EVIDENCE.-1. Agreement to explain acts of repair-Objecting to evidence at nisi prius.-Defendant, at nisi prius, to prove a public right of way over plaintiff's land, showed acts of repair done in a certain year by C. the township surveyor. Plaintiff offered to prove, in answer, an agreement made in that year between C. and the steward of plaintiff's predecessor, that C., in consideration of repayment by the steward, should repair a road which, according to plaintiff's case, was the road now in question. Defendant's counsel objected, because it did not appear that the steward, in that character, had authority to make such agreement. The judge received the evidence, which was not further objected to, and plaintiff had a verdict. On motion for a new trial on account of the improper reception of evidence, the former objection was renewed; and it was urged also, that the evidence, when given, did not show that the road to which the agree ment related was the same as that now in question. Held, 1, that assuming the roads to be identified, the agreement, even if the steward had no sufficient authority, was evidence to explain the fact of repair, and was properly admitted. 2. That if the evidence failed to identify the roads, that objection should have been made at nisi prius when the defect appeared, and the judge should have been requested to strike the evidence out of his notes, and that the point could not now be raised. Ferrand v. Milligan, 7 Q. B. 730.

2. Commission-Course of dealing-Evidence.-By an agreement between an African merchant and an African captain, the latter was to have a commission of 6l. per cent. on the net proceeds of the homeward cargo, after deducting the usual charges: Held, that parol evidence was not admissible to show, that, under this kind of contract, according to the course of dealing between African captains and African merchants, the captain was entitled to his commission on the whole amount for which the cargo had been sold, and not merely on the net sum that had come to the hands of the merchant as the result of that sale.-Cuine v. Horsefall, 2 C. & K. 349.

3. Foreign law, mode of proving.-A witness expert in the law of a foreign country was called to prove what that law was: Held, that he should state on his responsibility what the law was, and not read any fragments of a code. Cocks v. Purday, 2 C. & K. 269.

4. Secondary evidence-Memorial of registry in Middlesex.—If a deed be in the possession of a third person as mortgagee, and he having the deed in court, though not subpoenaed in the cause, decline to produce it, secondary evidence may be given of its contents; but if the deed is not in court, and he has not been subpoenaed to produce it, it is otherwise. The person thus declining to produce a deed must not state the contents, but he must state the date of the deed and the name of the parties, in order to identify it. An examined copy of a memorial of a purchase deed registered in Middlesex, under the stat. 7 Anne, c. 20, is only receivable as secondary evidence of the deed against the parties to the deed and all persons claiming under them; and the fact that A. mortgaged the property to B., and delivered this deed to B. as mortgagee, is not sufficient to

make it secondary evidence against A. Doe d. Loscombe v. Clifford, 2 C. & K. 448.

5. Secondary evidence-Transcripts of parish registers under 70th canon of 1603.- In ejectment it being proved by the rector of the parish of C. that no parish registers existed there of earlier date than 1733, the transcripts of the registers of that parish for 1705 and 1706, returned under the 70th canon of 1603, were produced by the registrar of the diocese from the bishop's registry, and received as evidence of a marriage in 1705, and a baptism in 1706, of persons through whom the lessor of the plaintiff traced his title. Doe d. Wood v. Wilkins, 2 C. & K. 328.

6. Witness-Competency of, under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 85.-A witness in an action brought to recover certain commission or brokerage, stated on the voir dire that he had a claim to one moiety of whatever commission the plaintiff should receive: Held, that the evidence of the witness was admissible under the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 85 (Lord Denman's Act). Hill v. Kitching, 2 C. & K. 278.

And see FALSE IMPRISONMENT. FEME COVERT. LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2, 3. LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. MANOR COURT. PARTICULARS.

FALSE IMPRISONMENT.-Justification - Felony-Suspicion-Evidence.-In an action for false imprisonment, the defendant pleaded his goods had been stolen, and having cause to suspect the plaintiff of the felony, he gave her into custody, the plea stating several grounds of suspicion. The plaintiff called a policeman to prove that the defendant directed him to take the plaintiff into custody; and in his cross-examination the policeman said that, at the same time and in the presence of the plaintiff, the defendant stated that the goods had been stolen, and also stated some of the grounds of suspicion mentioned in the plea: Held, that this was evidence for the jury to consider, and from which they might find that the felony had been committed, and that the defendant had good cause to suspect the plaintiff, if this evidence satisfied them that the facts really were so; held also, that although in this plea the defendant ought to set out his grounds of suspicion, yet that he would be entitled to a verdict without proof of the whole of them, if he proved that a felony was in fact committed, and proved so much of the grounds of suspicion as satisfied the jury that he had reasonable cause to suspect the plaintiff. Williams v. Cresswell, 2 C. & K. 422.

