regular course of business; and that the entries were made at the time of the transaction which Examiners, Board of. they represented.-Cormac v. Western White To recount votes, see Elections and Voters, 8-11. Bronze Co., (Iowa,) 480. 22. In such action, a special interrogatory as to whether the books of account kept by plaintiff showed that he received on account of defendant more money than he paid out, was not relevant to the issues in the case, and was properly refused. -Id. Parol to vary writing. 23. A written receipt, except so far as it may include a contract, may be contradicted or explained by parol.-Burke v. Ray, (Minn.) 240. 24. A power of attorney, purporting to be an instrument authorizing the defendant to collect money for plaintiff, parol evidence is inadmissible of a contract amounting to an absolute assignment of the fund.-Best v. Sinz, (Wis.) 169. EXCEPTIONS, BILL OF. See, also, Appeal; Error, Writ of; New Trial; Time of filing. 1. Where the record states that "by consent the defendants have to the 20th of November, 1887, to file a bill of exceptions, which was filed November 10, 1887, "it will be presumed that the bill was filed within the time.-Waller v. Waller, (Iowa,) 307. 2. Under Code Iowa, § 2831, providing that the party objecting to a decision must file his bill of exceptions during the term, "or within such time thereafter as the court may fix, but in no event shall the time extend more than thirty days beyond the expiration of the term, except by consent of parties or order of the judge," the bill of exceptions must be filed during the term, unless the time is extended by consent or order of court.Deering v. Irving, (Iowa,) 204. Settlement and signing. 3. In Wisconsin, the only proper and authorized practice requires that amendments allowed by the trial court to the proposed bill of exceptions shall be incorporated in the bill as finally settled and signed.-Killops v. Stevens, (Wis.) 970. 25. A written agreement to pay a sum "at the time of procuring a conveyance of the interest of the patent-title owner" of certain land, in favor of the promisee or his grantee, "or at the time of the perfection of the title" in one of them, is due and payable when the title is perfect in the grantee, and parol evidence to show a different meaning is inadmissible.-Hunt v. Gray, (Iowa,) 14. 26. In replevin for goods which plaintiff alleged had been consigned to defendant's assignor, plaintiff's agent, testified that the goods were consigned under a written agreement, and, without any adequate reason, was permitted to give evidence of its contents which conflicted with the terms of the agreement, afterwards introduced. The court, in charging the jury, after detailing the testimony of the agent, said: "Verbal testimony cannot be given to contradict the terms of a written contract, but, where a person has no written contract before him, it is the duty of the court to have the witness state his remembrance of the contract as it took place;" and afterwards read the written tions taken to the conclusions of law and order for 5. On appeal it was stipulated that "the excepagreement. Held, that the admission of and com-judgment, duly filed by the defendant, be taken as ments on the parol evidence were errors.-Simonds Manuf'g Co. v. Riddle, (Mich.) 675. Evidence on former trial. 27. A stipulation that the testimony of a witness on a former trial may be read in evidence gives a right to have it read on a new trial ordered by the supreme court.-United States Exp. Co. v. Jenkins, (Wis.) 957. Relevancy. 28. In an action to quiet title when the parties claim from a common source, evidence of a witness as to negotiations instituted by himself for the purchase of the real estate involved in the suit are properly excluded, such negotiation being entirely disconnected with the alleged purchase by the defendant.-Lucke v. Yoakum, (Neb.) 255. Evidence made competent by that of adverse party. 4. Where the testimony in a case referred has been preserved only by memoranda made by the referee, he may, in settling the bill of exceptions, make corrections therein to harmonize them with the testimony as actually given.-Runnels v. Moffat, (Mich.) 224. Contents. a part of the record in this action, and stand as 6. Affidavits used at the hearing of a motion to dissolve an attachment will not be considered in the Nebraska supreme court on error, unless preserved by a bill of exceptions.-Olds Wagon Co. v. Benedict, (Neb.) 254. 7. Minutes of the short-hand reporter's notes need not be attached to the bill of exceptions: it is sufficient if they are referred to therein.-Waller v. Waller, (Iowa,) 307. 