In each of these cases defendant in error sued plaintiff in error under the
Interstate Commerce act, to recover alleged overcharges on the trans-
portation of corn and recovered judgment, to each of which judgments
the defendant below sued out a writ of error to the Circuit Court of
Appeals. The cases being heard there the judgment in each was
reversed, upon
the ground that the jury should have been instructed to
find a verdict for the defendant, and the cases were remanded for further
proceedings in accordance therewith. On petitions for writs of cer-
tiorari to the Court of Appeals to bring up the records and proceedings,
held, that the petitions should be denied. Chicago & Northwestern
Railway Co. v. Osborne, 354.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 3, 4, 5, 6.
See ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD ;
RIPARIAN Owner, 2, 3.
CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
For the purpose of determining the amount of compensation to be paid to
a marshal of the United States for attending Circuit and District
Courts, under Rev. Stat. § 829, Held, that the court is "in session"
only when it is open by its order, for the transaction of business, and
that if it be closed by its own order for an entire day, or for any given
number of days, it is not then in session, although the current term
may not have expired. McMullen v. United States, 360.
See JURISDICTION, C.
CITIZENSHIP.
See JURISDICTION, C, 2, 3, 4.
CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
COMMON CARRIER.
See COURT AND JURY, 1.
CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS.
See CONFISCATION, 3, 4, 5.
1. The estate forfeited by proceedings to judgment under the confiscation
act of July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. 589, c. 195, and the joint resolution of the
same date, 12 Stat. 627, is the life estate of the offender; the fee
remaining in him after the confiscation, but without power of aliena-
tion until his disability is removed. United States v. Dunnington, 338.
2. The conflicting cases on the subject of proceedings under that act
reviewed, and Illinois Central Railroad v. Bosworth, 133 U. S. 92, and
Jenkins v. Collard, 145 U. S. 546, followed.
3. A judicial condemnation, for the use of the United States, of land in
Washington which had been so confiscated and sold, made during the
lifetime of the offender from whom it had been taken under the con-
fiscation act, is held to operate upon the fee as well as upon the life
estate, assuming that due and legal notice of the proceedings for the
condemnation were given. Ib.
4. The appraised value of the property in such proceedings for condemna-
tion represents the whole fee, and the interests, both present and pro-
spective, of every person concerned in it. lb.
5. By the payment into court of the amount of the appraised value of the
property so condemned, the United States was discharged from its
whole liability, and was not even entitled to notice of the order for
the distribution of the money. lb.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
See STATUTE, D, 2.
1. The validity of a state law providing for the appointment of electors
of President and Vice-President having been drawn in question before
the highest tribunal of a State, as repugnant to the laws and Consti-
tution of the United States, and that court having decided in favor
of its validity, this court has jurisdiction to review the judgment under
Rev. Stat. § 709. McPherson v. Blacker, 1.
2. Under the second clause of Article II of the Constitution, the legis-
latures of the several States have exclusive power to direct the man-
ner in which the electors of President and Vice-President shall be
appointed. Ib.
3. Such appointment may be made by the legislatures directly, or by
popular vote in districts, or by general ticket, as may be provided by
the legislature. 1b.
4. If the terms of the clause left the question of power in doubt, con-
temporaneous and continuous subsequent practical construction has
determined the question as above stated. Ib.
5. The second clause of Article II of the Constitution was not amended
by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and they do not limit
the power of appointment to the particular manner pursued at the
time of the adoption of these amendments, or secure to every male
inhabitant of a State, being a citizen of the United States, the right
from the time of his majority to vote for presidential electors. Ib.
6. A state law fixing a date for the meeting of electors, differing from
that prescribed by the act of Congress, is not thereby wholly invali-
dated; but the date may be rejected and the law stand. Ib.
7. The provision in Sec. 10 of Art. I, of the Constitution of the United States
that "no State shall" "pass any" "law impairing the obligation of
contracts," does not forbid a State from legislating, within its discre-
tion, to reduce the rate of interest upon judgments previously obtained
in its courts; as the judgment creditor has no contract whatever in
that respect with the judgment debtor, and as the former's right to
receive, and the latter's obligation to pay exists only as to such
an amount of interest as the State chooses to prescribe as a penalty
or liquidated, damages for the nonpayment of the judgment. Morley
v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co., 162.
8. A state statute reducing the rate of interest upon all judgments ob-
tained within the courts of the State does not, when applied to one
obtained previous to its passage, deprive the judgment creditor of his
property without due process of law, in violation of the provisions of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.
9. The provision in section 2486 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio, author-
izing cities and villages in that State to erect gas-works at the expense
of the municipality, or to purchase any gas-works therein, do not
infringe the contract clause of the Constitution of the United States
when exercised by a municipality, within which a gas company has
been authorized, under the provisions of the acts of May 1, 1852, and
March 11, 1853, to lay down pipes and mains in the public streets
and alleys and to supply the inhabitants with gas, and has exercised
that power; and with which the municipal authorities have contracted,
by contracts which have expired by their own limitation, to supply
the public streets, lanes and alleys of the municipality with gas.
Hamilton Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Hamilton City, 258.
