INJUNCTION.-Heritable bond-Jurisdiction-Scotch Court -Bankrupt.-The Court of Chancery has jurisdiction to grant an injunction, at the suit of the assignees of a bankrupt, to restrain the obligee under a heritable bond, executed by the bankrupt before his bankruptcy, from proceeding in the Court of Session in Scotland, to obtain payment of his debt out of a real estate in Scotland belong ing to the bankrupt at the date of the bond, and thereby charged with the debt; but it will not exercise that jurisdiction, if the cir cumstances of the case render its interference unadvisable, as if the question between the parties might upon the whole be more con veniently litigated and with a more conclusive result there than here. Jones v. Geddes, 1 P. 724; 14 S. 606.

And see INCLOSURE ACT.
INTERPLEADER.

What will support bill-Costs.-Jolin lodged 1301. in the bank in his own name upon a deposit receipt; afterwards Daniel, by the direction of John, lodged an additional sum of 51. in the bank, and obtained a new deposit receipt for 1351. in the name of Catherine, and the old receipt was cancelled; John died, and Daniel, as his administrator, claimed the money, alleging that the gift to Catherine was imcomplete, and that he had taken the receipt in the name of Catherine without the direction of John, and he refused to give Catherine the deposit receipt, and required the bank to pay him the money. Catherine also demanded the money of the bank, which they refused to pay, as she had not the deposit receipt. Both Catherine and Daniel commenced actions against the bank, who filed a bill of interpleader against them. This is not the case of a double demand for one duty, but it is a lease in which there may be two liabilities; the bill was therefore dismissed. A mere pretext of a conflicting claim will not support a bill of interpleader; the court is bound to see that there is a question to be tried. When a bill is dismissed, the court cannot decree the costs to be paid by a defendant whose misconduct occasioned the suit. Cochrane v. O'Brien, 2 J. & L. 380.

IRREGULARITY. See ANSWER, 3.

JOINT TENANT. See WILL, 6.

JUDGMENT. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 1, 3. LIMITA TIONS, STATUte of.

LESSOR AND LESSEE.-Specialty debt-Rent.-A lessee surrendered his lease and took a new one, for a different term, at a different rent, and with different covenants: Held, nevertheless, that the rent, accrued under the original lease (the whole of which remained unpaid), was a specialty debt under the covenant for payment of it contained in that lease. Greenwood v. Taylor, 14 S. 505.

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.-1. Avoidance by process.A suit was instituted in 1797 for the administration of real and personal assets. X., a creditor, filed a bill to establish an unliquidated demand by specialty against the realty in 1804, and obtained a

decree, and a judgment ascertaining his demand, in 1822. There were various proceedings in the suit of 1797, in which demands, similar to X.'s, were recognized as binding the estates; and there was a sale in 1816, and for the protection of the purchaser a portion of the proceeds was invested till X.'s suit should be determined. X. died in 1822, administration to him was obtained in 1841, and in that year the administrator came in under an advertisement for creditors in the first suit to prove X.'s demand against the fund invested: Held, that the principle of Sterndall v. Hankinson (1 Sim. 393) applied, and the demand was not barred by the Statute of Limitations. Bermingham v. Burke, 9 Ir. E. R. 86.

2. Judgment.-On a reference to inquire the sum due for principal, interest and costs, on foot of a judgment, for which a receiver has been appointed, the respondent is entitled to the benefit of the Statute of Limitations, although not set up in showing cause against the appointment of the receiver; and the petitioner is entitled only to interest for six years from the date of the conditional order for the appointment of the receiver. Dourk v. Burke, 9 Ir. E. R. 83.

