the pair of Romanists who have trained this ingenious manœuvre, (meaning the charge of felony aforesaid):" Held, that the said libel did not amount to a charge of conspiracy, though in the introductory part of the declaration the plaintiff alleged that the object of the defendant was to injure him, &c. by causing it to be suspected and believed that he the said plaintiff was guilty of conspiracy, calumny and fabrication of false charges, and that therefore it was not necessary that the defendant should have justified such a charge. O'Connell v. Mansfield, 9 Ir. L. R. 179.

2. Libel-Plea of justification-Demurrer-Want of particularity.- Declaration for a libel, which stated that the plaintiff sought admission into a club, and gave an entertainment a few days before he was to be elected; that on the next morning he bolted, and that some of the poor tradesmen had to lament the fashionable character of his entertainment. Plea, that the plaintiff did suddenly leave and quit the town without paying debts contracted by him with divers persons in the town, with intent to defraud and delay them, whereby the said persons remained unpaid: Held bad, for not stating the names of the persons alleged to have been defrauded.-O'Brien v. Clement, 4 D. & L. 343.

3. Libel- Plea of justification-Insufficiency of demurrer.A declaration for a libel, which stated that the plaintiff sought admission into a club, and gave a crack entertainment a few days before he was to be elected; that he was afterwards blackballed; and that on the next morning he bolted; and that some of the tradesmen had to lament the fashionable character of his entertainment. Plea, that the plaintiff suddenly left and quitted the town, leaving divers tradesmen to whom he owed money unpaid: Held, that the plea was bad, inasmuch as the libel imputed a fraudulent evasion of creditors, and the plea only stated something which was not necessarily fraudulent, and was not averred to be so. O'Brien v. Bryant, 4 D. & L. 341.

4. Slander-Averment by way of recital.-Case. Declaration stated for that whereas the defendant contriving and wickedly intending to injure the plaintiff spoke and published the false, malicious and defamatory words following, (stating the words and averring special damage to the plaintiff in his business): Held bad on special demurrer, for charging the grievances to have been committed by the defendant by way of recital only, and not directly or positively. Brown v. Thurlow, 16 M. & W. 36; 4 D. & L. 301.

5. Slander-Action by husband and wife-Plea in abatement.To an action by husband and wife for slander of the wife, a plea that the female plaintiff was not the wife of the other plaintiff is a good plea in bar. Chantler v. Lindsey, 16 M. & W. 82; 4 D. & L. 339.

6. Slander-Action by one of several partners-Plea in abatement -Damage sustained jointly by plaintiff and partners.- Declaration stated that plaintiff was a banker in partnership with A. and B., and that defendant falsely and maliciously spoke words of plaintiff, and of him in his said trade, imputing to him insolvency, by means

whereof plaintiff was injured in his good name, and divers persons believed him to be indigent and refused to deal with him in his said trade, and one C. withdrew his account from the bank of plaintiff and his partners. Plea in abatement: that plaintiff carried on the said business jointly and undividedly with A. and B., and not otherwise, and that all the damage in declaration mentioned accrued to A. and B. jointly with plaintiff, and not to him alone; and that at the time of the commencement of the suit A. and B. were living, &c.: Held bad, because it was pleaded in terms to damage and not to the cause of action, and the special damage to the partnership was not so essentially the cause of action that without it the action could not have been maintained. Quære, whether the declaration would have been bad on special demurrer for blending a cause of action vested in the plaintiff simply with a cause common to the partners. Robinson v. Marchant, 7 Q. B. 918.

LICENSE. See EXCISE, 2.

LIEN. Of conveyancer on deeds.-A certificated conveyancer has no lien for his charges upon deeds delivered to him, with and in respect of which he does certain business for the owner of the deeds. Steadman v. Hockley, 15 M. & W. 553.

