in a certain manor were held by customary tenure, passed by admittance, for the joint lives of the lord and tenant, were descendible from ancestor to heir, and, inter vivos, passed by deed of customary conveyance (licensed by the lord), with surrender and admittance. The case further stated that, before stat. 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, there was no instance of a devise made by a customary tenant of the legal estate of any lands in the manor, but it had frequently occurred that a tenant, wishing to dispose of his customary estate after death, conveyed by deed of customary conveyance, and surrendered to a trustee as on ordinary alienation, the trusts of the equitable estate being then declared by a separate instrument, and being usually for the alienor during his life, and, after his death, to convey to such a person as he should by deed or will appoint; but there was no instance of a devise of any customary tenement in the manor without such previous conveyance, surrender, and declaration of trust: Held, that, on this statement, the tenements must be considered as estates descendible from ancestor to heir, subject to the ordinary rules governing a copyhold estate; that a custom not to pass estates by devise, or to pass them by some substituted method, was not shown clearly enough to supersede the ordinary right of a copyholder to devise his lands; and therefore that a devise of such lands without surrender to the use of the will (before stat. 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26,) was sustained by sect. 1 of stat. 55 Geo. 3, c. 192, and not excluded from its operation by the latter clause of sect. 3. Doe d. Dand v. Thompson, 7 Q. B. 897.

DAMAGES. See PAYMENT, 1.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See COGNOVIT. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE. PLEADING, 5. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.

DE INJURIA. See PLEADING, 2, 11, 12.

DEMURRER.-Joinder in-Reg. Gen. Hil. T. 4 Will. 4, r. 3; Reg. Gen. Hil. T. 2 Will. 4, r. 108.-A defendant who obtained time to plead on the term of rejoining within twenty-four hours, delivered several pleas, to some of which the plaintiff replied, concluding to the country, and to others he demurred. The plaintiff having added the similiters and joinders in demurrer, the defendant struck them out. The plaintiff then obtained a judge's order, " that the defendant forthwith join in demurrer." On motion to rescind that order: Held, that the Reg. Gen. Hil. T. 4 Will. 4, r. 3, qualified and altered the Reg. Gen. Hil. T. 2 Will. 4, r. 108, and that the plaintiff was irregular in adding the joinders in demurrer. Cook v. Blake, 4 D. & L. 313. And see DISCONTINUANCE. PRACTICE, 5, 6.

DEPARTURE. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2. PLEADING, 10. DEPOSIT. See VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

DETINUE. — Pleading. - Declaration alleged that plaintiff delivered certain paper writings, purporting to be scrip certificates for shares, to defendant, to be redelivered on request, after payment to him of a certain sum, averring that that was paid to defend

ant. Breach, that defendant hath not delivered the paper writings, though requested, but detains the same. Plea, that they were deposited with defendant as a pledge and security for 210l. advanced by him to plaintiff, and that on payment of that sum defendant had offered to deliver up and return them to plaintiff, who then refused to receive them: Held, on demurrer, that this plea was bad, for denying the detention argumentatively, and for amounting to non detinet. The detention complained of was an adverse detention, because the word detain, in a declaration in detinue, means that defendant withholds the goods, and prevents plaintiff from having possession of them. The bailment stated in the declaration in detinue, whether it be general or special, is surplusage, and not traversable, the gist of the action being the detainer of plaintiff's goods. Clements v. Flight, 16 M. & W. 42; 4 D. & L. 261.

DEVISE. See CUSTOMARY TENEMENTS.

DISCONTINUANCE.-Costs-Practice.-After judgment for defendant on demurrer to one of several counts, the plaintiff took out a side bar rule to discontinue the action generally (see Reg. Gen. Hil. 2 Will. 4, art. 106). The defendant's costs, not of the demurrer only, under 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 34, but of the whole action, were taxed on the rule to discontinue, treating that rule as the termination of the action, and were received by defendant's attorneys as defendant's costs on discontinuance of the action. Judgment was entered upon the record for the defendant on the first count only: Held, that the discontinuance being issued after judgment, without leave of the court, was irregular, and that the judgment was also irregular. The judgment was set aside without costs. Benton v. Polkinghorne, 16 M.

& W. 8.

And see PLEADING, 8.

DISTILLER. See EXCISE, 1.

DISTRESS. See PLEADING, 11.

