of the father, and a fraud upon the power of appointment, is not sufficient to avoid the transaction. Hamilton v. Kirwan, 2 J. & L. 393.

2. Execution of-Fraud.-A father was tenant for life of certain estates, with remainder among his children, in such shares, &c. as he should appoint, and was also absolute owner of other property. Having two daughters, on the marriage of the elder, the other being very young, he limited all his estates in trust to secure himself an annuity until certain scheduled debts were paid, and then to divide the rents equally between him and his daughter's husband, during his life; remainder for a term to secure 2000l. for the younger daughter; remainder, subject to a jointure for his widow, to his daughter's husband and herself, and their issue, in strict settlement: Held a good execution, not being a fraud on the power from the benefit the donee took himself, as he settled the additional property, and the limitations to the daughter's issue being good, as made with the consent of the object of the power. Conolly v. M'Dermott, Beat. 601.

And see PORTIONS, 1, 3.

PRACTICE.-1. Answer-Taking answer off the file.-A bill containing reflections on a party, ordered by consent to be taken off the file. Clifton v. Bentall, 9 B. 105.

2. Bill and cross bill-Answer.—Until the defendant in the original cause has answered, he is not entitled to call on the plaintiff to answer his cross bill. Therefore, before the defendant in the original cause has answered, he cannot stay the proceedings in that cause till the defendant in the cross cause (the plaintiff in the original), though out of the jurisdiction, shall answer the cross bill. But after answering the original bill, the plaintiff in the cross cause can stay publication in the original cause till the cross bill be answered. Raikes v. Cherry, 9 Ir. Eq. R. 140.

3. Consent.-The court will not make a consent a rule of court, unless the names of all the parties in the suit are stated in the consent. Minchin v. Walpole, 9 Ir. Eq. R. 139.

4. Erroneous decree to account-Semble, when the court has erroneously made a decree to account, it is not bound to continue the error by further proceedings in the suit, on the return of the master's report. Roberts v. Hughes, Beat. 417.

5. Note at foot of bill-Irregularity.—Where the bill required one defendant only to answer by the note at foot, though subpoenas to answer were prayed against others, and the interrogating part was not divided or numbered: Held not to be irregular within the meaning of the 12th General Order. If a bill be irregular in consequence of the interrogating part not being divided or numbered, the proper course is to stay the proceedings, and not to move to take it off the file.-Burne v. Burne, 9 Ir. Eq. R. 205.

6. Order of course-Amendment-Master of the Rolls-General Orders-Jurisdiction.-An order of course for referring exceptions for insufficiency, obtained within the proper limit as to time, but

amended after its expiration, discharged for irregularity. An order of course may be amended before service; but semble, that after service it cannot be amended in the absence of the party to be affected thereby. In discharging an order of course attached to another court, the Master of the Rolls has not authority to direct the costs to be costs in the cause. Wool v. Tonnley, 9 B. 41.

7. Proof of exhibit.-Where the defence was, that the deed of assignment under which the plaintiff claimed was executed after bill filed, and was in trust for the assignor, against whom the defendant filed a cross bill: Held, that the assignment could not be proved by affidavit at the hearing under the 97th General Order. Joly v. Swift, 9 Ir. Eq. R. 195.

8. Right to begin.-When a cause is heard on an objection for want of parties, the party who took the objection begins. Prim v. M'Kenny, 9 Ir. Eq. R. 115.

And see CONTEMPT. COSTS. CREDITORS' SUIT. DISMISSAL. EXCEPTIONS. EX PARTE Orders. FEME COVERTE. HABEAS CORPUS. INJUNCTION. INTERPLEADER. ISSUE. PATENT. PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS. RECEIVER. REHEARING. SALE UNDER COURT. SOLICITOR. STAYING PROCEEDINGS. STOP ORDER. TITHES. WITNESS.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.-1. Letting lands-Under-value. -An agent to let lands is bound to let them to the best advantage; but, upon the mere ground of under-value, a bonâ fide letting, which would be binding on the principal himself, will be equally binding on him when he acts through an agent, if the agent has acted fairly and honestly. Dyas v. Cruise, 2 J. & L. 460.

