the land. Therefore a loan at more than five per cent. upon bills of exchange and upon a warrant of attorney authorizing the party to whom it is given to enter up judgment immediately, with a defeazance that execution shall not issue until default of payment of the bills of exchange, is not "a loan or forbearance of any money upon security of any lands," &c. within the meaning of the proviso in the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 37, s. 1, although a judgment duly signed and registered is "a charge upon the land" under the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, ss. 13, 19. Lane v. Horlock, 4 D. & L. 408.

VARIANCE.-Trial by the record-Title of court.—In debt on a judgment, the declaration described it as obtained "in the court of Our lady the queen of her bench here at Westminster, in the county of Middlesex." Plea, that there is not any record of the said supposed recovery remaining in the said court of our lady the queen, before the queen herself at Westminster (named in the declaration the court of our lady the queen of her bench at Westminster), in manner and form, &c. Replication, that there is such a record of the said recovery remaining in the said court of our lady the queen of her bench here in manner and form as the plaintiff hath in the said declaration above alleged. Held, that the issue was proved by the production of a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas. Bradley v. Gray, 4 D. & L. 458.

And see GUARANTEE, 2.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER.-Recovery of deposit.-S., the owner of a farm, orally employed defendant to sell it for him. Defendant, without naming the seller, agreed by written memorandum to sell the farm to the plaintiff for 27001., and gave instructions to an attorney to prepare a contract of sale by S. to plaintff. Plaintiff paid defendant 1007. deposit in part of the purchase-money, and afterwards signed the contract for sale by S. to himself; by which contract he agreed to pay down immediately on its execution 1001. as a deposit, for which S. undertook to pay interest at four per cent. till the completion of the purchase. The contract was afterwards rescinded for want of title in the seller, S. Defendant, before he had notice of the rescinding, paid S. 50l. and retained the other 50l., though without the consent of S., under an agreement by S. to give him one-half of any amount above 2600l. which defendant might `get for the farm. Held, that plaintiff could not recover any part of the 1007. from defendant. Hurley v. Baker, 16 M. & W. 26.

VENUE.-1. Changing venue-Action by attorney. In an action by an attorney since the Uniformity of Process Act, he does not waive his privilege of retaining the venue in Middlesex by suing person without naming himself an attorney on the record. Cutts v. Surridge, 4 D. & L. 373.

in

2. Changing venue-Cause of action arising partly abroad.Where the venue had been changed on the usual affidavit, the court made absolute a rule to bring it back to the original county in which it had been laid, on affidavit that part of the cause of action arose

abroad, and not in this country. Cundell v. Harrison, 4 D. & L. 431.

VERDICT. See NISI PRIUS.

VI ET ARMIS. See PLEADING, 10.

VOTER. See CASE, 1, 2, 3.

WAIVER. See PRACTICE, 4, 16.

WARRANT OF ATTORNEY.- Attestation by person not qualified as an attorney-Who may take advantage of the defect— Stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 9.-Judgment was entered up on a warrant of attorney executed by principal and sureties. One surety being arrested paid the debt and recovered a proportional part from his co-surety, who afterwards discovered that the warrant had been attested by a person not qualified to act as an attorney, contrary to stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 9. Held, that the co-surety, not being the party who had paid the debt, could not move the court that the warrant should be set aside for the defective attestation, and the amount of his contribution repaid him by the plaintiff; and a rule nisi, obtained by the co-surety for this purpose, was discharged without costs. Semble (per Patteson, J.), that under stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 9, a party who has introduced an unqualified person as qualified to attest the execution of a warrant of attorney, cannot afterwards move to set it aside because attested by such person. Price v. Carter, 7Q. B. 838.

WRIT OF CAPIAS. See ARREST. PROCESS, 1, 2.

WRIT OF ERROR. See PRACTICE, 15.

WRIT OF SUMMONS. See PROCESS, 3, 4.

CRIMINAL AND MAGISTRATES' CASES.

Contained in

7 Q. B. part 4.

4 D. & L. part 2.

2 New Sess. Cas. parts 6 and 7. 9 Ir. L. R. parts 3, 4 and 5.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT. See REMOVAL, 9, 10, 11, 14.
ADJOURNED SESSIONS. See REMOVAL, 1.
AFFIDAVIT. See EVIDENCE. PLEADING.

APPEAL. See LUNATIC PAUPER, 2. REMOVAL, 1—5. APPRENTICESHIP.-1. Indenture-Ordinary or parochial. -The examination on which an order of removal was founded stated that J. W. J. was, by and with his own consent, (his parents being dead,) bound by indenture of apprenticeship, dated, &c., which was duly stamped and executed, to serve R. M. S. as an apprentice for the term of six years, &c., the indenture being proved to have been lost: Held, that it sufficiently appeared from the examination that it related to an ordinary and not a parish apprenticeship. R. v. St. Anne, Westminster, (Re Jones,) 2 New S. C. 517.

2. Lost indenture-Secondary evidence-Register insufficient as not showing order of justices for binding.-The examinations on which an order of removal was made stated a settlement by apprenticeship, and secondary evidence of the indenture, which was lost, by an extract from the register of parish apprentices, kept under the 42 Geo. 3, c. 46, which contained an entry of two justices assenting to the binding. At the trial of an appeal against the order, the sessions found that the examinations were insufficient, as though it appeared from them that the justices had allowed, by signing and sealing an indenture, which indenture recited an order for binding, under the 56 Geo. 3, c. 139, there was no sufficient legal evidence in them of a parish apprenticeship: Held, that the sessions were right. Reg. v. The Inhabitants of East Stonehouse, 2 New S. C. 588. ATTACHMENT. See EVIDENCE.