3. Trust.-F. was indebted to C. in 8007., to secure which, in 1814, he granted to C. an annuity or rent of 1007. to be issuing out of the lands of Dovegrove (held by F. under a lease from C.), habendum until thereby the 800l. and interest was paid, and F. covenanted to pay the annuity. In 1815 C. assigned the sum of 7987. (being the money then due on foot of the 8001.) and the annuity to H., and covenanted that the annuity should be regularly paid; and being entitled to a sum of 20007. charged on lands of which he was himself tenant for life, he, as a further security, assigned 8001, part of the 2000l., to a trustee upon trust, in case the annuity should be unpaid for forty-one days, then from time to time to call in and receive such parts of the 2000l. as should be sufficient to satisfy the arrears, and apply same in payment thereof, and after payment thereof in trust for C. In 1816 the annuity was unpaid for more than fortyone days, but payments were made on foot of it up to October, 1821. In 1820 C. evicted the lands of Dovegrove for non-payment of rent, and died in 1824. Under a decree, to take an account of incumbrances affecting the lands charged with the 2000l., made in a suit instituted in 1839, the master reported that the principal money which, in October, 1821, was due on foot of the 7987., and to secure which the 8001. had been assigned, was still due, and that the residue of the 2000l., after payment of that sum, was due to the personal representative of C. Upon an exception taken by the personal representative of C.: Held, that the demand of H. was not barred by the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 40. The trust created by the deed of 1815 is a continuing trust not to be executed once for all, and a present right to receive the 800l., within the meaning of the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 40, did not accrue upon the non-payment of the annuity for fortyone days. A person entitled to a sum of money charged upon land assigned it to trustees in trust to secure the payment of a debt, and, after payment thereof, in trust for himself. He cannot, as against

his creditor, insist that the trust is barred by the Statute of Limitations. Heenan v. Berry, 2 J. & L. 303.

LUNACY.-1. Person of lunatic.-Mode of proceeding by the committee to obtain possession of the person of a lunatic, who, before inquisition found, had been committed to custody under the 1 Vict. c. 27. In re Flanagan, 2 J. & L. 343.

2. Petition-Practice-Right to begin.-A petition to confirm the master's report in lunacy, and a cross petition in the nature of exceptions to it, coming in to be heard together: Held (overruling In re Bariatinsky), that the counsel for the cross petition ought to begin. In re Townshend, 1 P. 804.

MARRIAGE ARTICLES. See DOWER.

WIFE.

MASTER. See EXCEPTIONS.

HUSBAND AND

LUNACY. SALE UNDER COURT.

MINES. See ARBITRATION, 1, 2.

MISDESCRIPTION. See VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 4.
MISJOINDER. See RENT CHARGE.

-

MORTGAGOR AND MORTGAGEE.-1. False recital of prior incumbrance Equitable mortgage-Priorities.-P., being indebted to B., makes a mortgage of an equity of redemption of real estate to B. for the purpose of securing the debt, and by the indenture of mortgage it was falsely recited that the mortgaged estate was subject to an equitable charge for monies due to J., secured by the deposit of a deed. P. retained the deed in his own possession, and subsequently deposited it with J., as a security for money partly lent to P. by J. before and partly after the mortgage of the estate to B. J. at the time of the deposit had no notice of the prior mortgage to B. Held, that inasmuch as an actual prior charge on the estate, if afterwards paid off by P. or otherwise avoided, would have left B. in the position of the first mortgagee of the equity of redemption, the recital of a charge, which had in fact no existence, could not have the effect of postponing B. That the interest acquired by J., by the subsequent mortgage by way of deposit, could not be enlarged by the effect of the false recital, and was only an interest in the equity of redemption subject to the mortgage to B., and that B., in a suit for that purpose, was entitled, as against J., to the ordinary decree for payment, or for foreclosure and delivery up of the deed on default. Frazer v. Jones, 5 H. 475.

2. Specialty debt.-A lessee mortgaged the demised premises, and covenanted for himself and his heirs with the mortgagee, his executors, administrators and assigns, to repay the mortgage money. Afterwards the mortgagee joined with the mortgagor in surrendering the lease for the purpose of having a new lease granted to the latter, which they agreed should be assigned to the mortgagee by way of security for his principal and interest, and that that arrangement should not prejudice any other security that the mortgagee might have for his debt. A new lease was granted to the mortgagor, but

he did not make any assignment of it in pursuance of the agreement. After his death the mortgagee assigned to A. the principal and interest due to him, and his security for them under the deed of surrender: Held, that the covenant in the mortgage of the original lease was not extinguished by the surrender, and that the assignee was a specialty creditor of the mortgagor in respect of it. Green wood v. Taylor, 14 S. 505.

And see DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 1.
MOTION. See COSTS, 1, 2.

NEXT FRIEND. See EVIDENCE, 2.
NEXT OF KIN. See WILL, 5.

NOTICE. See Debtor and CreditoR, S. VENDOR AND Pur CHASER, 3.

PAROCHIAL RELIEF. See CHARITY, 6.

