and that it will not be presumed, particularly after the lapse of many years. Welton v. Baltezore, (Neb.) 146. Change of possession. -- 6. A sale of chattels, unaccompanied by immediate delivery, and not followed by actual and continued change of possession, is presumed to be fraudulent, as against subsequent purchasers in good faith, unless it appear on the part of the person claiming under such sale that it was made in good faith, and without intent to defraud; and under Comp. St. Neb. 1887, c. 32, § 11, relating to sales and change of possession, the delivery of property sold is not necessary to protect the purchaser as against subsequent purchasers, provided the purchase is shown to have been made in good faith.Fitzgerald v. Meyer, (Neb.) 123.* 7. Under the above statute the retention of possession by the seller is only prima facie evidence of fraud, which may be rebutted by proof. Robison v. Uhl, 6 Neb. 328.-Id. 8. In all cases arising under Comp. St. Neb. 1887, c. 32, § 11, relating to sales and the change of possession, the question of fraud in a sale is one of fact, and not of law.-Id. 9. The mere fact that the grantor remained in possession for a time does not show that the prop: erty is held in trust for him.-Burtis v. Humboldt County Bank, (Iowa,) 585. 10. In January, J. gave to plaintiff, a firm consisting of his father and brothers, a chattel mortgage on certain horses in consideration, as he testified, of a pre-existing debt. In May, the mortgage was discharged, and J. made an absolute bill of sale to plaintiff. Plaintiff took the horses, and kept them about a week, and then returned them to J.'s possession, as he testified, under a lease of part of them to J., and part to his wife. Held, that there was no continuous change of possession, and the jury were warranted in finding the sale fraudulent as to a prior creditor of J.-White v. Woodruff, (Neb.) 785. Consideration. 11. A conveyance by a husband to his wife in repayment of a loan by her from property held in her own right is not fraudulent as to creditors who commenced attachment proceedings about the time of the execution of the conveyance, the value of the property being about the same as the amount of the loan. -Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Webster, (Iowa.) 47.* 12. Though the husband acquires the legal title to the wife's money loaned by her to him, but not acquired by her in any manner from him, she has an equitable claim therefor, which, together with a release of her contingent interest and homestead right in land of the husband, by joining in a mortgage with him, is a sufficient consideration for the husband's note to her as against debts subsequently contracted by him.-Payne v. Wilson, (Iowa,) 13. It does not appear that the wife has received more than is due to her from the fact that the husband made conveyances to her subject to incumbrances, the amount allowed by her for them not being shown to be inadequate.-Id. 45.* 14. One J. died intestate, leaving a widow and children. The widow was appointed guardian of the children, and gave bond; her brother, S., signing as surety, and retaining a part of the estate in his hands. The widow afterwards intermarried with one M. S. delivered that part of the estate to M., and took from him a chattel mortgage as indemnity against his liability on said bond, which mortgage was recorded. Held, that the mortgage was not in fraud of S.'s subsequent creditors.Grimes v. Sherman, (Neb.) 814. 15. T., having sustained large losses in business, within three days of a decree of foreclosure on his land, conveyed it to his wife subject to the mort gage. She having died, he quitclaimed his onethird interest to his eldest son, E., and his other children did the same. He testified that the conveyance to his wife was in consideration of certain money received by her from her parent's estate, and paid to him, but this testimony was vague, confused, and contradictory. After that convey ance, T. repeatedly claimed the land as his own, and brought actions in his own name for trespasses thereon, and did other acts of ownership. Later, E., who then owned the legal title, told a third person that his father owned the land, and that it was in his name to avoid creditors. Plaintiff's demand was for the price of chattels sold to T., which E. then claimed all the personalty in the hands of on execution were claimed by, and awarded to, E. the family, he being a young man, and unlikely to have accumulated so much. Held, that the land was subject to plaintiff's demand, though this v. Maddux, (Iowa,) 763. arose after T.'s conveyance to his wife.