after its execution, but did not execute it, filed a bill to be allowed to execute it and to have the benefit of it. But the court dismissed the bill, because the debtor could not have the benefit of the consideration. Lane v. Husband, 14 S. 656,

3. Judgment-Notice-Subsequent purchaser.-Notice of a judgment not revived or redocketed under the 9 Geo. 4, c. 35, will not make it binding against a subequent purchaser for valuable consideration. Beere v. Head, 9 Ir. E. R. 76.

DECREE.-Pleading-Error in decree-Purchaser pendente lite.-A., having a rent-charge secured by a term and judgment, in July, 1841, filed a bill praying an account of prior and contemporaneous incumbrances and a sale. There was a decree to account, directing an account of all incumbrances, and a final decree directing a sale of the inheritance. Subsequently to the grant of the rentcharge the grantor executed two leases, and after them two mortgages. A. filed a supplemental bill impeaching the leases, and charging, that if the estate was sold subject to the leases, it would be insufficient to pay the incumbrances: Held, first, that the final decree being erroneous in directing a sale of the inheritance, the court would not in this suit correct the error; secondly, that A. was not entitled to set aside the leases, unless they were prejudicial to his own security, and it was referred to the master to inquire whether they were Hamer v. Nesbit, 9 Ir. Eq. R. 96.

So.

And see VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

DEED.-1. Construction of-Bank stock. -A sum of 75002. bank stock was vested in trustees upon trust out of the proceeds thereof to pay an annuity of 5611. to I, for life, and to invest the residue in bank stock or government security; and upon trust that after the decease of I. the 75001. bank stock, and the savings of the dividends or proceeds thereof, be divided into five equal shares, a share to be transferred to each of five persons therein named. Onefifth of the 75001. bank stock was, upon the marriage of one of the persons entitled to the corpus of the trust fund in the lifetime of the annuitant, made the subject of settlement: Held, upon the intention of the parties, to be gathered from the nature of the instrument and upon its construction, that one-fifth of accretions, by way of bonus, subsequently added to the original capital sum, and also one-fifth of the surplus dividends were subject to the trusts of the settlement. Another of the persons entitled to one-fifth of the corpus of the trust fund, by indenture reciting that he was entitled, after the decease of the annuitant, to one-fifth of the sum of 7500l. bank stock, in consideration of the sum of 5001., sold and assigned 750l., or one-half of the sum of 15001. bank stock, and all his estate and reversionary interest therein: Held, that the purchaser was not entitled to the accretions by way of bonus, which had been afterwards declared on the 7501. bank stock, or to the surplus dividends thereof. Plunket v. Mansfield, 2 J. & L. 344.

2. Construction-Children.-A settlement directed the trustees, immediately after the decease of the survivor of the husband and

wife, to tranfer a fund unto and amongst all and every the son and sons, daughter and daughters, of the husband and wife, and the children of such son and sons, daughter and daughters, in case any of them should be dead leaving issue, share and share alike; but the child or children of such of the said sons and daughters as should be then dead were to be entitled only to a parent's share; and in case there should be no child or children of the husband and wife living at the death of the survivor of them, then in trust to transfer the fund to the survivor, his or her executors, &c. There were three children of the marriage, but they all died before either of their parents; two of them left children, some of whom survived both their grandfather and grandmother: Held, that the surviving grandchildren were en titled to the fund. Green v. Bailey, 14 S. 635.

DEFENDANT. See EVIDENce, 1.
DEV. VEL NON. See WILL, 3.

DEVISE. See REALTY. WILL.

DOWER.-Marriage articles.-By marriage articles the intended husband covenanted that in case he should die in the lifetime of his intended wife without issue by her, she should be entitled to one-half of what property real or personal he should die seised or possessed of; and that in preference to any creditor of his, or to any deed or will which he might make or execute in his lifetime contrary to the true intent and meaning of the articles. There was no issue of the marriage, and the husband died, leaving his wife surviving. She is not entitled, in addition to the moiety of her husband's real and personal estate given to her by the articles, to dower out of the other moiety of his real estates of inheritance. Hamilton v. Jackson, 2 J. & L. 295.