29. Where both the plaintiff and defendant call witnesses to establish usage, neither can assign error in the admission of such testimony.ing that the reporter's notes of the evidence are 8. The filing of a skeleton bill of exceptions, statHowell v. Graff, (Neb.) 142. 30. On the issue whether defendant had hired on file, and making them, and the translation plaintiff to go to L. to look after his business there, thereof, a part of the bill, and directing the clerk it appearing that plaintiff had gone to L., and to copy the translation into the bill, is a sufficient while there had received a letter from defendant preservation and certification of the evidence.relating to such business. Defendant may intro-Hunter v. Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry Co., (Iowa,) duce a letter received from a third person at L., which he testifies prompted him to write to plaintiff, and which is referred to in his letter to plaintiff.-Parrish v. Bradley, (Mich.) 818. Weight and sufficiency. 31. In an action on a foreign judgment, it is not error to refuse plaintiff's request to instruct the jury that "the burden of proving payment or satisfaction of the judgment is upon defendant, and he must establish *** satisfaction by a clear preponderance of the evidence," as in civil cases a preponderance of evidence is all that is required.-Marx v. Kilpatrick, (Neb.) 111. Examination. See Witness, 5. 305. See, also, Sale. EXCHANGE. Absolute or conditional. 1. In an action for the recovery of a horse exchanged for defendant's horse, which died from disease, there was no element of fraud involved, but the issue was whether the exchange was absolute, or on the express condition that the horse of defendant was sound and healthy. The answer admitted the allegation of the complaint that the horse was sick, but alleged that the exchange was immediate and complete. Held error to admit evidence, on plaintiff's behalf, showing that defendant knew his horse was sick; such evidence being unnecessary for any other purpose.-Rol- | firm debts paid by them on the settlement of the lins v. Wibye, (Minn.) 545. 2. The fact that the horse was diseased, unless known to both parties, could not affect the determination of the issue as to whether the agreement of exchange was absolute or conditional.-Id. EXECUTION. See, also, Attachment; Garnishment; Judicial Against estate, see Executors and Administra- Property subject to levy. 1. An execution issued on an ordinary judgment at law, if levied on a mere equity in real estate, the debtor not being in possession, and the legal title being in the Lame of another, will not pass the title of such equitable owner to the purchaser. -Dworak v. More, (Neb.) 777, 778. Levy on mortgaged chattels. 2. Under Acts 21st Gen. Assem. Iowa, c. 117, authorizing an execution creditor, desiring to levy on personalty, to deposit the amount of any mortgage debt, which may constitute a prior lien, in case the debt secured is due, the creditor cannot so subject the property to his execution where the mortgage note is not due, although the mortgage authorizes the mortgagee to take possession of the property whenever he deems himself insecure: the latter not having availed himself of such provision.Deering v. Wheeler, (Iowa,) 200. 3. Where an execution creditor, levying on personalty, deposits the amount of prior mortgage liens, in supposed compliance with Acts 21st Gen. Assem. Iowa, § 117, and the mortgagees release all claims, equity will effectuate the intention of the parties, though the execution creditor acquired no right under the statute, not having complied with its terms.-Id. Sale. partnership transactions, after the estate is fully administered and distributed, is not barred by failure to present it within the time fixed by Rev. St. Wis. § 3844, as such a demand is contingent until the settlement of the partnership transactions, and is therefore governed by sections 3858-3860, inclusive, allowing one year for the presentation of a claim that becomes absolute after the estate is settled.-Logan v. Dixon, (Wis.) 713. 4. His cause of action only accrues to a surety on his payment of the judgment against him, and therefore presentation to the county court within one year thereafter is a compliance with Rev. St. Wis. § 3860, requiring claims against a decedent's estate to be presented within one year after they accrue or become absolute.