-Romans defendant, but could find no property on which to 16. Complainant had obtained a judgment against levy. Later, understanding that defendant was to be called as a witness in another case, wherein he would testify as to his solvency, complainant attended to find out whether he would testify to the ownership of property subject to levy. Defendestate, but could not recollect the description, and, ant in his testimony did admit ownership of real while he was yet testifying, complainant hurried out to look up the description, and get a levy his testimony, and put a deed on record conveying made, but, before he could do so, defendant finished the land to his son for an alleged consideration. Held that, to justify setting the deed aside, it must appear not only that it was made with the intent to hinder, delay, or to defraud creditors, but due, and the testimony showing clearly that dethat it was not actually made to pay a debt justly fendant was indebted to his son, and that the property went to pay the debt, the deed would not be set aside.-Nichols v. Bancroft, (Mich.) 891. Confidential relations. 17. A conveyance of land by a mother to her son at less than its value, after the execution by her of notes for a considerable amount, is fraudulent, and will be set aside where the son, who lived with his mother, and knew of her indebtedness, and that the conveyance left her no property from which it could be collected, is indefinite and uncertain in his testimony as to the time and amounts of the payments, and the source from which he obtained the money.-Peterson v. Rone, (Iowa,) 68.* 18. A husband executed a quitclaim deed of land to his wife, reserving the use of it during his life. peared to have been intended to operate as a will; It was executed during grantor's illness, and apand was kept from the record, by a mutual understanding, for nearly 10 years, until the grantor became insolvent. Held, that it would be set aside in favor of a creditor whose dealings with the grantor had extended over a period of more than 10 years.-Fetters v. Duvernois, (Mich.) 514. 19. Pending an action against him, H. purchased a tract of land, taking a contract for a deed, which he assigned to his wife before rendition of judgment. They occupied the land as a homestead for some time after the judgment, and then assigned the contract to defendant Y. The assignment to the wife recited a valuable consideration, and there was no evidence to contradict it, nor was it shown that the husband was then insolvent, al though executions against him not long afterwards were returned nulla bona. Held, that the land could not be subjected to the judgment against H. -Belden v. Younger, (Iowa,) 317. 20. The husband's creditors have no right to question his conveyance to the wife of their homestead, which is not alleged to be subject to the indebtedness.--Payne v. Wilson, (Iowa,) 45.* Knowledge of grantee. 21. A conveyance in fraud of creditors will not be set aside where the evidence fails to show that a subsequent grantee for a consideration not so inadequate as to show fraud had knowledge of the fraudulent intent. -Burtis v. Humboldt County Bank, (Iowa,) 585.* Evidence. 22. A purchaser of personalty perfected the purchase a few hours before the wife of the seller in an action for divorce obtained a writ of attachment and levied on the property. In an action by the purchaser against the sheriff who made the levy, defendant was allowed to show that the seller, immediately after meeting his wife and her attorney, with a view to settlement of the divorce proceedings, which negotiations failed, visited his attorney, and consulted in regard to the property in controversy, but the purchaser was not present. Held, that the evidence was proper to show the fraudulent nature of the transfer and the wrongful intent of the husband, and was rightly admitted, even though the facts were not within the knowledge of the purchaser.-Picket v. Garrison, (Iowa,) 38. 23. Plaintiff, a resident of Ohio, exchanged a farm in that state for a stock of goods owned by one C. in Michigan. After the deed was delivered, and the key of the store passed over to plaintiff's agent, but before the goods had been removed to Ohio, certain creditors of C., alleging the sale of the goods, or the transfer of them to plaintiff, to be fraudulent as against them, procured writs of attachment, and defendant, as sheriff, levied on the goods thus transferred. Held, that declarations made by C. to plaintiff, after the contract between them was made, corroborative of their claim of good faith in the transaction, were inadmissible. SHERWOOD, C. J., and CAMPBELL, J., dissenting.