attached such a meaning to my language; for the very idea of different editions must infer at least a change in the date of the title-pages. But, by referring to my essay, it will be seen that I say, that Mr. C. continues to publish his book with the title ascribing "the translation" to Drs. Macknight, Campbell, and Doddridge. Mr. C., as my essay itself shows, did change the title in other respects, but he did not change the leading title, which is the only one of which my essay speaks. In addition to this, and in connexion with it, I said that Mr. C. issued several editions with a title declaring Dr. Doddridge to be a Presbyterian. I ask, then,

1. Did Mr. C. publish several editions with a title declaring Dr. Doddridge to be a member of the Church of Scotland? Judge for yourself; here is the title of edit. 2d, so far as this point is concerned: "Translated by George Campbell, James Macknight, and Philip Doddridge, Doctors of the Church of Scotland." No one will say that my use of the word several, as equivalent to distinct or different, is not strictly classical. Upon whom, therefore, ought Mr. C.'s accusation of falsehood to rest?*

2. The only other point in question is, did Mr. C. publish his book with this title when he knew that Dr. Doddridge was not a member of the church of Scotland? The reader will perceive that I have not, in my essay, charged Mr. C. with knowing this; but that I have merely stated a fact which he himself acknowledges the truth of, in his Remarks. See essay, p. 313. But as he charges me with saying this, I accept the charge, and will now make the public acquainted with the facts in the case.

I will not enlarge upon the very singular circumstance that Mr. C. received his collegiate education for the ministry, in a Presbyterian university in Scotland, and yet did not know that Dr. D. was not a "doctor of the church of Scotland!"-Nor upon the fact, that with the highest pretensions

* Mr. C. often solemnly protests that he could have had no object in view in publishing his version, but to do good. I would advise the reader who may feel desirous to examine this subject, just to turn to the well known work of Dr. O. Jennings, and read his disclosures on this subject, pp. 123142, and he will have fresh evidence of the value of Mr. C.'s most solemn professions.

to learning and general information, he had spent full twenty or thirty years in America, and did not know it!Nor upon the still more astounding circumstance, that he had been the editor of Dr. Doddridge's translation, and of course had constantly consulted his notes and paraphrase, and yet did not know it!-These things would, we know, settle this point with most people; but we shall refer you to something still more conclusive.

The first Preface containing Mr. C.'s "Apology for a New Translation," is dated Jan. 29, 1826. The second edition appeared two or three years later.

Now immediately upon the appearance of the first edition, as Mr. C. well recollects, it was assailed from all quarters. And among many other things charged upon Mr. C. as proofs of his incompetency for the task he had assumed, either on the score of dishonesty or ignorance, was the fact that he knew not to what communion so well known an author as Doddridge belonged:- he knew not that Doddridge was not a Scotch Presbyterian, but a Congregationalist!

Mr. C. felt these remarks severely; and how does he proceed, when, a considerable time afterwards, he commences his second edition? Why, he publishes it, (as I have remarked, p. 313 of my essay,) with the title-page still asserting this untruth; while in the body of the work he apologizes for so doing. After referring to the fact that Dr. D.'s membership of the Scotch church had been denied, he adds (by way of justifying the continuance of his name upon the title) the following: "But as the Presbyterians and Congregationalists in this country do amalgamate to a certain extent, the differences are more nominal than real." Now what is the meaning of this apology? Is it not this: "Though there be an untruth upon the title-page of the first edition, I think it too unimportant to require correction?" And notwithstanding all this, Mr. C. avers that my assertion (as he calls it) that he "knowingly and designedly retained a fasehood upon the title-page," is "UTTERLY FALSE AND UNFOUNDED."

I have now noticed every important point which Mr. C. has attempted to stamp with an uncertain character in my delineation of his system. And after having, as you tell him, in your letter, "ample" time and opportunity to do justice to

the subject, the reader will perceive that he has not disproved a single statement, or overthrown a single position in my essay. More need not be said. Mr. C. knows, of course, what kind of appeals best accords with the taste of his followers; and is most approved by their judgment; and it would be presumptuous, I suppose, to assert, that in the present controversy he has not strictly acted in accordance with such knowledge. But be this as it may, I now resign both him and his proceedings to the judgment of an enlightened public.

ARTICLE XI.

REMARKS ON CAUSE AND EFFECT IN CONNECTION WITH FATALISM AND FREE AGENCY.