FEME COVERTE.-1. Plea of coverture - Costs.-A feme coverte who succeeds on a plea in bar of coverture is entitled to costs. Findlay v. Farquharson, 4 D. & L. 185.

2. Plea of coverture-Right to begin-Evidence of Marriage.In an action of debt for goods sold, in which the defendant pleads her coverture, and the plaintiff in his replication denies the coverture, and there be no other issue, the defendant must begin. On this issue the person who is alleged in the plea to be the husband of the defendant is not a competent witness for the defendant to prove his

marriage with her. On this issue proof that the defendant and the person alleged in the plea to be her husband have cohabited together as husband and wife for four years is some evidence of the marriage, which the judge will leave to the jury. Woodgate v. Potts, 2 C. &

K. 457.

FOREIGN LAW. See Evidence, 3.

FORFEITURE. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 9.
See ASSUMPSIT, 3.

GENERAL ISSUE.

TENANT, 9. PAYMENT.

GOODS SOLD. See FEME COVERTE, 2. WIFE, 1, 2. PAYMENT.

LANDLORD AND

GUARANTEE. See LANDORD AND TENANT, 1.

HUSBAND AND

HUSBAND AND WIFE.-1. Allowance paid to wife.-If husband and wife be living apart, and the husband makes the wife a sufficient allowance for her support, he is not liable in an action by a tradesman for goods supplied to her, and it is immaterial whether the tradesman knew of such allowance or not. If a wife living apart from her husband orders goods to be addressed and sent to a third person, and they be sent to the house of such third person, that not being the place of abode of the wife, the husband is not liable to pay for those goods. Reeve v. The Marquis of Conyngham, 2 C. & K.

444.

2. Same.-If husband and wife be living separate and apart, and the husband make the wife a regular allowance of a sufficient sum for her maintenance, which is regularly paid, this is sufficient to repel the inference of agency, and he is not liable for any debt she may contract; and it is not necessary that there should be any deed of separation; but the allowance must be such as the jury shall think sufficient, reference being had to the station of the parties and the income of the husband.-Holder v. Cope, 2 C. & K. 437.

IMPRISONMENT.-What is.-Plaintiff attempting to pass in a particular direction, was obstructed by defendant, who prevented him from going in any direction but one, not being that which he endeavoured to pass: Held, no imprisonment, and this whether the plaintiff had or had not a right in the first-mentioned direction. Per Patteson, Coleridge and Williams, J.; dissentiente, Lord Denman, C. J. Bird v. Jones, 7 Q. B. 742.

And see ESCAPE.

INSOLVENT. See BANKRUPT AND INSOLVENT.

INTERIM ORDER. See BANKRUPT AND INSOLVENT.

INTERPLEADER. Payment of money out of court pending writ of error.-Property taken in execution being claimed by assignees of the debtor, who had become bankrupt, the sheriff sued out an interpleader rule, and an issue was directed, the assignees to be plaintiffs, and the execution-creditor defendant, the money levied being in the meantime paid into court. On trial of the issue the

assignees recovered; but the defendant having tendered a bill of exceptions, error was brought in the Exchequer Chamber. That court gave judgment, quashing the writ of error. The assignees then moved this court to make an order under the Interpleader Act, 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 53, for payment of money to them; but before cause shown, the defendant brought error in the House of Lords. There being no proof that the last writ of error was frivolous, this court refused to make such order pending the writ. King v. Birch, 7 Q. B. 669.

IRISH GRAND JURY ACT.-Presentment for damagesMalicious injury.-On an application for a presentment as compensation for the malicious destruction of property by fire, the grand jury are not bound by the conviction of the party who committed the offence. Evidence ought to be produced to satisfy them that the injury was malicious. The burning is malicious within the meaning of the Grand Jury Act, if done for the purpose of injuring any person having an interest in the property. The notice required in case of a malicious burning by 19 & 20 Geo. 3, c. 37, s. 3, to be served in six days, is sufficient, if served six days from the time the injury was completed. In re Elliott, 9 Ir. L. R. 100.

