attained the age of twenty-five years, or married; and after attaining that age or day of marriage, to permit M. G. to receive the interest during her life, and after her decease for her issue, as she should appoint; and in default of appointment, equally; but in case she should die previous to twenty-five, or day of marriage, or without issue, then over to the other children of A. On the marriage of M. G., A. by settlement of 1824 vested in trustees securities for money exceeding 10007., upon trust for the separate uses of M. G. for her life, and after her deccase for the use of the children of the mar riage, as the intended husband should appoint; and in default of appointment, equally; and in default of such issue, for the intended husband, his executors, &c. This settlement did not refer to the deed of 1805: Held, that the provision made for M. G. by the settlement of 1824 was a satisfaction on her claims under the deed of 1805, though it did not appear that the husband was aware of his wife's claim thereunder. A provision by a father on the marriage of his daughter of a greater sum than he owes her is in general to be deemed a payment of the debt, and it is not necessary that there should be an express stipulation to that effect, or to show that the husband knew of the debt. Hayes v. Garvey, 2 J. & L. 268.

SCHEME. See CHARITY, 3, 4, 6.

SCOTCH COURT. See INJUNCTION.

SECURITY. See SOLICITOR AND CLIENT, 2.

SEPARATE MAINTENACE. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 1. SEPARATE USE. See TRUSTEES, 5.

SETTLEMENT. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 4.

SHAREHOLDERS. See RAILWAY COMPANY.

SOLICITOR AND CLIENT.-1. Rents.-Testator devised his freehold lands to his wife and children equally, and appointed her his trustee. Under her marriage settlement the wife was entitled to a sum of 500l., charged on the land, and payable on the death of the testator. She entered into receipt of the rents as devisee and trustee in the will: Held, that as against a subsequent judgment creditor, with whose consent she entered, and who acted gratuitously as her solicitor in the matter of the trusts of the will, she was chargeable only with such parts of the rents as she had received and applied to her own use. Boyd v. Murdock, 2 J. & L. 203.

2. Security. A solicitor is not at liberty to deal with his client for a security for a debt due to him by a third person, without giving to his client all the information he possesses connected with his demand and the nature of the security. Therefore where a solicitor took from his client a security on a sum of money charged upon the estate of the principal debtor, for the recovery of which the client was then prosecuting a suit in equity, and did not disclose to him the circumstances connected with that estate, and particularly that he, the soli

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citor, had other demands affecting it, a bill to enforce that security was dismissed with costs. Higgins v. Joyce, 2 J. & L. 282.

And see FRAUD. GUARDIAN.

SPECIALTY DEBT. See LESSOR. MORTGAGOR, 2.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.-Indemnity-Compensation -Pleading.-Plaintiff by his bill stated that having a charge affecting the lands of M. held by defendant under a lease, an agreement was entered into between them that defendant should, in lieu of plaintiff's charge, grant him an annuity for the lives of himself and his sister, charged on the lands of B. and other properties, including M. Plaintiff afterwards discovered that there were charges outstanding affecting B., when defendant further agreed that a judgment affecting B. should be assigned to plaintiff as a security, which defendant was unable to do; and having broken certain penal covenants in the lease of M., his interest was evicted by the landlord, C., between whom and defendant an agreement was then entered into to give defendant a new lease. The bill charged and stated various acts to show that defendant evaded performing his agreement, and, in order to extinguish plaintiff's claims on the lands, aided C. to evict the interest in them on a previous promise of a new lease, and prayed a specific performance of the agreements, and that the new lease might be decreed liable to plaintiff's demand, and charged with the annuity; and also that if defendant could not fully perform the agreements, by reason of the incumbrances on B. then that he might do so as far as possible, and indemnify plaintiff against incumbrances; and for a reference or issue to ascertain plaintiff's loss, by the inability of defendant to perform his agreement fully; and that defendant should pay the amount. Defendant demurred to the relief and discovery, assigning as causes that part of the discovery sought was immaterial, being in relation to the new lease, as to which plaintiff had no title to relief; and that as the bill prayed specific performance, plaintiff could not seek part performance with indemnity and compensation: Held, that the demurrer in relation to the relief, seeking that the new lease might be liable, could not be sustained, and that the interrogatories being in part material, the plaintiff was entitled to the discovery that the demurrer, so far as related to the relief of part performance with indemnity and compensation, would, if so confined, be good; but the demurrer being bad as to the former part was bad altogether. Southwell v. Daly, 9 Ir. E. R. 7.