LIMITATION.-1. Of action-What is a thing done in pursu ance of an act within meaning of limitation clause-From what time limitation runs.-A railway company was empowered by statute to divert a canal, and it was enacted that, if by any accident, or in the execution of any works authorized by the act, (otherwise than from the neglect or mismanagement of the canal company,) or by reason of the bad state of repair of the railway company's works, the canal should be so obstructed that boats could not pass, the railway company should pay the canal company, by way of ascertained damages, 10s. at least for every hour during which the obstruction should continue; and if it should continue beyond seventy-two consecutive hours, or should have been occasioned by any wilful act of the railway company, then at 20s. per hour at least by way of ascertained damages; and that in default of payment on demand made on the railway company's treasurer, &c., the canal company might recover the sum by action of debt or on the case; but this clause was not to prevent their recovering special damage in respect of injuries by machines or engines on the railway, or of the acts or defaults of the railway company, in respect of which the lowest amount of liquidated damages was ascertained as aforesaid, though the special damage might exceed the liquidated damages; but if such liquidated damages should have been paid, and any action for special damage should be brought, credit was to be given therein for such payment. It was also enacted, that no action should be brought for anything done or omitted to be done in pursuance of this act, or in the execu tion of the powers or authorities given by it, without twenty days' notice, nor unless the action should be brought within six calendar months next after the act committed; or in case there should be a

Common Law.

continuation of damage, then within six calendar months next after the doing of such damage should have ceased: 1. Held, that an action of debt for liquidated damages incurred by obstructing the canal was an action for something done in pursuance of the act, and that the limitation clause applied. 2. The declaration stating that the canal, by means of the defendant's works, became obstructed on a certain day, and continued so obstructed for ninety-nine hours next following, and that the defendants refused payment when demanded: Held, that the time of limitation ran from the last obstruction and not from the demand of payment. Kennet and Avon Canal Company v. The Great Western Railway Company, 7 Q. B. 824.

2. Statutes of limitation, 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 7, and 4 Anne, c. 16, s. 19, operation of, where one of several partners was beyond seaAverments in pleading as to lapse of time-Incorporation of plea with declaration.-Declaration in assumpsit, reciting a writ issued on the 28th of November, 1843, charged that heretofore, to wit, on the 29th day of December, A. D. 1830, defendant contracted that he would, within twelve months from a certain day, to wit, the day and year aforesaid, supply plaintiff with certain articles. Breach that defendant did not nor would, within twelve months from the said day, to wit, the day and year aforesaid, supply the articles. Plea: that the cause of action did not accrue within six years next before the Replication that defendant when the commencement of the suit. action accrued was beyond seas, and that the action was commenced within six years of his return after such accruing. Rejoinder: that the promise was made by defendant jointly with W., that after the accruing of the action, and more than six years before the commencement of the suit, W. was in the kingdom and might have been sued. On demurrer to the rejoinder, Held, 1, that the declaration was substantially good, the averments showing that twelve months had elapsed before the action; and further, that the plea might be resorted to as showing that the twelve months had so elapsed. 2. That the rejoinder was no answer to the replication; for that under stat. 4 Anne, c. 16, s. 19, if a right of action accrue against several persons, one of whom is beyond seas, the Statute of Limitations does not run till his return, though the others have never been absent from the kingdom. Fannin v. Anderson, 7 Q. B. 810.

3. Statute of Limitations, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27.-Trespass q. c. f. Plea deducing title by an inclosure act to an allotment of land, comprising the locus in quo, to one T., and stated his entry and possession until just before the time when, &c., and giving colour to the plaintiff, justified the trespass as the servants of and by the command of T. Replication, that defendants entered and committed the trespasses after the passing of the Limitation Act, (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27,) and that the entry was made for the purpose of recovering the close in which, &c., and that the right to enter did not first accrue to T. or the defendants, or any person through whom they claimed, at any time within twenty years before making that entry: Held, on special demurrer, that the replication was good, it being sufficient for the

plaintiff to bring the case within the second section of the statute; and if the defendants relied upon any subsequent clause as preventing the right of entry from being barred, that matter should come from them by way of rejoinder. Jones v. Jones, 4 D. & L. 494. And see HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2. TITHES, 1.

MALICIOUS ARREST.-1. Declaration-Averment of falsehood or fraud in obtaining judge's order for capias-Defect cured by verdict. Since the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 100, the declaration in an action for a malicious arrest must allege falsehood or fraud in obtaining the judge's order for the capias, and must state the circumstances which constitute such falsehood or fraud. But where the declaration alleged that the defendants, not having reasonable or probable cause for believing that the plaintiff was about to quit England, falsely and maliciously, and without reasonable or probable cause, caused and procured a judge to make an order for the plaintiff's arrest: Held, that after verdict the declaration must be taken to mean that the order was procured by false evidence or by means of falsehood, the allegations as to the defendants not having reasonable or probable cause for believing that the plaintiff was about to quit England being rejected as surplusage. Daniels v. Fielding, 4 D. & L. 329.