-Buckingham v. Tyler, (Mich.) 868. 24. The court erred in refusing to allow defendant to show, by the cross-examination of C.'s bookkeeper, the indebtedness of C. at the time he made the transfer. SHERWOOD, C. J., and CAMPBELL, J., dissenting.-Id. 25. Evidence offered by defendant of a conversation between the debtor and witnesses for defendant, which took place after the transfer of the goods, and not in the presence or hearing of plaintiff, the grantee, was inadmissible.-Id. 26. The burden being on the grantee to show the bona fides of the transfer, which he had failed to do, evidence of statements of the grantor that he intended to dispose of the property so as to prevent its seizure for the debt, is competent.-White v. Woodruff, (Neb.) 785. Setting aside. circumstances which attended the making of it, in order to ascertain its true character.-Id. 3. Where doubt is cast on the validity of the contract, it is the duty of the party claiming under it to make it affirmatively appear that the contract was made with the intention to deliver the grain. Id. 4. The commission merchant testified that he never had a warehouse receipt for grain which he claimed to have purchased on orders of Nebraska parties; that he did not know in what elevator the alleged grain was which he claimed to have purchased; and that he settled the alleged losses by "ringing up" in the board of trade. Held, that his testimony failed to show a bona fide purchase of grain for actual delivery. REESE, C. J., dissenting.-Id. Action for money lost. 5. In an action under Crim. Code Neb. § 214, providing that, if any person lose money or property of value at a game or on a wager, he may recover it from either or all of the other persons playing at the game, or from the person with whom the wager was had, it need not be shown that the money lost by plaintiff on a wager with defendant was actually turned over to the latter.-Perry v. Gross, (Neb.) 799. GARNISHMENT. Service of writ-On corporation. the summons in garnishment of a corporation to 1. Under Pub. Acts Mich. 1887, No. 242, requiring be served on the "presiding officer, cashier, secretary, or treasurer, or any other officer or agent of such corporation," service of the summons on a book-keeper is not valid. - Pettit v. Muskegon Booming Co., (Mich.) 900. On foreign corporation. the commencement of suits against foreign cor2. Section 8145, How. St. Mich., providing for porations by the service of process, does not apply to a garnishment suit, as such suit is not commenced by service of a writ of garnishment.Milwaukee Bridge & Iron Works v. Brevoort, (Mich.) 215. 27. It was no error to refuse to set aside a fraudulent deed of lands mortgaged with the homestead, where the amount due on the mortgage largely exceeded the value of such non-exempt lands, on the 3. How. St. Mich. § 8086, permits foreign as well ground that the equity of redemption of the mort- vides no method for the service of the writ on foras domestic corporations to be garnished, but progagor therein had no substantial value for credit-eign corporations. Section 8087 provides a method ors.-Horton v. Kelly, (Minn.) 1031. 28. Where a conveyance by a mortgagor of that portion of the mortgaged premises not included in his homestead is found to be fraudulent and void, and is set aside at the suit of creditors, it cannot be continued in force as to any of the parties to the deed, and the homestead and dower interests of the grantors will be protected as if no such conveyance had been made.-Id. GAMING. Gambling contracts-Future delivery. 1. In an action on a note the defense was that it was given for losses sustained by the sale of options on corn in Chicago. The evidence showed that the purchasers bought wheat in Chicago, putting up $250 as margins. The wheat deal resulted in a profit. A second wheat deal also resulted in a profit. An order was thereupon given for 5,000 bushels of corn, and the aforesaid $250 was continued as a margin. A decline in the price of corn absorbed the margin, and a further decline left the purchasers indebted to the commission men, for which the note in suit was given. Held, that as there was no intention of the parties to purchase and receive the grain, and no intention of the sellers to deliver the same, no recovery could be had on the contract.-Sprague v. Warren, (Neb.) 1113.* 2. In considering such contract, though the forms of law may have been complied with, yet where the defense is that the contract is a wagering one, and not intended for the actual sale and delivery of property, it is the duty of the court to go behind the contract, and examine the facts and of service on foreign corporations when these are the principal defendants. Held, that such method would not avail when the foreign corporation was garnishee.