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such circumstances ;" it appeared that the invoice was in fact correct: Held, that there was no variance. A party who guarantees the die payment of a bill of exchange by the acceptor is liable for interest upon it if it be not paid when due. Ackermann v. Ehrensperger, 16 M. & W. 99.
HABEAS CORPUS. See SMALL Debts Act.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. – 1. Coverture -- Circumstantial and informal plea of.—To a count against the maker of a promissory note, he pleaded in bar, that at the time of making the note the plaintiff was the wife of A. ; that the consideration for the note wa the loan of money of A. advanced by the plaintiff to the defendant without A.'s authority, and against his will; that the plaintiff took the note, and held and still holds the same without the authority and against the will of A., and that he never had any property in or rigut to the note: Held, an informal plea of coverture. 'Guyard v. Sutton, 3 C. B. 153.
2. Pleading-Duplicity-Departure -Reduction of wife's chattes into possession by husband during coverture-Action by wife as sure vivor — Statute of Limitations. In assumpsit by payee against maker of a promissory note, defendant pleaded, that when the note wa made plaintiff was the wife of B., and that after the making, and while plaintiff was the wife of B., he “ elected to take and have the said note in his marital right, and then caused the plaintiff to indorse, and she, by his authority, did indorse the note, and B. then delivered it, so indorsed, to F.; and that afterwards, and after the note became due, and before action brought, B. died; and that afterwards, and before action brought, the note came to plaintiff's possession by del: very from F. Quære, supposing that the words “ elected to take, &c., and “ caused the plaintiff to indorse,” &c. contained avermenis of two distinct acts, whether the plea was not bad for duplicity; bal, assuming that the whole merely stated one transaction: Held, on special demurrer, that the plea was bad, because it did not clearly show such a reduction of the note into possession by the husband as disentitled the wife to sue upon it after his death. Defendant also pleaded the Statute of Limitations. Replication, that when the cause of action accrued, plaintiff was the wife of B., and that she continued to be so until, &c. when B. died, and plaintiff became discovert; and that she sued within six years after the death: Held, a good replication. Rejoinder, that the plaintiff' was a feme covert, and the wife of B. until the time of his death, as in the replication mentioned ; that the note was payable to her order; and that, before it was due, B. althorized her to indorse it in blank in her own name, and deliver it to F., which she did, for value; that when the note became due, and more than six years before action brought, the note was in the hands of another indorsee, who presented it for payment; and that after, wards, and before action brought, the note came to the possession of plaintiff by delivery from the last-mentioned indorsee, who was then entitled to sue thereon: Held, on special demurrer, that the rejoinder
was bad, for, either the matter alleged was a departure after pleading the Statute of Limitations, which plea admitted an original right of action, or if the rejoinder was confined to the matter stated in the replication, it was no answer, for want of a denial that the action was brought within six years after the husband's death. Scarpellini v. Atcheson, 7 Q. B. 864.
And see LIBEL AND SLANDER, 5.
INTEREST.-On judgment debt, from what time it runs.Interest runs on a judgment debt under the stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 17, from the time of the entry of the incipitur, and not merely from the final completion of the judgment after the taxation of costs. Newton v. The Grand Junction Railway Company, 16 M. & W.139.
And see GUARANTEE, 2.
JOINT STOCK BANK.-How far affected by notice to one of its members.-A., B., C., and D., who carried on business under the firm of G., P. & Co., in 1840 opened an account with a banking company, established under the 7 Geo. 4, c. 46, 1 & 2 Vict. c. 96, and 5 & 6 Vict. c. 85. In 1842, A. retired from the firm, but this fact was not advertised in the London Gazette, nor was any alteration made in the pass book : Held, that the mere fact of D., one of the firm of G., P. & Co., being also a director of the banking company, (but having as such no share in the management of or interference in the banking accounts,) did not amount to notice, actual or constructive, to the bank, of the dissolution, so as to discharge A. in respect of a debt subsequently accruing, a banking company so established differing in this respect from an ordinary trading partnership. Powles v. Page, 3 C. B. 16.
JUDGMENT. See CHARGING ORDER. DISCONTINUANCE. PRACTICE, 1, 6, 10, 13. USURY. VARIANCE.
