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AGENT. See ACCOUNT, 1. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 1.

AGREEMENT. See TRUST, 1, 2.

AMENDMENT.-1. Answer outstanding-Irregularity-General orders-Practice.-A plaintiff, having one of the defendants under his control, kept back his answer. Another defendant put in his answer, and after great delay on the part of the plaintiff, moved to dismiss for want of prosecution. The plaintiff, to defeat the motion, obtained an order of course to amend: Held, that as there was an answer outstanding, the order to amend could not be considered irregular; but it was afterwards discharged on other grounds. See next case. Forman v. Gray, 9 Beav. 196.

2. Same. An order of course to amend, obtained while an answer is outstanding, is not irregular, though under the circumstances it may have been improperly obtained. Arnold v. Arnold, 9 Beav. 266.

3. Last answer-General orders-Practice.-An order of course, though obtained within the time limited by the general orders, discharged on the ground of the inexcusable delay of the plaintiff in proceeding and getting in the answer of a defendant under her control, and because it had been obtained for the purpose of defeating a motion to dismiss for want of prosecution. The expressions "last answer," and "the last of several answers," in the general orders regulating the period within which a plaintiff may obtain an order of course to amend, mean the last answer required in the then state of the record. Forman v. Gray, 9 Beav, 200.

4. Order to amend obtained after replication--General orders— Practice.-An order of course to amend, by adding parties, obtained after replication, is irregular. Hitchcock v. Jaques, 9 Beav. 192.

5. Order to amend without prejudice.-Plaintiff will not be allowed to amend the bill, putting in issue puisne incumbrances, and making the incumbrancers parties, without prejudice to an order to take the bill pro confesso, obtained against the principal defendant. O'Callaghan v. Blake, 9 Ir. Eq. R. 220.

6. Order to amend without prejudice to injunction — General orders-Practice.-A special order to amend, without prejudice to an injunction, must be made to the court and not to the master. Wright v. King, 9 Beav. 161.

7. Prayer of bill-Practice.-Liberty given, on motion after a cause has been heard and reheard, to amend the prayer of the bill by praying the benefit of proceedings stated in it, when there was a satisfactory reason for its not having been asked at the hearing, the defendant being allowed to answer anew. Blake v. Foster, Beat.

464.

And see DISMISSAL, 3, 4. PRACTICE, 6. PRODUCTION OF DoCUMENTS, 1.

ANNUITY.-1. Decd-Impeachment-Waiver.-Where a son, who had joined his father in granting an annuity, which was assigned to the defendant, allowed and encouraged the latter to insure the life

for which it was granted: Held, he could not afterwards impeach the annuity as obtained under an undue exercise of parental authority. Rogers v. Bruce, Beat. 486.

2. Policy of insurance.-A., a tenant for life, granted an annuity to B. for B.'s life, in consideration of 500l., and a policy of insurance on A.'s life was assigned absolutely to B. in order the more effectually to secure the payment of the annuity and the repayment of the 5007.; and it was agreed that as soon as A. should give unexceptionable security for the annuity it should be decreased by amount of the annual premium of the policy, which was to be paid by B. out of the annuity until such security should be given. No other security was given for the annuity and the premiums were paid by B. until her death: Held, that the representatives of B. were entitled to the policy although several annual premiums had been paid by A. after the death of B. Kavanagh v. Waldron, 9 Ir. Eq. R. 279.

3. Rent charge-Bill in equity—Jurisdiction.—A bill in equity does not lie to recover a rent charge, for which there is a legal remedy, merely because of the difficulty of proceeding at law; the rule being that a party must abide by the legal remedy his deed provides for him unless that is defeated by fraud, or rendered insufficient by some contingency. Cupid v. Jackson, 13 Pri., and other cases on this subject observed on. Where an annuity deed contained a covenant to pay a rent charge, and for a further assurance of it, and the grantor becoming insolvent, questions arose as to the applicability of rents received by his assignees to discharge arrears, and a judg ment and execution was had for some past gales on which questions of satisfaction were raised, and the assignees submitted to the appointment of a receiver in a suit founded on the deed, who brought a fund into court: Held, that these circumstances gave jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The annuity was collaterally secured by a judgment, and breaches were suggested, and executions issued for some gales, and new bonds and judgments taken for other gales: Semble, these gales were satisfied and extinguished though these proceedings were unproductive. Roberts v. Hughes, Beat. 417. And see APPORTIONMENT. LIMITATIONS, STAtute of. ANSWER. See INFANT, 1. PRACTICE, 1.

