J to the horrors of hunger and cold; they reverted to a state of nature, and had the right of erecting fuch form of government as they pleafed. They were naturally led to copy as nearly as difference of fituation and manners would admit, the institutions of the country from whence they originated. A governor, council, and reprefentatives, bear fome refemblance to the king, lords, and commons of the English parliament. As they acknowledged allegiance to the British crown, no perfon could claim the pre-eminence of royalty. As none of the nobility had any inducement to exchange the luxuries of a cultivated country, for the enjoyment of religious, liberty in a wilderness; there were none to claim the privileges of noble blood. Equal in point of rank, they were naturally led to fill every department with members elected from themselves. By this accident, it was referved för America to give the laft improvement to the form of government, by introducing the election of every branch from the body of the people. The governor, council, and representatives, raifed to office by the faffrages of their equals, were vefted with the fupreme power of the ftate: acknowledging the authority of the British crown, they prefented thefe free conftitutions to the king, to be fecured by the fanction of a royal charter. Their resemblance to the English conftitution, and the contempt and indifference with which the little republics of America were beheld in England, induced the king to grant them charters, containing fuch extenfive rights and privileges, as enabled them to refift the tyranny of his fucceffors, and effect a revolution, which has fixed a new era in the hiftory of government, and policy. The act of independence paffed by Congress on the ever memorable 4th of July, 1776, diffolved the political connexion between this country, and Great-Britain, and furnished the people with an opportunity of reaping the full advantages that naturally flow from the fpirit and freedom of their governments. As foon as peace had healed the wounds of the country, bleeding from an eight years ftruggle in the acquifition of fovereignty, and given the ple an opportunity to reflect upon their fituation, the fruits of their fuperior knowledge in the fcience of policy became confpicuous. Convinced of the infufficiency of the confederation, to render them a rich, a happy, and refpectable nation, they exhibited to the world E 2 peo an unparalleled example of public fpirit, in adopting the prefent conftitution of the United States. In this conftitution the principles already difcovered in America, are difplayed in their full extent and meridian fplendor. We here behold all the ingredients, that conftitute a good government. The balance of power maintained by three branches of the legiflature. A feparation of the legislative, executive and judicative powers, fo as to operate as checks upon each other. A qualified negative on the legislature vested in the executive, fufficient to guard against any encroachment. Every branch of the legislature, and the fupreme executive magiftrate, ultimately elected by the people. The judiciary rendered independent. The reprefentatives fufficiently numerous, and the empire properly districted, fo as to give them an opportunity to be well acquainted with the intereft of every part of the community. Their elections fufficiently frequent to give their conftituents an effectual restraint upon them. The people are poffeffed of all the power, that can fafely be lodged in their hands. The republics of Athens and Rome, have demonftrated the danger of trafting the fupreme power in large popular aflemblies. The rights of electing the legislature and the fupreme executive, may fafely be vefted in them in their collective capacity, and this will be an eternal barrier to defpotifin. In a country where the three ranks of a king, an hereditary nobility, and the people, were distinguished, as in England, and the object was to fecure them all in their different rights, the English conftitution was the best that hunan wisdom could devife in a country, like America, where there is no diftinction of ranks, the prefent conftitution is the beft that could be adopted. The great fuperiority of this conftitution to the British, arifes from the circumftance that tho the fipreme executive magiftrate and fenate are elective, yet their mode of election is fo contrived, as to afford far more fecurity and fability than refult from the enfigns and trappings of hereditary royalty and nobility. An hereditary monarchy is certainly preferable to an elective, because it prevents difputes about the fucceffion. This conftitution appoints 1 fpeak of the general principles of the conflitution. I do not mean to approve of the inequality of reprefentation, and the test and corporation acts. Thole difgraceful reliques of an intolerant fpirits appoints a fucceffor to the prefident, in cafe of a demife in office, fo that there never can be an interregnum, nor a difputed fucceffion. In the fupreme executive and the fenate, there is no danger that the right of birth will place in thofe offices perfons who have nothing to boast of, but the merit and glory of their ancestors. In a country where the laws and the manners admit of but one order of citizens, and where the people inftead of meeting in a bo dy are governed by reprefentation, there may be a question ref pecting the propriety and the neceffity of a fenate in the legislature. As the conftitution is framed for a number of confederated states, there is a peculiar propriety in a fenate, for the purpose of maintaining the independence, and dignity of the feveral states. But in all countries where there is no distinction of ranks, feveral reasons will forever exift, that will justify the establishment of a fenate, for one branch of the legislature. k In every age and nation, the natural inequality of mankind, arifing from fuperiority of ability and virtue, has laid the foundation of a natural aristocracy. In a legislature compofed of a fingle branch, the perfonal influence attendant on genius, merit, and learning, might enable the poffeffors to form combinations, and execute plans, dangerous to the liberties of the people. Remove them to a fenate, (and fuch will be the characters of which fenates will always be compofed) and they lofe the opportunity of inflaming popular affemblies, by the fplendor of eloquence, and of perfuading them by the arts of intrigue, to adopt rash and ruinous meafurcs. This promotion will inhance their perfonal dignity, and leffen their popular influence. A feat in the fenate, is a proper reward for the fervices of thofe perfons who are by nature endowed with talents and difpofitions to do good to mankind. Such an object may divert the ardent purfuits of ambition, from schemes less praife worthy and honorable.