-Webster v. Lawson, (Wis.) 710. Settlements and accounting. Sec 5. Rev. St. Wis. §§ 3258, 3800, provide that the executor of an executor shall maintain no suit for, and have no control of or authority over, the effects of the testator of the first executor, and that an administrator c. t. a. shall be appointed to complete the administration in such a case. tions 3933 and 3934 provide that no action shall be commenced against the sureties on the bond of a deceased executor until they shall have had an opportunity to obtain a settlement of the deceased executor's accounts, and that a county court shall settle such accounts on the application of such a surety, or of any interested person. Held, that under said two first named sections the executor of a deceased executor cannot be compelled to settle the latter's accounts, and that the latter two Reed v. Wilson, (Wis.) 716. were not intended to establish a contrary rule. tlement of his accounts by one of the administra6. Where, upon an application for the final settors of an estate, (two having qualified,) and for a final discharge, the probate court, having jurisdiction to hear such application, made an order al 4. A sale of shares in the stock of a building as-lowing the account, and discharging the adminissociation, made after 9 o'clock at night, in the hall of the association, when but few of the members are there, is void, by reason of the unseasonable hour, at least as to purchasers having knowledge of the facts.-McNaughton v McLean, (Mich.) 267. Distribution of proceeds. trator, it was a final order, and valid until set aside in the same proceeding, though the other administrator, who had left the state, and ceased to act, had not been removed, and did not join in the application -State v. Probate Court, (Minn.) 1033. Compensation. 5. While an action by subsequent judgment 7. An executor went outside of his state to settle creditors, whose executions had been levied, was and dispose of the interest of his testator in a merpending against the prior judgment creditor to cantile partnership. He spent 12 days in travelsubordinate the defective judgment of the lat-ing and adjusting the matter, his labor principally ter to their own, the property levied on was sold consisting of taking an inventory, for which he on the executions, and the proceeds paid over to had no special aptitude. The stock of goods was the prior judgment creditor, in satisfaction of his turned over at cost to the surviving partner unexecution. Held, that such money in his hands der the partnership agreement, but the realty and was held subject to the results of that action; and, fixtures were valued, and it was alleged that by the plaintiffs therein prevailing, he was liable to his intelligence and persistence the executor saved them for the money so received, with interest; to the estate over $15,000 on those items. The only the money having been received and used by the disinterested witnesses who valued his services defendant as his own. Auerbach v. Behnke, based their estimate on this supposed saving, and (Minn.) 946. fixed it at $5,000. The court allowed $3,500. Held, that while the services were extraordinary, and EXECUTORS AND ADMINIS- deserving of compensation beyond the ordinary commissions, the allowance was excessive, $100 TRATORS. per day being ample under the facts of the case.-In re Mabley's Estate, (Mich.) $35. See, also, Descent and Distribution; Wills. 1. In proceedings to establish a claim, no formal pleadings being required, the administrator's resistance of a claim on a judgment puts in issue the validity, not only of the judgment as a claim, but also of the debt on which the judgment is founded.-Scovil v. Fisher, (Iowa,) 553. 2. Where a claim is allowed in the probate court, and the administrator appeals to the circuit court, assigning as a reason that the claim is on a note on which the claimant had previously obtained judgment against decedent, the issue is made sufficiently clear; no formal pleadings being necessary.-Hoffman v. Churchill, (Mich.) 907. Time for presentation. 3. A claim by surviving partners against the estate of a deceased partner for contribution to 8. Procuring the discount of notes taken of the surviving partner for testator's interest in the goods, to expedite the settlement of the estate, is not extraordinary service for which the executor should be compensated specially.-Id. 9. The executor, being a lawyer, is entitled to compensation for legal services rendered in litigation affecting the estate. -Id. 10. There being a contest between the widow and residuary legatee and the guardian of the infant legatees about the disposition of certain funds claimed by each, the executor is entitled to no compensation for inducing them to consent that the fund be deposited to their joint account pending the litigation. -Id. Liabilities and misconduct. 