ISSUABLE PLEAS. See PLEADING, 3.

ISSUE. See TRIAL, WRIT of.

JUDGMENT DEBT.-Stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, ss. 14, 15— What may be charged by judge's order with a judgment debt — When application may be made to rescind such order. - The East India Company granted to defendant a pension in consideration of his distressed state and the services of his father: Held, that this could not be charged with a judgment debt by a judge's order under stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, ss. 14, 15. The judge's order directed that the pension should stand charged, unless cause were shown at chambers in six calendar months. The court rescinded the order, on motion by the East India Company and by an assignee of the pension, within the six months.-Morris v. Manesty, 7 Q. B. 674.

JUSTIFICATION. See BAILIFf. FALSE IMPRISONMENT. LANDLORD AND TENANT, 8.

LACHES. See WARRANT OF ATTORney.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.-1. Contract-Guarantee.An indorsement, written and signed after the agreement to which it was annexed, purported to guarantee the performance of the covenants and conditions of that agreement, but there was no evidence to show that the guarantee was from the first agreed on between the parties : Held, that the agreement and subsequent indorsement formed but one entire contract, and that therefore the latter did not require a separate consideration. 2ndly. It being part of the agreement that the plaintiff should pay the first instalment of a certain sum on riven day: Held, that a verbal agreement to postpone the day was sufficient. 3dly. It being one of the covenants in the ag.eement that the

Common Law."

landlord of a certain public-house would accept the plaintiff as tenant, the declaration alleged that the landlord had refused so to accept him: Held, that the plaintiff was not required to prove that the individual who acted as the landlord was the real owner of the premises, or his authorized agent. Coldham v. Showler, 2 C. & K. 261.

2. Demise-Evidence- Surrender. In an action by A. against B. for rent on a demise from a quarter to a quarter, with the rent payable one quarter in advance, the defendant pleaded a denial of the demise, a notice to quit, and a surrender by operation of law. A written agreement for this quarterly letting, made while the stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 76, s. 4, was in force, was put in, which was signed by B. but not by A. Held, that this was evidence of a parol demise by A., and that it was put an end to by a parol notice to quit; held, also, that if a tenant have left a house unoccupied, and the landlord enter and be in the profitable occupation of the house, he cannot recover rent from the tenant for any time after such profitable occupation; but if he merely puts a person into the house to take care of it, and to prevent depredations, it would be otherwise. Bird v. De Fouvielle, 2 C. &

K. 415.

3. New lease--Recital-Evidence.-A., in 1781, by lease demised certain premises to B., his executors and assigns, for a term of sixtyone years and three lives concurrent, with a proviso that in case the lives should drop within thirty-one years, then the lease should be good for thirty-one years. In 1802 he demised the same premises to B., habendum to him and his heirs for the life of C., in the place, room and stead, and by way of exchange, for the life of D., the surviving cestui que vies in the lease of 1781, with a proviso, that in case C. died within the space of eleven years, the lease should subsist for that period; this latter lease also contained covenants not in the former lease: Held, that the lease of 1802 operated as a new lease, and passed a legal estate. Bowen v. Keatinge, 9 Ir. L. R. 61.

4. Notice to quit by landlord.-Notice was given to a tenant from year to year, holding from Martinmas to Martinmas, to quit "on the 13th day of May next, or upon such other day or time as the current year for which you now hold will expire." The notice was dated and Doe d. The Mayor, &c. of served on 21st October: Held bad.

Richmond v. Morphett, 7 Q. B. 577.

5. Same. Where a tenant is entitled to six months' notice to quit, a notice to quit "at the expiration of the present year's tenancy" is sufficient, although it does not appear on the face of it that it was given six months before the period therein specified for quitting. Doe d. Gorst v. Timothy, 2 C. & K. 351.

6. Notice to quit by tenant.-Tenant from year to year gave his landlord notice to quit, ending a time within half a year. The landlord at first acquiesced, but ultimately refused to accept the notice. The tenant quitted according to his notice, and the landlord entered and di' some repairs: Held, that the tenancy was not determined. Bess i vandsberg, 7 Q. B. 638.

7. Plecli-Costs-Certificate.-In trespass for taking goods,