late Earls of C. It was then averred that the said Richard, as also his heir William, the 7th Earl, were and continued to be Irish papists until their respective deaths, and that by the act of explanation (17 & 18 Car. 2,) it was enacted, that nothing in the act of settlement or explanation should be understood to give, restore or confirm to any Irish papist any advowson or right of patronage, but that all such should vest, remain and continue in his majesty, his heirs and successors, until the conformity of such papist, and after such conformity should revest in the person so conforming and his heirs. It was then averred that King Charles the Second, being seised of said advowson, did by patent of the 19th of December, 1681, reciting the act of explanation, and that Richard Lord Dunkellin, the eldest son of William the 7th Earl, had renounced the communion of the Church of Rome, and had embraced the Protestant religion, and had thereby put himself in the capacity of obtaining a mark of the said king's favour, grant to the said Lord D. and his heirs, continuing Protestants, inter alia, the said advowson of K. It then averred a presentation of said advowson by said Lord D., which was the presentation relied on Held, that the words in the act of explanation, providing that the advowsons of Irish papists should remain and continue in the king until conformity, were introduced to retain and preserve that species of property in the crown until the conformity of the Irish papists who had forfeited it, and therefore that it was not competent in Charles the Second to grant the advowson to Lord D., and that consequently the declaration was bad in not having shown a presentation which could be referred to the title relied upon. Held, also, that the declaration was bad in not having shown the payment of the money in the patent specified to Lord M., at the time and in the manner in the patent mentioned to have occurred prior to the grant to Lord D. Held, also, that the declaration was defective, in not having averred that Lord D. was a Protestant, or had conformed at the time of the patent of 1681. The title of the plaintiffs, as stated in the declaration, was a term of 500 years, created by a settlement of 1785, which was not to commence until the determination of a previous term of 300 years, created by a private act, 10 Geo. 3, and the trusts of which term (it was averred) had long since been satisfied, and the said term ceased and determined: Held, that the declaration was bad, in not having shown on which event or events that term was to cease and determine, or that any event or events had occurred upon which the term did cease and determine. Held, that it is competent for a bishop defendant to demur to a declaration in quare impedit, if the case made by the plaintiff is insufficient in point of law. Quære, did the said declaration show that a good title to present to the said vicarage was vested in any person anterior to, or at the time of, the presentation on which the plaintiffs relied. Winchester (Marquess) v. Killaloe, 9 Ir. L. R. 107.

RAILWAY COMPANY.-1. Allotment of shares.-In an action to recover the amount of deposit money paid on certain railway shares, the prospectus of the railway company setting forth that

120,000 shares would be issued: Held, first, that the allotment of only 58,000 shares was a breach of contract, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover on that ground; secondly, that if it was agreed that the company should go on with the smaller number of shares, that was virtually a new contract, from which any individual shareholder might withdraw. Wontner v. Sharp, 2 C. & K. 273.

2. Inspection of documents-Parliamentary contract-Subscribers' agreement. In an action by an allottee of shares in an abortive railway company against a provisional committee-man to recover back the deposit, the court will order the defendant to allow the plaintiff to inspect and take a copy of the parliamentary contract and subscribers' agreement, if it appear that those documents are in the possession or control of the defendant. Steadman v. Arden, 4 D. & L. 16.

3. Provisional committee.-In an action against railway provisional committeemen under contracts entered into by the committee: Held, that to render defendants liable, it was necessary not only that they were members of the provisional committee, but that they knew it to be still in operation, and also that the expenses incurred were reasonable and usual. Barrett v. Blunt, 2 C. & K. 271.

(See Reynell v. Lewis and Wyld v. Hopkins, 15 M. & W. 517; Com. Law Dig. vol. vi. N. S. p. 148.)

4. Scrip-Proof of calling in scrip to be registered.-In order to prove that scrip has been called in by a joint stock company to be registered under 8 Vict. c. 16, s. 9, it is not sufficient to call the clerk of the brokers who sent them in for that purpose, unless he produce the scrip itself; and semble, that some one from the office of the company itself should be called, to prove that the company did in fact call in the scrip. Mac Eren v. Woods, 2 C. & K. 330.

