10 oxen, among them "one red, five years old; two red, five years old," and "one black, five years old" in possession of the mortgagor in the town of M. In claim and delivery against third persons, one of defendants testified that on April 29, 1885, they had two red oxen, five years old, and one black ox, five years old, which were the property of H. R. Held, that they were not sufficiently identified.-Kellogg v. Anderson, (Minn.) 1045. 10. One H. executed a mortgage upon a span of mules to a machine company in July, 1885, in which they were described as "two brown mules, one four years old, the other five years old; weight about 950 pounds each." This mortgage was duly filed for record. August 14, 1885, H. executed a mortgage to K. & Son, on two mules, described as "one bay horse mule, five years old; one bay mare mule, five years old." This mortgage was duly filed for record. K. & Son had actual notice of the existence of the mortgage to the machine company on the mules described in its mortgage, and interrogated H. as to the number of mules possessed by him; and he informed them that he possessed two spans of mules, and that the mortgage to K. & Son was upon a different span from that mortgaged to the machine company. It appeared from the testimony that H. possessed but one span of mules. Held, that the right of the machine company was superior to that of K. & Son.-Rawlins v. Kennard, (Neb.) 1004.* 11. A mortgage on a stock in trade stipulated that it should cover all goods thereafter becoming a part of the stock. In replevin by the mortgagee against creditors of the mortgagor who had attached the stock, it appeared that defendants billed grain to the mortgagor on June 19th, and afterwards billed other goods to him "on commission." The mortgagor testified that during the delivery of the grain, on June 18th, he informed defendants' agent of the mortgage, and the agent testified that the goods were billed "on commission" at the mortgagor's request; denied that they were sold "on commission;" and admitted that he knew of the mortgage and its terms, shortly after delivering the grain. He afterwards settled up with the mortgagor, and took his notes for the balance due on the grain and the other goods. The attachment was brought on these notes, with no attempt to recover the property before commencing suit. Held, that plaintiff was entitled to an instruction that if defendants' agent, after he knew of plaintiff's mortgage, consented that the goods should be considered commission goods, and afterwards took the mortgagor's notes for them, plaintiff's mortgage "is valid and binding as against defendants. "-Merrill v. Denton, (Mich.) $23. 12. After refusing such instruction, an instruction that the jury must find that defendants' agent, knowing of the mortgage, "consented in fact "that the goods should go into the stock, and that the mere fact that he made out the bills as requested by the mortgagor would not constitute such consent, is erroneous, as containing no reference to the effect the settlement and taking the notes would have, and as leading the jury to believe that the agent must have made a positive declaration of consent to the goods going into the stock.-Id. Recording. 13. A chattel mortgage which is withheld from the records at the request of the mortgagor, because it would injure his credit, though without intent to defraud creditors, cannot avail against a creditor who subsequently takes the note of the mortgagor in settlement of a suit and extension of credit, in good faith, in the belief that the mortgagor's property is unincumbered; and the creditor's rights cannot be affected by the subsequent filing of the mortgage.-Sanger v. Freie Presse Co., (Wis.) 430. 14. The filing of a chattel mortgage in the office of the recording officer of the county, under the provisions of Comp. St. Neb. c. 32, 14, makes such mortgage a part of the records of the county, and under Civil Code, § 408, a certified copy is competent evidence of equal credibility to the original.-Hall v. Aitken, (Neb.) 192. 15. In an action by a corporation for personalty taken by one claiming under an unrecorded mortgage from M., who had sold the property to the corporation, of which he was president and general manager, the court charged that the knowledge of M., as president of the corporation, of such unrecorded mortgage, would be imputable to the corporation, and prevent it from asserting the rights of a bona fide transferee of the property. There was some testimony that there were persons interested in the formation of the corporation who had no knowledge of the mortgage, and who acted in good faith in purchasing the property. Held, that the instruction was erroneous, and that the question should have been submitted to the jury as to whether the interests of M. and the corporation were substantially the same. International Wrecking & Transp. Co. v. McMorran, (Mich.) 510. 