DUBLIN CITY MARSHAL. See TRESPASS, 1.

DUPLICITY IN PLEADING. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2. EJECTMENT.-1. Defence.-In ejectment for nonpayment of rent, a defendant cannot be compelled to confine his defence to the part of the lands in his actual possession. Power v. Connellan, 9 Ir. L. R. 266.

2. Joint demise by two of three executors. Two of three coexecutors may recover lands of their testator in ejectment, on a joint demise. Doe d. Stace v. Wheeler, 15 M. & W. 623.

3. Service-Secretary of railway company.-Personal service of a declaration in ejectment on the secretary of a railway company, who are in possession of the land sought to be recovered, is, under the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 16, s. 135, sufficient for a rule absolute for judg ment against the casual ejector. Doe d. Bayes or Burgess v. Roe, 16 M. & W. 98; 4 D. & L. 311.

And see COSTS, 4. LANDLORD and Tenant, 3.

ENROLMENT. See ANNUITY.

ERRONEOUS JUDGMENT. NISTRATOR, 1.

See EXECUTOR AND ADMI

EVICTION. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1, 8.

EVIDENCE.-1. Admissions by recitals in a deed.-A., by a deed in which it was recited that he was seised in fee, mortgaged to B. in fee. Indorsed on this deed was a memorandum, signed by C., that, "by an indenture of surcharge, bearing date, &c. the within premises were charged by me, the purchaser of the equity of redemption thereof, with the payment of the further sum of 3251. and interest :" Held, that this amounted to an admission by C. that he came in under A., and that he was therefore bound by the recital of A. Doe d. Gaisford v. Stone, 3 C. B. 176.

2. Evidence of postmark.-Semble, if the postmark of a letter be given in evidence, it ought to be proved either by persons from the post office, or by persons who are in the habit of receiving letters from that post office. Woodcock v. Houldsworth, 16 M. & W. 124.

3. Proof of having sent letter by post.-To prove the sending of a letter by plaintiff to defendant, a clerk of plaintiff deposed that he made up the letters of which this was one, and placed them in a box in the room where he sat, and that the public postman invariably called every day and took the letters from that box: Held, that such delivery to the postman was evidence for the jury that the letters had gone to the post office. Skilbeck v. Garbett, 7 Q. B. 846.

4. Undertaking to give material evidence, how satisfied.-A letter written and posted in county A., and addressed to and received by the plaintiff in county B., whereby the defendant admits a part of the debt claimed in the action, is evidence sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's undertaking to give material evidence in county A. Hall v. Story, 16 M. & W. 63; 4 D. & L. 345.

And see CONTRACT, 1.

EXCEPTION. See PLEADING, 9.

EXCHEQUER.-Equity jurisdiction of, in matters of revenue. -The equity jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer as a Court of Review is not taken away by the statute 5 Vict. c. 5. Att.-Gen. v. Halling, 15 M. & W. 687.

EXCISE.-1. Distiller of spirits, who is.-A person who distils spirit for the purpose of making, by the addition of nitric acid, sweet spirits of nitre for sale, is a distiller of spirits within the meaning of the 6 Geo. 4, c. 80, ss. 6, 7, requiring an excise license, and liable to the penalties imposed by sect. 39 of that act on persons having any private or concealed still, &c., for making or distilling low wines or spirits. Att.-Gen. v. Bailey, 16 M. & W. 74.

2. Spirit license.-The 7th sect. of the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 68, applies to the case of a person who has been previously licensed as well as to the case of a person applying for a license for the first time, and therefore it is necessary that a party applying for and obtaining a

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license should enter into the bond required by the 7th section, even though he should have obtained a license, and entered into a similar bond in the preceding year. M'Garry v. Pape, 9 Ir. L. R. 141. EXECUTION. See BANKRUPT, 1. PROCESS, 2.

EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.-1. Ne unques administrator-How such plea should conclude-Erroneous judgment below rectified by court of error.-In an action against an administrator, the plea that defendant is not nor ever hath been administrator, &c. properly concludes with a verification, being undistinguishable in this respect from the like plea by an executor. So held by the Court of Queen's Bench on special demurrer, and by the Court of Exchequer Chamber on error from the Queen's Bench. The Court of Queen's Bench gave a judgment for the defendant, which the Court of Error upheld; but the judgment in B. R. was entered up, erroneously, that the writ be quashed. The Court of Error reversed that judgment, and gave judgment that the plaintiff take nothing by his writ and that the defendant go thereof without day. Scott v. Wedlake, 7 Q. B. 766.

