly into the bung-hole of the barrel, and to be held securely in place by the contact of the surfaces. The larger end of this tube is provided with an annular flange projecting outwardly, and adapted to rest, when the bushing is screwed to its place in the hole of the barrel, snugly upon the outer surface of the stave. The interior surface of the bushing is also made in the form of a frustum of a cone, and tapers uniformly from the exterior or flanged to the inner end of the bushing. This surface is made smooth and unbroken, and extends in such form quite through from one end of the bushing to the other, so that the wooden or compressible plug or bung to which it is adapted may have a ready and unobstructed entrance, and may pass, if necessary, beyond the inner end of the bushing, and have a uniform bearing-surface throughout the entire length of the bushing." "Having thus described our invention, what we claim as new, and desire to secure by letters patent, is "A metallic bushing for the bung-holes of barrels, made with a flange adapted to rest on the outer surface of the stave, and with an exterior threaded and an interior smooth surface, both tapering from the flanged to the interior end, said inner surface being unbroken and unobstructed, and tapering uniformly from one end of the bushing to the other, as and for the purpose set forth." The notch in the flange of the bushing is not mentioned either in the specification or in the claim of this reissue, although it is shown in the accompanying drawings, substantially as it was shown in the drawings of the original patent and of the former reissue. The original patent and the first reissue having been distinctly limited to a bushing having a notch to aid in forcing Statement of the Case. it into place, the second reissue, obtained nearly seven years later, for a bushing without any such notch, is an unwarrantable enlargement of the supposed invention, which, according to the now well settled law, renders the reissue void. Yale Lock Co. v. James, 125 U. S. 447, 464, and cases there cited. The defendant's plea, that the second reissue was for a different invention from that described or claimed either in the original patent or in the first reissue, was therefore rightly adjudged good by the Circuit Court, and The decree dismissing the bill is affirmed. STATE OF WISCONSIN v. PELICAN INSURANCE COMPANY. ORIGINAL. Argued April 25, 1887.- Decided May 14, 1888. This court has not original jurisdiction of an action by a State upon a judgment recovered by it in one of its own courts against a citizen or a corporation of another State for a pecuniary penalty for a violation of its municipal law. THIS was an action of debt, commenced in this court by the State of Wisconsin against a corporation of Louisiana. The declaration was as follows: "The plaintiff, The State of Wisconsin, and one of the States of the United States, now comes and complains of the defendant, The Pelican Insurance Company of New Orleans, a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Louisiana, in a plea of debt "For that, whereas the plaintiff, the said State of Wisconsin, on the 16th day of September in the year 1886, at the county of Dane in the said State of Wisconsin, and in and before the Dane County Circuit Court, in said State - such court being then and there a court of general jurisdiction under the laws of said State-and by the consideration and judgment of the said court, recovered against the said defend Statement of the Case. ant, the said Pelican Insurance Company, a judgment in favor of the said plaintiff for the sum of eight thousand five hundred dollars damages, together with the further sum of forty-five dollars and thirty-nine cents for costs and disbursements, amounting in all to the sum of eight thousand five hundred and forty-five dollars and thirty-nine cents; which said judg ment still remains in that court in full force and effect, and not in anywise modified, reversed, set aside, appealed from, or otherwise vacated; and the said plaintiff, the said State of Wisconsin, hath not obtained any satisfaction upon the said. judgment, but, on the contrary, the whole thereof, together with interest thereon from said date of such judgment, remains wholly unpaid and owing; whereby an action hath accrued unto the said plaintiff, the said State of Wisconsin, to demand and have from and of the said defendant the said sum of eight thousand five hundred and forty-five dollars and thirty-nine cents, with interest. "Wherefore the said plaintiff, the said State of Wisconsin, saith that the plaintiff is injured and hath sustained damage to the said amount of eight thousand five hundred and fortyfive dollars and thirty-nine cents, with interest, and therefore it brings this suit." Annexed to the declaration was a copy of the record of the judgment therein described, which showed that it was rendered on default of the defendant, after service of summons on three persons, each of whom was stated in the officer's return to be a resident and citizen of Wisconsin and an agent of the defendant, upon a complaint alleging that the defendant had done business in the