JUDGMENT AS IN CASE OF NONSUIT.- Where cause struck out. — A defendant is entitled to move for judgment as in case of nonsuit, although the cause, on being called on for trial, was struck out of the list in consequence of neither plaintiff nor defendant appearing. Allott v. Bearcroft, 4 D. & L. 327.
JUDGMENT DEBT. See INTEREST.
JUROR.–Town councillor-Challenge. A town councillor of the borough of Dublin is exempt and disqualified from serving on a special jury summoned within the borough: and one of the special jurors having been challenged at the trial, on the ground of being a member of the town council for the time being of the borough of Dublin, the opposite party put in a counterplea, alleging that the jury was a special jury, “and that at the time of the striking of the jury aforesaid, and the arranging of the said panel, the said juror was a town councillor of the borough of Dublin, and that the same was well known to the said defendant at the time of the striking of the said jury, and arranging of said panel :" Held, that the challenge was a good challenge, and that the counterplea was not a sufficient answer to it. Dissentiente Richards, B. O'Connell v. Mansfield, 9 Ir. L. R. 179.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.-1. Eviction.-Covenant for rent on a lease. Plea, that before the lease was made, one P. impleaded the plaintiffs, and had judgment of elegit against their lands, &c.; that the inquisition found plaintiffs seised of the demised premises then leased to B., subject to two mortgages for years; that the sheriff delivered the demised premises to P., to hold &c. till his damages and costs should be levied thereout; that before the rent became due, defendant was evicted by P., who entered and tben ejected, expelled, put out, and amoved defendant therefrom, and kept and continued hini so ejected, &c.; that 10001. was still due to P., which was not levied. Replication traversed the eviction in the words of the plea. At the trial, the lease, elegit, and inquisition were put in, and it was proved that P. had called on defendant to pay him rent, or he, P., would turn him out, on which defendant attorned to him without privity of the plaintiffs, his lessors: Held, that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, as P.'s elegit only entitled him to the reversion expectant on the mortgages by the lessors: Held also, that the expulsion as pleaded was not established by the evidence. The Mayor, fc. of Poole v. Whitt, 15 M. & W. 571.
2. Same.-Semble, that if a party, having a paramount right to evict a party in occupation of premises, goes to him claiming to exercise his right, on which the tenant consents to change the title under which he holds, and attorns to the claimant accordingly, that would be equivalent to an expulsion. S. C. ib.
3. Forfeiture of lease-- Ejectment-1 Geo. 4, c. 87.-The statute 1 Geo. 4, c. 87, s. 1, enabling landlords to recover premises unlawfully held over by tenants, does not apply to the case where the tenant holds under a lease, which has not expired by lapse of time, but a right of re-entry is claimed for non-performance of the covenants. Doe d. Cundey v. Sharpley, 15 M. & W. 558.
4. Inclosure by lessee for benefit of lessor.---Lessee for lives of a farm inclosed from an adjoining extra-parochial waste, over which there was a right of common in respect of his farm, some small pieces of land near but not actually contiguous to the farm. The lessor was not lord of the waste: Held, that in the absence of
evidence showing a contrary intention, it was to be presumed that • the lessee made the inclosures for the benefit of his lessor, to belong to him as part of the farm at the determination of the lease : Held also, that such presumption was not rebutted by the fact that the lessee during the lease made a conveyance of these inclosures to his son in fee, which, however, was not delivered nor followed by any possession. Doe d. Lloyd v. Jones, 15 M. & W.
5. Same.-By writing indorsed on the lease, the lessee agreed that all inclosures made by him on the said waste should be surrendered up to the lessor, his heirs, &c. at the end of the lease, and that the lessee should pay to the lessor, his heirs, &c. the sum of 6d. annually, as an acknowledgment for the same: Held, that this was an admission on the part of the lessee that he had made the inclosures for the benefit of the lessor. S. C. ib.