2. Purchase-Concealment.-If in a transaction between principal and agent it appears that there has been any under-hand dealing by the agent,-ex. gr. that he has purchased the estate of the principal in the name of another person instead of his own, however fair the transaction may be in other respects, it has no validity in a court of equity. To set aside a sale from a principal to his agent, it is not necessary to show that it was made at an under-value. An agent may purchase from his principal, provided he deals with him at arm's length, and after a full disclosure of all that he knows with respect to the property. Murphy v. O'Hea, 2 J. & L. 422.

PRIORITY. See MORTGAGE, 3, 4.

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION. See SOLICITOR, 11. PRO CONFESSO.--Admission of facts.-By suffering the bill to be taken as confessed against him, the defendant admits the facts stated in it; but the plaintiff must show that the facts so admitted entitle him to relief. Simmonds v. Palles, 2 J. & L. 489.

PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.-1. Amended bill.— On a motion for production of documents, it is for the plaintiff to show from the admissions in the answer that the documents relate to the contents of the bill as it stands when the motion is made. And therefore, where, after an answer admitting possession of certain documents relating to the matters mentioned in the bill, or some of

them, the plaintiff amended his bill by striking out part of it, and then moved upon that answer, the motion was refused. Haverfield v. Pyman, 2 P. 202.

2. For limited period-Practice.-It is not the practice to order the production of documents admitted in the answer for a limited period. Att.-Gen. v. Bingham, 9 B. 159.

3. Reference to document in answer.-The plaintiff sought a renewal of a lease not in his possession; the defendant's answer denied his right to the renewal, "inasmuch as he is convinced from documents in his possession, to which he will hereafter more particularly refer, that no such lease was executed." Defendant then stated that it appears by a certain deed and schedule, which he admitted to be in his possession, that a lease for a different term and rent had been executed, and that it is manifest from the schedule, a renewal, if obtained, was fraudulent: Held, that the defendant had referred to the deed and schedule in such a way as to make it part of his answer, and was bound to produce it. Phelan v. Hamilton, 9 Ir. Eq. R. 264.

PROVISIONAL ASSIGNEE. See INSOLVENT.

PUBLIC POLICY. See HUSBAND AND WIife, 1.
PUBLIC TRUST. See TRUST, 9.

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RAILWAY COMPANY.-Lands Clauses Consolidation ActForm of condition of bond.-The condition of a bond given by a railway company, under the 85th section of the 8 Vict. c. 18, on taking possession of land before the purchase money was ascertained, on demand to pay to the owner, or on demand to deposit in the Bank, the amount of such purchase money when determined:" Held, that the condition was bad, as giving the party claiming to be owner the option of compelling payment, either to himself or into the Bank, whatever the title might turn out; and an injunction was granted till a proper bond should be executed. Poynder v. Great Northern Railway Company, 2 P. 330.

RECEIVER. 1. Accounts-Master's certificate Four-day order. Upon the master's certificate that a receiver is in default, the four-day order upon him is of course, and therefore a motion to discharge such order on the ground of error or irregularity in the certificate, but not directly impeaching the certificate itself, will be refused. Scott v. Platell, 2 P. 229.

2. Bygone rents. When a receiver is appointed by a puisne creditor, and afterwards extended by a prior creditor, the rents received before the extension of the receiver, but not paid over, belong to the puisne creditor. Rents not received until after the extension of a receiver, though due before, belong to the prior creditor; whether the contest be between claimants under different causes, or between the parties to a suit and a judgment creditor who has proceeded by petition under the judgment acts, or between two judgment creditors, one appointing and the other extending the receiver under these acts. Arrears of rent due at the time a receiver

is appointed under the judgment acts, but received after, belong to the judgment creditor. The cases on these questions reviewed and observed upon. Abbott v. Stratton, 9 Ir. Eq. R. 233.

3. Costs. An adverse application was made against a receiver by a party to the cause which was refused with costs. The applicant being wholly unable to pay the costs: Held, that the receiver was entitled to be indemnified and have his costs, as between solicitor and client, out of the fund in hand belonging to incumbrancers. Courand v. Hanmer, 9 B. 3.

4. Same. A receiver who, without the sanction of the court, defends an action brought against him by a party to the cause, is not on that account disentitled to the assistance of the court in recovering from such party the extra costs of the action, although if his defence had failed he would not, under such circumstances, have been entitled to reimbursement. Bristowe v. Needham, 2 P. 190.

