to read from the answer the directions or declarations of A. as to the trusts upon which the fund was to be held and disposed of. That the plaintiff ought not, in the circumstances of the case, to be allowed to withdraw that part of the answer which had been read. That as to B.'s statement of the declaration of A. that the residue should belong to B. herself, the court would direct an issue giving the plaintiff an opportunity of examining B. thereon as to the directions given to her by A. That the plaintiff was not bound to read the statement in the answer as to the fact of the payments to the other persons having been made; and that B. was bound to prove by other evidence the payments which she had made in pursuance of the trusts. Freeman v. Tatham, 5 H. 329.

3. General orders" Last answer."-" The last of several answers" in the 66th Order of May, 1845, and "the last answer" in the 68th Order, mean the last answer that is required to be put in before a replication can be filed. Distinction between evasion of the General Orders and irregularity. Arnold v. Arnold, 1 P. 805.

4. Practice -Defendant-Amendmet-Answer. A defendant may put in his answer notwithstanding an order to amend has been served upon him. Mackerel v. Fisher, 14 S. 604.

APPEAL. See PRACTICE, 7.

APPOINTMENT.-Power.-If a fund is given in trust for all and every of the children of A. in such parts or shares and in such manner and subject to such directions, contingencies and restrictions as A. shall appoint; an appointment of the whole income of the fund to the children for their lives successively is invalid. Lloyd v. Laver, 14 S. 645.

APPORTIONMENT. See TENANT FOR LIFE, 1, 2.

ARBITRATION AND AWARD.-1.Award by commissioner's under act of parliament-Power of arbitrators to impose terms -Setting aside award-Equity to enforce a parol contract-Commissioners appointed under an act of parliament to set out the metes and bounds of mines and quarries in the forest of Dean, and to fix the rent to be paid for the same, held, under the terms of the act, to have no power to compel a miner to pay in money for by-gone workings, or to exclude him from the award if he refused to make such payment. Commissioners appointed by an act of parliament to determine the respective rights of the crown and the customary miners on crown lands had made an award, giving a benefit to a miner, but had required such miner to submit to terms which they had no power to impose, and which the miner did not afterwards fulfil: Held, that after the time limited by the act for making the award had expired, the court would not set aside the award at the suit of the crown, as it could not then restore the miner to his rights under the act. In the case of an award made upon the faith of a parol contract entered into by a party taking a benefit under the award, that such party would pay a sum of money to the crown, an information by the crown seeking specific performance of the parol contract, and there

by in effect to add the parol agreement to the award, cannot be sustained. Attorney-General v. Jackson, 5 H. 355.

2. Award by commissioners Excess of authority -- Miner's agent. The agent employed by a miner in the management of his mines, and in his communications with the commissioners for setting out the metes and bounds, and fixing the rents and duties in respect thereof, is not therefore the agent of the miner for the purpose of making a contract with the commissioners not within the powers which had been conferred upon them in that character. S. C. ib.

3. Same.-Semble, the refusal to pay a sum of money according to an agreement, upon the faith of which an award was made, although it was a stipulation which the commissioners making the award were not empowered to insist upon, would be a ground upon which in equity the party to whom the monies were to have been paid might resist the performance of the award, if the other party had sought the aid of the court to enforce it. S. C. ib.

4. Rule of court — Demurrer -Jurisdiction.-A general demurrer to a bill to set aside an award, which was agreed to be, but had not been made a rule of the court of Chancery, overruled by the Vice-Chancellor, but allowed, on appeal, by the Lord Chancellor, (see 2 Phil. 79.) Heming v. Swinnerton, 14 S. 588.

5. Submission to arbitration – Rule of court-Motion.-The submission to arbitration may under the statute 9 & 10 Will. 3, c. 15, be made a rule of court, not only after the award has been made but after the last day of the term following the publication of the award, and when therefore it is no longer open to either party to complain of the award on the ground of corruption or undue practice. An objection to the validity of an award, apparent upon the award, is not an objection to making the submission a rule of court under the statute. A motion to make a submission to arbitration a rule of court under the statute may be made exparte. Semble. S. C. 5 H. 350.

