Opinion of the Court.

was nothing on the face of them to indicate any agency, or that the defendant had any connection with them. At the trial the person who signed the notes testified that they were given for premiums upon policies of insurance procured by him in the office kept by the plaintiff, at the request and for the use of the defendant, on property belonging to him, and that the witness acted merely as the factor of the defendant, and intended to bind him by the premium notes. The judge instructed the jury that, "if they believed the notes to have been made and signed for and in behalf of the defendant, the verdict ought to be for the plaintiff." It was held that the evidence was improperly admitted, and the instruction was

erroneous.

The converse of the rule laid down in the last two cases cited would seem to be identical with that contended for on behalf of the defendant in error.

On the other hand, authorities to sustain the view of the case contended for on behalf of the plaintiffs in error are not wanting, either in number or in pertinence.

In Kean v. Davis, 1 Zabriskie (21 N. J. L.), 683, a bill of ex change of the following purport, addressed to William Thom son, Esq., Somerville, New Jersey, and indorsed "The Elizabethtown and Somerville Railroad Company, by John Kean, President:"

"$500.00.

ELIZABETHTOWN, Sept., 1841. "Six months after date, please pay to the order of the Elizabethtown and Somerville Railroad Company, five hundred dollars, value received, and charge as ordered.

"Your obed't serv't,

JOHN KEAN,

"President Elizabethtown and Somerville R. R. Co." was held to be ambiguous on its face not clearly showing whether John Kean individually or the railroad company was the drawer, and proof was admitted, in the language of the court, "not to aid in the construction of the instrument, but to prove whose instrument it is." To the same effect see Chadsey v. McCreery, 27 Illinois, 253; Vater v. Lewis, 36 Indiana, 288; Hood v. Hallenbeck, 7 Hun (N. Y.), 362.

Opinion of the Court.

Mechanics' Bank v. The Bank of Columbia, 5 Wheat. 326, is also claimed to be an authority in favor of the position taken by the plaintiffs in error. This was an action of assumpsit brought by the bank of Columbia against the Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria on the following check:

June 25th, 1817.

“No. 18.

MECHANICS' BANK OF ALEXANDRIA,

"Cashier of the Bank of Columbia,

"Pay to the order of P. H. Minor, Esq., ten thousand

dollars.
"$10,000.

WM. PATON, Jr."

It was contended by the defendants that the check on its face was the individual check of Paton, and that evidence could not be received to show that it was in fact the check of the bank, and signed by Paton as cashier. On the other hand, the plaintiffs contended that the check upon its face did not purport to be the private check of Paton, but the check of the bank, drawn by him as cashier, and that the presumption was, that it was an official act. The court, however, decided that the check was ambiguous upon its face, that the marks indicating it to be the check of the bank predominated, and that the only ground upon which it could be contended that the check was the private check of Paton was that it had not below his name the initials for cashier. It was accordingly held that in such case testimony was admissible to explain the ambiguity and establish who was in fact the drawer of the check. The court say:

"But the fact that this appeared on its face to be a private check is by no means to be conceded. On the contrary, the appearance of the corporate name of the institution on the face of the paper at once leads to the belief that it is a corporate and not an individual transaction, to which must be added the circumstances that the cashier is the drawer and the teller the payee, and the form of ordinary checks deviated from by the substitution of to order for to bearer. The evidence, therefore, on the face of the bill, predominates in favor of its being

Opinion of the Court.

a bank transaction. Applying, then, the plaintiff's own principle to the case, and the restriction as to the production of parol or extrinsic evidence could have been only applicable to himself. But it is enough for the purposes of the defendant to establish that there existed, on the face of the paper, circumstances from which it might reasonably be inferred that it was either one or the other. In that case, it became indispensable to resort to extrinsic evidence to remove the doubt.” p. 336.

The reasoning of the court in this last case leads irresistibly to the conclusion that, had the check under consideration been signed by Paton with the word "cashier" appended, there would have been no ambiguity in it, but it would have been clearly and unequivocally the check of the bank. And in this view the case seems to be not necessarily an authority in favor of the plaintiffs in error, but rather an authority against them, and in favor of the defendant in error.

In Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, § 415, it is said: "If a note be payable to an individual, with the mere suffix of his official character, such suffix will be regarded as mere descriptio persona, and the individual is the payee," citing Chadsey v. McCreery, Vater v. Lewis, supra, and Buffum v. Chadwick, 8 Mass. 103. Continuing, he says, "In New York a different doctrine prevails," citing Babcock v. Beman, 1 Kernan (11 N. Y.), 209. But in § 416 the rule laid down would seem to be in favor of the contention of the defendant in error; for it is there said: "Where a note is payable to a corporation by its corporate name, and is then indorsed by an authorized agent or official, with the suffix of his ministerial position, it will be regarded that he acts for his principal, who is disclosed on the paper as the payee, and who, therefore, is the only person who can transfer the legal title," citing Northampton Bank v. Pepoon, 11 Mass. 288, and Elwell v. Dodge, 33 Barb. 336.

Many more authorities are cited and might be dwelt upon almost ad infinitum. A discussion of all of them would greatly protract this opinion, and would subserve no beneficial result. In all this vast conflict-we had almost said an

Syllabus.

archy of the authorities bearing on the question under consideration, it is not easy to lay down any general rule on the subject which would be in harmony with all of them. It seems to us, however, that the case of Hitchcock v. Bu chanan, supra, controls the case at bar. Both involve the same principles, and the decision in this, to be consistent with that of the former, must sustain the contention of the defendant in error. Neither do we think that the case of Mechanics' Bank v. The Bank of Columbia, supra, when considered in the light of the facts upon which it is based, in anywise conflicts with this conclusion.

We conclude, therefore, that the notes involved in this controversy, upon their face, are the notes of the corporation. In the language of the court below, they were "drawn by, payable to, and indorsed by, the corporation." There is no ambiguity in the indorsement, but, on the contrary, such indorsement is, in terms, that of the Peninsular Cigar Company.

This being true, it follows that the court below was right in excluding from the jury the evidence offered to explain away and modify the terms of such indorsement. White v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 658; Martin v. Cole, 104 U. S. 30;. Metcalf v. Williams, 104 U. S. 93.

Entertaining these views, we find it unnecessary to consider any of the other questions presented and argued by counsel; as what we have said practically disposes of the case adversely to the plaintiffs in error.

The judgment of the court below is accordingly

Affirmed.

ROBERTSON v. DOWNING.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

No. 267. Argued April 27, 1888. Decided May 14, 1888.

Under Rev. Stat. § 2907, and the act of June 22, 1874, c. 391, 18 Stat. 186, § 14, p. 189, as construed by the Treasury Department for many years: without any attempt to change it or until now to question its correctness,.

Opinion of the Court.

goods imported into the United States from one country which, in transportation to the port of shipment pass through another country, are not subject to have the transportation charges in passing through that other country added to their original cost in order to determine their dutiable value.

When there has been a long acquiescence in a Department Regulation, and by it rights of parties for many years have been determined and adjusted, it is not to be disregarded without the most cogent and persuasive reasons. When after duties have been liquidated a reliquidation takes place, the date of the reliquidation is the final liquidation for the purpose of protest. Letters from the Secretary of the Treasury to a collector of customs, affirming an assessment of duty, and to an importer acknowledging the receipt of his appeal from the collector's assessment, are admissible in evidence to show that an appeal was taken.

The Treasury Department not having objected that an appeal was too early, this court must assume that there was good reason for its action.

THIS was an action to recover duties alleged to have been illegally assessed. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appealed. The case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. Solicitor General for plaintiff in error.

No appearance for defendants in error.

MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiffs below, the defendants in error here, in March, 1882, imported into the United States at the port of New York 5179 packages of steel rods from Mulheim, in Germany. They were shipped at the port of Antwerp, in Belgium, to which place they were brought by rail from Mulheim, where they were made. Antwerp is distant from the frontier of Germany between forty and fifty miles, and from Mulheim two hundred miles. The appraisers added to the invoice price of the articles at Mulheim eleven marks per ton to make the dutiable value of the articles, and four marks per ton for the charges incurred in their transportation to Antwerp. Upon their appraised value, including these charges, the defendant, who was at the time collector of the port of New York, on the 5th of May, 1882, ascertained and liquidated the duties. Subsequently, a reliquidation was made, by which two and one-half