11. Testator devised land to plaintiff, subject to the repayment to testator's estate of the purchase Actions--Execution against estate. money then paid or thereafter to be paid by testa- | have ascertained whether an appeal would be taktor. By consent of defendant, the executor, and en before paying it. LONG, J., dissenting. -In re plaintiff, a real-estate agent sold the land, and, Mabley's Estate, (Mich.) 835. after retaining his compensation, paid the residue of the proceeds to defendant, who accounted for the proceeds in the probate court, which account was allowed, and not appealed from. There was a controversy as to whether the agent was acting for plaintiff or for defendant. Plaintiff petitioned the probate court to require defendant to pay him the amount retained by the agent. Held, that the defendant, as executor, had no power to sell the land, and was therefore not liable as executor for such sum, if liable at all.-Byrne v. Hume, (Mich.) 331. 12. A judgment against an administratrix, to be collected out of the assets of the estate, and not from defendant personally, in an action brought against the administratrix individually under How. St. Mich. § 5929, rendering a personal representative liable personally for failure to pay a debt after a decree of the probate court directing a distribution of assets, is void.-Peckham v Berrien County Circuit Judge, (Mich.) 926. 13. The care, prudence, and judgment which the man of fair average capacity and ability exercises in the transaction of his own business furnishes the standard to govern an administrator in the discharge of his trust duties.-Dundas v. Chrisman, (Neb.) 449. Sales under order of court. 20. How. St. Mich. § 5902, prohibiting actions have been appointed, except for realty or in reagainst estates when commissioners of claims plevin, and providing that no attachment or execu tion shall issue against an estate before the time limited by the court for the payment of debts, does not authorize the issue of an execution upon a money judgment against an estate.-Peckham V. Berrien County Circuit Judge, (Mich.) 926. EXEMPTIONS. Sale of exempt property, liability of sheriff, see 1. Where defendant is supporting her children and invalid husband, she is the "head of a family," within the meaning of Civil Code Neb. § 521, and, neither she nor her husband having any real estate exempt from execution, she is entitled to the personal property exemption. - Scholler v. Kuntz, (Neb.) 642. 2. How. St. Mich. 1882, § 8032, which exempts debts to defendant for personal labor for any amount not exceeding $25, "when the defendant is a householder having a family, covers the case of a man residing in the state, and supporting a family in Canada out of his wages.-Pettit v. Mus 14. An application for license to sell real estate for the payment of debts in the course of adminis-kegon Booming Co., (Mich.) 900. tration must be made within a reasonable time after the allowance of the claims of creditors; and Purchase price. such application, made after the lapse of 10 years, the limit of ordinary judgment liens, held properly refused.-State v. Probate Court, (Minn.) 1033. 15. A final decree discharging the administrator discharged the lien of creditors on real estate which might have been previously sold to pay debts.-Id. Personalty. 16. A lease of real estate for 25 years is personal property, which passes on the death of the lessee to his administrator, and under the Nebraska statutes the administrator may sell the lease as personalty, under proper order from the county court, without obtaining a license from the district court, as in case of the sale of real estate for the pay ment of debts.-Mulloy v. Kyle, (Neb.) 1117. 17. A lease of school land, containing no provisions for the purchase of the land by the lessee, is not rendered a contract for the purchase of land, under Comp. St. Neb. c. 23, § 97, providing that contracts for the purchase of land may be sold by administrator in the same manner as if the lessee had died seised of them, etc., by reason of the provisions of section 15, c. 80, entitled "School Lands and Funds," which gives the lessee of school land the first right to purchase the leased premises at their appraised value.-Id. Rights of purchaser. 18. A purchaser of lands specifically devised, at a sale by an executor under order of the probate court, which has been held void for want of authority to make it, and the land recovered in eject ment by the devisee's grantee, has no lien for the purchase price, and equity will not charge the land therewith, though the executor used the proceeds for the benefit of the estate.-Frost v Atwood, (Mich.) 96. Allowance to widow. 