-But there is another reafon far more weighty and important. In every legiflature, there is a perpetual propensity to enact too many laws, to attempt to regulate mankind, refpecting matters that ought to be left to their own operation; different branches, will leflen the facility of making laws, and check the rage of legiflation Adams's defence of American Conflitution. lation fo injurious to the community. A fudden whim or popu lar clamor, may impel one branch to enact impolitic laws, which the other not being under the fame influence, will reject. In two branches, where each have the power of originating, canvasling, and paffing the acts, there will be much more deliberation, coolnefs, and caution, than in a single body. Each branch, will watch with a narrow eye the conduct of the other, and will examine ev. ery bill with the utmost care, and criticife it with the utmost ferupolofity they will in this manner difcover defects, point out inconveniences, and fuggeft amendments, that would pats unnoticed, in the hafty deliberation of a fingle body. Tho the government be by reprefentation, which avoids many of the inconveniences of a democracy, yet if the reprefentatives fhould be as numerous as pub. lic fafety may require, it is poffible that on fome occafions, they may be impreffed by popular impulfe and clamor, and be led to all the exceffes of democratic violence, or if the reprefentation be fo finall as to avoid that danger, then they may run into the oppofite extreme of ariftocracy. But where there is a fenate, they will be able to controul the fpirit of popular caprice, while the reprefentatives will counteract any ariftocratic influence in the fenate. If all the members of a legature are liable to frequent chan. ges, they will never have that firmnefs, energy, and experience, which are neceffary for the public fecurity. If all the members of the legislature, are permitted to continue in office for any long period, there is a probability of their being under a temptation, to encroach upon the rights of the people. To guard against these inconveniences, there ought to be two branches in the legislature: let the houfe of reprefentatives be frequently elected, and the power of the people over them, will be fufficient to restrain them from any acts of oppreffion, and they will effectually check the fenate. Let the fenate be fecure in their feats for a confiderable time, and they will acquire fufficient firmness and energy, to counteract the rashnefs and imprudence of a houfe of reprefentatives, and defeat the clamor and violence of the people. Secure in their places, they will be able to fteer the fhip with a steady helm, through the moft boisterous ftorms, and wait till the return of a calm, for the approbation of their conduct. Many Many have indulged their fancies in attempting to discover a resemblance between the conftitution of the United States, and the British conflitution. They confider the prefident to answer to the king, the fesate to the lords, and the reprefentatives to the com mons. The house of reprefentatives being elected by the people, resembles the house of commons, but as the other branches are elective in this country, and hereditary in Great-Britain, the refemblance very remote, and the principles of the government widely differ ent. Our Government is original in its conftruction, and founded. on a new bafis. We have fteered clear of the inconveniences of monarchy, ariftocracy, and democracy. We have a established a reprefentative republic. We have imitated the British nation only in the adoption of the excellent principle of balancing the legisla. ture, by diftributing it into three branches. The principle upon which the government of the United States is founded, is the intereft and the happiness of the people. It is an appeal to their good fenfe, and it must depend for its fupport, upon a serious conviction of the neceffity of fubordination to government, for the security of their rights and privileges. It becomes therefore neceflary to communicate to the people, juft ideas refpecting their own interest and welfare, and to imprefs and inculcate upon their minds, thofe principles which are effèntial to the preservation of civil liberty and good government. A flight obfervation of human nature, will demonftrate that the remarks which Tacitus, and Voltaire have made refpecting the Romans, and the English, are applicable to all nations. That they can neither bear total fervitude, or total liberty. Another obfervation is equally evident, that man is extremely unwilling to fubmit to the exercise of authority over himself, but is very willing to exercife it over others. Kings are not the only perfons that are pleased with the exercise of fovereign power. The people in fome inftances have manifested a keen relish for this bufinefs. The populace of Rome during the period of the republic, appeared to glow with all the ambition of conqueft, and to be delighted in tyrannifing over all the nations of the world. They wished to be free / Nec totam fervitutem, nec totam libertatem pati poffunt. Et fit aimer fon joug a l'Anglois indompte, Henriade. Liv. |