MANSLAUGHTER.-1. Indictment against medical practitioner. An indictment against a medical practitioner charged that he made divers assaults on the deceased (a patient), and applied wet cloths to his body, and caused him to be put into baths: Held, that this was a proper mode of laying the offence, although all that was done was by the consent of the deceased, and that the indictment need not charge an undertaking to perform a cure, and a felonious breach of duty. Reg. v. Ellis, 2 C. & K. 470.

2. Indictment Cause of death. An indictment for manslaughter charged that J. E. caused R. D. to become mortally sick, of which mortal sickness, especially of a mortal congestion of the lungs and heart, occasioned by the means aforesaid, he died: Held, that this properly charged a death from a mortal congestion caused by those means. S. C. ib.

3. Negligence-Ventilation of a mine.-If it be the duty of a person as ground bailiff of a mine to cause the mine to be properly ventilated by causing air-headings to be put up where necessary, and by reason of his omission in this respect another be killed by an explosion of fire-damp, such person is guilty of manslaughter, if, by such his omission, he was guilty of a want of ordinary and reasonable precaution, and if it was his plain and ordinary duty to have caused an air-heading to be made, and a man using reasonable diligence would have done it. It is no defence in a case of manslaughter that the death of the deceased was caused by the negligence of others as well as by that of the prisoner; for if the death of a deceased be caused partly by the negligence of the prisoner and partly by the negligence of others, the prisoner and all those others are guilty of manslaughter. Reg. v. Haines, 2 C. & K. 368.

4. Negligence-Ventilation of a mine-Indictment.-Where an engineer who had charge of an engine which was worked for the purpose of keeping up a supply of pure air in a mine neglected his duty, so that the engine stopped, and the mine thereby became charged with foul air, which afterwards exploded and caused the death of one of the miners: Held, that in such a case the engineer could not be convicted of manslaughter on an indictment which did not allege a duty in him which he had neglected to perform. Reg. v. Barrett, 2 C. & K. 343.

And see BAIL. CORONER, 3.

MURDER.-1. Depositions--Caption.-In order to make the depositions of a deceased witness admissible in evidence against a prisoner charged with felony, such deposition need not have a separate caption. If there be a caption at the head of the body of depositions taken in the case, that is sufficient. Reg. v. Johnson, 2 C. & K. 334.

2. Evidence-Statements made by deceased.-On a trial for murder by poisoning, statements made by the deceased in conversation shortly before the time at which the poison is supposed to have been administered, are evidence to prove the state of his health at that time. S. C. ib.

3. Postponing trial.-An application to postpone the trial of a prisoner charged with murder, in order to afford an opportunity of investigating the evidence and characters of certain witnesses who had not been examined before the committing magistrate, but who were to be called for the prosecution to prove previous attempts by the accused on the life of the deceased, was refused. S. C. ib. NEGLIGENCE. See MANSLAUGHTER, 3, 4.

NIGHT POACHING. See POACHING.

NOTICE OF APPEAL. See HIGHWAYS, 2.

NOTICE OF APPLICATION. See CERTIORARI. NOTICE TO PRODUCE. See ORDER, 3. SUBPOENA, 2. ORDER-1. Of justices-Seal.-It is not necessary that an order of justices should be sealed with wax; an impression made in ink with a wooden block, in the usual place of a scal, is sufficient, when the document purports to be given under the hands and seals of the justices, and is in fact signed and delivered by them. Reg. v. St. Paul, Covent Garden, 7 Q. B. 232.

2. Of justices-Signature by initials.-An order of removal purported to be made by two justices for the jurisdiction, but did not set forth their names in full: in signing the order one justice abbreviated his Christian name, and the other signed by an initial only. The examination on which the order was made purported, by its caption, to have been taken by two justices for the jurisdiction, and the jurat was sworn before us, the said justices, and was signed in the same inanner as the order: Held, in each case, that the signatures were sufficient. Reg. v. The Inhabitants of Worthenbury, 7 Q. B. 555.