3. Money loaned one for the express purpose of enabling him to make a purchase of certain property, and so used by him, is "purchase money" of said property, within the meaning of Rev. St. Wis. $2982, subd. 20, providing that no property shall be exempt from execution for the purchase money thereof; and such property may be levied on by the lender under a judgment obtained for the money loaned.-Houlehan v. Rassler, (Wis.) 720. Waiver. 4. In replevin for goods seized on execution against plaintiff, the latter contended that a release of an exemption signed by him, and put in evidence by defendant, was procured by fraud, and that he signed it thinking it was a receipt for goods which he was allowed to take after the levy. The court charged that if he signed it, understanding what it was, and that it was a surrender of his right to the exemption, and delivered it to the creditor or officer, or intentionally did anything else to give the officer or creditor to understand that he surrendered the exemption, this would amount to a waiver thereof, but that if he signed it believing it to be a receipt for goods, "or did not fully understand that it was a waiver of his exemption," it would not amount to a waiver, and that the jury should determine the question from all the evidence. Held a fair submission of the question to the jury.-Charpentier v. Bresnaham, (Mich.) 856. Remedies. 5. Where a creditor, by garnishee process, obtains money of his debtor which is exempt from execution, the debtor may maintain an action against the creditor for its recovery.-Scholler v. Kurtz, (Neb.) 642. 6. In Nebraska, where a debtor has no real estate exempt from execution, he may, in lieu thereof, 19. The allowance provided for by law was made the officer levying the execution must, when the hold personal property of the value of $500; and by the probate court for the support of the widow debtor files an inventory of all his property, call and children pending the settlement of the estate. three disinterested freeholders of the county to apAn older sister expended certain sums for two of praise such property, and, if its value does not exthe minor children, and presented a claim, which ceed $500, return it to the owner. Held that, if the the widow resisted, but which the probate court officer neglect or refuse to call appraisers, the allowed out of said fund. Without consulting his debtor may enjoin the sale on the ground that the co-executors or the widow to ascertain if she in-officer is proceeding illegally under a claim of tended to appeal, one of the executors, before the right.-Cunningham v. Conway, (Neb.) 452. time for appeal expired, voluntarily paid the amount, after which the widow appealed. Held, that while the appeal was pending the amount Experts. should not be allowed the executor, as he should See Evidence, 11-15. Express Trusts. See Trusts, 1-5. FACTORS AND BROKERS. See, also, Principal and Agent. Fire Insurance. See Insurance. Fires. Set by locomotives, see Railroad Companies, 26-39. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DE- 1. In an action on an oral agreement by defend- Real-estate agents. 2. In an action by a real-estate agent against the vendor for his commission on a sale, a denial, in the answer, of the agreement authorizing him to sell, will not admit proof that while making the sale he was also acting as agent for the buyer in making the purchase.-MacFee v. Horan, (Minn.) 239. 3. In an action to recover commissions by realestate agents, the complaint designated the land to be sold as the "Ludwig Welker farm of 109% acres, described as follows," followed by a description by government subdivisions, the same as in the written authorization to sell given by defendant, and set out in the record, except that the last term was S. W. 4 of N. W. 4, instead of the S. W. 14 of S. W. 4. The plaintiff testified that the 109% acres sold by him was "the same land, " meaning the same land as that described in the written authorization, and the case was tried on the theory that the farm designated in both instruments was the same. Held, that the designation of the "Ludwig Welker farm of 109% acres" in specified sections was a proper mode of description, and the addition of the further description in the complaint was false, and should have been disregarded.-McAllister v. Welker, (Minn.) 107. 4. In a suit to recover commissions for the sale of real estate by a broker, when it appeared from plaintiff's testimony that defendant had given authority to one W. to sell a lot, and that after his authority had expired plaintiff notified W. that he had a purchaser, and defendant negotiated a sale with plaintiff's purchaser, who paid a sum of money down and signed a contract, which facts were denied by defendant, it was error to direct the jury to find for defendant.