-Id. Inter vivos. GIFTS. 1. A father, who held a mortgage on his son's land for $3,500, afterwards bought the land from the son for the sum of $8,500, giving the son $3,200 in cash. Before the purchase he indorsed on one of the mortgage notes, as paid, $694; intending to make the son a gift of that sum. Of this indorsement, or of the father's intention, the son knew nothing. The father changed his mind before he made the purchase, and in deducting the amount of the notes from the purchase price he ignored, and subsequently erased, the indorsement. Held not an executed gift.-Gray v. Nelson, (Iowa,) 566. 2. Plaintiff's father left a will, which was never probated. A few days before his death he handed to plaintiff's brother, who was named as executor in the will, a note executed by defendant, telling him that it was to belong to plaintiff. Plaintiff received the note, and subsequently handed it to her husband, the defendant, upon his demand, with instructions to keep the money until she called for it. Plaintiff and defendant were afterwards divorced. In assumpsit for the amount of the note, held, that plaintiff's right to recover was not af fected by the fact that the note had never been indorsed over to her by her father or his legal representative.-Letts v. Letts, (Mich.) 99. 3. Nor by the fact that the will was not probated, plaintiff's father before he died having conveyed all his property to plaintiff and her brother, the only_children.-Id. 4. It was competent to show that defendant wrote the indorsements of payment upon the note, and to give the note in evidence to show its amount and the indorsements.-Id. each. Afterwards the firm of R., W. & W. was dissolved by the withdrawal of R., and W. & W. entered into a new contract, and gave a new bond to L., which provided that W. & W. would guaranty all notes sold to L., and without notice pay such as were not paid 30 days after maturity thereof. Under this arrangement W. & W. procured a large number of notes to be renewed, and transmitted the same to L., and thereby obtained credit for themselves upon their account. Held sufficient consideration for the bond and contract. 5. Pending divorce proceedings, it was agreed between the parties that, in case of an absolute decree of divorce being granted, the husband should pay to the wife a certain sum as permanent alimony, "such sum to be in full, and in lieu thereof the complainant is to release all rights of dower-Klosterman v. Olcott, (Neb.) 250. and homestead." Held, that plaintiff had the right to explain this receipt, and to prove that she Acceptance. did not understand that she was receipting for anything but her alimony.-Id. 6. The step-father of a child was appointed her guardian, but received no assets until after the mother's death, when, upon his appointment as her administrator, he received in both capacities a gross sum from his ward's father's estate, of which the mother and ward were the only distributees. The ward's maternal grandfather had been the father's administrator, and had acted as guardian, though without apparent authority. During the widowhood of the mother, the grandfather had given her a monthly allowance, but nothing indicated an intention to deduct the amount from her distributable share. Though a good business man, he opened no books with either distributee, nor did he charge the amounts of the monthly allow ances to the mother, and his accounts were not settled at his death. An entry in his books recited that he had given the mother certain stocks in full of her distributable share, but there was no evidence that she accepted them as such, and their value, added to the monthly allowances received by her, would be much less than her share. After the mother's marriage, the grandfather, so long as he lived, paid the guardian an annual sum for the ward's support. Held, that the allowances to the mother were gifts, and not payments on her distributable share. In re Ward's Estate, (Mich.) 431. GOOD-WILL. Contract to sell. 2. The contract being a direct promise to guaranty the notes, no notice of acceptance was required.-Id. 3. Where defendant in a contract to act as agent for the sale of plaintiff's goods agrees to guaranty all notes good when taken by him, it is error, in an action upon a note so taken, to charge that if the note was signed by its maker in a fictitious name, and defendant exercised reasonable prudence, he is not liable, as such charge is of no avail so far as it applies to the fictitious signature, and it asserts that defendant is not liable though the actual maker is insolvent. Springfield Engine & Thresher Co. v. Van Brunt, (Iowa,) 578. Discharge. 