6. Lease or agreement --Stamp-Notice to quit.-By a memorandum of agreement, dated 23rd of June, 1842, made between A., as agent for and on behalf of the churchwardens of the parish of St. M. (not naming them), of the one part, and B. of the other part, it was agreed (provided a license could be obtained from the lord of the manor, and upon B. putting the premises into repair,) that the churchwardens should grant a lease to B. for twenty-one years from Midsummer day then next, under the clear yearly rent of 301. ; such lease to contain covenants for payment of rent and taxes, and to repair and insure, not to commit waste, &c., and all other usual and proper covenants, &c., and B. agreed to accept such lease, and execute a counterpart, &c., and that, until such lease and counterpart should be granted, the said yearly rent should be payable and recoverable by distress or otherwise, in like manner as if such lease and counterpart had been executed : Held, that this instrument was properly stamped as an agreement: Held, also, that the tenancy thereby created, whether a tenancy from year to year (which the court thought it was,) or a tenancy at will, was properly put an end to by a notice to quit and deliver up possession, given by persons acting as agents for C. and D., who were church wardens at the time the agreement was made, and B. let into possession, notwithstanding the notice purported also to have been given on behalf of the churchwardens and overseers in office when the notice was served, and did not state to whom the possession was to be delivered up. Doe d. Bailey v. Foster, 3 C. B. 215.
7. Lease or agreement- Determination of yearly tenancy by contract for purchase. On the 28th October, 1843, the plaintiff and defendant and M. entered into an agreement, by which, after reciting that M. was tenant to defendant of a house at a rent of 251. a year, and had agreed to let it to plaintiff at a rent of 201. a year from 24th June, 1847, at which time defendant agreed to exonerate M. from his tenancy on his paying all rent up to that day, and to accept plaintiff as tenant from that period at the said rent of 201. a year, M. agreed to let and plaintiff to take the house from the date of the agreement to the 24th June then next, at the rent of 201. a year; and M. agreed to find all materials except lath to put up a partition wall, &c. plaintiff finding lath and labour. And plaintiff agreed to take the house of defendant from the 24th June, at the rent of 201. a year, and to give or take six months' notice to quit the premises ; and defendant agreed to exonerate M. from his tenancy on the said 24th June, on his paying up all rent due to that time. Immediately after the execution of this agreement, M. let plaintiff into possession of the premises. On 4th March, 1844, defendant agreed to sell the house to the plaintiff, but this agreement was not carried into effect: Held, first, that the instrument of 28th October, 1843, amounted to a lease of the premises by defendant to plaintiff from 24th June, 1844; 2ndly, that it was not affected by the subsequcnt agreement for the sale of the premises. Tarte v. Darby, 15 M. & W. 601.
8. Quiet enjoyment - Contract for, where implied.-In 1841, B. agreed to let to A. for eight years and a quarter certain premises, subject to the same conditions as were mentioned in the memorandum under which B. held of C.; and it was further agreed that if C. was willing to accept A. as tenant instead of B., A. was willing to take the remainder of the lease or memorandum from C., and become his tenant. It appeared that C. was tenant to D., and that C.'s term expiring at Christmas, 1844, D. brought ejectment, and turned A. out on the 7th of February, 1845. In an action by A, against B. for this eviction, the declaration, after setting out the agreement and mutual promises, alleged that B. undertook and promised A. that he should and might quietly use, occupy and enjoy the premises for the term for which B. had so agreed to let them as aforesaid: Held, that no such promise could be implied from the contract set out in the declaration, the contract being subject to conditions, the nature of which were not disclosed. Quære, whether a contract for quiet enjoyment can be implied by law from a mere agreement to let. Messent v. Reynolds, 3 C. B. 194.
LAPSE OF TIME. See LIMITATION.
LIBEL AND SLANDER.-1. Construction of libel — What amounts to a charge of conspiracy. – A libel, which, by the innuendo to the heading of it, was alleged to be conversant about a false charge of felony, made through feeling of religious bigotry by the plaintiff against one D. S., went on to allege that “the plaintiff was aided in making the said charge by one C. R., who was stated to have been for some time back employing every means to win the confidence of this young gentleman, their intended victim, (meaning thereby that the said plaintiff and the said C. R. had been contriving some plan to assail the character and destroy the reputation of the said D. S.,) as taking him on country visits, and inviting him to the continent, with the hope, it is alleged, of getting him altogether to themselves, and destroying his prospects the more easily by some foul charge, which he could not find means of contradicting, there being no one else in company. They had met with a direct refusal, it seems, to their invitation to the continent, and therefore rather prematurely opened their present plot (meaning the said charge of felony); affidavits are, we understand, shortly to be laid before the law officers of the crown, charging the above facts, together with certain conversations between