-Crevier v. Stephen, (Minn.) 1039. False Pretenses. See Deccit; Fraud; Fraudulent Conveyances. Fees. Of county officers, see Counties, 2, 3. register of deeds, see Register of Deeds. Fellow-Servants. Negligence, see Master and Servant, 24, 25. Fences. Against trespassing animals, see Animals, 4. Fine. For contempt, see Contempt. 1. H. contracted with R. to rent his farm, and received $150 for the year 1885, also a note for $200, which the testimony tended to show was for the rent for the year 1886; and a second note for $200, which the testimony tended to show was for the rent for the year 1887. In 1886 H. sold to L., who had full notice of the rights of the lessee. In forcible entry and detainer by L. against the lessee, it appeared that by mistake the lease was made to terminate March 1, 1887, instead of March 1, 1858, as intended by the parties; and that H. had delivered the note due in 1887 for rent to L., who retained the same. Held, that while a justice of the peace or county judge could not grant affirmative relief reforming the contract, yet he could receive proof of the mistake for the purpose of showing that the defendant was not wrongfully and unlawfully in possession of the premises.-Lloyd v. Reynolds, (Neb.) 1072. Title involved. 2. In an action of forcible entry and detention, the mere tiling by the defendant of an answer claiming title to the premises will not deprive the court of jurisdiction; but when it appears from the evidence that the question involved is one of title, and not for possession of the premises alone, the case will be dismissed. See Pettit v. Black, 18 Neb. 142, 12 N. W. Rep. 841.-Lipp v. Hunt, (Neb.) 143. Defense-Right of possession. 3. In an action of forcible entry and detainer, a contention by defendant that he is entitled to the possession of the land in controversy, because of a contract by plaintiff to sell it, defendant conceding the title to be in plaintiff, is not prohibited by title shall not be investigated in the action of forCode Iowa, § 3620, providing that the question of cible entry and detainer.-Hall v. Jackson, (Iowa,) Appeal-Judgment. 620. 4. On proceedings in justice court, under Gen. St. Minn. 1878, c. 84, relating to the unlawful detainer of lands, plaintiff recovered judgment and the possession of the premises. The defendant having appealed to the district court, the action was dismissed, on motion of the plaintiff. Held, that in the judgment of dismissal it was proper to award restitution of possession to the defendant.-Fisk v. Towner, (Minn.) 972. See, also, Chattel Mortgages; Creditors' Bill; Fraud. In general. 1. The designation by a buyer who has not yet accepted the goods of a common carrier to which the seller is to deliver the goods for transportation, 1. An instruction that a fraud on a creditor "is the delivery of the goods to the carrier, and transportation by it to the buyer, are insufficient to conan act with the intent to prevent him from recovstitute acceptance within the statute of frauds.-ering his just debt by withdrawing from his reach Fontaine v. Bush, (Minn.) 465. Promise to answer for debt of another. 2. A contract for reinsurance is a direct and absolute liability of the reinsuring company, and not within the statute of frauds.-Bartlett v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., (Iowa,) 601. 3. Where a merchant refuses to sell goods on credit, and after such refusal the father of the purchaser directs the merchant to furnish the goods as requested, and that he would pay for them, and where the goods are furnished upon the faith of that promise, such promise is an original undertaking, and not within the statute of frauds as a promise to pay the debt of another.--Waters v. Shafer, (Neb.) 181.* * * * * 4. H. held a judgment against L., who owned a stock of drugs and notions, and owed certain debts, besides the judgment of H., for one of which debts K. was surety. L. was fatally sick. K. visited him, and examined into his business; proposed that he would pay $1,500 of the debts of L. (specifying them, and including the debt for which he was surety) in consideration of a bill of sale of the stock of drugs, fixtures, etc. Upon reaching his home, K. wrote a letter to H., as follows: "I have just returned from a trip to see Dr. L. * * * If L. and myself have time we can pay every debt with the goods. I don't want you to make any costs or trouble; *** but I think in a short time after his death we can arrange a settlement with you. So don't listen to any lawyers or any one, and if we can arrange you will get your just dues. So keep quiet, and if anything you want to know write me. This letter was received by H. while on his way to issue execution against L., and levy on his goods, but, relying on said letter, he desisted. L. executed a bill of sale of said goods, notes, etc., to K., and delivered the same, together with the keys and possession of the store. K. sold the goods, and collected the notes and accounts. In an action by H. against K. for the amount of his judgment, held, that the letter, in connection with the action of H. in giving the time required by K., and not making costs, or otherwise interfering with K. in the control and disposition of said goods, contained all the elements of an agreement in writing to pay said judgment on a sufficient consideration, and was good under the statute of frauds.