Opinion of the Court power to alienate it during his life; that the covenant of seisin in his deed estopped him and his heirs from asserting title to the premises against the grantee; and that the disability, if any, which had rested upon him against disposing of the fee was removed by the proclamation of pardon and amnesty of December 25, 1868, and he stood, with reference to that estate, precisely as though no confiscation proceedings had ever been had. "The amnesty and pardon, in removing the disability, if any, resting upon him, respecting that estate, enlarged his estate, the benefit of which enured equally to his grantee." Upon the whole, we think the doctrine was too broadly stated in Wallach v. Van Riswick, that the effect of the confiscation was to divest the owner of every vestige of proprietary right over the property, and that the sounder view is that intimated in Illinois Central Railroad v. Bosworth, and Jenkins v. Collard, that the estate forfeited is the life estate of the offender, and that the fee remains in him, but without the power of alienating it during his life, unless the disability be removed. The theory of the common law, that the fee can never be in abeyance, but must reside somewhere, though seemingly somewhat fanciful, is founded upon a consideration of good sense, that there shall always be some one in existence to represent it in actions brought for its recovery, and to protect the interest of the heirs. In treating of this subject, Mr. Fearne, in his work on Contingent Remainders, vol. 2, sec. 60, book I. c. 3, § 1, observes, "that if a person limits a freehold interest in the land, by way of use or devise, which he may do, though he could not do so at the common law, to commence in futuro, without making any disposition of the intermediate legal seisin, the legal seisin, property or ownership, except such part thereof, if any, as is comprised within a prior disposition of a vested interest, of course remains in the grantor and his heirs, or the heirs at law of the testator, until the arrival of the period, when according to the terms of the future limitation, it is appointed to reside in the person to whom such interest in futuro is limited." That the fee is not forfeited by the confiscation is also the logical deduction from the ruling in Shields v. Schiff, 124 U. S. 351, that the heirs Opinion of the Court. take by descent from the offender and not by donation from the government, inasmuch as, if there be no vestige of the estate left in the ancestor, it would be impossible for them to take by descent from him. This, too, disposes of the theory that the fee resides in the United States in trust for the heirs. A necessary inference from the position assumed by the claimants, that neither Dunnington nor his heirs retained any interest in the forfeited estate, nor any right to intervene in these proceedings, is, that the government can obtain no title by condemnation to confiscated property during the life of the offender; that it can only condemn his life estate in the hands of the purchaser; and that, upon the termination of such estate, the heirs can recover the property, or at least compel the government to institute new proceedings for its condemnation. Such a construction would be intolerable. The march of public improvement cannot thus be stayed by uncertainties, complications or disputes regarding the title to property sought to be condemned; and the language of section 8 of the act of May 8, 1872, requiring the appraisement to be made of the several interests of each and every owner of the real estate, evidently contemplated an investiture of the entire title and of the interest of every owner, present and prospective, in the United States. We are, therefore, of opinion that the condemnation in this case operated upon the fee as well as upon the life estate, and as the presumption is, that due and legal notice was given of the proceedings, the appraisement was valid and binding upon Dunnington and his heirs. Assuming that, after the confiscation proceedings, he held only the naked fee without the power of alienation, the amnesty and pardon proclamation of the President of December 25, 1868, before the proceedings to condemn, removed his disability in this particular, and restored to him the right to make such use of the remainder as he saw fit. 2. A further question remains to be considered with regard to the proceedings taken after the payment of the money into court. It is insisted by the claimants that it was the duty of the United States, as plaintiffs in the condemnation proceedings, to take proper steps for the payment of the sum fixed by Opinion of the Court. the appraisers to the persons entitled thereto, by apportioning the sum between the tenants of the life estate and the heirs of Dunnington, or by the investment of the entire amount in interest bearing securities, for the benefit of the tenants of the life estate, until its termination, and for the ultimate delivery of the same to the heirs. It is a necessary deduction from our conclusion upon the other branch of the case that the appraised value of the property represents the whole fee, and the interests, both present and prospective, of every person concerned in the property, and such are the authorities. Tide Water Canal Co. v. Archer, 9 G. & Johns. 