16. Where defendant alleges that the mortgage was duly recorded before plaintiff's purchase, indicating that he relies upon the record as notice of his interest, no issue is made as to actual notice. -Barrett v. Fisch, (Iowa,) 310. Lien. 17. A partner, having one-half interest in a stock of goods, mortgaged his moiety to secure an individual debt, and soon after bought his copartner's interest, giving a mortgage on the entire stock, which he agreed to keep up to the value of $3,000, to secure the purchase money. There was no evidence that the stock was ever worth so much, or of what its value was at that time. The record showed that it was sold by a receiver, who had, as the proceeds, $600 in his hands. There was no evidence that any of it had been used in the payment of partnership debts. Held, that no presumption existed that any of the stock was so used, and that the first mortgage constituted a paramount lien on one-half the proceeds, and the second on the other. BECK, J., dissenting.-Burdette v. Woodworth, (Iowa,) 598. 18. F. sold a vacant lot to G. for $125, $25 of which was paid down, and two payments of $50 each, with interest to be paid at agreed times. There was a written contract executed and delivered by F. to G., but not recorded. G. took possession, and built a house thereon, which she occupied as a store and dwelling, and executed a chattel mortgage of said house to plaintiffs to secure a debt, which mortgage was recorded. Afterwards G. executed two mortgages of the lot to the defendant to secure two debts, which were recorded. Plaintiff foreclosed the chattel mortgage, sold and bought in the house. Afterwards, the defendant received actual notice of the chattel mortgage, its foreclosure, and the purchase by plaintiffs; and in consideration of the two mortgages held by the defendant, and of a mechanic's lien that the defendant held against the property, G. executed to defendant a quitclaim deed, and assigned to defendant the F. contract. The defendant sold the house and lot to S., and put him in possession. Afterwards defendant tendered to F. the amount due on the contract, and demanded a deed, which was refused, on the ground that said contract was forfeited for non-payment of the purchase money. Defendant finally, by the payment of $50 additional, obtained. a deed from F. In an action for the value of the house, held, that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the value of the house, less the amount of the mechanic's lien held by the bank.-Holt County Bank v. Tootle, (Neb.) 291. Foreclosure. 19. Where a chattel mortgage is filed as required by Comp. St. Neb. c. 12, § 2, a certified copy is sufficient authority under which the mortgagee can take possession of the property and foreclose the mortgage; and if such foreclosure is not resisted, nor the authority of the mortgagee questioned, a certified copy is not necessary. The original mortgage on file is sufficient to justify the proceeding when collaterally attacked.-Hall v. Aitken, (Neb.) 192. Sale of mortgaged goods. 20. A. purchased personal property from plain tiff under an assumed name, and, to secure the price, gave a chattel mortgage thereon, also under the assumed name. A. gave his residence in the proper county, and the mortgage was duly filed in the proper office. After said filing, A. sold the property to defendant under his true name, and after defendant had examined the records for chattel mortgages and found none. Held, in replevin, that plaintiff was entitled to the property.-Alexander v. Graves, (Neb.) 290. CIVIL RIGHTS. Citizenship. COMPROMISE. See, also, Accord and Satisfaction; Payment. Rights of attorneys, see Attorney and Client, 8, 9. When binding. Under a complaint counting on a contract and account stated, and an answer alleging breach of the contract, there is no prejudice to defendant in a charge that, if all matters were settled, and defendant, knowing how the contract had been performed, talked over that matter, and the parties agreed as to the amount due, they were bound by the settlement; that, unless they understood that any claim for breach of contract was included in the settlement, such claim stood open and unadjusted.-Garvin v. Gates, (Wis.) 621. Confession. 1. Act Neb. March 4, 1885, entitled "An act to provide that all citizens shall be entitled to the same civil rights," in the body of it, extends its provisions to "all persons." Held constitutional only as to persons who are citizens, and an information under it must aver the citizenship of the person alleged to have been denied his civil rights.-Mes- See Criminal Law, 10. senger v. State, (Neb.) 638.