And see VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 5.

STAYING PROCEEDINGS.

See PRACTICE, 7.

TENANT FOR LIFE AND REMAINDER-MAN.-1. Fines on renewal of leases for lives and years-Apportionment.—On a devise of successive interests in leases for lives or years, where the testator directs that the leases are from time to time to be renewed without more, the fines and expenses of renewal are to be borne by the tenant for life and remainder-man, or parties sucessively entitled, in proportion to their actual enjoyment of the estate, and not in propor

tion to an extent of enjoyment to be determined speculatively, or by a calculation of probabilities. There is no difference in the rule as to the apportionment of fines for renewal between the devisees of successive interests in the estate, whether the leases are for lives or for years. If the testator provides a specific fund for the renewals, or directs that the renewals shall be raised or borne by the parties in a certain manner, or in certain proportions, such direction supersedes the general rule; but if trustees, having power to direct the manner in which the fines shall be raised, do not exercise the power, the court will pursue the general rule, which would be adopted in the absence of any direction as to the manner of providing for the fines. Whether there is any difference in the rule of apportionment in cases where the parties take successive interests under wills, and in cases where such interests are taken under settlements by deed, quære. Whether trustees, having power to raise the fines out of the rents and profits, or by mortgage or otherwise, as they should think fit, might so act as to throw the burden on the parties in proportions different from those in which it would be distributed by the general rule of the court, quære. Jones v. Jones, 5 H. 440.

2. Same. Where the tenant for life pays the whole fine on renewal, he will have a lien on the estate for the proportion, which shall ultimately appear to be chargeable on the remainder-man, or parties entitled in succession; and where the remainder-man renews, or the renewal is effected by means of a mortgage of the estate, the tenant for life may be required to give security to the remainder-man for a proportionate part of the fine calculated upon the assumed duration of the life interest; and if that interest should endure longer than such assumed period, he may be required to give further security, without prejudice in either case to the actual amount which, at the determination of his interest, shall appear to be his due proportion of the fine. S. C. ib.

TENANTS IN COMMON. See WILL, 9.

TITHES.-Receiver.-The court would not, at the instance of a lay impropriator, appoint a receiver for payment of the rent-charge upon an affidavit merely stating that he was the lay impropriator of the parish, where it appeared that his title to the tithes had been and still were contested by the parishioners, and the only payment he had obtained out of the lands of the respondent was by the hands of a receiver of the court appointed in the suit of a third person. Greville v. Fleming, 2 J. & L. 335.

TITLE. See TRUSTEES, 1. VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 1.

TRUSTEES.-1. Appointment of new trustees-Power-Vendor and purchaser-Title.-Testator devised his real estates to A., B., C. and D., and their heirs, on certain trusts, which required the legal estate to be vested in them, and gave a power of sale to them or the survivors or survivor of them, or the heirs of the survivor, and declared that their or his receipts or receipt should be a good discharge to the purchaser; and if any of them should die or decline

to act, that it should be lawful, and he thereby willed and directed, that the survivors of them should immediately, or within two months afterwards, by any deed nominate some fit person to be a trustee in his place. D. died; and A. and B. by one deed, and C. by another (both of which were executed more than two lunar months, but not less than two calendar months after D.'s death), nominated a new trustee, but did not convey the legal estate to him. A., B., C., and the new trustee, agreed to sell the estates to M., who objected to complete his purchase; first, because the appointment of the new trustee had not been made within two lunar months; secondly, because it had not been made by one single deed; and, lastly, because the power of sale was suspended during the vacancy in the trust. The court overruled the objections, but held that the new trustee had not been duly appointed, because no conveyance had been executed to him; notwithstanding which, that A., B. and C., could make a good title, and give an effectual discharge for the purchase-money. The court held also that the new trustee, though not duly appointed, might join with A., B. and C., in a suit for a specific performance. Warburton v. Sandys, 14 S. 622.

