of them. The ground I take is that we are acting under these rules, because we have acted in obedience to the rules in suspending this fifty-third rule. Mr. CUSHING. I am indebted to my colleague for the suggestion that the gentleman from Cecil (Mr. Pugh) wants to eat his cake and have it. He has suspended the fifty-third rule and yet he wishes it to be operative. The forty-seventh rule is: "Rule 47. The rules of parliamentary practice shall govern the convention in all cases to which they are applicable, and in which they are not inconsistent with the standing rules and orders of the convention." The only rule in reference to amending a report upon the third reading which is inconsistent with the parliamentary practice is the fifty-third rule, which in the present case does not exist because it has been suspended in its operation. I hope and trust that the gentleman from Cecil having made the motion to suspend the rule in order that this question might be settled, the convention will settle it according to the parliamentary law, and will pass the report in exactly the form it was agreed upon on its second reading and admit no amendment whatever. Mr. STOCKBRidge. I rise to a question of order, that a point of order is not debatable. The PRESIDEnt. The chair can perunit the disc ssion to go on. Mr. CUSHING resumed: Therefore I say that the fifty-third rule being suspended no longer operates, and therefore the convention is thrown back upon the forty-seventh rule which confines us to parliamentary practice. Now, in parliamentary practice, I can only go to the highest authority in this country the house of congress-which do not allow a bill to be amended upon its third reading. We bave suspended the only rule which made our practice different from that of congress. We fall back upon the forty-seventh rule, which refers us back to parliamentary practice. I rise therefore to the point of order that the proposition being to amend upon the third reading, and the fifty-third rule being suspended, it is not in order. Mr. NEGLEY. I think the point taken by the gentleman from Baltimore city (Mr. Cushing) is perfectly clear. By what authority or power do you take up this report and amend it upon the third reading? Is it by general parliamentary law-by authority outside of our rules? No, sir. It is by the fifty-third rule. That is the only power in the rules of this house by which you can amend a report upon its third reading. There is no other rule or rules in this whole body of rules by which you can touch a report upon its third reading for the purpose of emendation. What have we done? We have suspended the very rule which gives us the power of emendation. Where is the power then? If we have it anywhere it is in the general parliamentary law. By the forty-seventh rule you are not only governed as a general principle by parliamentary law, but that rule expressly says that you shall fall back upon parliamentary law, and that parliamentary law is that you cannot amend a report upon its third reading. Mr. CHAMBERS. It seems to me that the ingenuity of the gentleman from Baltimore (Mr. Cushing) has had the effect to obfuscate this business. There are certain parliamentary rules, and where nothing is said upon a particular point legislative bodies choose to regulate themselves by those rules. That is a conventional affair. They may do so or they may not, as they please. With regard to this matter this body has made its selection. There are certain rules of parliamentary law, but we have adopted a different law. Mr. CUSHING. We have suspended it. We Mr. CHAMBERS. We have not done such a thing. We have not suspended the whole. The gentleman has talked himself into a fog, but I do not think he can talk us into it. What is the history of this particular parliamentary rule? We have said distinctly that we will not adopt it-we will adopt another rule. The parliamentary rule is that you cannot suspend a rule without a vote of two-thirds. We have no such rule. have repudiated that parliamentary rule. We have adopted another rule for our government, and we say, taking this rule and the rule for suspension together, that except in cases where we suspend this rule we will require a majority of the whole number of votes to pass an amendment. But we have repudiated the parliamentary rule. We have declared as perfectly and effectually as if it had been in words that we will not adopt the parliamentary rule of requiring two-thirds to suspend the rule. We have suspended the operation of one of these rules. To suspend it is not to destroy it or to remove it. merely say that as to this particular vote it shall be suspended. Then you bring it back to parliamentary rule, and what is the re sult? You have the parliamentary law hanging over you, and you have a suspended rule directly in opposition to it-two rules upon this subject-one in a state of suspense, and the other in the state of adoption. It seems to me that it is a very clear thing that the rule cannot be destroyed by a vote not mentioning it, relating to it, or referring to it. The parliamentary rule has no existence in this body in this case. When we adopted the other rule we virtually discarded it as fully as if we had said so in so many words. We Mr. DANIEL. It