* 1. The clerk is not one of the officers specially required by law to have and use a seal upon all occasions. The court itself has a seal, which must be used by the clerk as prescribed by statute.State v. Barrett, (Minn.) 459. Records-Mandamus. Consideration. Of contract, see Contracts, 2-5. conveyances, see Fraudulent Conveyances, 11-16. deeds, see Deed, 2. negotiable instruments, see Negotiable Instruments, 3-7. CONSPIRACY. Civil action-Pleading. * A complaint reciting plaintiff's employment as minister by church officers, and charging defendants with "unlawfully, maliciously, and without just cause, *** conspiring, conniving, and contriving to injure the plaintiff, and break up his 2. Under Comp. St. Neb. 1887, c. 19, § 27, which and to drive him from his position as minister, relations with the congregation as their minister, makes it the duty of the clerk of the district court ** and to deprive him of the support of said to keep a record of the proceedings of the court, congregation, " followed by a recital of many acts under the direction of the judge of such court, the done by defendants in pursuance of "the purposes clerk is under the control of the district court, and aforesaid, " is sufficiently definite and certain, and the supreme court has no jurisdiction in the mat-states but one cause of action, (unlawful conspirter of the preparation of the records of said court, its jurisdiction, except in certain cases, being appellate, and not original.-State v. Le Fevre, (Neb.) 184. Deputies. 3. Judicial notice will be taken, in a district court of Minnesota, of the signature and official character of all persons who have been duly appointed deputies by the clerk, as all such appointments must be approved by the judge. Nor, in proceedings in the same court, is it material whether a deputy of the clerk, when signing the jurat to an affidavit of intention to become a citizen, designates himself as a "deputy, " or a "deputy-clerk. "-State v. Barrett, (Minn.) 459. COLLEGES AND UNIVERSI- Agricultural college lands. Though agricultural college lands are required to be sold on time to provide a fund for the college arising from the interest on the price, the college may receive the principal when its interest will be promoted thereby, and its officers will be presumed to have acted rightly and for its interest in receiving the principal before maturity with a bonus.Burtis v. Humboldt County Bank, (Iowa,) 585. Color of Title. See Adverse Possession, 8, 9. Complaint. See Pleading, 1, 2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Inheritance taxes, see Descent and Distribu- Amendments to constitution. 1. Const. Neb. art. 15, § 1, does not prescribe the form in which propositions by the legislature to amend the constitution shall be made, whether by bill or joint resolution; therefore, if an amendment is proposed by a bill passed by the requisite threefifths majority of the members of each house, and entered on the journals thereof, and afterwards presented to the governor for his approval, who retains the same for more than five days, Sundays excepted, the supreme court will not for such causes declare the propositions in conflict with the constitution, and void.-In re Senate File No. 31, (Neb.) 981. 2. The proposed amendments possess no efficacy until approved by a majority of the electors of the state voting at the election, and the approval of the governor is unnecessary, and adds nothing to the validity of the amendment.-Id. 3. The proposition to prohibit "the manufacture, sale, and keeping for sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage," and the proposition to license and regulate by law "the manufacture, sale, and keeping for sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage," Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v. Beebe, are independent, and to be separately submitted | title. 4. The proposed amendments offer divers modes of controlling the traffic in intoxicating drinks; in other words, a choice of remedies for an acknowledged evil. From the nature of the case, but one of the proposed amendments could be carried into effect. Therefore votes cast in favor of both prop. ositions nullify each other.-Id. 5. A title stating the object of a bill or provision to amend the constitution is unnecessary, and, if added, may be disregarded, such title being necessary only in cases of ordinary legislation.-Id. 6. A proposition to amend the constitution was passed by the senate, by the necessary three-fifths majority, and entered on the journal. The proposition was then amended by the house, and as amended was passed by that body by the requisite majority, and entered on the house journal. Afterwards the house amendments were concurred in by the senate, and such amendments entered on the senate journal. Held, that there was a sufficient compliance with section 1, art. 15, of the constitution. Id. Delegation of legislative powers. 