4. The mere neglect of the holder of a note to sue the maker does not discharge the guarantor, although the maker becomes insolvent. — Huff v. Slife, (Neb.) 289. Construction. 5. One who, before maturity, unconditionally guaranties the payment of a promissory note, becomes absolutely liable upon default of the maker. -Id. 6. M., a purchaser of goods, procured and sent to the seller the following guaranty: "Please ship goods ordered by M. We will guaranty payment of the first order upon receipt of goods. OXFORD BANK, per M." Relying upon this guaranty, the seller furnished goods to M. of the alleged value of $142, on which M. paid $60. In an action against the guarantor to recover the balance, held, that the guarantor was liable.-Van Buskirk v. Inder mill, (Neb.) 156. Action on guaranty-Evidence. Instructions. A. was engaged in selling hardware at O.; his son and daughter, acting, respectively, as salesman and book-keeper. He sold his stock and goodwill to complainants; agreeing not to engage 7. In an action on a guaranty, where defendants again in that business at O. for 10 years, and the pleaded want of consideration, and an agreement son agreeing not to so engage as principal for the between the plaintiff and his wife, who had sepasame period. Soon after the sale, a new hard-rated, and that the guaranty was given in considware store was opened at O., of which the son was eration that the husband would keep the agreemanager, A. assisting therein, and the daughter ment, and not molest his wife, which contract he acting as book-keeper; the business being in the had broken, there being doubt as to the true conname of the wife of A. The funds derived from sideration of the contract, the court erred in not the sale of the former stock were used to open the admitting evidence to sustain the allegations of new store; the wife alleging that her husband the answer.-Southard v. Bryant, (Neb.) 1009. owed her the money. It appeared that she had loaned him money derived from the sale of a lot for which her money had originally paid, but which he had improved with his own means until it was worth many times what it originally cost. He had owed her this money for 11 years, as she stated, without any demand for it until just before the new store was opened. She then asked for the money, and got it without objection, and had her son buy a stock of goods, and paid him a salary to act as manager for her. Held, that it was apparently a device to evade the agreement with complainants, in which the wife was a participant, and that all three should be enjoined from carrying on the business at O. for the term agreed upon.-Thompson v. Andrus, (Mich.) 683. GUARANTY. Contract of suretyship, see Principal and Surety. 1. The firm of R., W. & W. contracted with L., and gave a bond to sell him promissory notes on certain terms, and to guaranty their payment without notice in 30 days after the maturity of * 8. In an action for goods sold to defendant's sons, the court charged that "If the jury find from the evidence that W. told the plaintiff to let his sons have the goods * and he would see plaintiff paid therefor; and further that plaintiff did, upon the faith of such promise, let the sons have such goods,-then the promise of W. was an original promise, and he would be bound thereby. There was sufficient evidence to sustain a finding that defendant agreed unconditionally to pay for the goods, but the issue made by defendant was that he made no promise either to see the debt paid or to pay it. Held, that as the issue presented was not as to the kind or character of the promise, and if a promise was made it was a direct one to pay for the goods, the instruction could not have prejudiced defendant.-Waters v. Shafer, (Neb.) 181. GUARDIAN AND WARD. Guardianship of insane, see Insanity, 1-3. Liability of guardian. 1. Testator bequeathed the residuum of his estate to his daughter, to be paid when she should attain the age of 18, or marry, if anything should remain after providing for her support. The daughter lived with and was supported by her grandmother and uncle. The executor paid the uncle different sums for her support, before she was 18 years old, and while she was unmarried, and the uncle was afterwards appointed her guardian. Held, that the payments to the uncle were not made to him as guardian, and he was not liable therefor on his bond.-Perkins v. Tooley, (Mich.) 903. 