-

EVIDENCE.-1. Defendant Witness. Although relief is prayed against a defendant, he may be examined as a witness by a co-defendant, against whom independent relief is prayed. Ashton v. Parker, 14 S. 632.

2. Next friend-Practice-Witness.-An order for the examination of a next friend as a witness, if obtained ex parte, is irregular; and especially if it be made pending a reference to the master as to the priority of the suit. Palmer v. Horton, 14 S. 633.

And see ANSWER.

EXCEPTIONS.-- Master's report-Admission of evidence.The master in his report stated that he admitted certain evidence, and that thereupon he found certain facts. A party to the admission of the evidence, and to the conclusion thereupon, cannot open that ob jection as appearing on the face of the report, without having taken exceptions. East v. East, 5 H. 347.

EXECUTOR.-1. Breach of trust-Acquiescence.-An executor

having possessed a promissory note for 400/., part of the assets of the testator, retained the note in his possession without taking any proceedings to recover the amount or the interest for seven years; and at the end of seven years, when the sole residuary legatee came of age, the executor delivered the note to the residuary legatee. The residuary legatee, ten years afterwards, filed his bill against the executor, charging him with breaches of trust in the administration of the estate. The court under such circumstances refused to charge the executor with the amount of the promissory note, or direct an inquiry whether any loss had resulted to the estate by reason of the executor not having taken proceedings to enforce the payment of the amount due on the note. East v. East, 5 H. 348.

2. Same. In such a case the executor would not be chargeable, unless it should be found that the amount of the note could have been recovered during the seven years between the death of the testator and the time when plaintiff attained his majority; and if it were found that the amount could have been recovered during that time, still the executor would not be chargeable, unless it should be found that it could not have been recovered during the ten years which clapsed after the note had been delivered to the plaintiff. S. C. ib. 3. Executor de son tort-Principal and agent-Pleading.-The widow of the testator employed A. to collect some of the debts due to the testator's estate, which A. accordingly collected and paid over to the widow, believing that she was the administratrix. The widow subsequently died without having obtained letters of administration: Held, that A. having received monies which he knew to be part of the testator's, and not having accounted for such monies to the legal personal representative of the testator, A. was liable to be sued as executor de son tort. That the liability was not avoided by the suggestion that A. acted as the agent of the widow, inasmuch as the acts of the widow and A. in reference to the testator's estate were the acts of wrong-doers, and the law does not recognize the relation of principal and agent as existing among wrong-doers. That A. was liable as executor de son tort to account to a party interested in the testator's estate, in a suit for that purpose, without any charge of collusion between such executor de son tort and the legal personal representative. Sharland v. Mildon, 5 H. 469.

And see VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 5.
FALSE RECITAL. See MORTGAGOR, 1.
FINES. See TENANT FOR LIFE, 1, 2.

FOREST OF DEAN. See AWARD, 1.

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FRAUD.-- Pleading - Demurrer Acquiescence-Solicitor.The plaintiff was entitled under her father's will and an appointment by her mother, who was his executrix, and being in embarrassed circumstances, and without professional advice, and ignorant of the amount of her claims, G., her solicitor, induced her in 1833 to convey to him all her rights, which he represented to be only one

half that they amounted to, for a rent-charge on the lands so conveyed to him, the payment to be personally secured by him. The deed was drawn by G., and contained no clause of re-entry or covenant by him to pay, but a non-alienation clause was fraudulently, as alleged, inserted. G. ceased to pay in 1836, and the bill was filed in 1845 to set aside the deed and carry the trusts of the will into execution, and for an account of the testator's property, so far as to ascertain the plaintiff's rights, and, if necessary, of the personal estate of her mother. B., the executor of the mother and the administrator de bonis non of the father, was made a party, but the trustee of the father's will was not: Held, on a demurrer filed by G., first, that the length of time since the execution of the deed falling short of twenty years could not be set up by him on demurrer; second, that if it could, the case was one of actual fraud, and the time would not bar; third, that there was no misjoinder or multifariousness; fourth, if multifarious as to B., G. could not raise the objection; fifth, that the surviving trustee was not a necessary party. O'Kelly v. Glenny, 9 Ir. E. R. 25.