seems to me that the fortysecond rule will control this. It says: "All questions except those otherwise herein provided for, shall be determined by a majority of the members present." This is a question not otherwise provided for. We have allowed the majority of the members present, except in certain cases, to determine everything. That is the rule of all bodies of this sort. Besides, if we submit the constitution to the people, and if they ratfy it, I say it cures all that is behind it. vided for. The fifty-third rule is one of those of the majority of the members present to control the question. That is the judgment of the chair. The amendment is therefore in order. Mr. GREENE. I move to reconsider the vote by which the fifty-third rule was adopted; and if that motion prevails I shall immedi-ity, the forty-second rule puts it in the power ately move to strike out the provision that a majority of the members elected shall be necessary to amend a report upon its third read ing. I think that will obviate the difficulty. Mr. РUGH. I intended to suggest that that is in effect the motion I made; because at the time the object for which the rule was to be suspended was distinctly stated. The object was stated to be in relation to action upon this amendment. The PRESIDENT. The chair cannot entertain a motion while the point of order is pending. Mr. PUGH. We are acting under the rule which allows the convention to suspend any rule. which interferes with the action of the body. That is the object for which the fortyninth rule was adopted. That was the intention of the framers of that rule, undoubtedly, that three-fifths of the members assembled in this convention should determine that for the time being, in order to accomplish a certain stated purpose, a certain rule should not operate. They have so determined by one of their rules, just as binding as any other rule, and you must take the thing as a whole, for we are acting under the rules and in conformity with one of them. The convention have determined that for the time being, for a specific purpose stated, the fifty-third rule shall not operate. I submit this point that in conformity to the rules as a whole, this body have the right, by a vote of three-fifths of the members present, to suspend the rules for any purpose; and having determined to do that, I submit that there can be nothing in the rules to conflict with that action. Mr. SCHLEY. I move to amend the amendment so as to strike out "seventy-nine" and insert "eighty.' The PRESIDent The section was opened, under the fifty-third rule to the specific amendment indicated. Mr. SCHLEY. This is a part of the amendment, or the consequence of it. The PRESIDENT. The gentleman only moved to open the report to give Kent county two members instead of one. Mr. CUSHING demanded the yeas and nays on the amendment submitted by Mr. HOLLYDAY, and they were ordered. The question being taken, the result wasyeas 46, nays 19-as follows: Yeas-Messrs. Goldsborough, President; Belt, Billingsley, Blackiston, Bond, Briscoe, Carter, Chambers, Clarke, Daniel, Dellinger, Dent, Duvall, Earle, Ecker, Galloway, Greene, Hoffman, Hollyday, Hopkins, Hopper, Horsey, Kennard, King, Larsh, Lee, Markey, Miller, Mullikin, Nyman, Parker, Parran, Pugh, Purnell, Ridgely, Sands, Scott, Smith, of Carroll, Smith, of Worcester, Stirling, Swope, Sykes, Thomas, Todd, Turner, Wooden-46. Nays-Messrs. Abbott, Annan, Audoun, Baker, Barron, Cunningham, Cushing, Davis, of Washington, Farrow, Hebb, Keefer, Mayhugh, McComas, Murray, Negley, Russell, Schley, Stockbridge, Wickard-19. When their names were called, Mr. BELT said: I was in favor of the propo The PRESIDENT. The gentleman from Cecil (Mr. Pugh) has moved to suspend the fifty-sition supported by my colleague (Mr. Clarke,) third rule. That fifty-third rule requires that a motion to alter or amend a report upon its third reading should receive the sanction of the majority of the members elected to the convention, in order to prevail. After that rule has been suspended it throws us back upon the general principles of parliamentary law, if those general principles are not in conflict with any other standing rules of the house. If that general principle of parliamentary law is in conflict with any other standing rule of the house, of course the parliamentary law must give way to the rule adopted by the convention. who introduced into this house what I regard as the only true principle of representation, that you should place it upon the sound basis of population, and district the State, dividing it so that every man in it, every resident voter, should vote for one man. That not being adopted, the convention having decided to come down to a more arbitrary standard, my preference was to have the standard fixed as it is in the present constitution. Seeing that that will not be done, and that giving to Kent county one other member is an approach to it, I shall, simply on that theory vote for it, and upon no other ground. I have strong The convention has decided under the forty-objections to the proposition as at first ansecond rule that all questions without any limitation, shall be decided by a majority of the members present, except in the cases pro nounced, giving an addition to