2. In an action on the bond a receipt was produced signed "P. T. [the grandmother] by N. T.," (the guardian,) for a payment made many years before the guardian's appointment. The body of the receipt was in the handwriting of the executor, to whom it was given, the signature of P. T. was in that of another man, while N. T.'s signature was written by himself. The executor had no recollection of the payment of that particular sum, but had sent the grandmother money by drafts in her own name, and thought that the receipt in question was for one of such payments, which he had always remitted by mail. Held, no evidence that N. T. received the money.-Id. 3. Under ordinary circumstances a guardian is not chargeable with compound interest on the funds of his ward in his hands.-In re Ward's Estate, (Mich.) 431. Compensation of guardian. 4. There being nothing indicating an intention of a guardian, who was his ward's step-father, to maintain the ward at his own expense, her estate being ample, his treatment of her having been indulgent, and her maintenance expensive, and her grandfather, who had acted as her guardian, but without apparent authority, having for several years paid him a substantial sum for her support, the inference, if any, arising from the relationship of step-father and child, that she was being maintained gratuitously, is rebutted, and the guardian is entitled to reasonable recompense therefor.-Id. Sale of ward's realty. 5. In Minnesota, the probate court of a county in which real estate of a ward residing out of the state, under guardianship by virtue of an appointment of a guardian in another state, is the "probate court having jurisdiction," on an application by the guardian for license to sell such real estate of the ward.-Menage v. Jones, (Minn.) 972. 6. Where there is real estate of the ward in the county, and the record of the probate court shows a petition by the guardian from another state ask ing for license to sell the real estate, and notice and opportunity to be heard, the jurisdiction of the court is complete.-Id. 7. On such hearing it is for the probate court to determine whether the guardian was duly appointed in such other state, and whether he has complied with the law by filing an authenticated copy of his appointment, as required by Gen. St. Minn. 1878, c. 57, § 32, and its decision, except on appeal, is final.-Id. 8. Though a guardian's deed do not refer to the proceedings in the probate court, if it appear by the record of that court and the deed that the sale and deed were made pursuant to the license, it is sufficient. Such a deed in the name of the guardian, in his official capacity as grantor, is good.-Id. Habeas Corpus. Appeal by state to review proceedings, see Criminal Law, 25. Child committed to reform school, see Reformatorics, 1-3. Harmless Error. See Appeal, 82–90. HEALTH. Health officer-Powers. 1. The board of health of defendant township met to take action looking towards the suppression of scarlet fever, and to prevent its further spread, and among the resolutions voted was one authorizing its health officer to compel persons having the fever or living in the house where it was to remain at home until the danger of infection had passed, and "to provide for the wants of such persons as long as it is necessary for the public safety." Held, that the health officer had authority to employ a physician to attend the sick.-Wilkinson v. Township of Long Rapids, (Mich.) 861. 2. In such a case the physician's contract was with the township, and his action was properly brought against it.-Id. HIGHWAYS. See, also, Bridges. 16. Railroad crossings, see Railroad Companies, 14Streets, see Municipal Corporations. Dedication. incorporated town is by virtue of a recorded plat, 1. Where the only claim to a street made by an by which the ground was dedicated to pulle use as a street, but there is no evidence that the person who caused the plat to be recorded had any title to the land, nor any evidence of such user by the public as to establish the street by prescription, the establishment of a public highway is not shown.-Town of Edenville v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., (Iowa,) 568.* Establishment. 2. Jurisdiction of the county commissioners to locate a public road having been shown, all subsequent proceedings will be liberally construed and a substantial compliance with the statute will be held sufficient.-Howard v. Board of County Commissioners, (Neb.) 185; Shull v. Brown, (Neb.) 186. 