-Kenny v. Hews, (Neb.) 1006. Agreement relating to land. 5. The seasonable acceptance of an option to purchase, contained in a written lease signed by the lessee, need not be in writing, under Comp. St. Neb. c. 32, § 5, providing that a contract for the sale of lands must be in writing and signed by the vendee.-Smith v. Gibson, (Neb.) 360. 6. An oral contract for the purchase of real estate, followed by the payment of a portion of the price and the taking and retention of possession, constitutes a valid contract, not within the statute of frauds.-Lipp v. Hunt, (Neb.) 143.* the property of his debtor "is not erroneous, where it is apparent that unlawful acts, with intent to hinder, delay, or defeat creditors, were meant.Harrison v. Snair, (Iowa,) 315. 2. A debtor, apprehending that his creditors would press their claims, and designing to pay a debt to a bank, conveyed his stock of goods and considerable other property to the latter, in payment of the debt, and for a sum paid by the bank to him. The transaction was had, and the conveyance recorded, hastily, and in the night. There being no evidence of bad faith on the part of the bank, or of a desire to aid the debtor in hindering, etc., creditors, held, that the conveyance was valid, and the property not subject to subsequent garnishment by other creditors.-Stewart v. Mills County Nat. Bank, (Iowa,) 318.* 3. A purchaser of personalty perfected the purchase a few hours before the wife of the seller, in an action for divorce, obtained a writ of attachment and levied on the property. Held that, although a claim for alimony is not a debt within the ordinary meaning of that term, and must be ascertained according to equitable principles, it is a right which becomes vested with the right to divorce, and it can no more be defeated by a fraudulent conveyance than it could if it were fixed and certain in amount.-Picket v. Garrison, (Iowa,) 38. 4. It appeared that but five dollars were paid by the plaintiff on account of the purchase, about a week before the levy of the attachment; that the seller went to a neighboring town to settle with his wife, and failed, and returned to the place where the property was about 9 o'clock in the evening; that he and plaintiff talked together that evening; that plaintiff that night saw a banker, and arranged with him to be at his bank at 6 o'clock next morning; that at the time appointed a bill of sale was drawn, and plaintiff paid the seller the purchase price, excepting five dollars, with money borrowed of the banker, and possession of the property was immediately taken. The evidence also tended to show that plaintiff knew of the presence of the seller's wife at the neighboring town; that the judge allowed the writ of attachment before he arose; that the writ was issued as soon as the clerk's office was open, and that there was a struggle on the part of the wife to have the writ issued and levied before the husband disposed of his property. It was also shown that plaintiff knew of seller's visit to his wife, and that he feared interference with the property, and owned by the seller. Heid, that a verdict for dethat it comprised substantially all the property fendant was sustained by the evidence.-Id. 5. In replevin by a wife against a sheriff for levying on her property as that of her husband, the evidence showed that prior to the year 1879 she had received $250 from her father, which she loaned in satisfaction of the debt, and that the stock levied to her son, and had received live-stock from him on was a part of the offspring of such stock. The transfer took place in 1879, and the judgment against the husband was recovered in that year, but there was no proof that the property trans7. An agreement for the conveyance of a desig-ferred to the wife was not exempt. Held that, to nated number of acres "in" a specified larger tract entitle the defendant to a reversal of the judg of land, the subject of the agreement not being ment, fraud in the transfer must be established, Sufficiency of memorandum. |