5. Shares Bought note-Stamp.-A bought note for the purchase of railway shares, signed by the broker of the purchaser, is not a memorandum, letter or agreement, made for or relating to the sale of goods, wares or merchandizes, within the fourth exemption in the Stamp Act, 55 Geo. 3, c. 184. Knight v. Barber, 2 C. & K. 333.

READY MONEY. See PAYMENT.

the defendant The cause was The defendant pleas, and the

REMANET.-Costs.-In an action of trespass pleaded four pleas, upon which issues were joined. entered for trial at the assizes, and made a remanet. afterwards obtained an order to amend one of the cause was tried at a subsequent assizes, when a verdict was found for the defendant on the amended plea (which covered the whole cause of action), and for the plaintiff on the other pleas. Held, on motion to review the taxation, that the plaintiff was entitled to the costs of the remanet. Waller v. Blacklock, 4 D. & L. 4.

RENEWAL. See COVENANT, 2, 3.

REVERSION. See COVENant, 1.

RIGHT TO BEGIN. See FEME COvert, 2.

NISI PRIUS,

3, 4.

SCRIP. See RAILWAY COMPANY, 4.

SERVICES.-1. Payment in goods-Special contract. - Pleading. Where by the terms of a contract service to be performed by A. for B. is to be paid for in goods, A. cannot declare in debt for the value of the service, but must sue on the special contract; but if B. by his own act render the delivery of the goods impossible, A. may sue in debt for the value of the service; so if B. allow the goods to be sold under an execution against him. Keys v. Harwood, 2 C. B. 905.

2. Quantum meruit-Breach of contract.-In an action for work and labour, where there had been a breach of contract on the part of the plaintiff: Held, that under the common counts he could not recover a quantum meruit, nor prove that his breach of contract arose from the defendant's default. Kewley v. Stokes, 2 C. & K. 435.

SHARES. See RAILWAY COMPANY.

SHERIFF.- Procuring copy of sheriff's notes.-This court cannot aid a party in obtaining a copy of the notes taken at a trial. An application for a rule that defendant might be furnished with a copy of the notes taken by the judge of the sheriffs of London's Court, on a former trial between the same parties, was refused. Parkhurst v. Gosden, 2 C. B. 894.

And see ARREST. BANKRUPT. ESCAPE.

SLANDER.-1. Meaning of words as understood.-In an action for slander, the words were "You are a thief, you robbed Mr. L. of 301." The words were spoken in the hearing of B. and of several strangers. B. knew that the words did not mean to impute felony, but meant to impute that the plaintiff had improperly obtained 301. from Mr. L. to compromise an action for a distress. Held, that under these circumstances the question to be left to the jury was not what the defendant meant by the words he spoke, but what reasonable men hearing the words would understand by them. Semble also, that if all the persons present when the words were spoken had known that the words did not impute felony, that would have been an answer to the action. Hankinson v. Bilby, 2 C. & K. 440.

2. Pleading-Imputation of Misdemeanor.-A declaration for slander stated in one count that the plaintiff was guilty of most abominable conversation and public exposure of his naked person, and in another that he was guilty of publicly and indecently exposing and uncovering those parts of his person which ought to be kept covered and concealed: Held, an imputation of an offence punishable as a misdemeanor. Torbitt v. Clare, 9 Ir. L. R. 86.

SPECIFICATION. See PATENT.

SPEEDY EXECUTION. See PRACTICE, 3.

STAMP.-1. Lease-Agreement-Separate agreements on same paper.-Agreement dated April 14th, 1804, not under seal, between M. and N., that N. shall rent of M. the ferry called D. for 61. 6s. per

annum, to be paid half-yearly, for which N. is to have the sole use of the ferry and whatever profit may accrue from it for the time he holds the same. "Be it also known that N. has this day bought of M. the great ferry boat for the sun of 201., of which 57. shall be paid," &c.; instalments of 5l. to be paid yearly on April 6th, the first in 1805. Held, 1st, That the instrument, purporting to convey an incorporeal hereditament, was not a lease, because not under seal, and therefore did not require a lease stamp: 2nd, That as an agreement for a lease it was not subjected to duty by the clause of stat. 55 Geo. 3, c. 184, Sched. Part 1, tit. Agreement, exempting agreements for leases under the yearly rent of 51.; for that a duty could not be imposed by implication from this exempting clause: 3rd, That if the rent only were considered, the subject-matter of the agreement was not of the value of 20l., and therefore no stamp was necessary: 4th, That the price of the boat could not be taken into consideration, the agreement as to that not being ancillary to the contract for letting, but being a distinct and separate memorandum of a bygone purchase of goods, and, in itself, subject to no stamp duty. Mayfield v. Robinson, 7 Q. B. 486.