BAD TITLE. See VENDOR AND PURCHaser, 1.

BANKRUPTCY.-Proof of debt.-Four partners and two sureties for them entered into a joint and several bond to trustees of a banking company to secure the payment of all such sums of money as upon the balance of any account current between the partners and the bank should from time to time be due by the partners to the extent of 1000l. Separate judgments were entered against the obligors, the trading firm having become bankrupt: Held, that the banking company might prove against the joint estate for a balance less than 10001. due on foot of an account current. In re Clarkes, 2 J. & L.

212.

And see INJUNCTION.

BANK STOCK. See DEED, 1.

BIDDING. See RECEIVER, 2. SALE UNDER COURT,
CHARGE. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 1.

CHARGING ORDER. See PRACTICE, 2.

-

CHARITY.-1. Charitable use-Bequest for-Congregations of Unitarians. A bequest for the assistance of Unitarian congregations held to be valid, and the trust directed to be carried into execution. -Shrewsbury v. Hornby, 5 H. 406.

2. Charitable use-Legacy for the public benefit.-A bequest to the queen's chancellor of the exchequer for the time being, to be by him appropriated to the benefit and advantage of Great Britain, held to be valid so far as related to the pure personalty, but void in respect of the personalty savouring of realty.- Nightingale v. Goulburn, 5 H. 484.

3. Grammar school-Scheme-Appointment of trustees-Scholars Boarders-Practice- Attorney-general.-By the statutes of a free grammar school, founded at Manchester in the reign of Henry 8, it was provided that a high master and usher should be appointed, with certain stipends payable out of the revenue of the charity, who were to teach freely and indifferently any male child who should come to the school, from whatever county or shire, without any money or reward whatever, except only the said stipends; one of which scholars was to be appointed by the head master to teach the infant scholars (infantes) their A, B, C, primer and sorts, till they began grammar. The surplus income of the charity, when it exceeded a certain sum, which was to be kept as a reserve, was to be applied in exhibitions for the scholars at the universities of Oxford and Cambridge. Vacancies in the body of trustees, who were twelve in number, were to be filled up from among honest men of the parish of Manchester; and there was a power to the trustees for the time being to augment, expound, and reform all such of the original statutes as concerned schoolmaster, usher, and scholars. The revenue of the charity having of late years greatly increased, and an information having been filed for a new scheme, it appeared that for upwards of a century past some of the trustees had been elected from adjacent parishes and counties; and that for a like period the two masters had been allowed to take boarders, who had participated indiscriminately with the other scholars in the exhibitions and other benefits of the charity. The trustees had also sanctioned a regulation, by which boys under six years of age and unable to read were excluded from the school. By the decree of Lord Chancellor Cottenham it was referred to the master to settle a scheme with the following declarations: first, that in future appointments of trustees regard was to be had to the qualifications required by the statutes; secondly, that all boys, who were of an age to be capable of receiving instruction, were to be admitted; thirdly, that boarders were not in future to be eligible to exhibitions, or to derive any benefit from the funds of the charity in any manner by which the expenditure of such funds might be increased. On a rehearing before Lord Chancellor Lyndhurst, it was held that there was no ground for excluding boarders from the benefit of the charity. The third declaration was accordingly struck out, and in lieu of it a reference directed to the master to inquire on

what conditions, and subject to what restrictions, the masters were to be allowed to receive boarders in their houses. The attorney-general ought to be a party to all inquiries before the master, under 5 Geo. 3, c. 101 (Sir S. Romilly's Act), and any proceedings taken in his absence are irregular.-The Attorney-General v. The Earl of Stamford, 1 P. 737.

4. Grammar school-Scheme-Erection of additional buildings -Practice.-A scheme relating to a charity which had not been submitted to the master, but had been sanctioned by the attorneygeneral, directed to be carried into effect. Monies belonging to a free school founded by Queen Elizabeth ordered to be invested in land, for the purpose of erecting additional buildings in furtherance of the objects of charity. The Attorney-General v. The Earl of Mansfield, 14 S. 601.