13. The subject of Gen. Laws Minn. 1887, c. 191, entitled "An act to regulate actions for libel," is sufficiently expressed in its title.-Allen v. Pioneer Press Co., (Minn.) 936. 14. Sp. Laws Minn. 1887, c. 5, entitled "An act to amend the charter of the city of Winona," extended the city limits so as to include a part of another school-district. Held, that the act was not in conflict with Const. art. 4, § 27, relating to the entitling of statutes, because the matter of the change in the boundaries of the school-districts was not mentioned in the title.-City of Winona v. School-Dist. No. 82, (Minn.) 539. 15. Acts 21st Gen. Assem. Iowa, c. 83, entitled an act to amend specified acts "relating to the practice of pharmacy," though amending Code, § 1526, authorizing the sale of liquors for medicinal purposes, is not in violation of Const. Iowa, art. 3, § 29, providing that "every act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title," since the sale of liquors for medicinal purposes is properly embraced in an act relating to the practice of pharmacy.-State v. Aulman, (Iowa,) 379. 16. The title "An act to amend section 214 of the Criminal Code of the General Statutes of 1873," 7. The authority given by Gen. Laws Minn. 1887, said section imposing a punishment of fine and imc. 10, § 8, to the railway and warehouse commis-prisonment for gambling, covers a provision givsion to determine, in its discretion, what are equaling the loser a civil action to recover back money and reasonable rates, is not a delegation of legislative power.-State v. Minneapolis E. Ry. Co. (Minn.) 465. 8. Const. Mich. art. 10, § 6, provides for a county board of supervisors consisting of one supervisor from each township. Id. § 7, provides that "cities shall have such representation in the board of supervisors of the counties in which they are situated as the legislature may direct." Held, that the power of the legislature to determine the representation from cities cannot be delegated to the cities themselves, as is attempted to be done in regard to the city of Muskegon by Local Acts 1887, No. 415, which, after fixing the number of wards and supervisor districts, by title 6, § 28, confers upon the council power to divide and redistrict the city into wards and supervisor districts, "whenever the common council shall deem it expedient," and to increase the number of such wards and districts within certain defined limits.-People v. Riordan, (Mich.) 482. Judicial powers. 9. Under Pub. Acts Mich. 1887, No. 293, providing for election contests by petition to the probate judge, and appointment of a board of examiners to recount the baliots, the duty of the board is merely to recount the votes as they find them in the ballot-boxes, cast for the particular candidates, and not to pass upon any question of fraud or irregularity. Their duties are not judicial, and the act is not unconstitutional on that ground.-Andrews v. Carney, (Mich.) 923. 10. Gen. Laws Minn. 1883, c. 107, authorizing the organization of annuity, safe-deposit, and trust companies, and granting such corporations powers to act as guardians of the estates of insane persons, is not a legislative interference with the constitutional powers of the probate courts, which have jurisdiction over estates of persons under guardianship.-Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v. Beebe, (Minn.) 232. or property lost.-Perry v. Gross, (Neb.) 799. 17. Under the title of "An act to incorporate cities of the first class, and regulating their duties, powers, and government," (act Neb. March 1, 1881,) a provision (section 42, as amended 1883) declaring that "no court or judge shall grant any injunction to restrain the levy, enforcement, or collection of any special tax or assessment, or any part thereof, made or contemplated being made, to pay the cost of any improvement," etc., is not within the title of the act, and is void.-Touzalin v. City of Omaha, (Neb.) 796. 18. Sess. Laws Neb. 1887, c. 97, entitled "An act No. 259, regulating the sale of intoxicating liquors, organization of annuity, safe-deposit, and trust 11. Const. Mich. art. 12, § 7, which provides that the legislature shall provide by law for the removal of county officers "in such manner and for such cause as to them shall seem just and proper, "commits to the legislature the whole subject of removal, and the determination of the existence of cause for removal may be vested by it in other departments of the state government than the judi- for the exemption of pension money or property 21. Acts 20th Gen. Assem. Iowa, c. 23, providing cial, though it involves the exercise of judicial pow-purchased therewith, and that such exemption ers.-People v. Stuart, (Mich.) 1091. Titles of acts. 12. Gen. Laws Minn. 1883, c. 107, entitled "An act to authorize the organization of annuity, safe-deposit, and trust companies, " is not unconstitutional as not having its subject expressed in its v.41N.w.