Kent that is not extended to Charles, St. Mary's, and other counties, but that is excluded from the ques tion; and as an approach to what I regard as right I vote for this proposition, "aye." Mr. HEBB said: The majority of this house having solemnly decided heretofore that this report should stand as it is, I feel bound to vote against all changes; and I vote "no." Mr. MAYHUGH said: I have not heard a single argument in favor of this amendment, and no argument can be adduced in favor of it; and I therefore must vote "no." Mr. NEGLEY said: As it would disturb the foundation upon which this whole apportionment is based, and violate it in one particular, and I do not see why you might not as well violate it in a thousand, I vote "no." Mr. SCHLEY said: I felt strongly tempted to vote for the proposition of the gentleman from Kent, but am restrained by two considerations; first, an unwillingness to violate the principle adopted here, and secondly, a desire to stand by the action of the majority as the report was agreed upon. I vote "no." The amendment was accordingly adopted. BALTIMORE COUNTY. Mr. HOFFMAN. I move to suspend the fiftythird rule for the purpose of making a motion to open the report of the committee for the purpose of amending it in reference to Baltimore county by adding one to her delegation, giving her "seven" delegates instead of "six." Mr. BRISCOE. I understand my proposition that I offered this morning to be pending. The PRESIDENT. But one proposition can be entertained at a time. sented in that by eight delegates. She chose, however, not to accept that apportionment which would give her eight delegates, and give to some other counties one more delegate; but she chose to adopt this principle, arbitrary rule-call it what you choosecutting down my county, Anne Arundel, one representative, and cutting down other counties in the State, and giving her six delegates. I say now let Baltimore county stand or fall upon that. What claim has she, according to the basis fixed in this report of her own adoption, for other counties, to another member? The basis of 5,000 for each delegate up to a population of 25,000 will give her five delegates. Then the principle or arbitrary rule which they saw fit to adopt, has cut them down, and has cut down Baltimore city. In order to prevent the too large delegation which would result in Baltimore city, they have chosen to say that the next 20,000 shall give her one more delegate. Then that will give her the sixth delegate, and will leave only 1,722 for the fraction over. For that fraction I do not think she has the least claim upon the principle or the rule to ask for another delegate. Mr. SANDS. Mr. President The PRESIDENT. The question of suspending the 53d rule is not debatable. Mr. RIDGELY demanded the yeas and nays, and they were ordered. The question being taken, the result wasyeas 35, nays 29-as follows: Yeas-Messrs. Goldsborough, President; Barron, Briscoe, Carter, Chambers, Cunning Mr. BRISCOE. I made the motion notwith-ham, Daniel, Earle, Ecker, Galloway, Greene, standing. The PRESIDENT. The gentleman was not in order if he did make the motion. Mr. CLARKE. Before voting upon the motion of the gentleman from Baltimore county, I should like to have some explanation upon what ground the proposition is based. We had from the gentleman from Kent (Mr. Hollyday) some reason for his proposition. Mr. RIDGELY. We have a population of 46,722, and under this apportionment we get but six delegates; while Carroll county, with a population of 22,525, gets five delegates. Our people are complaining very much about this apportionment. We think the rule works very unjustly to us; and that it has been arbitrarily fixed in this respect. We hope the convention will grant us this one; and we shall not then be represented according to population as fully as other counties. I hope the convention will grant us this one member, for the sake of the constitution; for the sake of satisfying our constituents. We want them to vote for this constitution, and to give a strong majority for it. Mr. MILLER. I hope that motion will not prevail. When the minority report of the committee on the basis of representation was before the body, Baltimore county was repre Hoffman, Hollyday, Hopkins, Hopper, Kennard, King, Larsh, McComas, Mullikin, Parker, Pugh, Purnell, Ridgely, Sands, Scott, Smith, of Carroll, Smith, of Worcester, Stirling, Stockbridge, Swope, Sykes, Thomas, Wickard, Wooden-35. Nays-Messrs. Abbott, Annan, Baker, Belt, Billingsley, Blackiston, Bond, Clarke, Cushing, Davis, of Washington, Dellinger, Dent, Duvall, Farrow, Hebb, Horsey, Keefer, Lee, Markey, Mayhugh, Miller, Murray, Negley, Nyman, Parran, Russell, Schley, Todd, Turner-29. When their names were called, Mr. CLARKE said: I have one word to say with reference to the vote I shall give upon this proposition. I voted in favor of the proposition to amend so as to give Kent county two delegates instead of one. It was with great hesitation that I was brought to vote for that amendment; and it was simply upon this ground: I was opposed, when the convention had adopted a basis of representation here, to departing one iota from the actual operation of the rule-for I will not call it a principle. I yielded only