3. Where a petition for the establishment of a public road is presented to the county clerk under the provisions of Comp. St. Neb. 1887, c. 78, by a greater number of signers than is required by law, which petition is accompanied by an affidavit of one of such signers that all the signers are electors of the county in which the establishment of the road is desired, and that they reside within five miles of the proposed road, and the petition is accompanied with a deposit of money for the purpose of defraying the expenses in case the road should not be established, the county clerk will have jurisdiction to appoint a commissioner, as provided for by section 6 of said chapter, to view the proposed road.-Id.; Id. 4. Under How. St. Mich. § 1300, providing that the commissioner of highways "shall, at the time appointed, proceed to view the premises described in the application and notice, and to ascertain and determine the necessity for laying out, altering, or discontinuing a highway pursuant to such application," etc., it is a jurisdictional prerequisite that the commissioner's return shall state positively that he has ascertained and determined the necessity for taking the land for purposes of a public highway.-Truax v. Sterling, (Mich.) 885. 5. By appealing from the award of damages the land-owner waives all question as to the regularity of the assessment by the supervisors; and where, on such appeal, he obtains an increase of damages,- -a decision which he can enforce against the town,-he is as fully estopped to allege that the damages were not legally awarded as he would be if he had accepted payment of the supervisors' award.-State v. Harland, (Wis.) 1060. Notice. 6. An order of the town supervisors laying out a highway, reciting that the proper notices were given, and that they were satisfied that such notices had been served and posted as required by law, is, under Rev. St. Wis. § 1298, prima facie evidence that the proper notices were posted and served.-Id. 7. The presumption created by Rev. St. Wis. § 1298, making the order of the supervisors laying out a highway prima facie evidence that the proper notice of the proceedings was served, is one of fact merely, and may be rebutted by showing that no notices were in fact served or given.State v. Logue, (Wis.) 1061. 8. The fact that defendant signed the petition for a highway does not dispense with the necessity of notice to the public and other owners, and he may avail himself of want of such notice to impeach the proceedings.-Id. 9. How. St. Mich. § 1298, requires notice of proceedings to lay out a highway to be served on railroad companies by leaving a copy "with the agent in charge of any ticket or freight-office of the company," etc. Section 1299 provides that, on service of the notice required by the last section, the person by whom the service was made shall make an affidavit stating the time and manner of service, "and, if upon a railroad company, the fact of such service, and upon whom." Held, that an affidavit showing merely that service was made on a railroad company "by leaving a copy of the notice with their freight agent at Dorr station,' without giving his name, or showing that he was in charge of the freight-office, is insufficient. Truax v. Sterling, (Mich.) 885. Vacation. 10. Comp. St. Neb. c. 78, § 46, declares section lines to be public roads established by act of law, subject to be opened by the county board when the public good requires it. The order of the board declaring a section line to be a public highway, or establishing a line of road thereon, and ordering it to be opened by survey by the county surveyor, is an establishment of a highway on such line, which can only be vacated by pursuing the course designated in section 4 of said chapter. Held, that an order of the board afterwards made, declaring such highway "no road," for the reason that the public good does not justify the expense, without any proceedings by petition or otherwise, by which they could obtain jurisdiction, was void.-McNair v. State, (Neb.) 1099. 11. One who is not specially injured by the vacation of a highway has no right to appeal from the proceedings of the supervisors vacating it. Following Schuster v. Lemond, 6 N. W. Rep. 802; State v. Barton, 30 N. W. Rep. 454.-State v. Hol man, (Minn.) 1073. Obstruction. 12. Under Rev. St. Wis. § 1326, relating to obstructions in a highway, and section 1330 et seq., relating to encroachments, there is a clear distinction between the two; and when defendant is notified by the supervisors to remove his fence as being an encroachment on the highway, and denies the encroachment, the supervisors should proceed according to the statute to determine whether an encroachment had been made; and an action to recover the penalty for obstructing the highway, under section 1326, does not lie.