-72 "shall apply to debts of such pensioners contracted prior to the purchase of such homestead," is, as to such debts, a law impairing the obligation of contracts, within the meaning of Const. U. S. art. 1, § 10. BECK and ROTHROCK, JJ., dissenting.Foster v. Byrne, (Iowa,) 22. Regulation of commerce. 22. The Minnesota railroad and warehouse commission has no authority to prescribe rates for transportation by common carriers in another state, nor to fix rates between two points within the state, over a route extending across a neighboring state.-State v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., (Minn.) 1047. Restraints on liberty. 23. The ordinance of the city of Detroit prohibiting the distribution of hand-bills or advertising cards on any public streets or alleys of said city, even if authorized by the charter, under which a person convicted of giving away cards of the size of one and one-half inches by two inches, to persons on the street, inviting them to a meeting of the Young Men's Christian Association, becomes liable to a fine of $100, and imprisonment for six months, is an unreasonable restraint on liberty, and unconstitutional. People v. Armstrong, (Mich.) 275. Constructive Trusts. Public policy. treasurer of a school-district was settled by the 3. A shortage in the accounts of the outgoing payment of a certain amount of cash, and the exe. cution of a note by a third party for the balance agreed on as due from the ex-treasurer. There threats had been made, by the officer representing was some testimony that prior to the settlement the district, of prosecution, and that such officer had said that he would stop the prosecution if the note was executed, and that the maker signed under such representations. But there was no evidence that by "prosecution" was meant a criminal prosecution, and it did not distinctly appear what the terms of the agreement were, if any was made in relation thereto. Held, that the note was not shown to be against public policy, and in violation of Pen. Code Dak. § 184, or Code Crim. Proc. § 235, prohibiting the making of any contract to compound a felony.-School-District No. 61 v. Collins, (Dak.) 466. After findings directing the dismissal of an ac- 4. In such case, though the treasurer of the distion for divorce were filed, proceedings against the trict did in fact agree not to institute criminal husband for disobeying a prior order for payment proceedings against the ex-treasurer as an induceof alimony were commenced, in which it was ad- ment to the execution of the note, the invalidity of judged that he was in contempt, and that he be the note could not be asserted as against the dispunished by fine, and be imprisoned until pay-trict, the treasurer having had no authority to setment of the fine and alimony. Held that, so far as it required the payment of alimony, the order fell on the subsequent entry of judgment of dismissal, but that it was not affected by the judg ment, so far as it required the payment of the fine. -In re Fanning, (Minn.) 1076. Contests. See Elections and Voters, 6, 7. Continuance. In criminal cases, see Criminal Law, 6, 7. CONTRACTS. See, also, Arbitration and Award; Assignment Logging contracts, see Logs and Logging, 1. married woman, see Husband and Wife, 3, 4. Public policy, see Gaming, 1-4. 1. Plaintiff sued for damages caused by the failure of defendants to carry out an alleged contract for the erection of a building for them by plaintiff, alleging that he was the lowest bidder, and that there was an agreement that he should have the job. Defendants denied the employment or any agreement with plaintiff. The evidence showed no definite agreement; that plaintiff's bid was an unsigned memorandum, without reference to any building and without names of parties or specifi- | tle the claim of the district against the ex-treasurer, and the district having accepted the note without any notice of the corrupt agreement.—Id. 5. Where taxes are due on personalty, and the county treasurer is about to enforce collection by distress and sale, the treasurer cannot accept the promise of one negotiating for a purchase of the property to pay said taxes, and suffer the property to go without distress and sale, and such agreement is not binding on the promisor.-Cass County v. Beck, (Iowa,) 200. Construction. 