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likely to be injurious to the banks under their superintendence. Bright v. North, 2 P. 216.

SALE. See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 2. TRUST, 3, 7. VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

SALE UNDER COURT.-1. Commission on sales-Right of mortgagee of ship and cargo to charge-Distinction between sale under power in deed, and under order of court.-A broker having taken an assignment of several cargoes in trust to sell them on their arrival, and out of the proceeds to repay himself the amount of his advances, took possession of some of the cargoes, and sold them under the power in the deed, while the rest were sold under an order made in a suit instituted by him to enforce his security, by which it was directed that they should be sold by him in such manner and at such time as he and the receiver in the cause should agree, and in the event of their differing, then as the master should direct: Held, that, in the latter sales, he was entitled to the usual commission allowed to brokers employed by the court; but that, in the former, he was not entitled to any commission, having sold as trustee. Arnold v. Garner, 2 P. 231.

2. Plaintiff allowed to bid at sale.-Where lands, decreed to be sold for payment of the plaintiff's demand, were of insufficient value, and no bona fide bidders could be procured, the court permitted the plaintiff to bid without taking from him the carriage of the decree. Spaight v. Patterson, 9 Ir. Eq. R. 149.

SERVICE. See COPY BILL. SOLICITOR.

SETTLEMENT. See ELECTION, 1, 2. FEME COVERT. MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT. PORTIONS.

SHIP.-1. Injunction to prevent sailing - Part owner-Security. -The court will not restrain a ship from sailing, on the application of the part owner of the smaller ascertained share. The proper application is to the Court of Admiralty to compel the larger part owner to give security. This court interferes only where the shares are unascertained. And the application to restrain is too late when the ship is on the point of sailing with emigrants. Hellaran v. Donal, 9 Ir. Eq. R. 217.

And see BOTTOMRY BOND. SALE UNDER COURT, 1.

SOLICITOR.-1. Costs-Counsel's briefs and fees.-The plaintiff's solicitor is entitled to give out briefs and fees to counsel upon the same day that he sets down the cause to be heard pro confesso. Ivie v. Gahan, 9 Ir. Eq. R. 223.

2. Costs-Counsel's clerks' fees-General orders.-Fees to counsel's clerks are mere gratuities, for which they have no legal demand, and this court has no jurisdiction in respect of such fees as against the clerks. The sum allowed for clerks' fees on taxation does not limit the sum which may be spontaneously given; but it does limit the sum which the solicitor can safely pay without the special direction or permission of the client. The regulation of the 5th Nov.

1840. (Ordines Can. 157), is not a general order of the court, giving the clerks a legal demand for the fees therein mentioned, but a mere intimation of the opinion of the equity judges, that they may be properly allowed in taxation. Petition against a clerk of counsel dismissed for want of jurisdiction, but without costs, on account of his improper conduct in the matter complained of. Ex parte Cotton, 9 B. 107.

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3. Costs-Taxation-Counsel's fees - Affidavit - Practice-Taxing master. The fact of a petition being unopposed, is not of itself a sufficient reason for the disallowance of the costs of two counsel. Costs of two counsel, upon a petition of a retiring trustee for a reference to appoint a new trustee, and of a petition to confirm the master's report, allowed under the circumstances. A petition to review a taxation was successful, but the petitioner, not having taken proper steps to satisfy the taxing master when the matter was in his office, was ordered to pay the costs. The court having determined to communicate with the taxing. master as to a proceeding in his office, declined to receive an affidavit, tendered by the parties, of what had there taken place. Sturge v. Dimsdale, 9 B. 170.

4. Costs-Taxation-Legacy duty-Gratuities to clerks. - An order was made for the division and transfer of a fund in court, but before it could be completed the fund became altered, and the solicitor presented a petition for a similar object: Held, that it could not be considered as unnecessary, it appearing that the solicitor using his best exertions was unable to act on the first order, by reason of a difficulty as to the legacy duty; the solicitor was therefore allowed the costs upon taxation. Expedition money, paid by a solicitor to a stationer or writing clerk employed in the registrar's office, disallowed upon taxation. A gratuity paid to the clerks of the Accountant-General's office was disallowed to the solicitor on taxation, as was also a fee paid upon bespeaking an order for transfer which could not be made available. In re Bedson, 9 B. 187.