3. Of sessions for payment of costs-- What is original order— Service to ground indictment for disobedience-Notice to produceTaxation--Completing order for costs at adjourned session—Objection cured by implied consent.-An order of quarter sessions, on dismissal of an appeal against a poor-rate, that the appellant shall pay costs "immediately upon service of this order, or a true copy thereof," is valid; for the order is a judgment of the sessions, and therefore service of the original, or production of it on service of a copy, cannot be required. On indictment for disobeying such order, with an averment that a true copy of the order was served on defendants, and they had notice of the said order and of the contents thereof, the prosecutors produced in court the minute book of quarter sessions in which the order was entered, and a copy of the order on parchment, which was an authentic extract of the minutes; and they offered parol evidence that a true copy of the order was served on the defendants, and the contents of the parchment at the same time read over to them: Held, that (whether the parchment was an original or not) parol evidence as to the copy served was admissible, without notice to the defendants to produce the copy itself; for the object of the evidence was only to prove notice of the order, which notice the copy was, and therefore notice to produce it was unneces

sary. The order for costs was made at first without stating the amount, which was left to be ascertained by the clerk of the peace, the justices then adjourned; the costs were taxed, and the amount verbally reported by the clerk of the peace at the adjourned sitting, which was not attended by all the magistrates originally present. The order was there finally drawn up, with the amount of costs as taxed. Quære, by Coleridge, J., whether the justices at the adjourned sitting had jurisdiction to settle the costs. But evidence having been given on the trial of the indictment that both appellants and respondents had an opportunity of attending the taxation, and knew of the proceedings at the adjourned session, and took no objection: Held, on motion, after a verdict of guilty, for a new trial or to enter a verdict for defendants, that the irregularity, if any, was no ground for disturbing the verdict. Reg. v. Mortlock, 7 Q. B. 459. And see BASTARD. RELIEF. REMOVAL, 12, 13.

PARDON.-Certificate of discharge from hulks in respect to one offence, no bar to an indictment for another offence previously committed.-A. was at the Spring Assizes of 1846 indicted for stealing a horse on the 26th February, 1841; he had in 1842 been convicted of felony and sent to the hulks, from which he was discharged in February, 1846. He produced a certificate of his discharge, which stated that S. H., who was convicted at Worcester on the 22nd of June, 1842, is this day discharged, in consequence of having received a free pardon: Held, that if this pardon had been regularly proved, it would have been no bar to the charge of horse-stealing, as the pardon was expressly confined to another felony. Reg. v. Harrod, 2 C. & K. 294.

PARISH OFFICER. Sce SUBPOENA, 1, 2.
PENALTIES. See WORSTED ACT, 2.

POACHING.-Night poaching-Commencement of the prosecution. In a case of night poaching by persons armed, the offence was committed on the 4th of December, 1845; on the 19th of December information of the offence was made before a magistrate, who on that day granted a warrant to apprehend A. and B., two of the offenders. On one of these warrants A. was apprehended, and committed for trial on the 16th September, 1846; B. being apprehended on the other warrant, and committed for trial on the 21st of October, 1846. The indictment was preferred and found on the 5th of April, 1847: Held, that the prosecution was commenced within twelve calendar months after the commission of the offence, and that it was commenced by the information and warrants to apprehend, or at all events by the apprehension of the prisoners. Reg. v. Brooks, 2 C. & K. 402.

POOR-BOX. See LARCENY, 2.

POST-OFFICE.-1. Larceny by servant of the post-officePost letter. The president of a department in the post-office put a half sovereign into a letter on which he wrote a fictitious address,

and dropped the letter with the money into the letter box of a postoffice receiving house, where this prisoner was employed in the service of the post-office. The prisoner stole the letter and money: Held, that this was a stealing of a post letter, containing money, within the stat. 1 Vict. c. 36, s. 26, and that this was not the less a post letter within that enactment because it had a fictitious address. Reg. v. Young, 2 C. & K. 466.

2. Larceny by servant of the post-office-Taking - Felonious intent.-S. delivered two 51. notes to Mrs. D., the wife of the postmaster of C., at which post-office money orders were not granted, and asked her to send them by G., the letter-carrier from C. to W., in order that he might get two 51. money orders at the W. post-office; Mr. D. gave these instructions to G., and put the notes by his desire into his bag. G. afterwards took the notes out of the bag, and pretended when he had got to the W. post-office that he had lost them. It was found by the jury that G. had no intention to steal the notes when they were given to him by Mrs. D.: Held, by the fifteen judges, that this taking of the notes by G. was not a larceny, the notes not being in his possession in the course of his duty as a postoffice servant. Reg v. Glass, 2 C. & K. 395.