6. B., a member of a lodge, agreed to advance it money to build a hall, taking a mortgage to his wife as security. Being unable to furnish all the means, at his instance, and on his agreement to pay the sum, the lodge borrowed $300 to supply the deficit. The lodge refused to execute the mortgage until this debt was paid, and B. secured a loan of that amount; the creditor refusing to lend unless B. would be personally responsible. To this he agreed, but gave an obligation signed by the trustees of the lodge, of whom he was one. The lodge executed the mortgage, including therein the $300, under the impression that it was released, and both the creditor and B. treated the debt as owed by the latter only. B. repeatedly stated that he was personally liable for it, and made payments thereon. Held sufficient to establish B.'s personal liability, the execution of the mortgage being a consideration for the promise, and that it was error to direct a verdict for B.'s estate.-Barker v. Brown's Estate, (Mich.) 888. 7. Defendant was employed by plaintiff to render such service as might be necessary as "consulting oculist and aurist." The contract was partly written, and partly of printed form. By the printed form the physician employed agreed “to perform all necessary surgical and medical services for the treatment of said persons, if required to do so, and to furnish the necessary medicines and surgical appliances for the same. The words, "and to furnish the necessary medicines and surgical appliances for the same," were erased, so that the portion of the contract which was in writ ing immediately following the words, "if required to do so, "was, "by the chief surgeon as consulting oculist and aurist, "etc. Civil Code Neb. § 340, declares that when an instrument is partly in writing and partly in printed form, the former controls in case of inconsistency. Held, that the employment was only as consulting oculist and aur ist, and not as operating physician or surgeon.Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Graddy, (Neb.) 809. 8. Defendants employed plaintiff, a machinist having a shop and business of his own, to take entire charge of and keep in order all engines, boilers, and pumps in their saw-mill, and to keep in repair "all other machinery located and situated in said saw-mill," for a certain sum for the year. During the year plaintiff superintended the construction of a well, pump, and water-works, for the protection of the lumber-yard adjoining the mill in case of fire. Held, that this work was not in terms included in the contract, and the jury were justified, on conflicting evidence, in finding that there was an implied contract to pay for his work and materials furnished, at their reasonable price.-Reiser v. Stauer, (Wis.) 706. 9. There being evidence of declarations of plaintiff that he considered the work as embraced in his contract, a charge that if, at the time it was being done, plaintiff assumed that it came within the contract, that it was his right and duty to superintend it under the contract, and defendants understood that he was doing the work as part of his duty under the contract, he could not recover, was favorable enough to defendants.-Id. 10. Defendant wrote to plaintiff, soliciting a loan for investment in school lands in Kansas. Plaintiff proposed to furnish money to be invested on joint account. No counties were named in which the lands to be bought were to be situated. The money was afterwards sent. Held, upon conflicting evidence fixing the locality of the lands to be bought, that the contract did not prescribe that the lands were to be situated in a particular county. -McPherim v. Russell, (Iowa,) 304. 11. Laws Wis. 1882, c. 252, authorizing the construction of wings to the state capitol, required a board of commissioners to let the contract, after procuring "suitable and proper plans, drawings, and specifications," and to employ an architect to superintend the work; the architect to certify to the board monthly estimates of all materials furnished and labor performed. The board procured and adopted plans and specifications, and entered into a contract with plaintiffs, whereby all the materials were to be furnished, and all the work done, according to the plans and specifications, and under the direction and to the entire satisfaction of the architect. The architect was authorized to vary from such plans, the value of alterations to be added to or deducted from the contract price; and any doubt as to the quality of materials or workmanship, or as to allowances for extras, to be determined and adjusted solely by the architect. After plaintiffs had in good faith, according to the plans and under the directions of the architect, constructed a large portion of one wing, and the materials and work had been approved and accepted by the architect and by the board, the wing fell, owing to defects and inefficiency of the plans. Held, that the state warranted the plans, and was liable to the plaintiffs for the expense of restoring the portion of the building so destroyed.― Bentley v. State, (Wis.) 338. 