5. Costs-Taxation-Legacy duty. As to what items of disbursement are properly included in a bill of costs. Legacy and probate duties, estimated at 1407., were payable in order to make available certain funds in court. The solicitor, at the request of the client, engaged to pay them, and took a charge on the funds for 1401. and interest. The duties, amounting to 781. only, were paid by the solicitor: Held, that sum formed a proper itein in his account on the taxation of his bill of costs. In re Bedson, 9 B. 5.

6. Costs-Taxation-Lien.-A solicitor's lien upon the fund is not a general lien; it extends only to costs in the cause, and costs immediately connected with costs in the cause,-as, for instance, the costs of successfully protecting a solicitor's right to the costs in a Lucas v. Peacock, 9 B. 177.

cause.

7. Costs-Taxation - Mortgagor and mortgagee. - Petition by mortgagor for taxation of the mortgagee's solicitor's bill, presented five months after it had been discharged by retainer, dismissed with costs, on the ground that it neither alleged any circumstances of

pressure nor any specific item of overcharge. Dunt v. Dunt, 9 B. 146.

8. Costs-Taxation-Payment-Agent.-Where the taxing-master has received no special directions from the court in regard to payments made by a client to his solicitor, it is his duty to confine himself to simple payments plainly proved to have been made on account of the bill of costs. In ascertaining what is due on bills of costs, and in the consideration of what payments have been made on account of them, questions of law and fact of considerable difficulty may incidentally arise, and may possibly justify and require discussion and determination, even in the jurisdiction exercised by the court on petitions for taxation. In re Smith, 9 B. 182.

9. Costs--Taxation-Payment-Agent.-A. B., a married woman, conveyed her separate estate to C. D. in trust to sell, &c., and pay a debt due to him from her, and further advances, not exceeding in the whole more than 4007., and to hold the surplus for her separate use. C. D. afterwards made further advances, far exceeding the limit, part of which was paid upon bills drawn on him by A. B., with directions "to charge the same to the account of" her separate estate: Held, that C. D. was not entitled to appropriate his receipts, in the first place, in payment of the advances not covered by the security, the court considering that C. D.'s receipts could not be considered as indefinite payments; that he had them only for the purpose of paying off the charge, and afterwards for A. B.'s separate use; and that upon the true construction of the instruments C. D. was bound to apply the separate estate, which he received, in satisfaction of the charge, and could only consider the surplus, after such satisfaction, as subject to the disposition of C. D., or liable to such ordinary lien as he might acquire by advancing money to her. Smith v. Smith,

9 B. 80.

10. Costs-Payment-" Special circumstances"-Taxation.-The single fact that, upon a transfer of a mortgage, a mere draft bill of costs of the mortgagee's solicitor is, for the first time, produced and then paid, is not of itself, without proof of pressure or fraud, a sufficient "special circumstance" to authorize taxation after payment; nor is that fact sufficient, coupled with overcharges which are not so gross as to evidence fraud. The taxation (under the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73) of a solicitor's bill, at the instance of a third party "liable to pay," is regulated by the relations existing between the solicitor and his client, and not as between the solicitor and such third party. In re Fyson, 9 B. 117. 11. Privilege-Discovery-Demurrer of witness.—A solicitor is not bound to disclose professional communications which took place between him and his client, although no litigation existed or was contemplated at the time. The same rule applies to similar communications between the solicitor and a third party, who acts as the medium of communication between the solicitor and client. A solicitor demurred to interrogatories seeking a discovery of communications between him and A. B., stating that in such communication he considered and treated A. B. as representing his client, and as being

VOL. VII. NO. XIII.--DIG.

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the medium of communication between him and his client: Held, that he had brought the case within the rule as to protection. Carpmael v. Powis, 9 B. 16.

12. Service of notice of motion--18th General Order of October, 1842-Practice.-On the application of defendant's counsel, a motion stood over; when it came on again, it appeared that defendant had since changed his solicitor, but without order, and no counsel then appeared for him. The motion was granted on an affidavit of service. Davidson v. Leslie, 9 B. 104.

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13. Same. A party had some time since left home, and had not been heard of, and it was not known whether he was living or dead; his solicitor ceased to act for him, but no order had been made for changing solicitors: Held, that notices served on such solicitor were regular. Wright v. King, 9 B. 161.