5. Heir-Admission of title-Practice.-A receiver will not be appointed where the rights, as between the plaintiff and defendant, are doubtful, if the defendant has obtained the legal estate without fraud, and no case of danger as to his security is alleged. The plaintiff sued as heir, and the answer neither admitted nor denied that he held that character: Held, that this alone was not a sufficient ground for refusing a receiver. Lancashire v. Lancashire, 9 B. 120.

6. Judgment.-Semble, it is good cause against the appointment of a receiver under the judgment acts, that the party against whom the judgment was obtained was only a trustee of the lands. O'Neill v. Browne, 9 Ir. Eq. R. 131.

7. Same.-A judgment creditor having in 1836 obtained a conditional order for a receiver, a consent order was made in 1837 that the respondent should pay the instalments, and in default that a receiver should be appointed. Upon default in 1846, the creditor presented a petition to extend a receiver appointed in the meantime in the matter of a puisne creditor: Held, that the petition was a continuation of the original petition, and that it was not necessary to revive the judgment: Held also, that the application should properly be by motion. Dyas v. Cruise, 9 Ir. Eq. R. 256.

8. Same. A judgment creditor having obtained a receiver under the judgment acts over certain lands of his debtor, may, after the lapse of more than a year, get a receiver under the acts over other lands of the debtor, without reviving his judgment. Clendinning v. Lord Oranmore, 9 Ir. Eq. R. 150.

9. Notice-Forma pauperis-Meaning of the common affidavitSuppression of material facts- General Order.-The notice required by the 88th Order of May, 1845, does not apply to proceedings for appointing a receiver, but only to his taking possession of the estates when appointed. Dresser v. Morton, 2 P. 285.

10. Solicitor.-The 143rd General Order applies as well to the extension as to the appointment of a receiver; and therefore where a solicitor's clerk was appointed a receiver before the making of the order, he will not be extended to other lands of the debtor on the

application of another judgment creditor. Meara v. Egan, 9 Ir. Eq. R. 259.

REDEMPTION.

See MORTGAGE, 1, 4, 7, 8. REFUNDING. See LEGACY.

REGISTRY. See MORTGAGE, 6. VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 3. REHEARING.-Pleading-Creditor's suit-Review-Practice -Generally the court leaves the question of rehearing to the certificate of counsel, reserving nevertheless its power and jurisdiction, and if the order to rehear be obtained under such circumstances, or in such a manner that any party has a right to complain, the proper proceeding is to apply to take the petition off the file. Where a person not a party to the suit is desirous of obtaining a rehearing, he must apply for leave to present a petition to rehear. A bill by a creditor to obtain relief inconsistent with an order in a previous suit, was filed nearly twenty years subsequent to the date of the order, and prayed that the order might be reviewed. An application to rehear the former suit was refused, on the ground of laches, acquiesence, and length of time, but with liberty to renew the application at the hearing of the second suit. A party who comes in in a creditor's suit, intrusting the management of the suit to the plaintiff, must, upon an application to review the proceeding, stand in the place of the plaintiff, and, in the absence of fraud, be bound by his knowledge. Gwynne v. Edwards, 9 B. 22.

RENEWAL. See LESSOR AND LESSEE, 2, 3, 4. TENANT FOR

LIFE.

RENT. See LESSOR AND LESSEE, 5.

RENT-CHARGE. See ANNUITY, 3.

REPAIRS. See LUNACY, 1.

REPUDIATION. See TRUST, 3.

REVERSION. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2. LESSOR AND LESSEE, 5.

REVIEW. See REHEARING.

REVIVOR. See COSTS, 5.

RIGHT TO BEGIN. See PRACTICE, 8.

RIVER.-Powers of conservancy-Commissioners-Demurrer. -Under an act of parliament by which the conservators of river banks were empowered to apply the funds under their control (which were raised by a rate upon the proprietors of adjacent lands,) in doing, constructing, and executing all such works, acts, matters, and things, as they should from time to time deem necessary, proper and expedient for putting the banks into and maintaining the same in a state of permanent stability: Held, that they were authorized to apply a portion of the fund in watching, and, if necessary, opposing. a bill in parliament for a project lower down the river, which was