APPEAL. See EXPARTE ORDERS. PATENT.

APPEARANCE.-By counsel.-On the hearing of an appeal presented by a defendant, the court having intimated that a question included in it, relating to costs, could not be gone into in the absence of co-defendants who had not been served, counsel were, in the course of the argument, instructed to appear for them gratis. But the Lord Chancellor refused to sanction such an appearance, and disposed of the case as if they had not appeared. Att. Gen. v. Gibbs,

2 P. 327.

APPOINTMENT. See PORTIONS, 1, 3. POWER, 1, 2.

APPORTIONMENT.-Annuities.-Gift of an annuity of 3007. to the testator's three daughters and the survivors and survivor,

with a gift over to the last survivor of the sum set apart to answer the annuity. After the death of one of the daughters the fund set apart was lost by the misconduct of the trustee, and the annuity remained unpaid for the rest of the lives of the other two; but after their deaths a sum of money, forming part of the residue, but of less amount than the original fund, becoming available: Held (reversing the original decision) that as the last survivor had had no opportunity of receiving the capital during her life, the annuity was to be considered as continuing for her benefit after her sister's death until her own, and, therefore, that she was entitled to an apportionment, in respect of the arrears of such annuity during that interval, as well as in respect of the principal fund. Innes v. Mitchell, 2 P. 346.

ARBITRATION.-Setting aside award.-Upon the face of an award the arbitrator appeared to have improperly disallowed a sum of 8181. On an application to a court of equity to set aside the award the respondent offered to allow it: Held, nevertheless, that the award must be set aside. Skipworth v. Skipworth, 9 Beav. 135. ASSETS. See LEGACY.

ASSIGNMENT. See JUDGMENT.

ATTORNEY GENERAL. See COSTS, 2. INFANT, 1. ·

BARRISTER.-Bond for fees.-A bond given to a barrister for past and future professional services, though the taking of it is to be condemned, will not be relieved against on grounds of public policy. Such a security decreed to stand as a voluntary bond in the administration of the obligor's assets.-Leslie v. Verschoyle, Beat. 535. BILL OF DISCOVERY. See COSTS, 3. SOLICITOR, 11.

BILL OF EXCHANGE. Accommodation Bill. — Bankruptcy.-A bill of exchange is not to be treated as an accommodation bill if there be any effects of the drawer in the hands of the acceptor, no matter what the amount or in whose favour the balance may be. Ex parte Williams, Beat. 477.

BISHOP'S LEASE. See LESSOR AND LESSEE, 3, 7.

BOND. See BARRISTER. BOTTOMRY. RAILWAY COMPANY. BOTTOMRY BOND.-1. Fraud, where alieged by bill, but disproved, no secondary relief-Inquiry directed at request of defendant.-If a bill makes a case of actual fraud, and at the hearing the fraud is disproved, or not established, the court will not in general allow the bill to be used for any secondary or inferior kind of relief to which the plaintiff might otherwise have been entitled, but will dismiss it at once. But where a bill sought to set aside a bottomry bond, as having been concocted in a fraudulent conspiracy between the captain of the ship and the obligee, though the fraud was disproved at the hearing, the court, at the request of the defendant, directed the usual inquiries for the purpose of ascertaining how much of the sum secured by the bond was a proper subject of bottomry. Semble, a bottomry bond given by the captain of a ship at a foreign port is not necessarily void because there was time during the ship's

stay at such port for the captain to have written home to his employers and to have received an answer; but, at all events, if the omission of the captain, under such circumstances, to communicate with his employers is intended to be relied on as invalidating the bond, it ought to be specifically charged in the bill, otherwise, although it appear in evidence, it will not be regarded. Glascott v. Lang, 2 P. 310.

2. Mortgage-Charter party-Set-off.-The charterer of a ship in a foreign port, who had notice of a prior mortgage on the ship and its future earnings, agreed with the master, who was also owner, to advance on bottomry such sum as should be necessary to equip the ship for the homeward voyage, and a bottomry bond was accordingly executed, but the amount of the necessary expenses of outfit turned out greater than that for which the bond was given: Held, that, as against the mortgagee, he was not entitled to set off the excess against the sum which became due under the charter-party.