upon the assertion of the gentlemen that Kent county really had population enough to be entitled to two members. Now the proposition is to go further, and having adopted a principle, to tinker up the basis of representation just to suit localities, and make it popu ar here and there. If the gentleman from Baltimore county can in any way satisfy me that, under the rule adopted here, his county is entitled to this additional representative, I will vote to open the report. That is the only ground upon which I voted for the amendment giving a member to Kent county, that it was actually entitled, by its population, according to the rule, to have two members. I am not now satisfied of that, so far as regards Baltimore conty; and I therefore vote "no." Mr. DENT said: When I voted for the suspension of this same rule a short time ago, I did so under the impression that I was opening the matter to any amendment that might be offered, not supposing it was confined to the special amendment indicated by the gentleman from Kent. But since it pears that it is necessary to suspend in order to move any and every amendment that requires a special motion, I shall vote against any further suspension, unless it have a geneeral application to other amendments to be offered on the same subject. I vote "no." ap Mr. McCOMAS said: I voted "no" upon the last proposition, because I was opposed to any departure from the principle estab lished in the bill. I shall vote "aye" upon this, because the convention, by a large majority, has concluded to depart from the principle established. I do not see why Kent county should have two delegates for 7,000, and Baltimore county six delegates for 46,000. They are both agricultural districts, under the same circumstances. There may be justifiable grounds for discriminating between the city and the counties, but I see none for discriminating between counties. I vote "aye." Mr. RIDGELY. As one of the delegates from Baltimore county, I will say a word in reply to the question asked here by the gentleman from Anne Arundel (Mr. Miller,) why Baltimore county refused eight delegates upon the theory of representation suggested by the other side of the house, but went for a proposition which reduced the amount of her delegation, and now asks for an increase of her delegation. I have but a very short answer to make to that, and it is this: Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes. Now, sir, in relation to the remark of the gentleman from Prince George's (Mr.Clarke,) who suggested as a reason why he should discriminate and give an additional member to Kent county and refuse it to Baltimore county, that he had been assured by the declaration of some member of this house that there was a sufficient population in Kent county to bring it within the rules, I ask him as a lawyer, whether, in the course of his professional career, he ever permits himself to be assured by declarations founded upon mere judgment, of any fact? Mr. CLARKE. As the gentleman has put the question SEVERAL MEMBERS. Order; order. The PRESIDENT. The chair cannot permit discussion. Mr. RIDGELY. I desire to say that I vote for the proposition now before the house upon this theory-I want to explain my vote-that the strict operation of the rule excluded my county from another delegate, and also excluded Kent; and what is fish for one is flesh for the other. The PRESIDENT. The gentleman appears to be trans ending the rule, to state concisely the reasons for his vote. The chair cannot permit discussion at this stage of the case. Mr. CLARKE. When the vote is over, I hope I shall be permitted to make a personal explanation. Mr. BELT. I move that the gentleman be permitted The PRESIDENT. It is not in order now. Mr. SCHLEY said: When the question was up before, I voted "no," because I believed this was wrong. I have not changed my opinion in that respect; and therefore I again vote "no." Mг. THOMAS said: I desire to say in explanation of my vote, that when I cast my vote in favor of Kent county having an additional delegate, I did it in good faith; and I did it with the understanding that it was to be a compromise between those two sections; and that while this convention would give to Kent county her rights, they would not refuse to Baltimore county, the largest county in the State, hers. But, to my utter surprise, I find that gentlemen have gone back from their promises. The PRESIDENT. The gentleman is not in order. Mr. THOMAS. I am trying to explain my vote; and I am opposed to this more especially as gentlemen of the majority of this house have given to the minority one more delegate, and have refused to give the majority one more delegate that they are entitled to receive. I think it is no more than just and right that Baltimore county should have an additional delegate. gets but six delegates for 46,000 souls She Mr. CLARKE. I call the gentleman to order. Mr. THOMAS. I am explaining my vote. I say that Baltimore county is more entitled to seven delegates than Kent county to two. I voted for two for Kent county; and I vote for Baltimore county to have an additional delegate as a compromise. I therefore vote "aye." The rule requiring a three-fifths vote, the motion was rejected. Mr. STOCKBRIDGE. I ask