479, 525; Ross v. Adams, 4 Dutcher, (28 N. J. Law,) 160. The money, when deposited, becomes in law the property of the party entitled to it, and subject to the disposal of the court. In re New York Central &c. Railroad, 60 N. Y. 116; South Park Commissioners v. Todd, 112 Illinois, 379. It is evident that the gist of the petitioners' complaint in this connection lies in the order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia of April 3, 1873, directing the payment of the entire appraised value of the lot to the heirs of Martin King, the vendee of Shepherd, who had purchased the life estate of Dunnington under the confiscation proceedings. Neither Dunnington, who was still living, nor his heirs, the present claimants, appear to have intervened in the condemnation proceedings, or to have raised a question as to the propriety of this payment. The proceedings, however, appear to have been carried on in strict conformity with the act, which required the Secretary of the Interior, in case he should be unable to purchase at private sale, to apply to the court for an appraisement, and in case the owner neglected to demand of him the appraised value within fifteen days, to pay the same into court, subject to being paid out to the persons entitled to it. Assuming that the payment of the entire amount to the heirs of King was a mistake, it is difficult to see how the United States can be held responsible for it. The courts of the United States are in no sense agencies of the Federal government, nor is the latter liable for their errors or mistakes; they are independent tribunals, created and sup Opinion of the Court. ported, it is true, by the United States; but the government stands before them in no other position than that of an ordinary litigant. If the Federal government should proceed in a state court to condemn a piece of land for a public building, under a similar statute, and should pay the appraised value into court, and the court should award the money to the wrong party, it could not be seriously claimed that the government should pay it a second time. So, if a railway company should proceed to condemn land in this city for the purposes of a station, it would be completely exonerated from all further obligation by the payment of the appraised value to the depositary designated by the law under which the proceedings were taken. What was the United States to do after the deposit was made, to protect itself? It had discharged its entire liability by the payment into court, and was not entitled to notice even of the order for the distribution of the money. If the Attorney General had appeared, it might have been charged that he was a mere interloper, and that only the owners of the land were interested in the distribution of its proceeds. We are not without authority upon this subject. In a well-considered case in New Jersey, Crane v. City of Elizabeth, 36 N. J. Eq. (9 Stewart) 339, 343, it was held that the compensation fixed for the taking of certain land for streets was to include the value of all the interests, and was to be paid to the owner of the land if no other claimant intervened; and that, if in any case such owner ought not to receive the whole, timely resort must be had to the court of chancery, which would see to the equitable distribution of the fund. "The price to be paid," said the court, "by the city is to be the full value of all rights which may be impaired for the public benefit, and this is to be ascertained only after notice, not specially to individuals who alone may appear to guard their claims, but generally by the publicity which attends the doings of the council, and by newspaper advertisement, which will reach all alike, and under which all may be protected. The action of the city authorities has thus the distinctive quality of a proceeding in rem, a taking, not of the rights of designated persons in the thing needed, Opinion of the Court. but of the thing itself, with a general monition to all persons having claims in the thing. When, by the appraisement of the commissioners, the price of the thing is fixed, that price stands in place of the thing appropriated, and represents all interests acquired. But if, in any special case, this owner ought not, in equity, to receive the fund, the Court of Chancery will, at the instance of any interested complainant, take charge of its proper distribution, and so secure those particular equities which the generality of the statute has left without express protection." In the case of Heirs of John Van Vorst, 1 Green Ch. (2 N. J. Eq.) 292, it was held that when the amount to be paid by a railroad company for land taken, was directed by the statute to be paid into court for the use of the owner or owners, no notice to the company was necessary, of an application by the owners for an order upon the clerk to pay over the money so deposited. A like ruling was made in Haswell v. Vermont Central Railway, 23 Vermont, 228, wherein the court observed that the purpose of the statute was to give railroad companies a certain and expeditious mode of relieving themselves from any further responsibility in the matter, by depositing the money according to the order of the chancellor; and that the railroad company, though cited by the claimant, was not bound to appear, and that, having no interest in the matter, it had no right to appeal the case. See also Railroad Company v. Prussing, 96 Illinois, 203; Columbia &c. Bridge Co. v. Geise, 34 N. J. Eq. 268; and Cherokee Nation v. Kansas Railway, 135 U. S. 641. We think the United States discharged its entire duty to the owners of this property by the payment of the amount awarded by the commissioners into court, and that, if there were any error in the distribution of the same, it is not chargeable to the government. We do not wish to be understood as holding that there was necessarily an error in paying the money to the heirs of King. That question is not before us for consideration, and we are not called upon to express an opinion with regard to it. The case is doubtless a hardship for the claimants, but it would be a still greater hardship if the government, without VOL. CXLVI-23 |