2. Separate agreements on same paper.-A., by written contract, agreed to take a publichouse of S. at a certain rent, and to buy of S. all the beer which should be sold and consumed on the premises, under a penalty of 301. for every barrel bought of any other person; and to quit on six months' notice, under a penalty of 30l. per month for holding over. At the end of this instrument was written," And it is further agreed by O. (who was not previously made party to the contract) that he will hold himself responsible for any amount of money which may become due from A. to S., that is to say, to the amount of 361." The names of S., O. and A. were subscribed: Held, in an action by S. against O. on the guarantee, that a lease stamp was not sufficient, but that an agreement stamp was necessary in respect of O.'s guarantee for the payment of penalties. Wharton v. Walton, 7 Q. B. 474.

And see RAILWAY COMPANY, 5.

STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. See TROVER, 2.

SUBSCRIBERS'

PANY, 2.

AGREEMENT.

See RAILWAY COM

SUMMONS. See PROCESS.

SURRENDER. See LANDLORD and Tenant, 2.

SUSPICION. See FALSE IMPRISONMENT.

TRANSCRIPTS. See EVIDENCE, 5.

TRESPASS. See FALSE IMPRISONMENT.

TENANT, 7, 8. NISI PRIUS, 1.

LANDLORD AND

TRIAL, WRIT OF.-Several issues-Waiver.-A writ of trial directing the issue to be tried where there are several issues joined is

irregular, but if the defendant appears at the trial he waives the irregularity. Towers v. Turner, 4'D. & L. 177.

TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN. See MANDAMUS, 2.

TROVER.-1. Ownership-Damages.-In an action of trover, where the plaintiff had been endeavouring to baffle his creditors_by a merely ostensible transfer of the goods to another, and where they were seized upon premises in which the plaintiff's tenancy had expired: Held, 1st, that there was a sufficient possession as against a wrongdoer, without regard to the question of ownership; and, 2ndly, that the measure of damages was the value of the plaintiff's real and bonâ fide interest in the goods, and not the full value. Cameron v. Wynch, 2 C. & K. 264.

2. Stoppage in transitu.-By the custom of the spirit trade in the city of Dublin, where whiskey is bonded in the queen's stores, the party selling gives to the purchaser certain request notes, on the faith of which the price is paid, and which constitute a sufficient authority to the storehouse keeper to deliver the whiskey to the holder of them. The defendant having sold six puucheons of whiskey to A. B., and having got his acceptance for the amount, hands him six request notes; A. B. sells the same to the plaintiff, giving him the request notes; the plaintiff thereupon takes two puncheons out of the store, and on application for the remainder discovers that the defendant had, on the acceptances of A. B. becoming dishonoured, taken out the remaining four: Held, that trover lay at the suit of the plaintiff for the four puncheons, and that he had such a possession as put an end to the stoppage in transitu. Croker v. Lawder, 9 Ir. L. Ř. 21. UNCERTAINTY. See PLEADING, 5. USE AND OCCUPATION. 9, 10.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT,

VARIANCE. Amendment. The enactments for allowing amendments at nisi prius were intended to meet variances arising from mere slips or accidents, and do not extend to a case in which the party has intentionally and designedly framed his pleading in a manner which gives rise to the objection. Thus, if a plaintiff, declaring on a deed, recites it according to what he contends is its legal effect, and the judge should hold that that is not the legal effect of the deed, this would not be such a variance as should be amended at nisi prius. Bowers v. Nixon, 2 C. & K. 372.

WARRANT OF ATTORNEY.-Setting aside judgmentAppearance-Irregularity-Laches-Waiver.-E. gave a warrant of attorney authorizing the attorney to appear for him, receive a declaration in debt, and thereupon confess the action or suffer judg