BAIL. See CERTIORARI, 3.

BASTARD.-Order of filiation-Attendance of putative father in person or by attorney.-An order in bastardy, under the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 10, (which enables a putative father to appear by attorney or counsel,) stated that the putative father appeared in person, and in a subsequent part that the evidence was received in the presence and

hearing of the attorney attending on his behalf: Held sufficient. Reg. v. Shipperbottom, 2 New S. C. 641.

BRICKFIELDS. See RATING, 2.

BRIDGE.-Liability to repair in parish newly added to a borough -Boundary and Municipal Corporation Acts.—A borough, incorporated by charter with a non-intromittant clause, was enlarged, under stats. 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 64, s. 35, and 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 7, by the addition of a parish in the same county, containing a bridge, which until that time the county had repaired. There was no evidence that the borough had been used to maintain any bridges: Held, that the transfer of the new district did not render the borough liable to repair the bridge. Reg. v. The Inhabitants of New Sarum, 7 Q. B. 941.

CERTIORARI.--1. Case reserved by the sessions—Practice— Additional points not reserved.--Where a writ of certiorari has been granted to bring up an original order, and also a special case from the court of quarter sessions, this court will not permit any other objections to be taken than those reserved by the special case, although it was mentioned to the court when the writ was moved for that it was intended to make such other objections; and although the rule upon which the argument took place was to show cause why the original order, as well as the order of sessions, should not be quashed, the points reserved by the special case not applying to the original order at all. Reg. v. The Inhabitants of Hartpury, 2 New S. C. 648.

2. Same. When a case is granted by sessions for the opinion of this court, the party at whose instance the case is granted must either proceed with the case reserved, waiving any other objections to the order of removal, or must abandon the case, and rely on any other objections which may be raised when the order is brought up by certiorari. Reg. v. The Inhabitants of St. Anne, Westminster, (In re Jones,) 2 New S. C. 517.

3. Masters and Servants Act-Conviction-Prisoner-Bail-Recommitment.-Where a certiorari had issued to bring up a conviction under the Masters and Servants Act (4 Geo. 4, c. 34) for the purpose of being quashed for defects on the face of it, the court admitted the defendant, who was in prison under the conviction, to bail. Semble, that the court has power, in case the conviction be affirmed, to recommit the defendant for such further time as he would otherwise have passed in prison. Ex parte Lord, 4 D. & L. 405. And see CONSPIRACY.

CHURCH RATE. See RATING, 1.

COMMITMENT. See CERTIORARI, 3. EXCISE, 1.

CONSPIRACY. - Indictment - Naming parties aggrieved— Overt acts--Sentence of imprisonment at the sittings under 11 Geo. 4 &1 Will. 4, c. 70, s. 9—Bringing postea before court of errorCertiorari.--Indictment charged that the defendants conspired to cheat and defraud certain liege subjects of the queen, being trades

men, of divers large quantities of their goods; that in pursuance of the conspiracy, defendant B. fraudulently ordered and obtained upon credit, from W. W. and C. W., upholders, divers goods, to wit, &c., of the said W. W. and C. W.; the count then stated a like obtaining on credit from other tradesmen named, and from others whose names were unknown; and that in further pursuance, &c., and in order that the said goods might be taken in execution and sold as after mentioned, the defendants ordered the same to be delivered by W. W. and C. W., &c. at the house of B., one of the defendants; and they were so delivered and never paid for: and in further pursuance, &c., and in order, &c., B. allowed them to continue in her house till they were taken in execution as after mentioned. That defendants, in further pursuance, &c., did falsely and fraudulently pretend that certain debts were due from defendant B. to K. and P., two others of the defendants; and K. and P. did, to obtain payment of such fictitious debts, by collusion with B., commence actions against B.; that in further pursuance, &c., K. and P. collusively signed judgment against B. in the said actions, and issued execution thereon, by virtue of which the said goods, before the expiration of the times of credit, were taken in execution and sold to satisfy the said fictitious debts: and so the jurors, &c., found that the defendants, in manner and means aforesaid, did cheat and defraud the said W. W. and C. W., &c., of the said goods. Defendants being convicted and sentence passed at the sittings, under stat. 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 70, s. 9, and motion made to arrest the judgment for defect in the indictment: Held, by the Court of Queen's Bench, that the judgment was good. Error being brought upon the judgment: Held, by the Court of Exchequer Chamber, that the indictment was bad; for that the words alleging conspiracy showed a design to injure, not tradesmen indefinitely, but individuals, and therefore either the persons should have been named or an excuse stated for not naming them; and that the allegation of conspiracy was not aided by the overt acts; and that the overt acts themselves did not, either in connection with the allegation of conspiracy or independently, amount to indictable misdemeanours. Error being assigned on the ground that the sentence pronounced at nisi prius was faulty, the court refused to notice a statement of the sentence embodied in the transcript of the record, but required the plaintiffs in error to bring up the postea itself with the sentence indorsed, and they granted a certiorari for that purpose. Semble, that, under the statute, a sentence that defendant be imprisoned for a term commencing from the time when he shall be actually taken into custody is correct. Quære, whether in such sentence it be necessary to use the words "it is considered." Judgment being reversed, defendant K., who was still under imprisonment, was discharged by order (in vacation) of a judge of the Court of Queen's Bench sitting at chambers. Reg. v. King, King v. Reg. 7 Q. B. 782.

CONVICTION.

MUS, 1.

See CERTIORARI, 3. EXCISE, 1. MANDA

VOL. VII. NO. XIII.-DIG.

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