PARTIES.-1. Presumptive next of kin.-Where property is settled in trust in remainder for the persons who should be the next of kin of the tenant for life at her death, the presumptive next of kin are not necessary parties to a suit instituted for the execution of the trusts during the lifetime of the tenant for life. Fowler v. James, 1 P. 803.

2. Supplemental suit-Pleading.-A tenant for life mortgaged under power the inheritance for 500l. and 1000l., and afterwards paid the first mortgage, and took an assignment to a trustee. After his death B. became entitled to the mortgages. C., the tenant in tail, being a minor, covenanted by marriage articles in 1827 to convey the lands in trust to sell and pay off the debts then affecting them, and subject thereto for herself for life, remainder to her children, and a recovery was suffered on her majority. B. filed a bill and obtained a report, finding in 1835 that arrears of rent and fines due in the life of A and after were paid off by loan on mortgage, and found this sum and the two mortgages, with interest on them all before the death of A. to the time of the report, to be due, and a sale was decreed to pay them. In 1840 B.'s assignee filed a bill, not making the trustee C.'s settlement a party, and obtained a decree to carry the former decree into execution: Held, first, that the trustee was a necessary party as representing the inheritance. Second, that the first decree was erroneous, declaring the inheritance liable for interest, payable by the life estates of A. and C., and that a purchaser under the second decree, in which the inheritance was not represented, could not be held to his purchase. A report of good title, plaintiff's soli citor undertaking to procure a signature, is informal. Muguirley v. Brady, 9 Ir. E. R. 59.

And see FRAUD.

of

PARTNERSHIP.-1. Covenants.-Premises were demised to A. and B., who were co-partners, upon which they carried on their partnership business. A. died during the lease, and after his death his executors carried on the business in co-partnership with B. on

the

premises: Held, nevertheless, that the covenants in the lease, which were joint only, were not to be considered as several as well as joint, so as to make A.'s estate liable for breaches of the covenants which occurred after his death. Clarke v. Bickers, 14 S. 639.

2. Statute of frauds - Partners in dealing with land-Agreement made and signed by third persons.-A partnership agreement between A. and B. that they shall be jointly interested in a specula. tion for buying, improving for sale, and selling lands, may be proved without being evidenced by any writing signed by, or by the authority of, the party to be charged therewith, within the Statute of Frauds, and such an agreement being proved A. or B. may esta blish his interest in land, the subject of the partnership, without such interest being evidenced by any such writing. Dale v. Hamilton, 5 H. 369.

3. Same. An agreement between B. and C. was communicated by one of the parties to A. After applications in writing from A. for the signature of the other parties to a memorandum expressing his interest as a partner in the transaction relating to the land, the subject of the agreement, and the court held that the agreement so communicated must be taken, not as an original proposal, but as an acknowledgment of a pre-existing right in A., and that A. might avail himself of the acknowledgment, notwithstanding the agreement between B. and C. was res inter alios acta, and notwithsanding A. objected to some of the terms in that agreement as not truly expressing his partnership contract. S. C., ib.

PETITION. See LUNACY, 2. PRACTICE, 5.

PLEADING.-Bill of revivor-Provisional assignee.—Where the provisional assignee of the Insolvent Court is a party defendant to a suit and dies, the new provisional assignee may be made a party by revivor merely. O'Brien v. Mahon, 2 J. & L. 201.

And see EXECUTOR, 3. PARTIES. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. POOR. See CHARITY, 6.

PORTIONS. See SATISFACTION.

POWER. See APPOINTMENT. TRUSTEE, 1, 2.

PRACTICE.-1. Amendment.-A formal amendment having been made after the bill had been taken pro confesso, without having applied under the 51st General Order, the court permitted the amendment to stand without prejudice to order to take the bill pro confesso. Martley v. French, 9 Ir. E. R. 4.

2. Charging order-3 & 4 Vict. c. 105.-The 23d and 24th sections of 3 & 4 Vict. c. 105, are to be read in connection, and therefore the charging order under that statute is first a conditional order ex parte to be made absolute, which last is the order contemplated by the 23d section. In re Dunscombe, 9 Ir. E. R. 4.

3. Election of suit.-The proper course to compel the plaintiff to elect between a suit in equity and one at law is by entering a side bar rule, and not by application to the court. The defendant is at liberty