12. A. and B., engaged in business, purchased a lot of D. for $1,000, and erected a building in which to conduct their business. D. owned an adjoining lot, and it was agreed to erect a partition wall; D. to pay one-half the cost, to be credited on the purchase price of the lot. A. and B. erected a building at a cost of $3,700, the construction account being kept by A. After the completion of the building, A. sold his interest in the building and lot to B., the contract not being reduced to writing, but stated by A., in the presence of a third person, to be one-half of $4,710, and by B. to be one-half of the actual cost. The credit due from D. was $387.19, which reduced the cost of the building and lot to $4,322.81. Held, that a verdict allowing B. credit on the purchase price for onehalf of $387.19 was sustained by the weight of the evidence.-Wilson v. Ellsworth, (Neb.) 177. Performance. 13. Under a written agreement to pay a sum "at the time of procuring a conveyance of the interest of the patent title owner" of certain land in favor of the promisee or his grantee, "or at the time of the perfection of the title" in one of them, a tax deed and intermediate conveyances to the promisee as prima facie evidence of title in him, and the promisor has the burden of proving facts defeating his title.-Hunt v. Gray, (Iowa,) 14. 14. Plaintiff had an agreement with defendant by which he was to saw a quantity of timber on defendant's land; no time being fixed for performance. Held, that plaintiff could not recover on a complaint alleging, as a breach of the contract, that defendant had conveyed the timber to a third person, and a refusal to allow him to proceed with the sawing, though he was ready to perform, where there was no proof of such readiness, or of a refusal to allow the sawing after readiness was shown.-Thomas v. Corey, (Mich.) 901. 15. Defendant agreed to furnish water by means of his dams, to run a specified quantity of logs for plaintiff. In case the dams should be washed out before all the logs were run, defendant was either to repair them, or refund a proportionate amount of the consideration. After the specified quantity had all been run out, the dams washed out, and plaintiff repaired them without being requested or directed thereto by defendant. Held, that plaintiff could not recover for such repairs.-George W. Roby Lumber Co. v. Gray, (Mich.) 420. 16. Complainant sold a saw-mill to defendant by a contract whereby defendant agreed to pay part in cash, and the balance in sawing. Complainant agreed to keep the mill stocked with lumber, and for every thousand shingles cut therefrom she was to pay $1.10, less 25 cents, to be applied on the purchase price. In a bill filed by her to foreclose the contract as a mortgage or lien on the property, she alleged that defendant during December, January, and February had cut a large number of shingles, but that they were worthless, and that she had refused to apply the 25 cents per thousand towards the payment for the mill. It appeared that defendant had obtained a judgment for the 85 cents per thousand due him for these shingles, in an action in which it was litigated and decided that the shingles manufactured during those months were according to contract. It also appeared that, if complainant had kept the mill properly stocked, defendant would have completed the payment. Held, that the bill should have been dismissed.-Harris v. Clark, (Mich.) 1077. Extension of time. 17. The time of performance of a contract in writing may be extended by parol, and no new consideration is necessary, especially where there are mutual acts to be performed by the parties.Izard v. Kimmel, (Neb.) 1065. Rescission. 18. Plaintiff agreed to pay to defendant a sum of money for the transfer of a license to manufacture under a patent, the transfer to be made at once. A tender of the license was not made until more than a year afterwards, and after suit had been begun by plaintiff on a note given by defendant, when the latter set up the amount which plaintiff had promised to pay for the license as a counterclaim. Held, that plaintiff was not bound by the contract.-John A. Roebling's Sons Co. v. Merchants' Union Barb-Wire Co., (Iowa,) 569. Actions on contracts. 19. An order authorizing plaintiff to procure of the manufacturer a machine for which defendant agreed to pay "one span of horses, twelve years old," is not a contract with the manufacturer, it appearing that plaintiff had no authority to make it for the manufacturer, and that it was made for his own benefit, and that he was responsible to the manufacturer for the price of the machine; and plaintiff may maintain an action for a breach of the warranty of the ages of the horses in his own name.-Jackson v. Mott, (lowa,) 12. 20. The order does not so represent the entire agreement of the parties as to exclude evidence to show the horses selected and the representations made at the time in regard to their ages.-Id. 21. It was improper to charge that, if defendant |