State for thirty months, without having itself, or by any officer, agent or other person in its behalf, prepared or deposited in the office of the commissioner of insurance of the State annual statements of its business, as required by the provision of § 1920 of the Revised Statutes of Wisconsin, and that the defendant had thereby become indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $15,000, according to that provision. By that section of the Revised Statutes of Wisconsin, it is enacted that the president or vice-president and secretary of Statement of the Case. each fire insurance corporation doing business in the State shall annually within the month of January prepare and deposit in the office of the commissioner of insurance a statement, verified by their oaths, of the business of the corporation during the year, and of the condition thereof on the 31st day of December then next preceding, exhibiting various items, enumerated in the statute, as to its capital stock, property or assets, liabilities, income and expenditures, and any other items or facts which the commissioner of insurance may require, and that "for any failure to make and deposit such annual statement, or to promptly reply in writing to any inquiry addressed by the commissioner of insurance in relation to the business of any such corporation, or for wilfully making any false statement therein, every such corporation or officer so failing or making such false statement shall forfeit five hundred dollars, and for neglecting to file such annual statement an additional five hundred dollars for every month that such corporation shall continue thereafter to transact any insurance business in this state until such statement be filed." By the statute of Wisconsin of 1885, c. 395, (which took effect April 12, 1885,) § 1, it is "made the duty of the commissioner of insurance to prosecute to final judgment, in the name of the State, or to compromise, settle or compound, every forfeiture incurred by an insurance corporation, by its failure to comply with, or for its violation of, any law of the State, of which he may be credibly informed;" and by § 2, "one half of every sum collected, paid or received by virtue of section 1 of this act shall be paid into the state treasury, and the remainder shall belong to the commissioner of insurance, who shall pay all expenses incurred in prosecuting all actions brought to enforce the payment of such forfeitures, both in and out of the State, and shall pay all expenses incident to the collection of such forfeitures." In the present action in this court, the defendant filed several pleas, the first of which was as follows: "The defendant is a civil corporation organized under the terms of the Revised Statutes of the State of Louisiana, sections 638 to 688, both inclusive, and is authorized to effect fire Statement of the Case. insurances, and is subject to suit and required to determine its domicil in the city aforesaid, and to maintain and designate an officer of that company to receive there citations and other judicial writs and notices. This duty has been fulfilled from the date of the organization, and the charter of the company has been recorded and published, as those statutes require, in the office of the recorder of mortgages and a city paper, for the time defined in the statute. No other designation has been made or required of the defendant. The section 687 of the Revised Statutes of the United States defines the original jurisdiction of this court, and designates as subjects for the exercise of that jurisdiction, where a State is the complainant, citizens of States other than of the plaintiff or complainant; and, that there should be no error on the subject, the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States exactly describes all of those who are citizens. They are natural persons born or naturalized within the limits of the United States, and having a residence in any State determines the State in which he may have privilege or immunity as a citizen. Moreover, the complaint of the plaintiff discloses that this defendant is a fire insurance company, without political character or interstate relations, and had its origin and domicil in New Orleans, and that the said corporation had offended the State of Wisconsin by imputed and alleged disobedience or inattention to her statute laws, and had incurred heavy forfeitures and penalties by such offences to the sum stated in the demand, and for the collection of which fines and forfeitures this suit has been commenced in this court. But the defendant says that the statute of the United States, above cited, further defines the cause for the exercise of original jurisdiction that the controversy should be of a civil nature. It excludes from cognizance of this court the punitive statutes and divers litigations arising out of the internal and peculiar or peevish regulations, accompanied with fines, forfeitures, and arbitrary exactions, which a State may impose upon citizens or corporations of other States from a just cause, or from caprice or captiousThe controversy must be of a civil nature, and not of ness. |