By Rev. Leonard Woods, D. D., Prof. of Theol. in Theol. Sem. Andover, Mass.

[Continued from Vol. III. page 193.]

THE additional remarks which I shall make on the subject above mentioned, will be arranged under several distinct heads. And let me here repeat what I said before, that I shall refer to the essay of the anonymous writer, chiefly as an occasion of introducing several topics, which seem to require attention at the present day. It is not my object to fasten the charge of error upon any particular person. And if it shall, in any way, be made to appear, that the writer of the essay did not mean to advance and does not maintain the opinions which I call in question, it will be highly gratifying to me; but it will not materially affect my object. The question, whether he really holds the opinions which I controvert, I can cheerfully give up to be decided by himself. My object is, to examine certain subjects, which the reading of the essay has suggested to my mind, and to determine what is true and what is not true respecting them. The first subject which I shall examine is,

SECOND SERIES, VOL. III. NO. I.

19

THE POWER OF A CONTRARY CHOICE.

Many writers regard this as a matter of great importance; and some of them evidently suppose, that the power referred to is frequently denied. As there is really much indefiniteness and obscurity in the disputes which are carried on respecting this subject; we should do what we can to make it clear and definite. Let us then inquire what are the points in which all candid men are agreed; so that we may avoid needless controversy, and may, at last, fix upon the real question at issue.

First, then, all agree that we have the power of choice. Every man certainly knows that he has this power, because he often exercises it. While we live and act as rational beings, we are under the necessity of using this power, that is, of taking by way of preference one or more things among several things offered. In the common course of human affairs, different things are proposed to us. We compare them, and then determine or choose between them, so that we can no more doubt that we have the power of choice, than that we have the power to think or to walk, when we are actually thinking or walking.

Secondly. It must be evident to all, that the way and the only way, in which our power of choice is acted out, is in the choices we really make. We never exercise our power by choosing differently from what we do choose. This may be called a truism. But it is true. However great our power of choosing differently from what we do, we never, in any instance whatever, exercise it. This is clear.

Thirdly. All must agree, that at the very time in which we make any particular choice, we have no power actually to make a contrary choice; in other words, that we cannot at one and the same time make two choices, the one opposite to the other. However great our power of a contrary choice, we have no power to do this. If we should be in so singular a state of mind as to wish to do it, we could not. And when any one asserts, that we have the power of a contrary choice, he cannot really mean, that we can make the choice we do, and at the same time another choice opposite; for example, that we can choose to go north, and at the same time choose to go south. I think no one, who understands the import of words, can mean to assert such

an absurdity. And I must suppose it an inadvertency, that the anonymous writer uses language which seems to imply this, as he does, p. 407. Priestley says: "In any given state of mind, with respect both to disposition and motive, two different determinations are impossible." The anonymous writer rejects this; of course he holds, as we should suppose, that a man in the same state of mind with respect both to disposition and motive, may make two different and opposite determinations, and may do it at the same time. But I think he cannot really mean this, and if he does not, then what is the point of difference? For,

Fourthly. All agree that we have power to make different and opposite choices at different times and in different circumstances. Our choice at one time is in fact different from what it is at another time. How often is it the case, that we come to different and opposite determinations respecting the same subject? An unrenewed sinner chooses to disobey God and enjoy the pleasures of sin. The same person, when renewed by the divine Spirit, chooses to obey God and forsake the pleasures of sin. The power thus to vary our choices under the influence of different motives, objective or subjective, evidently belongs to all men, as we know from the fact that all exercise it.

Fifthly. It is a point in which all will agree, that, in any case, we might have made a different choice instead of the one we did make, if we had been disposed to do it, or had found sufficient inducements. A man who chooses the life of a farmer, might have chosen the life of a mariner, if he had been so inclined, or had found inducements sufficient to influence him to such a choice. This, I apprehend, is commonly the meaning of those who say, that we might have chosen, or had power to choose, differently from what we did; not that we might at the same time have made another and opposite choice in connection with the one we made; but that we might have made another choice instead of it, if we had been disposed to do it, or if our inducements had been sufficient. These are the necessary conditions of choice; and without them choice cannot be. If a man should tell us that he put forth an act of mind which he called choice, without any inclination or inducements, we should say, he entirely mistakes the meaning of the word. Sixthly. All agree that we may hereafter make a choice