and this, therefore, proves that these laws never will or can be violated." But the lifeless remains of these animals in the rocks show that their reasoning would have been as false as Hume's is, and that God did work a miracle to destroy them from the face of the earth. It is, therefore, nothing to the purpose to assert that a miracle is contrary to past experience. The only relevant question is, whether the evidence adduced in proof of the miracle, as a fact, be valid and sufficient or not? Neither is it true to affirm that "a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature," in any sense in which such a violation is regarded as impossible or inconceivable. For, as has been shown by Dr Brown, in his work on "Cause and Effect," a miracle is simply the introduction of a new cause, with new powers; and it cannot, therefore, be reduced to the rules suggested by a past experience, but its reality must be determined upon independent evidence of its For example, by the law of gravitation, all bodies left free fall necessarily to the earth; but by the will and power of man, aided by science, these bodies, such as a cannon ball, can be forced upwards in an opposite direction. This, however, is not a violation of a law of nature, but it is merely the introduction of a new force. If, then, man's will can produce such results, may not God's will produce greater? And why, in such a case, should our limited "experience" lead us to deny a fact?

own.

This has been well illustrated, in a recent work, with reference to that mysterious principle of life "which seems to have the power, during its continuance, of 'violating' all the laws of nature. By that principle, the chemical elements which enter into the composition of the oak are detached from their natural connections, as they are found in the air, the earth, and the waters; the chemical laws which held them in these connections are suspended; they enter, under the new principle of life, into new combinations, constituting now the component parts of a tree-the organic structure, the fibre, the bark, the branch, the leaf, the fruit, and they are held together, by that principle of life, with all the power needful to lift up the enormous mass from the earth, despite the law of gravitation, and to keep it steadfast against the influence of storms and tempests, century after century, until that principle of life shall lose its grasp, and become extinct; and then, not before, the chemical laws resume their power, and the old oak returns to gases and to earth, under the resumed operation of these laws. . . . All over the earth, therefore, on the land, in the waters, in the air, nothing is more common than that what are called the 'fixed and uniform laws of nature' are in fact suspended, 'violated,' held in check and abeyance, by this principle of life, where life is the only antecedent in the result. That a higher power than life-the Life itself, GOD-may not sus

pend them; that that higher Power may not suspend the laws which regulate life itself, or restore it, has not as yet been established by a firm and unalterable experience" (Barnes, "Evidences of Christianity," pp. 171, 172).

Second, as to the reliableness of human testimony in favour of miracles. Now, as to this, it must be admitted that some testimonies do deceive us; but then there is a kind of testimony which never deceives us, and the falsehood of which would imply as great a miracle as any recorded in the Bible. For example, as we shall endeavour to show in our next and concluding chapter, the testimony of the whole Jewish nation to the miracles of Moses, both at the time when they were wrought and in succeeding ages, cannot be reasonably accounted for, unless it was perfectly true. And so, the testimony of the apostles and others to the miracles of Christ, and the testimony of the primitive Church to the miracles of the first preachers of Christianity-miracles wrought publicly and repeatedly, appealed to as proofs of a Divine commission, and accredited by the losses and sufferings of those who performed and witnessed them-such testimony as this has a force and verisimilitude and conclusiveness which it is not easy to see how any fair reasoner can resist or gainsay. Those who bear testimony to these miracles could not be themselves deceived in plain matters of fact which they had seen with their eyes;

N

and neither could they have any conceivable motive to deceive others, as their proved integrity and personal sufferings amply demonstrate. Why, then, we ask, should such testimony, so truthlike and so consistent, be discredited or rejected, merely because the miracles which it attests were performed "in support of religion?" And yet Hume asserts that such testimony should be "rejected without further examination," merely because the miracles are the foundation of a system of religion, and because pretended miracles, or lying wonders, have been adduced in support of false religions, such as Popery. His argument just amounts to this: Some testimonies regarding religion deceive us; therefore all such testimonies deceive us, and none can be trustworthy. That is to say, because counterfeit money has sometimes been circulated, therefore we must reject all money as of the same stamp; whereas the counterfeit only proves the true. To assert that, because some testimonies are false, all must necessarily be so; or that, because some religions have been impostures, all must be the same, is equivalent to the monstrous assertion that because there is hypocrisy in the world, therefore there is no real virtue or integrity. Hume's argument is simply this : "Some men are liars, and therefore, all men are liars.” King David said this in his haste; but he never said it, as the infidel does, in his calm and deliberate judgment.

We have already said that Professor Powell not only adopted the fallacious argument of Hume, but even went far beyond him, in his opposition to miracles. Hume candidly admitted that human testimony might prove a miracle, if "the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish,”unless indeed it were wrought "in support of religion!" And he admitted further that he would believe a miracle if he had seen it with his own eyes, and had been able to satisfy himself, by personal examination, that no deception was practised. Professor Powell, however, made no such admissions; but, on the contrary, he asserted that no kind of testimony whatever can prove a miracle: and he declared that he would not believe in one, although it were wrought before his very eyes. His own words were, "Testimony, after all, is but a second-hand assurance; it is but a blind guide; testimony can avail nothing against The essential question of miracles stands quite apart from any consideration of testimony; the question would remain the same, if we had the evidence of our own senses to an alleged miracle" ("Essays and Reviews," p. 141). Such is the melancholy conclusion to which the so-called "reasoning" of modern infidelity is helplessly driven. This reductio ad absurdum is a suggestive commentary on the apostle's words, "Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools."

reason.