2. Want of probable cause-Suppressio veri in affidavit to hold to bail-New trial-Misdirection.-In case for maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause causing the plaintiff to be arrested on a capias under the statute 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 3, the order for which had been obtained upon an affidavit not fairly disclosing the nature of the contract, for the alleged breach of which the defendants were suing; the judge having stated that in his opinion the plaintiff had failed to make out a want of reasonable and probable cause, told the jury that to entitle the plaintiff to a verdict they must be satisfied that there was a total want of reasonable and probable cause, and that the defendants had acted with malice: Held a misdirection. Gibbons v. Alison, 3 C. B. 181.

MANDAMUS. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

MANOR. See COPYHOLDS. CUSTOMARY TENEMENTS.

MASTER AND SERVANT.--Agreement in restraint of trade. -The plaintiffs agreed in writing with L. that he should serve them for seven years as a crown glass maker; that he should not during that term work for any other person without their license; that they might deduct from his wages any fine he might incur for breach of their rules; that during any depression of trade he should be paid a moiety of his wages; that if he should be sick or lame the plaintiffs should be at liberty to employ any other person in his stead without paying him any wages; that the plaintiffs should pay him so long as he should be employed and work as a crown glass maker certain wages by the piece, and 81. a year in lieu of house rent and firing; and that the plaintiffs should have the option of dismissing him from their service on giving him a month's notice or a month's wages: Held, that this agreement bound the plaintiffs to employ L. during

the seven years, subject to the above power of dismissal; that there was therefore a good consideration for L.'s contract to serve for the seven years, and the agreement was not an unlawful restraint of trade. Pilkington v. Scott, 15 M. & W. 657.

MIDDLESEX COURT OF REQUESTS.-Suggestion-Affidavit.—An affidavit in support of an application to enter a suggestion under the 23 Geo. 2, c. 33, (the Middlesex Court of Requests Act) described the defendant as of No. 51, Bedford Row, Holborn, in the county of Middlesex, and further stated that before and at the commencement of this suit he was, and ever since hath been and still is, inhabitant and resident in Bedford Row aforesaid, and that for and during all that time he was and still is liable to be summoned to the Court of Requests at Kingsgate Street, Holborn, aforesaid, and that the cause of the above action, and every part thereof, arose within the jurisdiction of the said court: Held, that the affidavit was insufficient, as it did not show the whole of Bedford Row to be in the county of Middlesex; and that the court could not take judicial notice that the Court of Requests for Middlesex was held in Kingsgate Street. Thorne v. Jackson, 4 D. & L. 478.

MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED.-Legacy-Priority of Contract. The defendant, as the agent of an executor, wrote to a legatee informing him of his legacy and its amount, stating that he would remit it in any way the legatee might suggest. He transacted the business necessary for the transfer of the legacy, and remitted to the legatee the amount of the legacy, minus a sum deducted for expenses: Held, that the defendant was not liable to legatee in an action for money had and received for the sum so deducted. Barlow v. Browne, 16 M. & W. 126.

MONEY PAID. See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.

MORTGAGE. See ASSIGNMENT.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.-1. Borough rate-When not legally made. The council of a borough made a borough rate to levy 6591., and assessed a portion of that sum on the parish of W. within the borough. The rate ordered was 6d. in the pound, on the value of messuages, &c., and the council appointed overseers to levy it in W. The overseers, in consideration of circumstances peculiar to W., made and assessed the rate on that parish at 7d. in the pound. B., an inhabitant, refused payment, his name was in consequence left out of the burgess list, and the mayor and assessors refused to insert it in the burgess roll: Held, that the rate of 7d. was invalid; and the court awarded a mandamus to the mayor and assessors to enrol B.'s name. Reg. v. The Mayor of New Windsor, 7 Q. B. 908.

2. Return to mandamus.-Separating good part of return from bad. The writ recited that B., a person duly qualified and entitled to be enrolled in the burgess roll of the said borough in respect of property within the said parish and borough, was omitted, &c. The return certified that B. was not a person duly qualified and entitled to be enrolled in the burgess roll of the said borough in respect of