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See PARTNERSHIP.

GENERAL ORDERS. See ANSWER, 3. PRACTICE.
GRAMMAR SCHOOL. See CHARITY, 3, 4.

They are

GUARDIAN.—Testamentary guardian-Solicitor.--Two out of three testamentary guardians declined to accept the trust. not entitled as of right, after the death of their co-guardian, to be appointed guardians by the court. But testamentary guardians (other circumstances being equal) will be preferred to the person nominated in the will of the mother (the third guardian), to be the guardians of the infants after her decease. The solicitor for any of the persons who exercise a controul over the minor's estate will not be appointed the guardian of their persons. In re Johnston, 2 J. &

L. 222.

And see WILL.

HERITABLE BOND. See INJUNCTION.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.-1. Agreement for separate maintenance-Legality of provision for the event of future separation Infancy. Whether an ante-nuptial contract, whereby the intended husband agreed to secure to the intended wife an annuity for her separate maintenance in the event of his death, or any separation taking place between them during their lives, is void; and if not, whether such contract is valid as far as it is intended to secure an annuity to the wife in case of a separation or divorce for any cause, or whether it is valid to the extent of securing the annuity to the wife in case of desertion by the husband, or divorce without misconduct on the part of the wife, or whether it is valid only to the extent of securing the annuity to the wife in the event of her sur viving the husband: Quære. Cocksedge v. Cocksedge, 5 H. 397.

2. Chose in action-Reversionary interest.-The tenant for life of a trust fund having consented to surrender her interest to the

reversioner, a married woman, and the latter having been examined in court and consenting, the court ordered the fund to be transferred to her husband. Creed v. Perry, 14 S. 592.

3. Same. A married woman who was entitled to a trust fund in reversion having had the life interest assigned to her, the court ordered the fund to be transferred to her husband, she consenting. Hall v. Hugonin, 14 S. 595.

4. Settlement.-A husband had large advances made to him by his wife's father, and had the benefit of a provision made for his wife by her father's will, and afterwards became bankrupt: Held, that his wife, who had no provision except the income of a fund under her uncle's will, was entitled to have the whole of that income settled on her for life for her separate use, without power of anticipation. Gardner v. Marshall, 14 ̊S. 575.

And see TRUST.

INCLOSURE ACT.- Power of commissioners — Public or private act-Injunction-Damage to watercourse or drain.-An act of parliament empowering commissioners to inclose the common lands in a certain township, reciting the titles of certain landowners, and that it would be greatly for the advantage of the proprietors of the common lands that the same should be divided and inclosed, enacted, that it should be lawful for the commissioners to set out and make such ditches, watercourses and bridges, of such extent and form and in such situations, as they should deem necessary in the lands to be inclosed; and also to enlarge, cleanse or alter the course of and improve any of the existing ditches, watercourses or bridges, as well in and on the same lands, as also in any ancient inclosures or other lands in the township as they should deem necessary: Held, that the act did not empower the commissioners to alter the drains in the common lands from another township, and thereby to obstruct the drainage of the lands in such other township, to the damage and injury of the owners of such lands. Where an act of parliament empowers certain persons to deal with their own property, or with property in a certain place or district, or defined by a certain description, and does not by express words or by necessary implication import that the legislature intended to affect the rights of other persons in other property, courts of law do not construe mere general words in the act as affecting the rights of strangers, as to the property not within the description of that with which the act expressly purports to deal. Whether an act of parliament is to be deemed a public act, binding on all the queen's subjects, or merely a private act, depends upon the nature and substance of the case, and not upon the technical consideration whether the act does or does not contain a clause declaring that it shall be deemed to be a public act. Danson v. Paver, 5 H. 415.

INDEMNITY. See VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 5.

INFANCY. See HUSBAND And Wife, 1.