And see RECEIVER, 10.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.-Loan of Money.-Defendant representing that his estate was incumbered only to the amount of 18,000l., borrowed that sum, agreeing to mortgage the estate as a security, paying off the incumbrances out of the money. The lender's solicitor being very negligent, the mortgage was executed and great part of the money paid, when it was discovered that the incumbrances exceeded 30,000l.: Held, it was not too late to relieve the lender in equity. Brown v. Stepney, Beat. 588.

And see LESSOR AND LESSEE, 6, 7, 8; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 1.

STAMP ACTS.-Evasion.-A clause in an agreement, providing that if it should become necessary to stamp it and to pay any penalty for that purpose, the creditor may charge it against the debtor, is an evasion of the stamp acts and the court will not enforce it. Abbott v. Stratton, 9 Ir. Eq. R. 233.

STAYING PROCEEDINGS.-1. Practice-Two suits for same object-Costs.-A party prosecuting a suit after notice of decree in another suit, under which he may obtain all the relief which he seeks in his own, may be refused his costs of an application to stay proceedings; but it is contrary to the practice to order him to pay such costs. Such application may be made by the plaintiff in the suit in which the decree has been made, if he have an interest in staying the proceedings, as well as by the defendant, although such plaintiff be not a party to the other suit. The Earl of Portarlington v. Damer, 2 P. 262.

2. Same. Where the plaintiff's bill has been dismissed for want of prosecution, with costs, the defendant is entitled to stay him in another suit for the same object until the costs of the first suit are paid. The merits of the case cannot be discussed on the motion. Montgomery v. Johnson, 9 Ir. Eq. R. 221.

STAYING TRIAL. See ISSUE.

STOP ORDER.-Practice.-A stop order does not affect any right, and it is therefore unnecessary to specify that it is made "without prejudice." Lucas v. Peacock, 9 B. 177.

SUPERSEDEAS. See LUNACY, 9.

SUPPLEMENTAL BILL.-1. Executors-Parties-Pleading. A suit was instituted by legatees whose interest (upon the happening of a contingency) might vest in the next of kin, against the executors alone. The next of kin were brought before the court by supplemental bill: Held, that the executors were not improper parties to such supplemental bill. Parker v. Parker, 9 B. 144.

2. Liberty to file supplemental bill-Practice.--Liberty to file a supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review refused to a defendant on the ground that the defence sought to be introduced was originally within his means of knowledge and was inconsistent with the defence before relied on. Blake v. Foster, Beat. 461.

SURVIVORSHIP. See PORTIONS, 4; WILL, 6.
TAXATION. See SOLICITOR, 1-10.

TENANTRY ACT. See LESSOR AND LESSEE. TENANT FOR

LIFE.

TENANT FOR LIFE.-Renewal-Tenantry Act (19 & 20 Geo. 3, c. 30)-Laches.-A lessee for lives renewable for ever settled his estate, making himself tenant for life. The lives dropped, and in 1809 the landlord brought an ejectment, to which the trustee took defence and which was abandoned. He then filed a bill against the tenant for life, only praying that he might be compelled to renew, or forfeit the estate, and obtained a decree on sequestration; in 1811 he was put into possession by injunction. Being himself lessee for lives, he had not renewed from previous to 1809, and his right to a renewal being disputed he obtained a renewal only after a suit in 1812. Early in that year the tenant for life died, and the parties entitled in remainder tendered the arrears of rent and sought a renewal, the fine being nominal: Held, they were entitled to a renewal, the delay being excused, and the decree in 1811 not operating as a demand under the Tenantry Act even if that act applied, which it was held not to do, there being no fine payable. Armstrong v. Jessop, Beat. 515.

And see INSOLVENT, 2. LESSOR AND LESSEE, 1, 2. MORTGAGE, 9.

TENANT IN COMMON.-Liability of, to account to co-tenant -Stat. 4 Anne, c. 16-Executor.-Whether one tenant in common of a farm, who has alone occupied and cultivated it, is liable, independently of contract, to account with his co-tenant for a moiety of the profits, quære. An executor, who had been tenant in common with his testator of a farm which the latter had alone cultivated, claiming to be a creditor of the estate for a moiety of the profits, the court directed an action to be brought to try the right. Henderson v. Eason, 2 P. 308.

And see MORTGAGE, 9.

TIMBER. See WASTE, 2.

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