permission to move to strike out "79" and insert "80." Mr. BRISCOE. It is very likely that the matter may have to be changed again. I have a motion to make. Mr. STOCKBRIDGE. I will give way for the present. Mr. BRISCOE. I move to suspend the 53d rule to enable me to move to strike out "one" after Calvert, Charles and St. Mary's, and to insert the word "two" in each place, so as to give each county of the State two delegates at least. I was somewhat surprised a few moments ago to hear the gentleman from Baltimore city (Mr. Thomas) say that there had been an outside understanding that this thing, so far as the increase for the county of Baltimore was concerned, was to be considered The PRESIDENT. The motion to suspend is not debatable. Mr. BRISCOE. I will move to add one to Baltimore county at the same time. The motion to suspend the 53d rule was rejected. KENT COUNTY. Mr. THOMAS moved to reconsider the vote by which the amendment submitted by Mr. HOLLYDAY to increase the representation of Kent county was adopted. Mr. HOLLYDAY. I hope that motion will not prevail. The gentleman from Baltimore city (Mr. Thomas) stated that there had been a promise made if another representative was given to Kent, to give another one to Baltimore county. I should like to know from whom that promise came; for I have not understood that there was such a promise. Mr. THOMAS. I will say to the gentleman that I thought it was generally understood. I would not have come up to the house this afternoon, sick as I am, if I did not think from what I heard outside of this house that Baltimore county was to have one more delegate. I told the gentleman at dinner I would be here. Mr. HOLLYDAY. I can only say with regard to that matter that I never promised anybody. I told them I had no objection at all to giving one to Baltimore county; but I never said that I would vote for it. I am one of those who never make an araangement of that kind. I told them that I would not bind myself to vote for Baltimore county or any other county. Mr. CHAMBERS. In explanation of my position I solemnly protest that I not only never heard of the compromises, but never heard that it was designed to move, if Kent obtained a member, that Baltimore county should have another, until I heard it from gentlemen upon this floor since the vote was taken. Mr. BARRON. I will state that this morning it was mentioned that Kent wanted a member, and Baltimore county a member, and I said: put them both together and I will vote for them. I was willing to vote for Baltimore county every day in the week; but I saw that as soon as they got the member for Kent, they were satisfied to go back. Mr. CLARKE. This is a motion to reconsider, and I regard it now in order in debating the matter whether or not we should reconsider the vote, to call the attention of the convention to the difference of the ground upon which Kent county appealed to the convention, and that upon which Baltimore county has appealed to the convention. I will state, as I stated before, that I voted this morning at first against the increase to Kent county upon the ground that the convention having determined upon an arbitrary rule by which representat on should be apportioned in the State, the basis of that rule should be applied and carried out to its consequences, and that there should be no departure from it for the purpose of conciliating anywhere any local feeling, or any local dissatisfaction; because after the principle was adopted it must work equally every where if that was to be the rule of representation. I stated further, as a reason for my subsequent vote upon the proposition to increase the delegation from Kent county, and as a reason for my vote in opposition to the increase of the delegation from Baltimore county in order to reconcile the two votes, that I did it simply upon this ground; that I had heard it stated by gentlemen in whose word I placed implicit confidence, upon this floor, that Kent county possessed a white population which entitled her to two members. gentleman from Cecil said he knew that the population of Kent since 1860 had largely increased, and by the census of 1860 Kent county only wanted about one hundred and fifty additional white population to entitle her to another member. And other gentlemen stated positively that they were sure that if the population of Kent county were now to be taken, she would have a population which would entitle her to two representatives. The Now the gentleman from Baltimore county (Mr. Ridgely) inquires whether I, as a lawyer, would take hear-say evidence. I do not take hear-say evidence at all. That was not a hear-say state of evidence. It was the testimony of honorable gentlemen upon this floor, asserting from their knowledge of the fact that she was entitled to this representation. And I would ask him, or any gentleman upon this floor, if honorable members here make an assertion, acting under their oaths, and their duties to the State of Maryland, other members have not a right to act upon it. That fixes my vote for Kent county. Now I will come to Baltimore county. Baltimore county had under this apport'onment five members, one for each five thousand white inhabitants, up to twenty-five thousand. Then the convention say that |