S. C. 2 P. 325.

BREACH OF TRUST. See PLEADING, 2. TRUST, 1, 2.
BYGONE RENTS. See RECEIVER, 2.

CHARGE ON REALTY. See WILL, 2.

CHARITY.-1. Charitable bequest Validity-Scheme.-A direction to trustees to spend at their discretion, "in the service of my Lord and Master and I trust Redeemer," 2000l. annually, till the testator's son attained his age: Held a good charitable bequest. From the temporary character of the bequest, and the discretion intended to be given to the trustees, the court declined to refer it to the master to approve of a scheme. Powerscourt v. Powerscourt, Beat. 572.

2. Charitable use- Crown-Information.-An allegation of a grant in the reign of Edward III. in Ireland, for the improvement of a city and support of public buildings, bridges, highways and establishments therein: Held to be a sufficient statement of a charitable use, and one which, though made to a civil corporation, will be enforced in this court as a trust. Such a gift from the crown is sufficient to create a condition; and the crown must insist on the forfeiture, or waive it on performance of the condition, so as to give this court jurisdiction on the information. An information against a corporation, and also against an individual officer of it, making a case in which the latter would be personally liable, is not demurrable. Attorney General v. The Corporation of Limerick, Beat. 563.

3. Vacancies in corporation trustees.-The court will not make an order for filling up vacancies in charity trustees, under the Municipal Corporation Act, unless it be satisfied that the existing number is practically insufficient, and that inconvenience arises from not having more. In re Worcester Charities, 2 P. 284.

And see TRUST, 4, 7.

CHILDREN. See CONVEYANCE, 1,2. PORTIONS. WILL, 5, 6, 7.

COLLATERAL RELATIONS. See LUNACY, 1.

COMMISSION. See SALE UNDER Court, 1.

COMMISSIONERS. See RIVER.

CONDITIONAL PURCHASE. See MORTGAGE, 2.

CONSERVANCY. See RIVER.

CONSIDERATION. See MARRIAGE.

CONSTRUCTION. See CONVEYANCE. DEED. WILL.

CONTEMPT.-1. Delay-Excuse for- Practice. — After a petition had stood over at the request of the respondent's counsel for his convenience, the petitioner incurred a contempt, which he had not cleared when the petition came on again: Held, that he was nevertheless entitled to be heard. Bristowe v. Needham, 2 P. 190.

2. Illness of Defendant-Practice.-Proceedings of contempt for want of answer stayed, on proof of the defendant's inability by reason of illness to put in his answer. Hicks v. Lord Alvanley, 9 B. 163. CONTRACT. See TRUST, 4. VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 1, 2. CONTRIBUTION.-Debts-Imperfect will.—A testator by an imperfect passage referred to a trust deed for payment of his debts; and his desire that said deed, notwithstanding his death before payment of all his debts, out of the produce of his estates, should contribute rateably to the payment of his debts in proportion to the annual profits now arising from each part respectively, and confirmed the deed, and charged all his estates with the debts then or which should thereafter be due by him, and, subject to said debts in manner aforesaid, gave the estates to different devisees. He subsequently executed a mortgage for the same purposes as the trust deed, and after that republished his will by a codicil, giving the estates to the same uses, intents and purposes mentioned in his will: Held, that the estates should contribute in proportion to the annual profits at the date of the will, and not in proportion to their value at the testator's death. O'Dell v. Harte, Beat. 449.

And see CREDITOR'S SUIT. LESSOR AND LESSEE, 3.

CONVEYANCE.-1. Construction of-Vested interest — Will.— S., entitled to a lease for lives, by lease and release of the 5th of March, 1833, in consideration of love and affection for his eldest son, J., and in order to advance him in life, and to entitle him to a wife and fortune, now in contemplation, conveyed the lands to J. and his heirs. This deed was executed by S. and J., and was registered by S. nine months afterwards, but S. retained it in his possession, and with the assent of the son continued to his death to act as the owner of the lands. S., by his will, devised all such real freehold and personal property of which he should die seised or possessed to J., "in case he shall recover from his present illness," and appointed E. his residuary legatee. There was no particular marriage in contemplation when the conveyance of 1833 was executed. J. survived the testator, and afterwards died of the illness with which he was

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