10. A municipal ordinance not passed under legislative authority, is not
a law of the State within the meaning of the constitutional prohibi-
tion against state laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Ib.
11. The general rule that a valid grant to a corporation, by a statute of
a State, of the right of exemption from state taxation, given without
reservation of the right of appeal, is a contract between the State and
the corporation, protected by the Constitution of the United States
against state legislative impairment, is not qualified by Henderson
Bridge Co. v. Henderson City, 141 U. S. 679; nor by St. Paul, Minne-
apolis &c. Railway v. Todd County, 142 U. S. 282. Wilmington &
Weldon Railroad Co. v. Alsbrook, 279.
12. A state statute, conferring upon one charged with crime the right
to waive a trial by jury and to elect to be tried by the court, and
conferring power upon the court to try the accused in such case, is
not in conflict with the Constitution of the United States. Hallinger
v. Davis, 314.
13. When a prisoner, charged with the crime of murder committed in a
State, pleads guilty, the proper court of the State may, if its laws
permit, proceed to inquire on evidence, without the intervention of a
jury, in what degree of murder the accused is guilty, and may find
him to be guilty of murder in the first degree, and may thereupon
sentence him to death, without thereby violating the provision in the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States that
no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty or property without
due process of law." Ib.
14. The Constitution permits a State to cede to the United States jurisdic-
tion over a portion of its territory. Benson v. United States, 325.
15. An allegation—in a petition to a state court for a writ of prohibition
to restrain State Harbor Commissioners from extending or locating
harbor lines over wharves erected by and belonging to the petitioner -
that the petitioner is and for thirty years past has been the owner of
the wharf and of the uplands abutting on the shore upon which the
wharf was constructed, does not set up or claim a title, right, privilege
or immunity under the Constitution, or a statute of, or authority exer-
cised under the United States, so as to give jurisdiction to this court
to review the judgment of the highest court of the State denying the
writ. Yesler v. Washington Harbor Line Commissioners, 646.
16. Such a judgment does not deprive the owner of the wharf of his prop-
erty without due process of law; nor is it in conflict with the provisions
of the act of September 19, 1890, (26 Stat. 426, 454, c. 907,) concern-
ing the construction of wharves, etc., in navigable waters of the United
States where no harbor lines are established. Ib.
17. If a judgment for a fixed sum of money, recovered in one State by a
creditor of a corporation against one of its officers upon a liability for
all its debts, imposed by a statute of that State for making and record-
ing a false certificate of the amount of its capital stock, is sued on in a
court of another State, and that court declines to enforce it, because of
its opinion that such liability was a penalty, the judgment is thereby
denied the full faith, credit and effect to which it is entitled under the
Constitution and laws of the United States.
See ALABAMA CLAIMS;
CONTRACT, 4;
JURISDICTION, B, 17, 18; C, 4;
Huntington v. Attrill, 657.
STATUTE, D, 1, 3, 4;
TAXATION, 1, 3.
1. By a contract in writing V. agreed to make for B. certain cotton-seed
oil-mill machinery, at a fixed price. It was made and shipped to B.
and not paid for. B. put it into use and afterwards executed to L. a
mortgage covering it. V. then brought a suit in detinue against C., a
bailee of L., for the property. L. was made a codefendant. After the
mortgage was given, B. executed to V. notes for what was due to V.
for the purchase money of the machinery, which stated that the express
condition of the delivery of the machinery was that the title to it did
not pass from V. until the purchase money was paid in full. Held,
that the terms of the written contract could not be varied by parol
evidence. Van Winkle v. Crowell, 42.
2. The condition of the title to the machinery at and before the giving of
the mortgage was a conclusion of law to be drawn from the undisputed
facts of the case. Ib.
3. It was proper to direct the jury to find for the defendant. Ib.
4. There can be no irrepealable contract in a conveyance of property by a
grantor in disregard of a public trust, under which he was bound to
hold and manage it. Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 387.
See ADMIRALTY;
CORPORATION, 4;
1. A Massachusetts corporation brought a suit in equity in the Circuit
Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York,
against a citizen of New York, founded on a judgment obtained by it
in a state court of Connecticut, and an execution issued there, and
returned unsatisfied, against a Connecticut corporation, to compel the
defendant to pay what he owed on his subscription to shares of stock
in the Connecticut corporation, and have it applied towards paying the
debts of that corporation, including one due to the plaintiff. Held,
that the bill was defective in not alleging any judgment in New York
against the corporation, or any effort to obtain one, or that it was
impossible to obtain one. National Tube Works Co. v. Ballou, 517.
2. Any arrangement by which directors of a corporation become interested
adversely to the corporation in contracts with it, or organize or take
stock in companies or associations for the purpose of entering into con-
tracts with the corporation, or become parties to any undertaking to
secure to themselves a share in the profits of any transactions to which
the corporation is a party, is looked upon with suspicion. McGourkey
v. Toledo & Ohio Central Railway, 536.
3. On all the facts in this case, as detailed in the opinion of the court, held ;
(1) That the contracts with the trustee for the holders of the car-trust
certificates was voidable at the election of the corporation; (2) That
it was in law a purchase by the railway of the rolling stock in ques-
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