POSTPONING TRIAL. See MURDER, 3.
PRACTICE. See DEPOSITIONS, 1, 2.

PRINCIPAL. See LARCENY, 1.

PRIOR ORDER. See SETTLEMENT, 1, 2, 3.

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION. See FORGERY, 4.
PROCURING ABORTION. See ABORTION.

PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS. See SUBPOENA, 1, 2.
PROPERTY. See LARCENY, 2.

PUNISHMENT. See LARCENY, 3.

QUEEN'S COUNSEL. Licence to plead-Criminal information for libel.--- On the trial of a criminal information, a queen's counsel ought not to be of counsel for the defendant without a licence from the queen, or at least a letter from the secretary of state; and it is not enough that an application for a licence has been sent to the secretary of state from an assize town in the country, to which no answer has been received at the time of the case being tried. Reg. v. Bartlett, 2 C. & K. 321.

RAPE.-Practice-View in a case of felony.-Where, on the trial of a case of rape, it was wished on the part of the prisoner that the jury should see the place where the offence was said to have been committed, and the place was so near to the court that the jury could have a view without inconvenience, the judge allowed a view, although the prosecutor did not consent to it. Reg. v. Whalley, 2 C. & K. 376.

RATING.-1. Dock dues, rateability of.--By stat. 14 Geo. 3,

c. 56, s. 15, the Hull Dock Company were empowered and required, within seven years from December 31st, 1774, to make a basin or dock at Kingston-upon-Hull, with reservoirs, sluices, bridges, roads, &c.; by sect. 18 certain lands of the crown were granted to them for that purpose, and sect. 42 enacted that, in consideration of the expense the company would be at in making and keeping in repair such dock, &c. there should be payable, from and after December 31st, 1774, to the company, for every ship, &c. "coming into or going out of the said harbour, basin or docks, within the port of Kingston-upon-Hull," or unloading or putting on shore, or lading or taking on board, any of their cargo, or any goods, within the said port, certain duties of tonnage (according to the full of the reach and burthen), to be paid at the time of the ship's entry inwards or clearance outwards; or in case any ship should not enter as aforesaid, then at any time before such ship should proceed from the said port at the custom-house in the said port. The company, according to the statute, made a dock in the parish of T. communicating with the harbour or river Hull and the river Humber. The dock is in their own land, granted as above. They have no right of property in the harbour, and occupy nothing on the shore of the Humber, except the entrance basin of the dock. The port of Hull (in the popular sense, adopted in this case) includes the Humber to the mid stream, and all ships using the dock pass through this portion of the Humber. Some discharge and load their cargoes in the Humber or the harbour, without using the dock or entering upon any property of the company, but these, as well as the ships entering the dock, pay the tonnage duties: Held, on appeal against a poor rate for the parish of T., I. Even assuming that the word "harbour," in sect. 42, was synonymous with " port," so that the duties attached on all ships entering the port, whether they came into the dock or not, still that the company were rateable for the duties on ships which actually did enter the dock, those duties being profits of the company's land in T. accruing there. But 2. That they were not rateable in T. for the dock in respect of duties which were paid by ships not entering or using it. Reg. v. Hull Dock Company, 7 Q. B. 2.

2. Mandamus to issue distress warrant-Liability of shareholder in a bridge to poor rate.--Commissioners were appointed by statute for building a bridge, the tolls to be vested in them, with power to contract for the building and repairs, and to convey the tolls to the parties with whom they contracted, charged with certain payments. The commissioners contracted accordingly with certain subscribers, who agreed to build and repair the bridge, and the commissioners agreed, when the bridge should be built, to convey over in perpetuity all the tolls, &c. to the subscribers, their executors, &c. to hold as tenants in common, and not as joint tenants, or as such subscribers should appoint. The bridge being built, the commissioners by indenture reciting the contract assigned to the trustees in fee the bridge and tolls, upon trust to permit and suffer the subscribers, their heirs and assigns, to take the tolls, and to have the sole management