-State v. Pomeroy, (Wis.) 726. 13. A fence standing in the highway does not constitute an obstruction within the meaning of the statute.-Id. Sidewalks-Abutting owners. 14. A land-owner is under no legal obligation to build or keep up a walk along the highway adjoining his land, and is not liable for personal injuries sustained by a party on account of the narrowness of such walk or its defective condition.-Fletcher v. Scotten, (Mich.) 901. HOLIDAYS. Deposition taken on holiday. Rev. St. Wis. § 2576, as amended by chapter 142, Laws 1885, providing that no court shall be opened or transact any business on "any legal holiday, unless it be for the purpose of instructing or discharging a jury, or of receiving a verdict, and rendering a judgment thereon," does not render inadmissible in evidence a deposition taken in another state on a day made a legal holiday by the laws of Wisconsin-Green v. Walker, (Wis.) 534. HOMESTEAD. Conveyance, fraud on creditors, see Fraudulent Purchased with pension money, prior debts, see 1. Pending an action against him, H. purchased a tract of land, taking a contract for a deed, which he assigned to his wife before rendition of judgment. They occupied the land as a homestead for some time after the judgment, and then assigned the contract to defendant Y. While the land was so occupied as a homestead, judgment was ob tained against the wife in garnishment proceedings on the judgment against H. Held, that the land, being a homestead, was not subject to the judgment against the wife. Belden v. Younger, (Iowa,) 317. Conveyance. 2. The title to a homestead, exempt under the laws of Nebraska to a family consisting of a husband and wife, with or without other members, cannot be divested or incumbered by deed, unless such deed be executed and acknowledged by both husband and wife.-Betts v. Sims, (Neb.) 117.* 3. A mortgage on a tract of land including a homestead, executed by a married man without the concurrence and signature of the wife, is invalid for the purpose of in any manner affecting such homestead or its appurtenances.-McCreery v. Schaffer, (Neb.) 996. 4. Pending an action against him, H. purchased a tract of land, taking a contract for a deed, which he assigned to his wife before rendition of judgment. They occupied the land as a homestead for some time after the judgment, and then assigned the contract to defendant Y. H. and wife took the money arising from the assignment, and purchased another tract; the contract therefor being made with the wife alone. This tract they also accupied as a homestead until the wife, H. not joining, assigned the contract to defendant S., whereupon they left the country. Held that, the land being a homestead, the wife's individual assignment was invalid as a conveyance of her interest therein, and not cured by the abandonment, and that her interest remained subject to the judgment against her.—Belden v. Younger, (Iowa,) 317. Rights of surviving spouse. 5. Where a homestead right has been lost by removal and failure to file the notice that the premises are claimed as a homestead, as required by Gen. St. Minn. 1878, c. 68, § 9, the premises do not pass to the surviving husband or wife, under chapter 46, § 2.-In re Baillif's Estate, (Minn.) 1059. Enforcement of right. 6. Under Pol. Code Dak. c. 38, § 14, providing that, "when a disagreement takes place between the owner and any person adversely interested, as to whether any land or buildings are properly a part of the homestead, it shall be competent for the district court, in any proper case, to determine the district court has no authority, on motion, to such question, and all questions relating thereto," quash a levy on the ground that the property levied on is the debtor's homestead. The question must be determined by a direct action.-Dorsey v. Hall, (Dak.) 471. 7. On a bill to enjoin a sheriff from selling land on execution, alleged to be exempt as plaintiff's homestead, it appeared that plaintiff owned 40 acres adjoining 120 acres owned by his wife, and that the land was used as one farm. The dwellinghouse stood partly on plaintiff's land, and partly on his wife's land, the dividing line passing through the house. No proceedings had been had under Code Iowa, § 1998, providing that the owner or the husband or wife may select the homestead, and cause it to be marked out, platted, and recorded. Held, that as under Code, 1994, the homestead must embrace the house used by the owner as a home, and by section 1995 it need not be limited to one subdivision of land, the homestead must be se |