2. Appointment of new trustees-Power.-The court, in decreeing the appointment of new trustees, will not direct a power to be inserted in the deed for appointing new trustees toties-quoties. Borles v. Weeks, 14 S. 591.

3. Costs.If a trustee has not misconducted himself, even though the court punish him as by making him pay interest on funds in his hands, yet he shall get the costs of the suit; but if his account be greatly reduced in the office, he shall not get the costs of passing it. Fosier v. Andrews, 2 J. & L. 199.

4. Same.-A. assigned leaseholds to B., in consideration of 4001. stated to have been paid to him by B. On the next day B. executed a deed, declaring himself to be a trustee of the leaseholds for A.'s wife. The deeds were afterwards declared to be fraudulent and void as against A.'s creditors; and the court refused to give B. his costs, because the declaration of trust recited, falsely, that the 400l. was the separate property of A.'s wife, and that B. had received it from her, and B. had signed a receipt for it. Turquand v. Knight, 14 S. 643.

5. Husband and wife-Separate use. - A money fund belonging to the wife was vested in trustees, upon trust to pay the interest to the husband for his life, or until he should take the benefit of any act for the relief of insolvent debtors; and after his decease, or obtaining the benefit of such act, upon trust to pay the interest to the wife for her life, the same to be paid to her, in case of the insolvency of the husband, to her separate use, and after her decease, in trust for the issue. The trustees, at the instance of the wife, committed a breach of trust, by lending part of the trust funds to the husband, who afterwards was discharged as an insolvent. Upon a bill by the wife and her children to make the trustees answerable for the breach of trust, held that the contingent interest of the wife for her separate use was not

bound to make good to the trustees the money advanced by them at her request. Quære, whether her life interest after the decease of her husband was so bound. Semble, that if the discharge of the husband as an insolvent had been concerted with the privity of the wife, in order thereby to entitle her to a present interest in the trust funds, and defeat the equity of the trustees against her husband, the trustees would be entitled to the same relief against her as against the husband. Mara v. Manning, 2 J. & L. 311.

And see LIMITATIONS, 3. WILL, 10.

UNITARIANS. See CHARITY, 1.

USURY.-Annuity.-Quære, whether a grant of an annuity for a term of years, which annuity in the course of time will repay the principal money and more than the legal interest, is or is not usurious. Kinny v. Lynch, 2 J. & L. 319.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER. - 1. Bad title · Decree.The lands of M., part of the manor of C., were conveyed in 1823 to A. and his heirs, "saving and excepting thereout the manorial rights belonging to the manor of C., and the tolls and duties of the fairs and markets thereof, and also any liberty of turbary or limestone heretofore granted therein or thereout by B or his ancestors to any of the tenants of the said manor, as expressed in their leases respectively." There was no limestone or turbary on the lands of M., nor had any manorial rights been exercised for more than twenty years, nor any fair or markets held. In 1845 the lands of M. were set up and sold, as held by a clear indefeasible title in fee-simple. Upon objection to the title, the master in chancery reported the title as bad: Held, upon exceptions to the report, that under the circumstances the saving in the deed did not form any ground for the report of bad title. Martin v. Cotter, 9 Ir. E. R. 44.

2. Purchase-money.-A lessee assigned the demised premises to A. by way of mortgage, and afterwards made two equitable mortgages of them, one to B. and the other to C., and died. C. agreed to purchase the lease of his executors free from incumbrances, and afterwards took possession of the premises, but did not pay the purchase-money: Held, that as between C. and the executors, the purchase-money must be considered to have been applied on the day on which C. took possession, towards satisfaction of the incumbrances, according to their priorities. Greenwood v. Taylor, 14 S.

505.

3. Purchase without notice.—A purchase for a valuable consideration, without notice, is a defence as well against a legal as an equitable title. Joyce v. De Moleyns, 2 J. & L. 374.

4. Rental for sale- Discharge. In a rental under which lands were sold, a part was thus described: "Term for which demised: under an article of agreement for lease for four lives, bearing date 1804, and one year." The sale took place in January, 1845, and on the 9th of April the purchaser's solicitor received a copy of the article, and then first discovered that the agreement was for a lease, to commence