5. Jurisdiction-Petition-Practice.-After a decree had been made in a suit by information and bill for the general administration of a charity, one of the objects of which was a free grammar school, the master of the school, who was not a party to the suit, presented a petition in it, with the sanction of the attorney-general, stating that in 1832, which was five years before the decree was made, the defendants, the trustees of the charity, unlawfully removed him from his office, and praying to be paid the arrears of his salary: Held, that the petition could not be entertained, because it was presented by a person who was not a party to the suit, and involved an important question between the petitioner and the trustees, which was not raised at the hearing of the suit; held also, that the court would not have had jurisdiction to determine the question, if the petition had been presented under Sir Samuel Romilly's Act; but that a new suit must be instituted. The Attorney-General v. The Corporation of Bristol, 14 S. 648.

6. Poor of a parish--Parochial relief-Poor rate-Education and clothing of poor children-Scheme - Decree-Rehearing.— Semble, a decree containing a declaration as to the proper mode of applying the income of a charity estate with reference to the founder's deed need not be reheard, in order to enable the court, on the hearing of a subsequent information, to make a different prospective declaration in reference to the same question. Observations on the doctrine of limiting the participants in a fund devoted to the poor of a parish to those who are not in receipt of parochial relief. Semble, a sounder rule is to administer the charity according to the ordinary rule, and leave to chance to what extent it may operate to the relief of the poor rate. The order of reference to approve of a scheme in such a case contained a special authority to the master to include provisions for educating, clothing, and apprenticing the children of the poor, advancing sums by way of loan, &c. Sketch of scheme pursuant to such order. Attorney-General v. Bovill, 1 P. 762.

CHILDREN. See DEED, 2.

CHOSE IN ACTION. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2, 3.

COMMISSIONERS. See ARBITRATION, 1, 2, 3. INCLOSURE

CONVERSION. See WILL, 2.

COPY BILL. See PRACTICE, 6.

CORPORATION. See RAILWAY COMPANY, 1.

COSTS.-1. Motion-Practice.-The costs of an abandoned motion, in support of which the party has given notice of his intention to read an affidavit previously filed in the cause, are only 40s. Green v. Meares, 14 S. 526.

2. Same. If the costs of a motion are reserved until the hearing, and at the hearing no mention is made of these costs, but the costs of the suit are reserved until the hearing for further directions, that reservation does not include the costs of the motion, and consequently the court can make no order respecting them. Gardner v. Marshall, 14 S. 575.

3. Notices.-A party unnecessarily serving notices in a cause shall pay the costs occasioned thereby. Hogan v. M'Namara, 2 J. & L. 242.

4. Revivor. A decree for the delivery of the possession of lands and title deeds and payment of money was made, with costs to be paid by the defendants. One of them having performed all that he was directed by the decree to do, except paying the costs, died before the costs were taxed: Held, that there could be no revivor for the costs. The general rule is, that there can be no revivor for untaxed costs; and whether the abatement is caused by the death of the party to pay, or the party to receive the costs, is immaterial. Morgan v Scudamore, 2 Ves. jun. 313; 3 Ves. 195; and Barry v. Stawell, Han. & Kel. 1, observed upon. Bowyer v. Beamish, 2 J. & L. 228. And see INTERPLEADER. TRUSTEES, 3, 4.

COVENANT. See PARTNERS.

DEBT. See SATISFACTION. WILL, 10.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.-1. Charge upon land--Judg ment-Equitable mortgagee.--Notwithstanding the stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, which gives to a judgment the effect of an equitable charge upon the land of the debtor, an equitable mortgagee retains his right in equity to enforce his security against the title of a creditor under a subsequent judgment, although the latter may have acquired the legal seisin and possession of the land under an elegit without notice of the mortgage. Whitworth v. Gaugain, 1 P. 728.

2. Creditor's deed-Consideration.--A debtor conveyed all his property to trustees for his creditors, in consideration of a licence and release granted to him by the deed, and afterwards died. Seven years after his death a creditor, who had notice of the deed shortly

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