2. Pleading-Use and occupation.-To a declaration in indebitatus assumpsit against an administratrix containing counts for use and occupation and the money counts, the defendant pleaded to the whole declaration, that before she had any notice of the said demands, and before she had any notice of the making of the said promises, she had fully administered: Held bad, as tendering an immaterial issue, and as surplusage; held also, that surplusage, tending to embarrass the pleading, is ground of special demurrer. Quare, would such a plea to the count for use and occupation be a good plea? Commissioners of Education v. Longham, 9 Ir. L. R. 167.

And see EJECTMENT, 2. MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED.
EXTORTION. See SHERIFF, 2.

FEME COVERT.-Conveyance by, under 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 91. Upon a motion, on the part of a married woman, under the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, s. 91, to convey her interest in property without the concurrence of her husband, on the ground that he is of unsound mind, the affidavit must show in distinct terms, or by necessary inference, that the husband is lunatic at the time of the application. Re Turner, 3 C. B. 166.

FILING. See COGNOVIT, 3.

FOREIGNER. See PATENT, 1, 2, 3.

FOREIGN JUDGMENT.-Plea, that the defendant had no notice of process in the foreign court, and did not appear to defend therein.--In assumpsit on a judgment or decree of the Tribunal of Commerce at Brussels, the defendant pleaded that he was not at any time served with any process issuing out of the court at the suit of the plaintiffs for the causes of action upon which the said judgment or decree was obtained, nor had he at any time notice of any such process, nor did he appear in the said court to answer the plaintiffs:

Held bad, inasmuch as the plea did not show that the proceedings against the defendant in the Belgian court were so conducted as to deprive the defendant of the opportunity of defending himself therein. Reynolds v. Fenton, 3 C. B. 187.

FOREIGN LAW. See PLEADING, 2.

FORMA PAUPERIS. See RELEASE, 1.

FORMER RECOVERY. Sce TrovER.

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.-Acceptance of goods.-Goods were shipped by the plaintiff from abroad to this country on the verbal order of the defendant at a price exceeding 101.; they were sent to a shipping agent of the plaintiff in London, who received them, and warehoused them with a wharfinger, informing the defendant of their arrival; the wharfinger handed to the shipping agent a delivery warrant, whereby the goods were made deliverable to him or his assignees by indorsement on payment of rent and charges; the agent indorsed and delivered this warrant to the defendant, who kept it for several months, and, notwithstanding repeated applications, did not pay the price of or charges upon the goods, nor return the warrant, but said he had sent it to his solicitor, and that he intended to resist payment, for that he had never ordered the goods, and that they would remain for the present in bond: Held, that there was no such delivery to or acceptance by the defendant of the goods as to satisfy the 17th section of the statute of frauds. Farina v. Home, 16 M. & W. 119.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.-What is.-A sale of property for good consideration is not, either at common law or under stat. 13 Eliz. c. 5, fraudulent and void, merely because it is made with the intention to defeat the expected execution of a judgment creditor. Wood v. Dixie, 7 Q. B. 892.

FRIVOLOUS DEMURRER. See PRACTICE, 6.

GENERAL ISSUE. See PLEADING, 3.

،،

GUARANTEE.-1. Consideration.-Held, that no consideration appeared on the face of the following guarantee: 1843, June 28. Mr. Price, I will see you paid for 5. or 10l. worth of leather on the 6th of December, for Thomas Lewis, shoemaker." Price v. Richardson, 15 M. & W. 539.

2. Construction of Liability of guarantor for due payment of bill of exchange-Interest-Variance.- Declaration in assumpsit on a guarantee stated that the defendant promised the plaintiffs to guarantee to them the due acceptance and payment of two bills of exchange, drawn by K. being the amount of an invoice of the plaintiffs of goods shipped by them, and that as the defendant had not then heard from K. if the invoice had been found correct, the defendant was to have "the reserve customary under such circumstances." The terms of the guarantee were, that the defendants guaranteed the due acceptance and payment of the bills, &c., and it proceeded thus," As we have not heard from Mr. K., ᎥᏝ your invoice has been found correct, we claim this reserve as customary under